A recent paper by Jakl, Jung and Pultr succeeded for the first time in establishing a very natural link between bilattice logic and the duality theory of d-frames and bitopological spaces. In this paper we further exploit, extend and investigate this link from an algebraic and a logical point of view. In particular, we introduce classes of algebras that extend bilattices, d-frames and N4-lattices to a setting in which the negation is not necessarily involutive, and we study corresponding logics. We (...) provide product representation theorems for these algebras, as well as completeness, algebraizability results for the corresponding logics. (shrink)

With their “bottom-up” approach, Holk Cruse and Malte Schilling present a highly intriguing perspective on those mental phenomena that have fascinated humankind since ancient times. Among them are those aspects of our inner lives that are at the same time most salient and yet most elusive: we are conscious beings with complex emotions, thinking and acting in pursuit of various goals. Starting with, from a biological point of view, very basic abilities, such as the ability to move and navigate (...) in an unpredictable environment, Cruse & Schilling have developed, step-by-step, a robotic system with the ability to plan future actions and, to a limited extent, to verbally report on its own internal states. The authors then offer a compelling argument that their system exhibits aspects of various higher-level mental phenomena such as emotion, attention, intention, volition, and even consciousness. The scientific investigation of the mind is faced with intricate problems at a very fundamental, methodological level. Not only is there a good deal of conceptual vagueness and uncertainty as to what the explananda precisely are, but it is also unclear what the best strategy might be for addressing the phenomena of interest. Cruse & Schilling’s bio-robotic “bottom-up” approach is designed to provide answers to such questions. In this commentary, I begin, in the first section, by presenting the main ideas behind this approach as I understand them. In the second section, I turn to an examination of its scope and limits. Specifically, I will suggest a set of constraints on good explanations based on the bottom-up approach. What criteria do such explanations have to meet in order to be of real scientific value? I maintain that there are essentially three such criteria: biological plausibility, adequate matching criteria, and transparency. Finally, in the third section, I offer directions for future research, as Cruse & Schilling’s bottom-up approach is well suited to provide new insights in the domain of social cognition and to explain its relation to phenomena such as language, emotion, and self. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step in this work (...) is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

The question of whether perception can be penetrated by cognition is in the limelight again. The reason this question keeps coming up is that there is so much at stake: Is it possible to have theory-neutral observation? Is it possible to study perception without recourse to expectations, context, and beliefs? What are the boundaries between perception, memory, and inference (and do they even exist)? Are findings from neuroscience that paint a picture of perception as an inherently bidirectional and interactive process (...) relevant for understanding the relationship between cognition and perception? We have assembled a group of philosophers and psychologists who have been considering the thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability in light of these questions (Abdel Rahman & Sommer, 2008; Goldstone, Landy, & Brunel, 2011; Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, & Swingley, 2010; Macpherson, 2012; Stokes, 2011). Rather than rehashing previous arguments which appear, in retrospect, to have been somewhat ill-posed (Pylyshyn, 1999), this symposium will present a thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability that is at once philosophically satisfying, empirically testable, and relevant to the questions that cognitive scientists find most interesting. (shrink)