Agrippa was the main expounder of the occult philosophy, which is the knowledge of the hidden causes of things and is finalized to their manipulation by magic. Magic, in turn, is the highest form and the end of philosophy. According to his De occulta philosophia, magic is threefold: natural (concerning sublunar world), celestial (concerning stars and heavenly intelligences), and divine (concerning God and higher angels). It consists of the manipulation of concrete objects and of the summoning of intelligences and God, (...) which is performed on the basis of the precepts of the Kabbalah. Agrippa’s overall aim was to purify magic from its necromantic and irrational components: this would enable the restoration of the prelapsarian condition of man (in accordance with the Hermetic ideal of deification) and a Christian reform of culture. The critique of philosophical knowledge and of every science, presented in Agrippa’s De vanitate, and his critique to the subordination of woman typical of Scholastic theology, contained in the De nobilitate foeminei sexus, are functional to these ends. (shrink)

Il fascino di un libro, tra Reuchlin e Bruno. -/- RINASCIMENTO ESOTERICO Speciale V centenario De arte cabalistica (1517-2017) -/- Nella sua rinomata libreria antiquaria, nel cuore di Firenze, Paolo Pampaloni sta sfogliando un grazioso volumetto in ottavo, rilegato in pelle scura. Si tratta di un esemplare del De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum di Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim.

Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der These von Frances Yates, dass Denker wie Giordano Bruno und Agrippa von Nettesheim angenommen haben, dass die Schriften des Hermes Trismegistos von dem Ägypter Thoth (Hermes) stammten. Es soll in diesem Aufsatz demonstriert werden, dass die Annahme von Yates sehr spekulativ war und zumindest nicht auf Agrippa zutrifft, da aus keiner seiner Schriften hervorgeht, dass er das Corpus Hermeticum für Texte des Ägypters Hermes selbst hielt. Er glaubte zwar an die Legende des Hermes, aber (...) in dieser Abhandlung wird die Hypothese überprüft, dass Agrippa dem Neuplatoniker Jamblichus folgte, dass griechische Philosophen, die ungefähr in der Zeit von Jamblichus lebten, diese Schriften verfasst haben. Damit wäre die Hypothese von Frances Yates widerlegt, nach der Agrippa glaubte, das Corpus Hermeticum würde direkt vom Ägypter Thoth herrühren. Aus der „Occulta philosophia“ geht hervor, dass Agrippa die Werke Jamblichus hervorragend kannte, doch Yates hielt es scheinbar für nicht relevant, dass Jamblichus darauf hingewiesen hatte, dass das Corpus Hermeticum von ägyptischen Priestern geschrieben wurden. Es war damit nicht Casaubon, der als Erster erkannt hat, dass das Corpus Hermeticum unmöglich auf eine ägyptische Legende mit dem Namen Hermes zurückgehen konnte. Casaubon dachte selbst nicht, dass er der Erste war, der den Irrtum aufdeckte, denn er berichtete ebenfalls von der Aussage von Jamblichus. (shrink)

Sebastian Franck commented and translated parts of Agrippa´s De Vanitate Scientiarum, confirming that Franck knew at least some of this philosopher’s work. However, there is no detailed research on the influence Agrippa had on Franck—a gap this paper tries to fill. In a paper of Keefer, the author advocates that Franck was much influenced by Agrippa. The major claim of this paper is that Agrippa’s influence on Franck should not be overestimated, primarily because Franck deliberately did not cite from the (...) Occulta philosophia. Only De Vanitate Scientiarum and one paragraph of Oratio habita papiae are shown to have had a direct influence on Franck. The influence on Franck`s philosophy has to be analyzed very carefully to avoid such fallacies. In a comparison of the metaphysical belief systems of both Franck and Agrippa, important parallels concerning the soul and Christology can be found. Notably, Agrippa and Franck were both believers in the Platonic doctrine of the tripartite soul. However, Franck did not cite this concept from Agrippa. A difference between Agrippa and Franck was that Agrippa had a cosmological perspective that was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism and Hermeticism. In contrast, the Neoplatonic concept of the world soul did not make sense in Franck’s philosophical system of beliefs because Franck denies the idea that the world is conducted by rationality. His pessimistic view of the world and the human being did not blend with this idea of the world soul. These differences demonstrate that Franck did not agree with many concepts found in the Occulta philosophia. The Corpus Hermeticum was also not as important for Franck as it was for Agrippa. Franck focused primarily on the Pimander and to a certain extent on the thirteenth book (rebirth), whereas for Agrippa many parts were relevant. Research on the influence of the Hermetic books on Franck just began in the 21st century and this paper further contributes to a better understanding of how the Hermetic books affected Franck. Franck used Agrippa to convey his understanding of the Corpus Hermeticum to his readers. However, it remains an open question why Franck integrated only a small part of the Corpus Hermeticum and the writings of Agrippa into his philosophy. (shrink)

According to Agrippa's trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifiable.

In this paper, I analyse Agrippa’s trilemma, an old skeptical argument that questions the possibility of justifying any arbitrary belief p and its paradox about jus-tification. Assuming that neither infinitism nor skepticism are satisfactory positions, the main alternatives available to face the problem (foundationism, coherentism and epistemic externalism) are outlined, as well as some central arguments that show the serious difficulties they face. In the case of foundationalism, these problems arise from two dilemmas, which work together with the trilemma to (...) make our philosophical life even more difficult: the so-called Sellar’s dilemma and Bergmann’s dilemma —although the latter is a very general attack on internalism. The former calls into question the inte-lligibility of a key idea of standard foundationalism: the notion of justified basic belief. The second casts doubt on the rational sustainability of epistemic internalism, which is a usual presupposition of the presentation of the trilemma. I explore a Humean way out of the trilemma that also manages to escape such dilemmas. Like any position in this difficult territory the way out has costs. However, they do not seem unaffordable. Here I only intend to tentatively present the idea, as a possible way out of our difficulties, which deserves to be seriously discussed. (shrink)

Sebastian Franck hat Teile von Agrippas De Vanitate Scientiarum übersetzt und kommentiert. Von daher ist der Einfluss der Philosophie von Agrippa auf Franck bekannt. Es gab allerdings bisher keine ausführlichen Untersuchungen zu den Einflüssen von Agrippa auf Franck. Diese Lücke versucht dieser Aufsatz zu schließen. Beim Vergleich der metaphysischen Systeme von Franck und Agrippa stellt sich heraus, dass es bedeutende Einflüsse im Bereich der Seelenlehre und der Christologie gab. Sowohl Agrippa als auch Franck sind Anhänger der platonischen Lehre der drei (...) Seelenteile. Die Seele besteht nach dieser Lehre aus Geist, Seele und Körper. Der Geist ist der unsterbliche göttliche Teil im Menschen. Der Hauptunterschied zwischen Agrippa und Franck kann darin gesehen werden, dass Agrippas Synkretismus stärker den Neuplatonismus betont und Franck`s Synkretismus die Gnosis. Die Weltseele ergibt im Konzept von Franck nur wenig Sinn, während diese bei Agrippa ganz zentral ist. Franck lehnt den Gedanken ab, die Welt werde durch eine Vernunft geleitet. Sein pessimistisches Bild von der Welt und vom Menschen verträgt sich nicht mit diesem Gedanken. Da es keine Vernunft gibt, ist auch die Astrologie, die Mantik oder die Kabbalistik nicht wichtig für Franck. Daher ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Franck nirgends die Occulta philosophia zitiert, sondern immer nur De Vantitate Scientiarum Der Synkretismus von Agrippa beinhaltet Astrologie, Mantik, Kabbala und Neuplatonismus. Am ehesten spielt bei Franck noch die Hermetik eine Rolle. Franck meint, Christus habe im Pimander mit Hermes Trismegistos kommuniziert. Diesen Gedanken findet man nicht nur bei Franck, sondern auch bei Agrippa. Die für Franck so wichtige Lehre des inneren Christus ist ebenfalls Teil der Seelenlehre von Agrippa. Wenn der Mensch seinen Geist oder seinen inneren Christus erkennt, dann erkennt er Gott. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Franck nur diejenigen Dinge von dem „weisen Agrippa“ übernommen hat, die in sein Konzept passen. (shrink)

English translation of paper title: Action and Passion in the Renaissance. The Womanly and the Manly in Agrippa, Postel, and Bovelles. This paper uses the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa and the Querelle des Femmes as historic backgrounds for how Agrippa of Nettesheim, Guillaum Postel, and Charles de Bovelles reconcile the notions of "male" and "female" in their respective philosophies.

Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonism is skepticism about epistemology and philosophy more generally. Philosophical reflection on ordinary epistemic practices leads us to deny the possibility of knowledge and justified belief. However, instead of accepting the dogma that knowledge and justified beliefs are impossible, a neo-Pyrrhonist rejects the philosophical premises that lead to this conclusion. Fogelin argues in particular that contemporary theories of justification cannot avoid dogmatic skepticism, because they are committed to the premises of the skeptical argument deriving from the modes of Agrippa. (...) It is argued against Fogelin that those theories can and typically do deny one or another of the premises and thus can avoid the skeptical conclusion. Neo-Pyrrhonism should rather be defended by arguing that the premises of the Agrippan argument are intuitively plausible and that neo-Pyrrhonism provides the best resolution of the resulting paradox. Only neo-Pyrrhonism both explains the intuitive plausibility of the premises and avoids dogmatic skepticism. (shrink)

The Mode of Relativity in Agrippa’s Five Modes does not fit with the other four modes, and disrupts an otherwise elegant system. We argue that it is not the familiar argument from epistemic relativism, but a formal condition on the structure of justifications: the principle that epistemic grounding relations cannot be reflexive. This understanding of Agrippan Relativity leads to a better understanding of the Modes of Hypothesis and Reciprocity, a clearer outline of the structure of Agrippa’s system as a whole, (...) and a new insight into the Two Modes that follow the Five. (shrink)

Title in English: : A Contextualist Answer to Agrippa's Argument.

This paper argues for the following three claims. First, the Agrippan mode from disagreement does not play a secondary role in inducing suspension of judgment. Second, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the criteria of justification underlying the Five Modes of Agrippa, which nonetheless does not prevent him from non-doxastically assenting to them. And third, some recent objections to Agrippan Pyrrhonism raised by analytic epistemologists and experimental philosophers fail to appreciate the Pyrrhonist's ad hominem style of argumentation and the real (...) challenge posed by the mode from disagreement. (shrink)

The question of whether the Pyrrhonist adheres to certain logical principles, criteria of justification, and inference rules is of central importance for the study of Pyrrhonism. Its significance lies in that, whereas the Pyrrhonist describes his philosophical stance and argues against the Dogmatists by means of what may be considered a rational discourse, adherence to any such principles, criteria, and rules does not seem compatible with the radical character of his skepticism. Hence, if the Pyrrhonist does endorse them, one must (...) conclude that he is inconsistent in his outlook. Despite its import, the question under consideration has not received, in the vast literature on Pyrrhonism of the past three decades, all the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I do not propose to provide a full examination of the Pyrrhonist’s attitude towards rationality, but to focus on the question of whether he endorses the law of non-contradiction (LNC). However, I will also briefly tackle the question of the Pyrrhonist’s outlook on both the canons of rational justification at work in the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa and the logical rules of inference. In addition, given that the LNC is deemed a fundamental principle of rationality, determining the Pyrrhonist’s attitude towards it will allow us to understand his general attitude towards rationality. (shrink)

This paper deals with the “magic” of the Carpocratians, who, according to Irenaeus of Lyon, believed in the Platonic tripartite nature of the soul. The Carpocratian approach to philosophical magic is probably derived from Neoplatonic ideas popular during the first centuries of the Common Era. The Carpocrations, a second-century Christian Gnostic group, believed Yeshua was a soul personality like all other people, but because of his “spiritualization,” he reached the state of the “philosophical magician.” He did not lose his memory (...) while “staying with his Father” (while he was in the eternal sphere before his next incarnation) and, according to Irenaeus, despised the creators (angels) of the world during the ascension of the soul, a Hermetic and Neoplatonic notion. In addition, as the Christ, Yeshua overcame all emotions and passions. That is, according to the Neoplatonic tripartite nature of the soul, he overcame the emotional part of himself in favor of the spirit. This ascent gave him magical abilities such as healing and prophecy. The Carpocratians believed that each soul can achieve what Christ achieved. Ceremonial and heavenly magic was practiced by the Carpocratians, but their main goal was to achieve the complete spiritualization of the soul or the attainment of Christ Consciousness. To analyze Carpocratian magic, it is useful to use the theories of other magicians like Agrippa von Nettesheim or Iamblichus, because their ideas improve our limited understanding of the text by the Early Church Writer Irenaeus whose basic interest in the Carpocratians was heresiology. Finally, this analysis of how magic was applied by the Carpocratians could contribute to a better understanding of their philosophy. (shrink)

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types (...) of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation. (shrink)

Michael Lewin geht es in seinem Buch um die Vernunft als ein wohlbegründetes und in zeitgenössischen Kontexten fortführbares Forschungsprogramm. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Theorienreihe zu vielfältigen Arten und Funktionen der Ideen, mit deren Hilfe die Vernunft das Verstehen und Wollen steuert und selbstreflexiv wird. Dazu entwickelt der Autor unter dem Stichpunkt „reflektierter Perspektivismus“ das Programm einer perspektivistischen Metaphilosophie, die den Hintergrundparametern forschungsprogrammatische Festlegungen (in Anlehnung an Imre Lakatos), Ansprüche und (Wissens-)Ziele hinter den philosophischen Positionierungen nachspürt und dadurch ihre (...) Grenzen und Möglichkeiten offenlegt. (shrink)

This Open Access book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are (...) typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract, it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics. (shrink)

What can we know if we take sceptical worries such as the Münchhausen trilemma seriously? Quite a lot, actually - if the world is a certain way, namely if transcendent mediocrity is the case.

This paper presents a uniform general account of regress problems in the form of a pentalemma—i.e., a set of five mutually inconsistent claims. Specific regress problems can be analyzed as instances of such a general schema, and this Regress Pentalemma Schema can be employed to generate deductively valid arguments from the truth of a subset of four claims to the falsity of the fifth. Thus, a uniform account of the nature of regress problems allows for an improved understanding of specific (...) regress objections or arguments, and, correspondingly, of the general logical geography of the debate about infinite regresses. This uniform approach is illustrated by a treatment of the classical epistemological problem of justification, but it encompasses a whole variety of cases including explanation and ontological grounding. Furthermore, this general account is compared and contrasted with the existing literature discussing argument schemata for regress objections, particularly with the work of Jan Willem Wieland. It is shown how such other schemata can be incorporated and superseded by the general Regress Pentalemma Schema. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the influence of Cambridge Platonism and materialist philosophy on Mary Astell's early feminism. More specifically, I argue that Astell co-opts Descartes's theory of regulating the passions in his final publication, The Passions of the Soul, to articulate a comprehensive, Enlightenment and body friendly theory of feminine self-esteem that renders her feminism modern. My analysis of Astell's theory of feminine self-esteem follows both textual and contextual cues, thus allowing for a reorientation of her early feminism vis-a-vis contemporary feminist (...) theory . An entire chapter in the dissertation is devoted to Astell's use of Descartes's theory of regulating the passions to render women more substantial and inherently worthy. This rendering becomes more concrete in Astell's feminist framework as she employs the language of the social contract in her fourth publication, Reflections Upon Marriage, to depict wives as contractual slaves. I argue that her assertion concerning women's slavery is theoretically consistent when read in light of her theory of feminine self-esteem, since this theory is based on the Enlightenment principles of self-mastery, independence and self-preservation. Further, I align Astell's early feminism in a dialogic sense with the Continental "querelle des femmes," especially as presented in writings by Christine de Pizan and Agrippa. Astell, I argue, contributes to the "querelle" by framing the feminist problem she wishes to solve concerning women's equality in a robust , philosophical manner that uncannily prefigures Wollstonecraft's call for the universalization of human virtues and the reform of of women's education. (shrink)

The Münchhausen trilemma is the following: When trying to prove a fundamental truth, you run into one of, two of, or all three of the following issues: -/- 1: Circular reasoning 2: Infinite regress 3: An arbitrary starting point -/- But what if these are not in fact “problems”, but three different ways to observe the fundamental truth? Reconciling the three and showing how they function together is what I endeavor to articulate here.