Results for 'Brent J. C. Madison'

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  1. Is Justification Knowledge?Brent J. C. Madison - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
    Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it is distinct from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this view is deeply mistaken, for according to Sutton justification is knowledge. That is, a subject is justified in believing that p iff he knows that p. Sutton further claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a consequence of Sutton’s view is that there are no false (...)
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  2. On Justifications and Excuses.B. J. C. Madison - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.
    The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...)
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  3. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):61-70.
    In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...)
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  4. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...)
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  5. Internalism and Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 283-295.
    This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.
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  6. Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.
    Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, (...)
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  7. Disqualifying ‘Disqualifiers’.B. J. C. Madison - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    In addition to the notion of defeat, do we need to expand the epistemological repertoire used in accounting for the context dependence of justification? It has recently been argued that we ought to admit a hitherto unrecognized fundamental epistemic kind called ‘disqualifiers’. Disqualifiers are taken to be not reducible to any other epistemic notion. Rather, they are meant to be primitive. If this is correct, it is a surprising and novel discovery, and so it is worthy of further epistemological investigation. (...)
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  8. On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.
    Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...)
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  9. On the Nature of Intellectual Vice.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (12):1-6.
    Vice epistemology, as Quassim Cassam understands it, is the study of the nature, identity, and significance of the epistemic vices. But what makes an intellectual vice a vice? Cassam calls his own view “Obstructivism” – intellectual vices are those traits, thinking styles, or attitudes that systematically obstruct the acquisition, retention, and transmission of knowledge. -/- I shall argue that Cassam’s account is an improvement upon virtue-reliabilism, and that it fares better against what I call Montmarquet’s objection than its immediate rivals. (...)
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  10. On the Possibility of Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):513-526.
    If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own (...)
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  11. Peacocke’s A Priori Arguments Against Scepticism.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):1-8.
    In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief. In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively. If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing epistemological problems. In (...)
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  12.  52
    Reliabilists Should Still Fear the Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 2 (12):193-202.
    In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon (NED) cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED (...)
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  13. The Heterodox 'Fourth Paradigm' of Libertarianism: An Abstract Eleutherology Plus Critical Rationalism.J. C. Lester - 2019 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 23:91-116.
    1) Introduction. 2) The key libertarian insight into property and orthodox libertarianism’s philosophical confusion. 3) Clearer distinctions for applying to what follows: abstract liberty; practical liberty; moral defences; and critical rationalism. 4) The two dominant (‘Lockean’ and ‘Hobbesian’) conceptions of interpersonal liberty. 5) A general account of libertarianism as a subset of classical liberalism and defended from a narrower view. 6) Two abstract (non-propertarian, non-normative) theories of interpersonal liberty developed and defended: ‘the absence of interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-satisfaction’, abbreviated (...)
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  14.  33
    Falsificationism Unfalsified: A Reply to Callahan’s “Why Popper is Wrong on Induction”.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Epistemology is often a problem for libertarianism. Many libertarian texts assume that they need to do more than explain and defend the libertarian conjecture. Instead, they try to offer epistemological support for it (whether empirically or morally); which falsificationism and, more broadly, critical rationalism explains is not possible. Moreover, they often mistake this attempt at support for an explanation of libertarianism (which ought to include an abstract theory of liberty and how it relates to liberty in practice). Therefore, when a (...)
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  15. Coping with Nonconceptualism? On Merleau-Ponty and McDowell.J. C. Berendzen - 2009 - Philosophy Today 53 (2):162-173.
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  16. Eleutheric-Conjectural Libertarianism: A Concise Philosophical Explanation.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    The general philosophical problem with most versions of social libertarianism and how this essay will proceed. The specific problem with liberty explained by a thought-experiment. The abstract (non-propertarian and non-normative) theory of interpersonal liberty-in-itself as ‘the absence of interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-satisfaction’, for short ‘no (proactive) impositions’. The individualistic liberty-maximisation theory solves the problems of clashes, defences, and rectifications without entailing libertarian consequentialism. The practical implications of instantiating liberty: three rules of liberty-in-practice, 1) initial ultimate control of one’s body, (...)
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  17. How Abstract Liberty Relates to Private Property: A One-Page Outline.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Libertarianism—and classical liberalism generally—presupposes (or entails) a specific, but implicit, conception of liberty. Imagine two lists of property-rights: one list is all those that are libertarian; the other list is all those that are not. What determines into which list a property-right is assigned? If libertarianism is really about liberty, then the determining factor must be whether the property-right fits what liberty is in a more abstract sense. It greatly clarifies matters to have an explicit theory of this presupposed conception (...)
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  18. Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills.J. C. Nyíri & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1988 - Croom Helm.
    A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.
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  19. A Libertarian Response to Macleod 2012: “If You’Re a Libertarian, How Come You’Re So Rich?”.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 95-105.
    This is a response to Macleod 2012's argument that the history of unjust property acquisitions requires rich libertarians to give away everything in excess of equality. At first, problematic questions are raised. How much property is usually inherited or illegitimate? Why should legitimate inheritance be affected? What of the burden of proof and court cases? A counterfactual problem is addressed. Three important cases are considered: great earned wealth; American slavery; land usurpation. All are argued to be problematic for Macleod 2012's (...)
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  20. Motor Imagery and Merleau-Pontyian Accounts of Skilled Action.J. C. Berendzen - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1:169-198.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty is often interpreted as claiming that opportunities for action are directly present in perceptual experience. However, he does not provide much evidence for how or why this would occur, and one can doubt that this is an appropriate interpretation of his phenomenological descriptions. In particular, it could be argued the Merleau-Pontyian descriptions mistakenly attribute pre-perceptual or post-perceptual elements such as allocation of attention or judgment to the perceptual experience itself. This paper argues for the Merleau-Pontyian idea that opportunities (...)
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  21. Disjunctivism and Perceptual Knowledge in Merleau-Ponty and McDowell.J. C. Berendzen - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):261-286.
    On the face of it, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views bear a strong resemblance to contemporary disjunctivist theories of perception, especially John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. Like McDowell, Merleau-Ponty seems to be a direct realist about perception and holds that veridical and illusory perceptions are distinct. This paper furthers this comparison. Furthermore, it is argued that elements of Merleau-Ponty’s thought provide a stronger case for McDowell’s kind of epistemological view than McDowell himself provides. Merleau-Ponty’s early thought can be used to develop a unique (...)
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  22. Arguing with "Libertarianism Without Argument": Critical Rationalism and How It Applies to Libertarianism.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    This is a response to “Libertarianism without Argument”. Various misunderstandings in that text are given replies. Both critical rationalism and how it applies to libertarianism are elucidated and elaborated.
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  23. Intellectual Property, the Non-Aggression Principle, and Pre-Propertarian Liberty: New-Paradigm Libertarian Replies to Some Rothbardian Criticisms.J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 160-183.
    Andy Curzon replied (often quoting from the opening sections of Lester 2014, chapter 10) in an ongoing debate with Lee Waaks, which Mr Waaks forwarded (with approval) to the Libertarian Alliance Forum (27 February 2015). This response replies to the criticisms after directly quoting them (the indented text; except where Lester is occasionally quoted, as indicated). A few cuts have been made to avoid some repetition and irrelevance. However, just as Mr Curzon sometimes repeats his main points in slightly different (...)
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  24. Wittgenstein and the Problem of Machine Consciousness.J. C. Nyíri - 1989 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 33 (1):375-394.
    For any given society, its particular technology of communication has far-reaching consequences, not merely as regards social organization, but on the epistemic level as well. Plato's name-theory of meaning represents the transition from the age of primary orality to that of literacy; Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning stands for the transition from the age of literacy to that of a second orality (audiovisual communication, electronic information processing). On the basis of a use-theory of meaning the problem of machine consciousness, to which (...)
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  25.  93
    A Plague on Both Your Statist Houses: Why Libertarian Restitution Beats State-Retribution and State-Leniency.J. C. Lester - 2005 - In Simple justice / Charles Murray ; commentaries, Rob Allen ; edited by David Conway.
    Charles Murray describes himself as a libertarian, most notably in his short book, What it Means to be a Libertarian. He might more accurately have described himself as having libertarian tendencies. My reading of Simple Justice is that the views it espouses are far more traditionalist than libertarian. Neither traditionalist state-retribution nor modernist state-leniency is libertarian. Nor does either provide as just or efficient a response to crime as does libertarian restitution, including restitutive retribution. Here, I shall respond directly only (...)
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  26.  55
    Libertarianism Allows Retributive Restitution (Which is Optimally Deterring): A Reply to Joseph Ellin’s “Restitution Not Retributive: A Mini-Paper”.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    The following essay responds to a draft article that criticises the theory of libertarian restitution in “Libertarian Rectification: Restitution, Retribution, and the Risk-Multiplier” (LR). The article was freely available to internet search engines. Hence, it seems fair and useful to reply to these very welcome objective criticisms. It is not intellectually relevant that its author might subsequently and subjectively have thought better of them, possibly as a result of the earlier version of this reply. Generally, the article misconstrues the position (...)
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  27.  43
    Reply to the Kyle Swan Review of Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    The central classical liberal insight is that private property appears both to protect personal liberty and to promote general productivity. By way of philosophically clarifying this insight, Escape from Leviathan (EfL) posits the extreme classical liberal, or libertarian, Compatibility Thesis: there is no long-term, systemic, practical conflict among economic rationality, interpersonal liberty, human welfare, and private-property anarchy (i.e., four plausible and relevant theories of these that are presupposed, or entailed, by libertarianism and consonant social science). The review (Liberty, November 2002) (...)
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  28.  32
    Rejoinder to the Kyle Swan Response.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Contra critical rationalism, the response begins by referring to “the variety of internalist and externalist versions of foundationalism” (Liberty, December 2002). But it makes no attempt to explain or defend any of them. Hence, no further criticism is due here. The response then argues that, “The critical rationalist method seems to suggest that Lester’s extreme compatibility thesis is probably false” because—quoting Escape from Leviathan (EfL)—“bold universal theories might be false, and probably are” and yet “he doesn’t think the thesis is (...)
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  29. Advice to the Philosophically Perplexed: A Reply to the S. Meckled-Garcia Booknote on Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Despite receiving high praise from Professors Barry, Narveson, Flew, and Gray (see the first page of the paperback), the review puts the level of Escape from Leviathan (EfL) as “undergraduate” and rates it one star. While undergraduates may profit from reading EfL, it is not mainly at their level. Norman Barry specifically warns “this book is not to be recommended to beginners”. The review either applies unusually high standards of philosophical argumentation or is simply philosophically perplexed.
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  30.  88
    How to Attack a Non-Strawman: A Reply to the Andrew I. Cohen Review of Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Primarily using philosophy, but also some social science, Escape from Leviathan (EfL) explains and defends what it calls an extreme version of the implicit ‘classical liberal compatibility thesis’: liberty, welfare, and anarchy are overwhelmingly complementary in normal practice (rationality is added for its intimate theoretical connections to these categories). This is done using theories, not definitions, of each concept. This important thesis is entirely positive. Therefore, somewhat unusually, all normative issues are avoided as irrelevant distractions in this context. In addition, (...)
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  31. Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”: Three Libertarian Refutations.J. C. Lester - 2020 - Studia Humana 9 (2):135-141.
    Peter Singer’s famous and influential article is criticised in three main ways that can be considered libertarian, although many non-libertarians could also accept them: 1) the relevant moral principle is more plausibly about upholding an implicit contract rather than globalising a moral intuition that had local evolutionary origins; 2) its principle of the immorality of not stopping bad things is paradoxical, as it overlooks the converse aspect that would be the positive morality of not starting bad things and also thereby (...)
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  32.  65
    Smiting Statist Philosophical Philistinism: A Reply to the Thom Brooks Review of Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    It is possible to pose many difficult and fascinating problems and criticisms for the various theses and arguments in Escape from Leviathan (EfL). This occurred while writing it, and various sharp minds did it on reading drafts or the final product. However, some reviews misunderstand, or ignore, what is written and reassert conventional views. But it is best to answer all published criticisms if only to show how they fail, lest anyone thinks they are sound, and even poor criticisms can (...)
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  33. Give Me That Old-Time Justificationism ... Not! A Reply to the James R. Otteson Review of Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    I thank Professor Otteson for his review of Escape from Leviathan (EFL). His exposition of what I wrote is relatively accurate. I shall here do my best to correct any misunderstandings and reply to his welcome criticisms, ignoring our various points of agreement and his generous praise.
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  34. A Reply to the Norman Barry Review of Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    As someone who wishes Escape from Leviathan (EfL) to succeed, I am grateful for a review with such high praise from a well-known classical liberal. As a critical rationalist who also wishes to learn from his mistakes, I am also grateful for Norman Barry’s criticisms. The only way that I can hope to try to repay these and appreciate their full force is by doing my best to reply to them.
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  35. Tibor Foaming with Much Blood: A Reply to the Tibor Machan Review of Escape From Leviathan.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Applying critical rationalism, all criticism is to be welcomed. A serious response can help to elucidate matters even when the criticisms are poor, misconceived, and hostile. Thus, we turn to the review.
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  36.  56
    Escape From Philosophy: A Rejoinder to the Thom Brooks Reply.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    The reply begins by stating that responses to reviews of EfL are “taking criticism of their philosophical claims as personal attacks” and resorting to “hysterical ad hominems”. On the contrary, the responses to around fourteen—often highly positive—reviews have welcomed all their criticisms and simply replied to them. None of these replies appear to commit the ad hominem (to the man) fallacy: that of addressing the qualities of a person as a way of attempting to undermine or defend an argument or (...)
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  37. Immigration and Libertarianism: Open Borders Versus Directionalism.J. C. Lester - forthcoming - MEST Journal:9 (2).
    To explain the correct libertarian approach to immigration, a thought-experiment posits a minimal-state libertarian UK and then the introduction of several relevant anti-libertarian policies with their increasingly disastrous effects. It is argued that the reverse of these imagined policies, as far as is politically possible, must be the correct way forward. This framing is intended to counter the tendency for many articles to misapply libertarian principles to the current messy situation on the mistaken assumption that a state need only stop (...)
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  38.  29
    How the Calvin Hayes Review is Wrong About Libertarianism.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    The review cites the “Open Society” twice in its title—and is clearly pro-Popperian—but then fails to mention the fourteen-point list, and surrounding discussion, that explicitly compares Popper’s critical rationalism with anarcho-libertarianism (strong similarities) and liberal democracy (strong dissimilarities); EfL, pp.135-142. If the review had engaged more closely with the arguments of EfL and been more informed by the relevant social scientific literature, then it would probably have found the anarcho-libertarian case to be far more robust and realistic than such a (...)
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  39. A Critical Commentary on Block 2011: "David Friedman and Libertarianism: A Critique" and a Comparison with Lester [2000] 2012's Responses to Friedman.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 106-143.
    David Friedman posed a number of libertarian philosophical problems (Friedman 1989). This essay criticizes Walter Block’s Rothbardian responses (Block 2011) and compares them with J C Lester’s critical-rationalist, libertarian-theory responses (Lester [2000] 2012). The main issues are as follows. 1. Critical rationalism and how it applies to libertarianism. 2.1. How libertarianism is not inherently about law and is inherently about morals. 2.2. How liberty relates to property and can be maximized: carbon dioxide and radio waves. 2.3. Applying the theory to (...)
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  40. Abortion and Infanticide: A Radical Libertarian Defence.J. C. Lester - forthcoming - In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 19: One Year After Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020). Ria University Press.
    1. First there is an outline of the libertarian approach taken here. 2. On the assumption of personhood, it is explained how there need be no overall inflicted harm and no proactive killing with abortion and infanticide. This starts with an attached-adult analogy and transitions to dealing directly with the issues. Various well-known criticisms are answered throughout. 3. There is then a more-abstract explanation of how it is paradoxical to assume a duty to do more than avoid inflicting overall harm (...)
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  41. Adversus “Adversus Homo Economicus”: Critique of the “Critique of Lester’s Account of Instrumental Rationality”.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    This essay goes through Frederick 2015 (F15) in some detail, responding to the various paraphrases and criticisms therein. It is argued that in each case F15 is mistaken about what Lester 2012 (L12) says, or about what F15 presents as a sound criticism, or both. It is concluded that the philosophical theory of new-paradigm libertarianism that L12 (etc.) comprises has yet to be given adequate critical consideration, and that almost all libertarian texts still fall foul of the three fundamental errors (...)
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  42. Against Against Intellectual Property: A Short Refutation of Meme Communism.J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 148-154.
    This essay is intended to be a refutation of the main thesis in Against Intellectual Property, Kinsella 2008 (hereafter, K8). Points of agreement, relatively trivial disagreement, and irrelevant issues will largely be ignored, as will much repetition of errors in K8. Otherwise, the procedure is to go through K8 quoting various significantly erroneous parts as they arise and explaining the errors involved. It will not be necessary to respond at the same length as K8 itself.
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  43.  63
    A Critical Commentary On Kukathas's "Two Constructions Of Libertarianism".J. C. Lester - 2012 - Libertarian Papers 4 (2):77-88.
    Kukathas’s proposed libertarian dilemma is introduced and two key criticisms of it stated. The following critical commentary then makes several main points. Kukathas’s account of libertarianism offers no theory of liberty at all, nor a coherent account of aggression. Consequently, he cannot see that his “Federation of Liberty” is not libertarian by a basic understanding of morals and non-invasive liberty, still less by a more precise theory of liberty. In trying to explain his “Union of Liberty,” Kukathas evinces considerable confusion (...)
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  44.  72
    A Critical Commentary on the Zwolinski 2013 "Libertarianism and Liberty" Essays.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 64-84.
    The Zwolinski 2013 "libertarianism and liberty" essays on libertarianism_org are argued to have the following problems: taking libertarianism to be a "commitment" to the view that "liberty is the highest political value" ; examining and rejecting the maximization of liberty without a libertarian theory of liberty; accepting a persuasive sense of "coercion" ; misunderstandingliberty in the work place; conflating, to varying degrees, freedom of action and freedom from aggression and justice/rights/morals; focusing on logically possible clashes instead of practically possible congruence (...)
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  45.  60
    A Damned Politician: A Dialogue Introduction to Libertarianism.J. C. Lester - 2017 - In Two Dialogues: Introductions to Philosophy and Libertarianism. Buckingham MK18, UK: pp. 47-88.
    Why learn about libertarianism? Because politics causes or exacerbates the very problems that it purports to solve, or it misperceives voluntary behaviour and free markets as problems. Liberty is always preferable: its maximal practical observance entailing self-ownership, private property, and consensual interactions. And libertarianism will be the ideological framework of the future of humankind.
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  46.  92
    Alan Haworth Anti-Libertarianism[REVIEW]J. C. Lester - 1997 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 14: 92-93.
    In this book Alan Haworth tends to sneer at libertarians. However, there are, I believe, a few sound criticisms. I have always held similar opinions of Murray Rothbard‟s and Friedrich Hayek‟s definitions of liberty and coercion, Robert Nozick‟s account of natural rights, and Hayek‟s spontaneous-order arguments. I urge believers of these positions to read Haworth. But I don‟t personally know many libertarians who believe them (or who regard Hayek as a libertarian).
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  47. A Response to "Libertarianism and Pollution: The Limits of Absolutist Moralism".J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libetarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 155-159.
    Most self-identified libertarians unwittingly have a moral muddle without a central factual theory of liberty. They cannot yet see that they first need to sort out what liberty is, and therefore entails if instantiated, and only after that can moral questions about it be coherently raised and tackled.
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  48. A Reply to Frederick 2013: “A Critique of Lester’s Account of Liberty”.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 155-199.
    Frederick 2013 (F13) offers criticisms of the Lester 2012 (L12) theory of libertarian liberty and of its compatibility with preference-utilitarian welfare and private-property anarchy. This reply to F13 first explains the underlying philosophical problem with libertarian liberty and L12’s solution. It then goes through F13 in detail showing that it does not grasp the problem or the solution and offers only misrepresentations and unsound criticisms.
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  49. Apriorist Self-Interest: How It Embraces Altruism and is Not Vacuous.J. C. Lester - 1997 - Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 20 (3):221-232.
    This essay is part of an attempt to reconcile two extreme views in economics: the (neglected) subjective, apriorist approach and the (standard) objective, scientific (i.e., falsifiable) approach. The Austrian subjective view of value, building on Carl Menger’s theory of value, was developed into a theory of economics as being entirely an a priori theory of action. This probably finds its most extreme statement in Ludwig von Mises’ Human Action (1949). In contrast, the standard economic view has developed into making falsifiable (...)
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  50. A Sceptical Look at “A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper”.J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: the University of Buckingham Press. pp. 102-107.
    It is an irony to attack a more sceptical epistemology than one's own in the name of scepticism and defend, instead, an epistemology that is positively illogical. And yet that is what Martin Gardner has done in his “A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper.”.
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