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  1. Can the Self Be a Brain?Alan Kenneth Schwerin - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (2): 235 - 246.
    Philosophical materialists suggest that a person can be identified with their brain. My paper is a critical investigation of this provocative thesis and an analysis of some of the prominent arguments to support this view. My overall argument is that there is more to this issue than some philosophers appear to acknowledge.
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  2. Did Russell Experience an Epiphany in 1911?Alan Kenneth Schwerin - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):1-17.
    Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy evolved dramatically in 1911 — the year he fell in love with Lady Ottoline Morrell. For many years Russell had been an ardent advocate of the view that philosophers ought to look for truths that are certain. The co-author of Principia Mathematica altered his commitment to certainty in philosophy in 1911. An analysis of his published views and correspondence from this time strongly suggests that the radical transformation was induced by an epiphany brought about by (...)
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  3. Is Hume Attempting to Introduce a New, Pragmatic Conception of a Contradiction in His Treatise?Alan Kenneth Schwerin - 2016 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (3):315-323.
    Hume’s Treatise, with its celebrated bundle theory of the self, is a significant contribution to the embryonic Newtonian experimental philosophy of the enlightenment. But the theory is inadequate as it stands, as the appendix to the Treatise makes clear. For this account of the self, apparently, rests on contradictory principles — propositions, fortunately, that can be reconciled, according to Hume. My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s argument for this intriguing suggestion.
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