The existence of God is once again the focus of vivid philosophical discussion. From the point of view of analytic theology, however, people often talk past each other when they debate about the putative existence or nonexistence of God. In the worst case, for instance, atheists deny the existence of a God, which no theists ever claimed to exist. In order to avoid confusions like this we need to be clear about the function of the term 'God' in its different (...) contexts of use. In what follows, I distinguish between the functions of 'God' in philosophical contexts on the one hand and in theological contexts on the other in order to provide a schema, which helps to avoid confusion in the debate on the existence or non-existence of God. (shrink)

There is a close systematic relationship between panentheism, as a metaphysical theory about the relation between God and the world, and transhumanism, the ethical demand to use the means of the applied sciences to enhance both human nature and the environment. This relationship between panentheism and transhumanism provides a ‘cosmic’ solution to the problem of evil: on panentheistic premises, the history of the world is the one infinite life of God, and we are part of the one infinite divine being. (...) We ourselves are therefore responsible for the future development of the life of the divine being. We should therefore use the means provided by the natural sciences to develop the history of the world in such a way that the existence of evil shall be overcome and shall no longer be part of the divine being in whom we move and live and have our being. The metaphysics of panentheism leads to the ethics of transhumanism. (shrink)

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause left an impressive oeuvre consisting of 256 books and articles, covering numerous branches of philosophy, the humanities, and science.[1] His Urbild der Menschheit, his Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie and his Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft are of particular pertinence for philosophers today. [1] See: E. M. Ureña and E. Fuchs, “Einführung in das Gesamtwerk”, in Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Band 1: Entwurf des Systems der Philosophie, ed. T. Bach and O. Breidbach.

Special divine action is an integral part of the Christian worldview. In fact, the plausibility of the Christian worldview depends on and is grounded in the putative reality, and therefore possibility, of special divine action. Without special divine action, Scripture does not make sense, and without Scripture, Christianity neither. However, the possibility of special divine action is highly contested in almost every field of human enquiry. In what follows, I briefly suggest a minimal definition of special divine action and show (...) its indispensability for the internal plausibility of Christian faith. I then argue against the very possibility of special divine action. I end by way of identifying ways in which Christian theologians can respond to the arguments in order to justify the possibility of special divine action. It turns out that special divine action neither contradicts science nor metaphysics. (shrink)

The role of acetylcholinesterase (AChE) in neurotransmission is well known. But long before synapses are formed in vertebrates, AChE is expressed in young postmitotic neuroblasts that are about to extend the first long tracts. AChE histochemistry can thus be used to map primary steps of brain differentiation. Preceding an possibly inducing AChE in avian brains, the closely related butyrylcholinesterase (BChE) spatially fore-shadows AChE-positive cell areas and the course of their axons. In particular, before spinal motor axons grow, their corresponding rostral (...) sclerotomes and myotomes express BChE, and both their neuronal source and myotomal target cells express AChE. Since axon growth has been found inhibited by acetylcholine, it is postulated that both cholinetsreases can attract neurite growth cones by neutralizing the inhibitor. Thus, the early expression of both cholinesterases that is at least partially independent from classical cholinergic synaptogenesis, sheds new light on the developmental and medical significance of these enzymes. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, (...) say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory. (shrink)

In Paul Moser’s view, philosophical arguments of natural theology are irrelevant as evidence for God’s existence. I argue that embracing Moser’s view would bring about the end to the project and practice of Christian apologetics as we know it. I draw out implications from Moser’s work on religious epistemology for the project of Christian apologetics. I sketch what Christian apologetics would look like if one were to embrace Moser’s call to eliminate arguments as evidence for God existence. The result (...) of embracing Moser-style apologetics is apologetics without argument. I argue that Moserian apologetics should be rejected. (shrink)

In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction by explication. (...) We argue that the details of the relations of particular sciences, disciplines and domains of discourse depend on empirical evidence and empirical-theoretical developments and that the generalized approach of reduction by explication is also subject to related empirical-theoretical constraints. So understood, physicalism lacks much of the controversial force and many of the implications sometimes associated with it. (shrink)

Paul Goodman, 1960’larda modern Amerikan toplumunun organize sistemi içerisinde dönemin gençliğinin sorunlarını ön plana çıkaran ‘Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized System’ (Saçmayı Büyütmek: Organize Sistemde Gençliğin Problemleri, 1960) eseri ile sosyal bir eleştirmen olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Amerikalı bir düşünür olan Paul Goodman’ın kısa öyküler, romanlar, şiirler ve makalelerden oluşan çalışmaları, siyaset, sosyal teori, eğitim, kentsel tasarım, edebi eleştiri, hatta psikoterapi gibi geniş bir yelpazeye dağılmıştır. Onun temel argümanı (1960: 9-10) tek bir merkez etrafında (...) örgütlenen teknoloji toplumunun başarısızlıklarını eleştirerek, mevcut düzenin insanın doğasına uygun bir biçimde yeniden inşasını vurgulamaktadır. Goodman’ın yeniden inşa süreci içerisinde insan doğasına önem veren faaliyete dayalı anarşist ideolojisi, sorumluluk duygusunun homojen bir şekilde bireyler arasında paylaşılması gerektiğini vurgular. Goodman merkeziyetçi olmayan siyaset anlayışı ile kendisini Amerikan siyasetinin ve kültürünün karşısında yer alan bir pozisyonda konumlandırmaktadır (Honeywell, 2011: 1). Diğer bir deyişle Goodman (1960: 36), anarşist geleneği formüle etmek amacıyla yirminci yüzyıl Amerikası’nın içinde bulunmuş olduğu mevcut durumdan yola çıkarak eleştirilerini ademi merkeziyetçilik, katılımcı demokrasi, özerk toplum temaları üzerine temellendirmiştir. -/- Goodman’a göre, sosyal, kültürel, ahlâk ve eğitim gibi alanlarda uygulanan kurallar günümüz devletlerini etkisi altına alan kapitalist düzen tarafından belirlenmektedir (Bakır, 2016: 110). Bu durum Goodman’ın da içerisinde bulunduğu anarşist düşünürler tarafından kabul edilebilecek bir husus değildir, çünkü anarşistler mevcut düzenin ve sosyal yaşamın otorite ve itaat yapılarıyla güçlendirilen belirli yaklaşımlar ile kontrol altına alınmasını, insanların fikirlerini özgürce ifade edemeyeceği, bir nevi entelektüel bir hapishane içerisinde yaşaması anlamına geleceğinden dolayı karşı çıkmaktadırlar (Sheean, 2003: 122). Aynı nedenlerden dolayı Goodman, modern liberalizm ve Marksizm gibi alternatif radikal ideolojileri yerinden yönetim düşüncesi ve sosyal mühendislik konusundaki eğilimleri dolayısıyla reddetmektedir. Goodman için anarşizm, özgürlük ve toplumsal değişime yeterli düzeyde arka çıkabilecek tek ideolojik çerçeve olarak görülmektedir. Ona göre (2010: 143), “anarşizm ya da daha iyisi, anarko-pasifizm (toplumsal değişim hareketleri içerisinde örgütlü şiddete ve kurumlara karşı çıkan anarşist anlayış) günümüzün gelişmiş toplumlarının bürokrasilerini, karar verme konusunda aşırı merkezîleşmelerini ve sosyal mühendislik gibi problematik durumlarını ve tehlikelerini tutarlı bir şekilde öngörmüştür”. -/- Siyaset, sosyoloji ve felsefe gibi çeşitli alanlar içerisinde etkili olan anarşist kuramlar, radikal bir söylem olarak eğitimcileri ve araştırmacıları yeni öğretilere ve uygulamalara teşvik etme konusunda itici bir güç oluşturabilmektedirler. Anarşist yaklaşımlardan eğitim kuramı ve araştırmalara yönelik daha belirleyici bir rol alması beklenmektedir, ancak bu yaklaşımlar mevcut radikal akademik görüşü büyük ölçüde etkisi altına alan Marksizm’in eğitim alanında göstermiş olduğu aynı etkiyi gösterememiştir. Anarşist düşünceleri eğitim alanı içerisinde daha etkili ve görünür kılabilmek amacıyla Paul Goodman, Francisco Ferrer ve Alexander Neill’ın ileri sürmüş olduğu çeşitli düşünceler, girişimler ve uygulamalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Goodman’ın anarşizme ilişkin düşünceleri ile bu çalışma sıkı bir anarşizm tahlili, eleştirisi ve felsefesinden öte anarşist anlayışın eğitimdeki uygulanabilirliğine yönelik bir soruşturma içerisine girmekte ve anarşist yaklaşımın mevcut eğitim sistemlerinden hangi yönleriyle farklılaştığını, sonucunda etkili bir eğitim anlayışı ortaya koyup koyamadığını tartışmaktadır. (shrink)

A letter protesting the publication of a homophobic rant in the Proceedings of the APA.

Abstract My review of Boghossian's book, Fear of Knowledge, is generally sympathetic toward his rejection of epistemic relativism and turns toward an examination of "constructivist" themes in light of an anti-nominalist perspective. In general terms, this is a fine little book, tightly argued, and well worth considerable attention--especially from the friends of relativism and those supporting versions of constructivism. (Constructivism + radical nominalism = relativism.).

Appears to give the first model-theoretic account of both "must" and "ought" (without conflating them with one another). Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and (...) predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power (e.g. derivatively predicting the existence of supererogatory and permissibly suboptimal alternatives), thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track. (shrink)

Ang Noli Me Tangere at El Filibusterismo ay mga nobelang isinulat ni Dr. Jose P. Rizal na sumasalamin sa kalagayan ng mga Pilipino noong panahon ng mga Español. Ikinubli ni Rizal ang mga di-makatáong pagtrato ng mga Español sa mga itinuring na Indio sa pamamagitan ng mga pangyayari at mga karakter sa kaniyang dalawang akda. Mula sa Teorya ng Moral na Pag-unlad (Theory of Moral Development) ng isang Amerikanong Sikolohistang si Lawrence Kohlberg ay sinuri ng papel na ito ang 10 (...) tagpo na nagpapakita ng katungkulang moral sa dalawang nobela gámit ang Antas at Yugto ng Moral na Pag-unlad ni Kohlberg (Kohlberg’s Levels and Stages of Moral Development). Mula sa ginawang pagsusuri, napagtanto ng papel na ito na gumamit si Rizal ng estratehiya upang ipakita na ang aksiyong isinagawa ng ahente sa bawat tagpo ay taliwas sa kaniyang kabuoang moralidad, bagaman ang pamamaraang ito ay nagdulot sa mga mambabása ng Noli Me Tangere at El Filibusterismo ng iba’t ibang interpretasyon at pagkaunawa sa mga isinulat ng may-akda. Mapanghámon ang mga nobela ni Rizal na sumusubok sa tradisyonal na kaugalian at panuntunan ng Pilipinas maging sa pagkukunwari ng lipunang Pilipino. Malaki ang naging gampanin ng nabuong tema na sumisimbolo sa mga isyung panlipunang nais palutangin ni Rizal. Gayunpaman, dahil sa mataas na pangangatwirang moral na nakapaloob sa kaniyang mga gawa, nararapat na gamítin ito hindi lámang bílang materyal sa pagaaral ng Filipino at sa mga kaugnay na larang, kundi pati rin sa pag-aaral ng kritisismo sa politika at lipunan, maging sa pag-aaral ng etika at moralidad, partikular na sa konteksto ng Pilipinas. (shrink)

Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific (...) form of collective intelligence, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to a number of debates in social epistemology, especially those that seek to understand how group (or collective) knowledge arises from the interactions between a collection of individual epistemic agents. Beyond this, however, mandevillian intelligence raises issues that are relevant to the research agendas of both virtue epistemology and applied epistemology. From a virtue epistemological perspective, mandevillian intelligence encourages us to adopt a relativistic conception of intellectual vice/virtue, enabling us to see how individual forms of intellectual vice may (sometimes) be relevant to collective forms of intellectual virtue. In addition, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the nascent sub-discipline of applied epistemology. In particular, mandevillian intelligence forces us see the potential epistemic value of (e.g., technological) interventions that create, maintain or promote individual forms of intellectual vice. (shrink)

Although the word 'sustainability' is used broadly, scientific approaches to sustainability fall into one of two competing paradigms. Following the influential Brundtland report of 1987. some theorists identify sustainability with some form of resource availability, and develop indicators for sustainability that stress capital depletion. This approach has spawned debates about the intersubstitutivity of capitals, with many environmental theorists arguing that at some point, depletion of natural capital cannot be offset by increases in human or social capital. The alternative approach is (...) grounded in stock and flow systems systems modeling, and defines sustainability through indicators that determine whether the system structure is robust (e.g. resists perturbation), resilient (recovers after disruption) and adaptive (capable of change in response to external conditions). Both paradigms have applications in economics and ecology. (shrink)

Grice bu yazıda temel olarak sezdirim kavramını incelemektedir. Sezdirim bir karşılıklı konuşmada konuşucunun, söylediği şey ötesinde dinleyicisine aktardığı düşüncedir. Konuşma sezdirimleri söz konusu olduğunda dinleyici, bir çıkarım sonucunda sezdirimleri saptar. Grice'ın savı, bu çıkarımda nicelik, nitelik, bağıntı ve tarz olmak üzere dört grupta toplanabilen ilkelerin (maksimler) belirleyici rol oynadığıdır.

A história da psicologia, tal como aparece em algumas obras (E.G. Boring 1950; M. Reuchlin 1957; P. Fraisse e J. Piaget 1963) ou em capítulos introdutórios de alguns manuais (M. Reuchlin 1977), reflete uma adesão — raramente discutida — a uma concepção internalista. Segundo essa concepção, a psicologia seria animada por uma dinâmica própria, um processo evolutivo totalmente endógeno, e seria independente de fatores externos tais como os domínios religiosos, sociopolíticos e econômicos. Além do mais, os partidários dessa história aceitam (...) ver a psicologia influenciada por disciplinas situadas em suas fronteiras, como a biologia, a fisiologia e, em menor medida, a física. Esses domínios fronteiriços geralmente dizem respeito a objetos psicológicos habitualmente qualificados de inferiores, como reflexos, sensações e percepções, em oposição à linguagem e ao pensamento, qualificados como processos superiores. Esses mesmos domínios fronteiriços engendraram por sua vez subdomínios relativamente autônomos, tais como a psicofísica ou a psicofisiologia. Correlativamente a essa concepção internalista, o desenvolvimento científico é apresentado como um caminho ao estado de psicologia positiva, tal como A. Comte a definiu em 1837 na 45a lição do Curso de Filosofia Positiva. A caminhada até a positividade foi indicada pelo próprio A. Comte: estudo da anátomo-fisiologia do sistema nervoso (a frenologia de Gall lhe parece a esse respeito uma contribuição decisiva), estudos comparados, análise de casos patológicos, estudo dos comportamentos animais e do desenvolvimento individual. Considerando a evolução da psicologia nos últimos cem anos, seríamos tentados a sustentar que ela realizou o projeto positivista. Psicologia diferencial, psicopatologia, etologia animal e psicologia da criança são vários domínios que concorrem para essa realização. Entretanto, esses domínios estão longe de parecerem homogêneos quanto aos métodos empregados e os modelos epistemológicos aos quais se referem. Um exame atento dessas dimensões metodológicas e epistemológicas mostra que se avança, sobretudo, em ordem dispersa. (shrink)

Der endliche Mensch hat Probleme bei W a h r n e h m u n g oder V o r s t e l l u n g eines „unendlichen“ Raumes: als gleichzeitig oder als nacheinander. Die Vorstellung eines solchen Raumes führt für Paul Sturm zu einem Widerspruch. Dabei will er nicht stehen bleiben. Die Vorstellung dieses Raumes möchte er durch das D e n k e n „erweitern und vervollständigen“. Darin sieht er die Lösung dieses Konfliktes. Er (...) möchte das Bewusstsein dafür schärfen, dass sich das „Unendliche“ nicht vorstellen, sondern nur denken lässt. In der richtigen Formulierung der Problemstellung sieht Sturm ihre Lösung. Er legt dar, dass eine falsche Methode in der Vergangenheit stets zu einem Widerspruch führte, der sich als Sophisma (irrtümliche Schlussfolgerung) erweist. (Zusammenfassung verfasst von Michael Sturm-Berger und Beate Sturm). (shrink)

The Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (MZI) is chosen to illustrate the long-standing wave-particle duality problem. Why is which-way (welcher weg) information incompatible with wave interference? How do we explain Wheeler’s delayed choice experiment? Most crucially, how can the photon divide at the first beam splitter and yet terminate on either arm with its undiminished energy? The position advanced is that the photon has two identities, one supporting particle features and the other wave features. There is photon kinetic energy that never splits (on (...) half-silvered mirrors) or diffracts (in pinholes or slits). Then there are photon probability waves that do diffract and can reinforce or cancel. Photon kinetic energy is oscillatory; its cycles require/occupy time. E = mc2 suggests that kinetic energy is physically real as occurrence in time just as rest mass is physically real as existence in space; both are quantized and both occupy/require a dimension for their occurrence or existence. Photon kinetic energy (KE) thus resides in time, but is still present/available for interactions (events) in space; rest mass (e.g., your desk) resides in space but is still present/available for interactions (events) in time. While photon probability waves progress in space and diffract there, photon KE resides in time and never diffracts in space; at reception it always arrives whole and imitates particle impact without being a particle. Photon probability waves are real; they diffract in space. Acknowledging that the photon has two identities (residing energy and progressing probability), explains photon dual nature. And wave-particle duality is central to quantum mechanics. Understanding it leads to new insights into entanglement, nonlocality and the measurement problem. A 30-minute video on nonlocality and photon dualism can be found by a google: search “youtube klevgard nonlocality”). (shrink)

.... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant stance in relation (...) to agents who are rational self-controllers but nevertheless subject to covert control.26 In this way, what is compromised by conditions of covert control is not the responsibility of the agent as such. It is, rather, the participant stance of those other agents who covertly control him. Clearly it is possible to establish these specific limits on who can hold these agents responsible without denying that the agents themselves remain free and responsible. When we take this approach we will find that we are no longer faced with an unattractive choice between simply “biting the bullet” or having to “spit it out”. All we need to do is chew carefully, until there is nothing left that we find too hard to swallow. (shrink)

with some reference to my graffiti and arrest at U of G.

Four initial postulates are presented (with two more added later), which state that construction of the physical universe proceeds from a sequence of discrete steps or "projections" --- a process that yields a sequence of discrete levels (labeled 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). At or above level 2 the model yields a (3+1)-dimensional structure, which is interpreted as ordinary space and time. As a result, time does not exist below level 2 of the system, and thus the quantum of action, (...) h, which depends on time (since its unit is time•energy), also does not exist below level 2. This implies that the quantum of action is not fundamental, and thus e.g. that the physical universe cannot have originated from a quantum fluctuation. When the gravitational interaction for the model is developed, it is seen that the basic ingredient for gravity is already operating at level 1 of the system, which implies that gravity, too, is not fundamentally quantum mechanical (since, as stated, h only kicks in at level 2) --- perhaps obviating the need for a quantum theory of gravity. Further arguments along this line lead to the conclusion that quantum fluctuations cannot be a source of gravity, and thus cannot contribute to the cosmological constant --- thereby averting the cosmological constant problem. Along the way, the model also provides explanations for dark energy, the beginning and ending of inflation, quark confinement, and more. Although the model dethrones the quantum, it nevertheless elevates an idea in physics that was engendered by quantum mechanics: the necessary role of "observers" in constructing the world. (shrink)

Don Ihde has characterized his philosophy as "phenomenology + pragmatism." This article argues that Ihde's pragmatism can be understood as consistency with two philosophical commitments from the first generation of American pragmatists (e.g. Peirce, James, Dewey and Addams). First, Ihde's notion of embodiment relations for tools and techniques is consistent with the organism-environment relational epistemology of these thinkers. Second, his desire to dissociate himself from romantic and neo-idealist readings of the phenomenological tradition link him with their naturalism.

G.E.M. Anscombe famously remarked that an adequate philosophy of psychology was needed before we could do ethics. Fifty years have passed, and we should now ask what significance our best theories of the psychology of agency have for moral philosophy. My focus is on non-moral conceptions of autonomy and self-governance that emphasize the limits of deliberation -- the way in which one's cares render certain options unthinkable, one's intentions and policies filter out what is inconsistent with them, and one's resolutions (...) function to block further reflection. I argue that we can expect this deliberative "silencing" to lead to moral failures that occur because the morally correct option was filtered out of the agent's deliberation. I think it follows from these conceptions of self-governance that we should be considered culpable for unwitting acts and omissions, even if they express no ill will, moral indifference, or blameworthy evaluative judgments. The question is whether this consequence is acceptable. Either way, the potential tradeoff between self-governance and moral attentiveness is a source of doubt about recent attempts to ground the normativity of rationality in our concern for self-governance. (shrink)

In this paper, I look at Susan Stebbing’s articles and reviews that critically engage logical positivism. These appeared before the publication of A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and helped shape the early British reception of logical positivism. I highlight Stebbing’s adoption of G.E. Moore’s tripartite distinction between knowing a proposition, understanding it, and giving an analysis of it and, in light of this distinction, her focus on whether the principle of verifiability can ground a plausible account of communication. Stebbing (...) thinks not, and I reconstruct her reasons, as well as her own account of communication. In doing this, I relate her criticisms to her rejection of methodological solipsism and her dissatisfaction with the logical positivist treatment of statements about other minds and the past. I also argue that Stebbing’s work provides a bridge to later criticisms of logical positivism from ordinary language philosophers. Foregrounding Stebbing’s engagement with logical positivism, especially her focus on communication, paints a fuller picture of how the logical positivists came to be part of analytic philosophy despite having different concerns than many of the British philosophers engaging their work. (shrink)

Cambridge’deki büyük akademik cemaatin sakinleri olan bizler bir araya geldik ve hoşgörü ve onun egemen politik iklim içerisindeki yeri hakkında dostça ama ateşli bir tartışma yürüttük. Okuyucu, bizim nerelerde aynı düşüncede olmadığımızı bulmakta hiçbir zorluk çekmeyecektir. Diğer taraftan, farklı başlangıç noktalarından ve farklı yollardan hareketle yaklaşık olarak aynı yere ulaştık. Her birimiz için, egemen hoşgörü kuramı ve pratiğinin, incelendiği takdirde, korkunç politik gerçekleri gizlemeye yarayan bir maske olduğu ortaya çıktı. Kızgınlığın tonu makaleden makaleye keskin bir şekilde artmakta; belki de boş (...) yere, okuyucuların bu noktaya getiren akıl yürütmeyi takip edeceklerini umuyoruz. Nihayetinde bu kızgınlık hem kafa hem de kalpte ikamet etmektedir…. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretation of time that is an 'A-theory' in that it incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series. The A-series characteristics are supposed to be 'ontologically private' analogous to qualia in the problem of other minds and is given a definition. The main idea is that the experimenter and the cat do not share the same A-series characteristics, e.g the same 'now'. So there is no single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states. It is (...) proposed one may define a 'unit of becoming' that coordinatizes the future/present/past 'private' spectrum as well as allowing one to calculate the rates of becoming. Relativity is briefly considered. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretation of time that is an 'A-theory' in that it incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series. The A-series characteristics are supposed to be 'ontologically private' analogous to qualia in the problem of other minds, such as in the Inverted Spectrum thought experiment, and is given a definition. The main idea is then that the experimenter and the cat do not share the same A-series characteristics, e.g. the same 'now', to some extent. So there is no (...) single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states, one by the experimenter and one by the cat. Also it is proposed one may define an ontologically private 'unit of becoming' that coordinatizes the future/present/past A-series spectrum as well as allow one to calculate rates of becoming with seconds. The latter are taken to measure differences in B-series times. (shrink)

Although our concepts of “Mama,” “milk,” and “mice” have much in common, the suggestion that they are identical in structure in the mind of the prelinguistic child is mistaken. Even infants think about objects as different from substances and appreciate the distinction between kinds (e.g., mice) and individuals (e.g., Mama). Such cognitive capacities exist in other animals as well, and have important adaptive consequences.

We present a game mechanic called pseudo-visibility for games inhabited by non-player characters (NPCs) driven by reinforcement learning (RL). NPCs are incentivized to pretend they cannot see pseudo-visible players: the training environment simulates an NPC to determine how the NPC would act if the pseudo-visible player were invisible, and penalizes the NPC for acting differently. NPCs are thereby trained to selectively ignore pseudo-visible players, except when they judge that the reaction penalty is an acceptable tradeoff (e.g., a guard might accept (...) the penalty in order to protect a treasure because losing the treasure would hurt even more). We describe an RL agent transformation which allows RL agents that would not otherwise do so to perform some limited self-reflection to learn the training environments in question. (shrink)

Never was dogmatic reductionism helpful in conceiving the phenomenon of life. The post-genomic era has made it clear that genes alone cannot explain the functioning of whole organisms. Already each cell represents a unique, non-recurring individual. Recent progress in developmental biology has conveyed new perspectives both on the makings of individual organisms (ontogeny), as on evolutionary change (Evo-Devo). The genome (the entirety of all genes) of an animal remains constant from fertilization onwards in each cell. The realization of genes requires (...) molecular environments, in particular pertinent to the cytoplasm of the unfertilized egg. Individuality of an organism therefore is not only determined by its genome, but is shaped through developmental processes (it needs time!). Organisms can only exist through mutual interplays with their respective (molecular and cellular) environments at all levels of organization. Thus, life can be conceived of as endless networks of communication, e.g. as a mutual continuum, connecting all individuals, all species and all generations within their given environments. Evolutionarily, nature does not select fitting genes, but rather viable traits. The presented concepts render it unlikely that it was genes that founded our living world, but rather that distinct environments shaped “genes” (of whatever chemical nature) which proved to be “life-suitable”. (shrink)

In the introduction I argue that the basic element (or primitive) for constructing the physical universe is "displacement from a prior level", and the basic structure is "a sequence of such displacements" (summarized as postulates 1 and 2). The displacements are then defined as one-dimensional objects with a direction (postulate 3). The relations between these displacements are stated in postulate 4. In section 2 we discuss basic consequences of the postulates, and in section 3 we use the postulates to derive (...) a (3+1)-dimensional structure, interpreted as ordinary space and time. We then derive further properties of space --- isotropy, homogeneity, and a rapid early expansion (i.e. inflation). Time, comporting with experience, is shown to be a one-dimensional stream --- with a direction. In section 4 we associate energy with the displacements, and find that the same factors that construct ordinary space (and make it isotropic and homogeneous) also smear the locations of entities/particles across that space --- thereby providing a mechanism/explanation for that iconic and enigmatic aspect of quantum mechanics. We also determine that there must be a continual, uniformly-distributed stream of (non-zero-point) energy coming into the system that constructs new space (i.e. dark energy). The streaming natures of both time and dark energy are shown to have the same basic cause: the processes that input dark energy into the system, and that construct time, are themselves independent of time --- and so they are continual processes. Further consequences follow from the model, including an explanation for why the presence of energy affects space and time, and why quantum vacuum energy is an exception to this rule (i.e. does not gravitate) --- thereby eliminating the cosmological constant problem. A key benefit of the model is that it liberates us from always having to think about the construction of the universe in terms of spatio-temporal relations and evolution (e.g. the big bang model), which is problematic because presumably (and as we will indeed see) space and time are products of the fundamental construction process, not things that govern it. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Molecular developmental biology has expanded our conceptions of gene actions, underpinning that embryonic development is not only governed by a set of specific genes, but as much by space–time conditions of its developing modules. Typically, formation of cellular spheres, their transformation into planar epithelia, followed by tube formations and laminations are modular steps leading to the development of nervous tissues. Thereby, actions of organising centres, morphogenetic movements, inductive events between epithelia, tissue polarity reversal, widening of epithelia, and all these occurring (...) orderly in space and time, are driving forces of emergent laminar neural tissues, e.g. the vertebrate retina. Analyses of self-organisational formation of retina-like 3D structures from dispersed cells under defined cell culture conditions demonstrate that not only particular genetic networks, but—at least as important—the applied culture conditions define phenotypes of emergent tissues. Such in vitro approaches allow assigning emerging tissue formation to ground-laying genetic networks separately from contributions by conditional constraints. (shrink)

When humanism is thought, especially within the borders of 20th century philosophy, one of the things that first comes to mind is the statements which have occurred in 1950s between Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, can be named as Heidegger-Sartre Controversy on Humanism and mainly based on two texts. Sartre, in one of his speeches, builds an essential connection between humanism and existentialism and in here he defines Heidegger as an existentialist like himself. In return, Heidegger, probably as a (...) criticism to Sartre's attribution to him, told about his thoughts on humanism within the expanded version of one of his earlier letters. By this controversy the context and content humanism had been expanded, the understanding of humanism is deepened. The aim of this article is to manifest if there are some things that the controversy between Heidegger and Sartre could contribute to the terms -as a problematic humanism has nowadays- like post-humanism, trans-humanism, meta-humanism, super-humanism, alter-humanism whose terminological meanings aren't quite well-defined. It is to investigate if there are any solutions that humanism -which is being shaped again and obtaining new contexts through these terms- could gain by this controversy against this current terminology problem. (shrink)

Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be impermissible because we have a right to be treated on the basis of merit and capacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. I call this suggestion the Impermissibility Account. I argue that, despite how the Impermissibility Account seems intuitive to most of us with a humanist outlook, it is indefensible. I show that well-informed discrimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we cannot have a (...) strict right not to be discriminated against. I then propose an alternative and more plausible account which I call the Fairness and Externalities Account, arguing that acts of discrimination are wrong partly because they are unfair and partly because they create harmful externalities which—analogously to pollution—there is a collective responsibility to minimize. Both of these factors are however defeasible, meaning that if the Fairness and Externalities Account is correct, then discrimination is sometimes permissible. These results are counterintuitive, and suggest that the ethics of discrimination requires further attention. (shrink)

We review some of the main implications of the free-energy principle (FEP) for the study of the self-organization of living systems – and how the FEP can help us to understand (and model) biotic self-organization across the many temporal and spatial scales over which life exists. In order to maintain its integrity as a bounded system, any biological system - from single cells to complex organisms and societies - has to limit the disorder or dispersion (i.e., the long-run entropy) of (...) its constituent states. We review how this can be achieved by living systems that minimize their variational free energy. Variational free energy is an information theoretic construct, originally introduced into theoretical neuroscience and biology to explain perception, action, and learning. It has since been extended to explain the evolution, development, form, and function of entire organisms, providing a principled model of biotic self-organization and autopoiesis. It has provided insights into biological systems across spatiotemporal scales, ranging from microscales (e.g., sub- and multicellular dynamics), to intermediate scales (e.g., groups of interacting animals and culture), through to macroscale phenomena (the evolution of entire species). A crucial corollary of the FEP is that an organism just is (i.e., embodies or entails) an implicit model of its environment. As such, organisms come to embody causal relationships of their ecological niche, which, in turn, is influenced by their resulting behaviors. Crucially, free-energy minimization can be shown to be equivalent to the maximization of Bayesian model evidence. This allows us to cast natural selection in terms of Bayesian model selection, providing a robust theoretical account of how organisms come to match or accommodate the spatiotemporal complexity of their surrounding niche. In line with the theme of this volume; namely, biological complexity and self-organization, this chapter will examine a variational approach to self-organization across multiple dynamical scales. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a tension between the Law in the novel The Island of Doctor Moreau, by H. G. Wells, and Kant's reciprocity thesis. The Law is a series of prohibitions that Moreau has his beasts recite. Moreau devotes his time to transforming animals through a painful surgery into beings that resemble humans, but the humanized beasts are constantly slipping back into animalistic habits, and so Moreau promulgates the Law to maintain decorum. Kant's reciprocity thesis states that free (...) will is the necessary and sufficient condition of moral practical laws. That is, in order for a moral practical law to be applicable, there must be free will, and, if free will is present, then there will be a moral practical law that sets a standard for the free will. However, in Wells's novel, the humanized beasts seem to lack free will. So, how can a law be applicable to them? By delving deeper into the mystery of Moreau's strange island, I will shed light on the otherwise cumbersome concepts of free will, natural impulses, and practical laws, as well as their interrelationships. The upshot will be a deeper understanding of personhood through an exploration of the instinctual nature of animals, moral law, and free will. (shrink)

In the last decade there have been intense disputes about the scientific status of psychology espe-cially in connection with the replicability of prominent effects in textbooks. Very different statements about the reasons for this situation have been given (for instance, sample sizes too small, inferential statistical considerations, faulty applications of evaluation methods, lack of theory building, etc.). All these reasons have their relative justification. What remains unresolved, however, is whether these deficiencies are really the fundamental reasons for the state of (...) psychology as a science or just sur-face symptoms. Thus, one needs a diagnosis that can identify these fundamental reasons. For this purpose, the systematicity theory is suitable, which can address the scientific status of psychology, e.g., in distinction to everyday psychology, via nine aspects. These nine aspects are well founded and at the same time can give hints how to improve the scientific status of psychology. Only by advancing a common and integrated development of psychology will it be possible to improve its scientific sta-tus. Individual improvements of rather arbitrarily selected aspects cannot achieve that. The purpose-ful connection of diagnosis and therapy will be demonstrated by the example of psychology in order to guide the scientific process in a focused way. (shrink)

This book focuses on issues in epistemology, semantics and logic with Quine’s views always setting the themes, even if Quine does not always remain quite at center stage. Gochet, Professor at Liège and Secretary to the Editorial Board of Logique et Analyse is a prominent of Quine’s views in Europe. The author does not aim to take up the whole of Quine’s philosophy here. Rather, the aim is to “focus on a few central themes...and to treat them thoroughly.” Continental Europe (...) not only recognizes Quine’s importance, then, but it is prepared to talk back: a point which has become increasingly evident in the wake of several recent works on Quine by W.K. Essler (1975), J. Largeault (1980) and Henri Lauener (1982). Gochet has made an earlier contribution to this in the form of his Quine en Perspective (1978) and its German translation (1984). But the present volume is not a further translation of the earlier work. Rather, the author “tried to avoid overlap.”. (shrink)

The enigma of the Emergence of Natural Languages, coupled or not with the closely related problem of their Evolution is perceived today as one of the most important scientific problems. The purpose of the present study is actually to outline such a solution to our problem which is epistemologically consonant with the Big Bang solution of the problem of the Emergence of the Universe}. Such an outline, however, becomes articulable, understandable, and workable only in a drastically extended epistemic and scientific (...) oecumene, where known and habitual approaches to the problem, both theoretical and experimental, become distant, isolated, even if to some degree still hospitable conceptual and methodological islands. The guiding light of our inquiry will be Eugene Paul Wigner's metaphor of ``the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences'', i.e., the steadily evolving before our eyes, since at least XVIIth century, ``the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics''. Kurt Goedel's incompleteness and undecidability theory will be our guardian discerner against logical fallacies of otherwise apparently plausible explanations. John Bell's ``unspeakableness'' and the commonplace counterintuitive character of quantum phenomena will be our encouragers. And the radical novelty of the introduced here and adapted to our purposes Big Bang epistemological paradigm will be an appropriate, even if probably shocking response to our equally shocking discovery in the oldest among well preserved linguistic fossils of perfect mathematical structures outdoing the best artifactual Assemblers. (shrink)

This book presents new research into key areas of the work of German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). Reflecting various aspects of Leibniz's thought, this book offers a collection of original research arranged into four separate themes: Science, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Religion and Theology. With in-depth articles by experts such as Maria Rosa Antognazza, Nicholas Jolley, Agustín Echavarría, Richard Arthur and Paul Lodge, this book is an invaluable resource not only for readers just beginning to discover Leibniz, (...) but also for scholars long familiar with his philosophy and eager to gain new perspectives on his work. (shrink)

Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a (...) nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis to ‘On Certainty’, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles. -/- Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia dot edu and philpapers dot org , but for PMS Hacker see his papers on his Oxford page. -/- He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. -/- “There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, (...) W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likwise the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq.(esp. in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia.edu but for PMS Hacker see http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)