The UK Government's Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill is currently progressing through Parliament. The bill is designed to strengthen free speech and academic freedom in higher education, in response to what former Education Secretary Gavin Williamson describes as ‘the rise of intolerance and cancel culture upon our campuses’. But is there really a crisis of academic freedom in British universities?To see that there is, say Judith Suissa and Alice Sullivan, we need only look at the contemporary reality of (...) suppression of debate on sex and gender. The evidence they catalogue of suppression of research, of blacklisting, harassment and smear campaigns, of no-platforming, disinvitations and shutting down of events, is incontrovertible. The recent experience of scholars and students wishing to discuss the material reality and political salience of sex makes complacency about academic freedom a luxury we cannot afford.Suissa and Sullivan set out a powerful argument for the role of academic freedom in pursuing truth within the academy and developing democracy beyond it. They effectively counter attempts to narrow the scope of academic freedom so as to render it compatible with no-platforming. And they lay out a series of practical steps administrators can take to ensure that universities are places where an expansive and pluralistic intellectual climate prevails.This is a timely and compelling intervention in a vexed but urgent public debate. For their clear-sighted diagnosis of where and how academic freedom has been eroded in our universities, and for their judicious account of what must be done to rebuild it, Suissa and Sullivan deserve a wide and attentive hearing. (shrink)

The so-called cultural war in classics seems to have evolved into a false dilemma, at least according to Dan-el Padilla Peralta’s and Johanna Hanink’s understanding of their profession (“If Classics Doesn’t Change, Let It Burn, The Chronicle Review, February 11): Either one accepts the views of those who have glorified and romanticized about Roman and Greek classical culture or one accepts the views of those who are ready to “burn down” the classical tradition. Between the two extremes there is (...) plenty of room and issues to be explored from serious, critical, and contestable points of view. (shrink)

This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose purpose isn’t just (...) to protect the speech of academics, but also to give them the prerogative to determine which views and speakers have sufficient disciplinary credentials to receive a hearing in academic contexts. No platforming should therefore be acceptable to liberals, in principle, in cases where it is used to support a university culture that maintains rigorous disciplinary standards, by denying attention and credibility to speakers without appropriate disciplinary credentials. (shrink)

Jon Stewart, the famous comic of the Daily Show, takes on creationism, intelligent design and evolution.

Bird on an Ethics Wire es un libro sobre valores y cómo los entendemos como individuos y como sociedad. Es un libro que refleja un profundo respeto por la filosofía y la ética clásica como una subdisciplina de la filosofía moral; pero no está escrito para filósofos, sino más bien para una audiencia y escenarios distintos de la esfera pública, como una contribución en la búsqueda de los valores que podemos asumir en nuestras vidas. Por esta razón, la doctora Somerville (...) toca temas ampliamente discutidos de la bioética como el aborto, la eutanasia, la fertilización in vitro, e incluso el transhumanismo, pero va mucho más allá de la tradicional discusión de pros y contras. Podríamos decir que el argumento central del libro se encuentra en aquello que ella dice que cuando algunas personas tratan con el misterio lo convierten en un problema y terminan buscando una solución tecnológica para él (p.200), olvidando completamente que la experiencia del asombro, el maravillarse y la reverencia enriquecen nuestras vidas y nos pueden ayudar a encontrar el significado y la manera como vemos el mundo y por lo tanto, ayudándonos a tomar las decisiones en nuestras vidas. (shrink)

It is widely thought that stealing, trading and destroying cultural artifacts in time of war are inherently immoral actions, and that it is right that they be treated as war crimes, which, indeed, they currently are. But oppressive cultures have their heritage and cultural artifacts too, in the form of monuments, sites of worship, and so on; and for the oppressed, these things may be awful reminders of their subordination, and may even perpetuate it. This chapter suggests that, since cultural (...) objects can be both tools and symbols of unjust oppression, their theft and destruction ought to be seen as appropriate when this would be a means of overcoming oppression. Whatever current law may say, in these instances, it would be morally inappropriate to count such acts as war crimes. Furthermore, it is bizarre that theft and destruction of cultural property are counted as war crimes when soldiers killing each other is not (due to combatant immunity). Surely killing is worse than property destruction and theft. It is therefore argued that, where possible, it would be better for conflicts to be fought using the latter methods. Finally, the chapter responds to many objections to using theft and destruction of cultural property as a method of warfare. E.g. to the objection that such property has timeless, trans-cultural, aesthetic, historical and scientific value, it is replied that justice is a more important value; and to the objection that these practices amount to cultural genocide it is replied that unjust cultures have no right to exist unmodified. (This chapter was formerly entitled: "Culture Weaponized: A Contrarian Theory of the Sometime Appropriateness of the Destruction, Theft and Trade of Art and Cultural Artifacts in Armed Conflict." The PhilPapers archived version is a pre-penultimate version of the published version.). (shrink)

Bernard Williams thought that philosophy should address real human concerns felt beyond academic philosophy. But what wider concerns are addressed by Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, a book he introduces as being ‘principally about how things are in moral philosophy’? In this article, we argue that Williams responded to the concerns of his day indirectly, refraining from explicitly claiming wider cultural relevance, but hinting at it in the pair of epigraphs that opens the main text. This was Williams’s solution (...) to what he perceived as the stylistic problem of how to pursue philosophy as cultural critique. Taking the epigraphs as interpretative keys to the wider resonances of the book, we show how they reveal Williams’s philosophical concerns – with the primacy of character over method, the obligation to follow orders, and the possibility of combining truth, truthfulness, and a meaningful life in a disillusioned world – to be recognisably rooted in the cultural concerns of post-war Britain. In the light of its epigraphs, the book emerges as the critique of a philosophical tradition’s inadequacies to the special difficulties of its cultural moment. (shrink)

In discussion surrounding the destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflict, one often hears two important claims in support of intervention to safeguard heritage. The first is that the protection of people and the protection of heritage are two sides of the same coin. The second is that the cultural heritage of any people is part of the common heritage of all humankind. In this article, I examine both of these claims, and consider the extent to which they align with (...) the current practices that they are intended to justify. (shrink)

Ruins are evocative structures, and we value them in different ways for the various things they mean to us. Ruins can be aesthetically appreciated, but they are also valued for their historical importance, what they symbolize to different cultures and communities, and as lucrative objects, i.e., for tourism. However, today an increasing number of ancient ruins have been damaged or completely destroyed by acts of war. In 2001 the Taliban struck a major blow to cultural heritage by blasting the Bamiyan (...) Buddhas out of existence. They were not easy to destroy. This direct targeting of cultural property might change our attitudes toward conservation practices. Francesco Bandarin, the UNESCO assistant director-general for culture, states, “Deliberate destruction has created a new context. At the time, Bamiyan was an exceptional case.” Bandarin’s comments notwithstanding, the destruction of cultural property in times of war is not new. Not only is there relatively settled international law prohibiting the looting of cultural property during times of war, we can find examples of intentional destruction of cultural property from thousands of years ago. In this paper I would like to focus on one particular case, that of the Mỹ Sơn Archaeological Sanctuary, in the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam. Mỹ Sơn is the foremost Champa archaeological site and the largest archaeological site in Việt Nam. The largest temple (kalan) at Mỹ Sơn, A1, was destroyed in a US bombing raid in 1969. In this paper I highlight different approaches to architectural cultural heritage preservation in terms of reconstruction, restoration, and ruination -- with an eye to applying these approaches to the remains of the A1 temple in Mỹ Sơn. I briefly discuss the history of Mỹ Sơn before providing some reasons to believe that we should allow A1 to ruinate. (shrink)

In my paper, I develop a phenomenological and pragmatist reflection on the fragility of liberal democracy’s moral foundations in times of war. Following Judith Shklar’s conception of the “liberalism of fear”, the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order is seen as grounded in experiences of suffering caused by political violence. It is also assumed that the liberalism of fear delivers an adequate conception of the normative foundations of the European project. With the help of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (...) and Michel Henry, the paper ants to philosophically deepen the liberalism of fear by outlining a theory of “pathic evidence” as a normative foundation and the concept of a common “flesh of the political” as a shared moral sensitivity that sets boundaries to political conflict as well as the political imaginary, excluding what I call the production of “monumental meaning”. It then examines the question which political conditions are needed for this evidence to become a shared, communal criteria of ethical thought, and considers inner and outer challenges to the transmission and reproduction of this evidence in time, drawing especially on John Dewey’s ideas of democratic communication and social intelligence. In the current war, the following problem appears as crucial for the “soul” of European democracies which are confronted with the need to respond to Russia’s attack: How can a political morality grounded in pathic evidence be sustained, once it is challenged by an aggressor who, out of cultural and political reasons, shows a higher level of toleration towards violence? Besides aggression from an external foe, there are also temporal dynamics that further the loss of the inhibiting force of pathic evidence from the inside. As it shall be argued, boredom can be such a factor. The paper concludes by drawing conclusions for the current war in Ukraine. (shrink)

In the culture of ancient Greece, the term Paideia (Greek: παιδεία) referred to the upbringing and education of an ideal member of the polis. However, the period from Homer's epic poetry (9th or 8th century BCE) to the Peloponnesian War (5th century BCE) differs notably, concerning the forms of Hellenistic culture after the emergence of Christianity (especially from 2nd to 9th century AD). For that reason, it is necessary to consider what significance Paideia had in different historical periods (...) of Greek culture. In addition, the discussion of Paideia cannot exist in the abstract form of conceptual analysis without taking into account the real historical figures who contributed to the survival of Greek culture in the Roman and early Christian periods. This paper aims to examine the role of Greek culture in the social life of the early Christian Romans. We will try to achieve this through a detailed analysis of the panegyrics (Greek: πανήγυρις). Panegyrics are eulogies that educated pagan thinkers addressed to Roman emperors. Following the panegyrics, we will examine the influence of the Greek tradition on the distribution of the social roles in the upper classes in the Roman Empire. At the same time, by analyzing panegyric, the socio-cultural context of early Rome, and the demands that social betterment placed on pagan thinkers, we will introduce new elements of Christian Paideia concerning her classical predecessor, thus showing what such a transformation essentially entailed. (shrink)

The War on Drugs has been waged primarily for cultural reasons, i.e., to enforce the Protestant Work Ethic. It does not serve a rational utilitarian function.

Historically, laws and policies to criminalize drug use or possession were rooted in explicit racism, and they continue to wreak havoc on certain racialized communities. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, psychologists, and other allied professionals who have come together in support of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and ethically recommended. We call for the immediate decriminalization of all so-called recreational drugs and, ultimately, for their timely and appropriate legal regulation. We (...) also call for criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses pertaining to the use or possession of small quantities of such drugs to be expunged, and for those currently serving time for these offenses to be released. In effect, we call for an end to the “war on drugs.”. (shrink)

TUCÍDIDES: GUERRA DO PELOPONESO E A BUSCA DA OBJETIVIDADE1 TUCÍDIDES: PELOPONNESE WAR AND THE SEARCH OF OBJECTIVITY Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva2 IFPE - Belo Jardim 1 CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO: GUERRA DE PELOPONESO Os gregos liderados por Atenas e Esparta venceram os persas na batalha naval, em Salamina (480 a.C.), e terrestre, em Plateia (479 a.C.), expulsando-os definitivamente da sua terra. Nos anos seguintes, Atenas consolidou seu poder sobre outras cidades, especialmente nas ilhas do Mar Jônico, formando a Confederação de Delos. (...) Ressentindo-se com a ascensão da rival, Esparta começou a bloquear o desenvolvimento do império ateniense. Temístocles,3 que assumiu papel preponderante nas guerras persas, começou a alertar a seus compatriotas das intenções da grande cidade do Peloponeso. Não obstante, foi derrubada por uma oligarquia, sendo exilado em seguida. Surgiu, então, uma nova liderança do partido democrático, Péricles, que, em 441 a.C., assumiu o governo de Atenas. 4 TUCÍDIDES nasceu, por volta de 465 a 460 a.C., em data incerta, em Halinute, 5 próximo de Atenas, descendente de rica família ateniense, sendo filho de Oberós. Sofreu muito com a grave epidemia de 430 a 427 a.C., na qual faleceu Péricles, mas a ela sobreviveu. Em 424 a.C., era comandante naval das tropas ateniense na Trácia, estacionada na ilha de Samos, mas não conseguiu impedir que o comandante espartano Brasidas ocupasse Anfípolis, cidade de grande importância para o fornecimento de trigo para Atenas, razão pela 6 qual foi exilado no mesmo ano.7 Depois de vinte anos, com o fim da guerra de Peloponeso, pôde retornar do ostracismo, falecendo em 400 a.C., sem ter terminado a sua obra História da Guerra do Peloponeso. Foi educado e influenciado pelas personalidades mais ilustres de Atenas, como Péricles e pelos sofistas, tendo ainda convivido com Eurípedes. Existia narração de encontro seu, ainda adolescente, com HERÔDOTOS, historiador da guerra com os persas e já 8 conhecido em sua época. Este lia trechos de sua História, por ocasião de concurso literário, durante a realização de Jogos Olímpicos, tendo TUCÍDIDES chegado às lágrimas, ao ouvir as narrativas, demonstrando seu pendor para a história.9 O autor escolheu como tema de sua obra a Guerra do Peloponeso, por ele considerada a mais importante até então, como expunha no início de sua obra: “1. O ateniense Tucídides escreveu a história da guerra entre os peloponesos e os atenienses, começando desde os primeiros sinais, na expectativa de que ela seria grande e mais importante que todas as anteriores, pois viu que ambas as partes estavam preparadas em todos os sentidos; além disto, observava os demais helenos aderindo a um lado ou ao outro, uns imediatamente, os restantes pensando em fazê-lo. Com efeito, tratava-se do maior movimento jamais realizado pelos helenos, estendendo-se também a alguns povos bárbaros, bem dizer à maior parte da humanidade”. 10 As relações entre Atenas e Esparta continuaram tensas, principalmente depois que aquela, ignorando essa, levantou uma nova e extensa muralha em sua volta, com a desculpa de precisar de defesa contra os persas. A Confederação de Delos, ao longo dos anos, serviu apenas para fortalecer seu poder marítimo e embelezar a cidade, que tinha sido destruída pelos persas. As cidades-estados que integravam a Confederação como aliadas passaram logo à condição de súditas, perdendo a liberdade. O estopim para a guerra foi a ajuda que os atenienses deram a Córcira, contra sua metrópole, Corinto, aliada dos espartanos, em 431 a.C. No começo, com a força de Atenas, na frota marítima, e de sua rival, com suas falanges, houve apenas incursões periódicas. Contudo, a grande peste de 429 a.C., que levou Péricles, bem como as desastrosas campanhas contra Siracura, na Sicília, em 415 a.C., cidade dória, que fornecia trigo para Esparta, enfraqueceu os atenienses. Logo seus aliados começaram a se revoltar e os espartanos levaram a guerra para a Ática, fazendo com que Atenas capitulasse em 404 a.C., sendo destruída suas muralhas e sua frota naval. O esforço de guerra foi tão grande que todo o mundo grego se enfraqueceu, permitindo que a Macedônia dominasse toda a Grécia, em 338 a.C. A única obra de TUCÍDIDES foi marcada pela objetividade e busca da verdade, evitando as fábulas e as lendas. A História da Guerra do Peloponeso compunha-se de cinco partes: a primeira, o Livro I, tratava da importância dessa guerra e do método histórico do autor; a segunda, os Livros II, III, IV e parte do V, versava sobre a chamada Guerra dos Dez Anos; a terceira, fim do Livro V, descrevia a paz precária; a quarta, Livros VI e VII, cobria a guerra na Sicília; e a quinta, Livro VIII, tratava da chamada Guerra de Decêleia e da operação na Ásia Menor. Faleceu antes de terminar sua obra, deixando-a inacabada, em 400 a.C. Não podia deixar de haver comparações entre as obras de TUCÍDIDES e HERÔDOTOS, pois enquanto este escreveu sobre amplo tema envolvendo várias regiões, povos e época, aquele restringiu seu assunto à Guerra de Peloponeso. O método de 11 TUCÍDIDES foi mais neutro e racional, sendo considerado mais objetivo do que o do outro, pois escrevia apenas com base no conhecimento pessoal ou em informações cuidadosamente verificadas. A exatidão e a objetividade levaram-no a ser considerado um dos maiores historiadores da Antiguidade e, até hoje, admirado pela precisão e pesquisa empreendida. 2 TUCÍDIDES E O MÉTODO: A BUSCA DA OBJETIVIDADE A obra de TUCÍDIDES tem fundamentação teórica no racionalismo de Anaxágora e 12 na visão crítica dos sofistas. Estava voltado para o rigor de exatidão, tanto nos fatos históricos, como na apreciação dos homens e nas descrições do espaço geográfico. Existia em sua obra um método, voltado para a aferição da verdade e a imparcialidade de julgamento, excluindo os mitos e as lendas. O autor procurou, inicialmente, separar seu método do utilizado por HERÔDOTOS ao denunciar que “20 [...] Os homens, na verdade, aceitam uns dos outros relatos de segunda mão dos eventos passados, negligenciando pô-los à prova ainda que tais eventos se relacionem com sua própria terra. [...] A tal ponto chegou a aversão de certos homens pela pesquisa meticulosa da verdade e tão grande é a predisposição para valer-se apenas do que está ao alcance da mão”.14 TUCÍDIDES procurou elaborar sua análise das ações históricas, como a movimentação de tropas e os combates, as matérias relativas à opinião pública, as discussões dos dirigentes sobre a estratégia adequada ou o confronto entre as delegações diplomáticas. Procurou, então, explicar a complexidade da situação política e a dificuldade de se escolher a opção adequada. Para ele, o conflito era permanente entre as soluções adequadas aos problemas apresentados, com base na influência sofista. O método utilizado significava exprimir a complexidade da situação e a dificuldade de escolha, dentro de um mesmo contexto. A discussão contraditória entre os oponentes representava as opções extremadas das soluções de problemas.15 Para Jackeline de Romilly, o método utilizado foi o da antiloquia, que consistia em opor discursos. Essa autora indicava que a metodologia de TUCÍDIDES estava perfeitamente exemplificada, nos dois discursos pronunciados em Camerina, por Heróncrates e pelo ateniense Eufemos, no Livro VI (§§ 75 a 87). Usava a prática jurídica, pois entre os gregos havia o hábito de sempre se ouvir duas teorias adversas, apresentadas como o maior vigor possível, de modo que da relação entre os dois discursos pudesse sair a verdade.16 Coube a TUCÍDIDES, ainda, a paternidade da investigação do passado, em um trabalho quase de arqueologia, ainda que ele não se tivesse preocupado em fazer escavações. Não obstante, trouxe para a história novas provas e informações. O autor afirmava, então, que: “22. [...] O empenho em apurar os fatos se constitui numa tarefa laboriosa, pois as testemunhas oculares de vários eventos nem sempre faziam os mesmos relatos a respeito das mesmas coisas, mas variavam de acordo com suas simpatias por um lado ou pelo outro, ou de acordo com sua memória. Pode acontecer que a ausência do fabuloso em minha narrativa pareça menos agradável ao ouvido, mas quem quer que deseje ter uma ideia clara tanto dos eventos ocorridos quanto daqueles que algum dia voltarão a ocorrer em circunstâncias idênticas ou semelhante em consequência de seu conteúdo humano, julgará minha história útil e isto me bastará. Na verdade, ela foi feita para ser patrimônio sempre útil, e não uma composição a ser ouvida no momento da competição por algum prêmio”. 17 A obra de TUCÍDIDES tinha seus problemas, pois às vezes era lenta e cansativa, sem a graça e a criatividade de HERÔDOTOS, mas a objetividade obtida representava um marco na análise histórica e política da humanidade. Precedera em dois mil anos a própria criação da ciência, podendo dizer que sua pesquisa tinha rigor científico e busca da verdade. Por outro lado, várias de suas antilogias foram criadas pelo autor, a partir de informações orais, com o uso da contradição, mas sem chegar exatamente a uma síntese, apenas informando as posições contrárias, sem qualquer opção pessoal. Notas: 1 In. COSTA, N. N. Ciência Política. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2012. p. 68-74. 2 Tecnólogo em agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Normalista pela Escola Frei Cassiano Comacchio. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos com cunho filosófico, com ênfase em política. 3 “Temístocles, general e político ateniense (Atenas, c. 525 – Magnésia do Menandro, c. 460 a.C.). Chefe do partido democrático, havia aconselhado osateniensesa voltarem todasas suasatividades paraaexpansão marítima, encontrado neste ponto a oposição de Aristides, chefe do partido aristocrático. Tendo obtido a condenação deste ao ostracismo, Temístocles fez construir o porto de Pireu e equipou excelente frota. Ao ser invadidaa Grécia por Xerxes, obrigou os persas a aceitar um combate naval, antes que o exército grego se retirasse para o Peloponeso, daí resultando a vitória de Salamina (480). Apesar da oposição de Esparta, rival de Atenas, Temístocles fez reconstruir as muralhas de Atenas, fortificou a parte de Pireu e de Muníquia. Contado, em decorrência das intrigas de Esparta, foiacusado de peculato e condenado ao ostracismo (471)” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 1558). 4 Vide nota 7 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 5 “Tucídides em gr. Thoukidídes, historiador grego (Atenas c. 465 – 395 a.C.). Eleito estratego em 424 a.C., foi encarregado da defesa do litoral da Trácia durante a Guerra do Peloponeso. Derrotado, viu-se forçado a partir para o exílio e só regressou à sua pátria por volta de 404 a.C. No exílio começou aescrever (431 a.C.) suas Histórias da Guerra do Peloponeso, que não chegou a terminar e que é uma profundareflexão políticasobrea natureza do poder indo em busca das causas profundas dosacontecimentos. O desenvolvimento do conflito éaí narrado em estilo simples e direto, por vezes entremeados de trechos de grande força emotiva, como o discurso de Péricles sobre atenienses mortos na guerra. Além de ter sido o compilador de um relato concreto dos acontecimentos. Túcides é considerado o primeiro historiador a adotar uma postura críticaem relação aeles” (Grande Enciclopédia Larousse Cultural, op. cit., vol. 23, p. 5734). 6 “104. [...] E mandaram um mensageiro ao outro comandante para o território fronteiro à Trácia; ele era Tucídides filho de Oloros, o autor desta História, na época estacionado em Tasos, ilha situada a aproximadamente meio-dia de viagem por mar de Anfípolis e colônia de Paros, e lhe pediam para socorrê-los. Recebendo a mensagem, ele partiu imediatamente com sete naus que se encontravam lá, pois queriam chegar o mais depressa possível, principalmente para socorrer Anfípolis antes dela render-se, ou, se isto não fosse possível para ocupar Êion. 105. Nesse ínterim Brasidas, temendo a vinda dos de Tasos, e tendo ouvido dizer que Tucídides, um detentor dos direitos de exploração das minas de ouro naquela parte da Trácia, exercendo por isso grande influência sobre os homens mais importantes do continente, apressou-se em capturar a cidade” (TUCÍDIDES. A Guerra do Peloponeso. 3ª ed. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1987, pp. 228-9). 7 “26. [...] Vivi a guerra inteira, tendo umaidade que me permitiaformar meu próprio juízo, e segui-aatentamente, de modo a obter informações precisas. Atingiu-me também uma condenação ao exílio que me manteve longe de minha terra por vinte anos após meu período de comando em Anfípolis e, diante de minhafamiliaridade com asatividades de ambos os lados, especialmente aquelas do Peloponeso em consequência de meu banimento, graças ao meu ócio pude acompanhar melhor o curso dos acontecimentos” (TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 255). 8 Vide nota 12 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 9 KURY, Mário Gama (Introdução. In: TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 13) cita com referência dos fatos a obra de Marcelino, que escreveu a Vida de Tucídides, na época do imperador bizantino Justiniano. 10 TUCÍDIDES. A Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 19. 11 “Tucídides começou do ponto em que Herôdotos deixou a narração – o termo de Guerra Persa. [...] Herôdotos escrevia com o fito de entreter o leitor culto; Tucídides escreve visando fornecer informaçõesaos futuros historiadores e orientar com a experiência do passado aos futuros estadistas. Herôdotos narra em estilo solto e fluente, inspirado talvez pelo modo dos poemas de Homero; Tucídides, como alguém que tinha ouvido filósofos, oradores e dramaturgos, escreve em estilo frequentemente complicado e obscuro. [...] Herôdotos abrangia os mais remotos lugares, e as mais variadas épocas; Tucídides força a sua história numa severa moldura cronológica de estações e anos sacrificando a continuidade da narrativa. Herôdotos escrevia mais à luz das personalidades do que dos processos, sentindo que estes se operam através daqueles; Tucídides, [...] inclina-se mais para o relato impessoal e para a consideração das causas, desenvolvimentos e resultado. Herôdotos descrevia acontecimentos remotos, a ele narrados, na maioria das vezes, de segunda e terceira mão; Tucídides com frequênciase exprime baseado na própriatestemunha, no de quem informa ou em documentos originais, em vários trechos reproduz os documentos citados” (DURANT, Will. A História da Civilização. nossa herança clássica, op. cit., vol. II, p. 341). 12 Vide nota 8 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 13 “Os primeiros desses novos humanistas, os Sofistas, salientaram-se no tempo da grande eclosão do individualismo que se referem às Guerras Persas e da difusão da democracia por todo o mundo grego e os sofistas consideravam perda de tempo a busca de uma vaga e fugitiva verdade a respeito do universo. Achavam muito melhor estudar o problema, bem mais prático, do homem e da sociedade. Como mestres, sua finalidade ideal era preparar jovens para assumirem sua responsabilidade de cidadão” (SAVELLE, Max (coord.), História da Civilização Mundial: as primeiras culturas humanas, op. cit., vol. I, p. 203). 14 TUCÍDIDES. História de Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 27. 15 CHÂTELLET, François. Tucídides: a guerra do peloponeso. In: CHÂTELLET, François, DUHAMEL, Olivier, e PISIER, Evelyne. Dicionário de Obras Políticas. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1993, p. 1.221. 16 “Os Gregos sempre viram no princípio daantilogiaa própria condição dasabedoriae da compreensão. A antilogiaé a deliberação” (ROMILLY, Jackeline de. História e Razão em Tucídides. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1998, p. 143). 17 TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra de Peloponeso, Livro Primeiro, op. cit., p. 28. (shrink)

The Second World War and its associated political events of a national and global scale brought new circumstances, which was considerably influenced the development processes of Tehran. During World War II, Iran hoped that Washington would keep Britain and the Soviet Union from seizing control of the country’s oil fields. In 1951 and 1952 Truman worked with Iranian Prime Minister, though unsuccessfully, to regain some of those lost oil rights for Iran. By the late 1950s and President Kennedy’s presidency, he (...) used aid as leverage for social reform. During the early years of 1960s, the Kennedy Administration was urging its allies in the third world to carry out necessary reforms in order to prevent popular discontent and enhance the dominant ideology of ‘modernism’. In 1968, a major piece of legislation, the Urban Development and Renewal Act, enabled the municipality to implement Tehran’s Comprehensive Plan (TCP 1968), which integrated all the elements of a 1960s’ American city such as the separation of functions, highways, suburbs, shopping centers and housing area. The export of these American cities principles can only be understood from the background of the Cold War period, in which the east and west were both competing for cultural colonization of Middle Eastern strategically important cities like Tehran. During this period, the new developments supported by the oil boom of 1970s, were built in different forms to constitute an expanding metropolis. In 1974, the second “International Congress of Architecture” with the theme of “Toward a Quality of Life” held at Persepolis and brought together all leading world architects and planners to review Iran’s progress in its professional response to the challenges posed by increasing oil revenues. This research aims to represent the export of planning as a political means of cultural colonization of the Third World during the cold war period. (shrink)

During the past decades, the culture industries have multiplied media spectacles in novel spaces and sites, and spectacle itself is becoming one of the organizing principles of the economy, polity, society, and everyday life. An Internet-based economy has been developing hi-tech spectacle as a means of promotion, reproduction, and the circulation and selling of commodities, using multimedia and increasingly sophisticated technology to dazzle consumers. M edia culture proliferates ever more technologically sophisticated spectacles to seize audiences and augment their (...) power and profit. The forms of entertainment permeate news and information, and a tablodized infotainment culture is more and more popular. New multimedia that synthesize forms of radio, film, TV news and entertainment, and the mushrooming domain of cyberspace, become spectacles of technoculture, generating expanding sites of information and entertainment, while intensifying the spectacle-form of media culture. Political and social life is also shaped more and more by media spectacle. Social and political conflicts are increasingly played out on the screens of media culture, which display spectacles like sensational murder cases, terrorist bombings, celebrity and political sex scandals, and the explosive violence of everyday life. M edia culture not only takes up expanding moments of contemporary experience, but also provides ever more material for fantasy, dreaming, modeling thought and behavior, and constructing identities. Of course, there have been spectacles since premodern times. Classical Greece had its Olympics, thespian and poetry festivals, its public rhetorical battles, and bloody and violent wars. Ancient Rome had its public offerings of bread and circuses, its orgies, its titanic political battles, and the spectacle of Empire with parades and monuments for triumphant Caesars and their armies, extravaganzas put on display in the 2000 film Gladiator.. (shrink)

The British government's current educational policy for England draws on E.D. Hirsch's writings on 'cultural literacy'. This paper aims to uncover the roots of Hirsch’s influential views through a genealogical critique. Hirsch admired the Scottish Enlightenment educator Hugh Blair as a model architect of a hegemonic culture to unite disparate members of a nation. Following Hirsch, the government Department for Education in England called for ‘shared appreciation of cultural reference points’ and ‘a common stock of knowledge on which all (...) can draw and trade’. Consequently, the literature curriculum in England increasingly disenfranchises a significant component of the population in terms of both gender and cultural heritage. Recent ‘culture wars’ have highlighted the legacy of colonialism and have led educators to decolonise the curriculum and prioritise social justice. Continuing racism within civil society demonstrates the need for a general recognition that cultures are desirably diverse and internally plural. (shrink)

The historic material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to their (...) disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historical trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance. (shrink)

In so far as long-range tele-operated weapons, such as the United States’ Predator and Reaper drones, allow their operators to fight wars in what appears to be complete safety, thousands of kilometres removed from those whom they target and kill, it is unclear whether drone operators either require courage or have the opportunity to develop or exercise it. This chapter investigates the implications of the development of tele-operated warfare for the extent to which courage will remain central to the (...) role of the warrior and for the future culture of the armed services in the age of drone warfare. (shrink)

Whenever we try to make an inventory of humankind’s store of knowledge, we stumble into an ongoing battle between what CP Snow called ‘the two cultures’. On one side are the humanities, on the other are the sciences (natural and physical), with social science and philosophy caught somewhere in the middle. This is more than a turf dispute among academics. It strikes at the core of what we mean by human knowledge.

Many just war theorists (call them traditionalists) claim that just as people have a right to personal self-defense, so nations have a right to national-defense against an aggressive military invasion. David Rodin claims that the traditionalist is unable to justify most defensive wars against aggression. For most aggressive states only commit conditional aggression in that they threaten to kill or maim the citizens of the nation they are invading only if those citizens resist the occupation. Most wars, then, (...) claimed to be justified by the traditionalist fail to meet the proportionality criterion. Thus, a just war, for Rodin, is best conceived of as a punitive war of law enforcement, not as a war of national-defense. I argue that Rodin does not have a case against the traditionalist. If national-defense is a disproportionate response to conditional aggression, then punitive war is a disproportionate response as well. Furthermore, the belief that punitive war is a proportionate response to conditional aggression underscores the traditionalist’s view that self-determination, cultural identity and the like are of sufficient value to defend by means of lethal force. I end the paper by very briefly sketching an account, different from that of Rodin’s, of how individual nations can be justified in waging wars of law enforcement. (shrink)

The event that King Kuai of Yan demised the crown to his premier Zizhi, is a tentative way of political power transmission happened in the social transforming Warring States Period, which was influenced by the popular theory of Yao and Shun’s demise of that time. However, this tentative was obviously a failure, coming under attacks from all Confucian, Taoist and Legalist scholars. We may understand the development of the thinking concerning the issue of political legitimacy during the Warring States Period (...) by analyzing the different commentaries by different schools on this unusual event, and get some beneficial inspirations. (shrink)

The results revealed that students who remained in China experienced challenges which included anxiety, closure of campuses, lockdown, their parents’ concern regarding health issues, and not being able to meet with friends. On the other hand, students who had left China during the pandemic were confined to their home countries. This group of students experienced more severe problems than the students who remained in China. Since the transition to home countries was “unplanned,” they were not ready to readjust to their (...) native culture and were vulnerable to severe reverse culture shock. Upon returning to their home countries, international students faced a number of challenges, including readjustment to their home countries and changes in their lives in host and home countries. In addition, they lost social and academic resources, such as the disruption of study environment, losing important group memberships, financial constraints, visa expiry, graduation delay, and academic suspension. (shrink)

At the beginning of the Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union put up massive resistance, but due to its sudden overload, it was unable to deal with the situation adequately. It was in a state of paralysis for some time. Therefore, five explanatory models for the Russian actions are presented: an offensive, a defensive, a situational, a socio-cultural, and an ideological-historical one. It is then shown that the German term Gewalt, which combines the English terms (...) violence, power, and force ontologically, is best suited to summarize and describe all these models. It is also shown that Gewalt is a neutral, fundamental human concept that can be described as one of the basic driving forces of man. By piercing society, Gewalt constitutes an impulse, a motivation that stimulates and fuels the individual and society in toto. This leads to what we call Progressus, which depends on four variables – group desire, potential means of violence and force, group aims and objectives, as well as group comparison and evaluation. Progressus is inherent in all persons and in all societies. It can be analyzed and managed in a variety of different ways. Combined with the foundation of Gewalt, seen as neutral agent in varying levels of intensity, Progressus forms a matrix for efficient analysis to describe positive and frictional interaction, establishes social relations from friendship up to war; and this between individuals, groups and/or states. How this is possibly implemented in practice is described at the end using an example from the previously presented explanatory models. (shrink)

Th e contemporary right to freedom of thought together with all its further declinations into freedom of speech, religion, conscience and expression, had one of its earliest historical recognitions at the end of the Wars of Religion with the Edict of Nantes (1598). In several respects one can saythat the right to freedom of thought is virtually “co-original” with the endof the Wars of Religion. Following this thought further, one might think that human rights defi ne the boundaries (...) of our social coexistence and are inextricably connected to the “fact” of cultural pluralism. (shrink)

The paper analyzes a book written by Volodymyr Yarymovych, Oleksandr Bilyk, and Mykola Volynskyi, entitled Narys istorii ukrainskoi studentskoi hromady ta Ukrainskykh poselen v Espanii 1946–1996 (An Overview of the History of the Ukrainian Student Community and Ukrainian Settlements in Spain, 1946–1996), which tells about the Ukrainian students who arrived in Madrid in 1946 and formed part of the early Ukrainian Diaspora in Spain. The book proves to be an important source of information, previously unknown to scholars, which describes the (...) dramatic and controversial process of constructing Ukrainian identity in the aftermath of World War II. The authors of the study consider the historical and cultural context of the Ukrainian emigration in the second half of the 20th century, its connection with Francoist ideology, and its integral role in the Spanish-Ukrainian cultural dialogue. (shrink)

In this chapter, I add to the new body of philosophical literature that addresses African approaches to just war by reflecting on some topics that have yet to be considered and by advancing different perspectives. My approach is two-fold. First, I spell out a foundational African ethic, according to which one must treat people’s capacity to relate communally with respect. Second, I derive principles from it to govern the use of force and violence, and compare and contrast their implications for (...) war with other recent African views and especially with some prominent accounts in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I argue that the approaches to military conflict prescribed by the Afro-communal ethic and its derivative principles differ, and in some prima facie plausible ways, from the views of thinkers that include Thomas Hurka, David Luban, Larry May, Jeff McMahan, and Michael Walzer. In particular, I conclude that the African perspectives ground some interesting and under-explored approaches to just causes for war that merit consideration, including the ideas that military conflict could in principle be justified in order to protect a people’s culture or to correct an aggressor’s vice. (shrink)

Communities of nuclear workers have evolved in distinctive contexts. During the Manhattan Project the UK, USA and Canada collectively developed the first reactors, isotope separation plants and atomic bombs and, in the process, nurtured distinct cadres of specialist workers. Their later workplaces were often inherited from wartime facilities, or built anew at isolated locations. For a decade, nuclear specialists were segregated and cossetted to gestate practical expertise. At Oak Ridge Tennessee, for example, the informal ‘Clinch College of Nuclear Knowledge’ aimed (...) to industrialise the use of radioactive materials. ‘We were like children in a toy factory’, said its Director: ‘everyone could play the game of designing new nuclear power piles’. His counterpart at Chalk River, Ontario headed a project ‘completely Canadian in every respect’, while the head of the British project chose the remote Dounreay site in northern Scotland because of design uncertainties in the experimental breeder reactor. With the decline of secrecy during the mid-1950s, the hidden specialists lauded as ‘atomic scientists’ gradually became visible as new breeds of engineers, technologists and technicians responsible for nuclear reactors and power plants. Mutated by their different political contexts, occupational categories, labour affiliations, professional representations and popular depictions, their activities were disputed by distinct audiences. This chapter examines the changing identities of nuclear specialists and the significance of their secure sites. Shaped successively by Cold War secrecy, commercial competition and terrorist threats, nuclear energy remained out of site for wider publics and most nuclear specialists alike. The distinctive episodes reveal the changing working experiences of technical workers in late-twentieth and early twenty-first century environments. (shrink)

The central place accorded the notion of ‘sustainable development' among those attempting to overcome ecological problems could be one of the main reasons for their failure. ‘Ecological civilization' is proposed and defended as an alternative. ‘Ecological civilization' has behind it a significant proportion of the leadership of China who would be empowered if this notion were taken up in the West. It carries with it the potential to fundamentally rethink the basic goals of life and to provide an alternative image (...) of the future. It could both inspire people and provide the cultural foundations for the cultural, social and economic transformations necessary to create a new world order, a world order in which humans augment rather than undermine the ecosystems of which they are part. This paper explicates these implications. (shrink)

Using Australia to illustrate the case, in this paper it is argued that the transformation of universities into businesses and the undermining of the liberal arts is motivated by either contempt for or outright hostility to democracy. This is associated with a global managerial revolution that is enslaving nations and people to the global market and the corporations that dominate it. The struggle within universities is the site of a struggle to reverse the gains of the Radical Enlightenment, the tradition (...) of Enlightenment that, committed to upholding and developing the civic humanism of the Renaissance, strove for liberty, understood as democratic self-governance. The central place the liberal arts had in upholding this liberty is shown. Inspired by the Ancient Greek notion of paideia, the liberal arts, which originated in republican Rome, was the form of education required designed for free people, in opposition to the specialist education appropriate for slaves, to inspire them to maintain their liberty and enable them to govern themselves. While not always upholding this ideal, it is argued in this paper that the liberal arts always kept alive this quest for liberty, bequeathing this quest to the Renaissance philosophers and to the proponents of the Radical Enlightenment. With managerialism and the undermining of democracy, such education and the questioning, creative people it produced, are now seen as a threat to the new global corporatocracy who, to achieve cultural hegemony, have coöpted university managers and academics to impose their agenda to cripple the liberal arts. Their goal, never fully articulated as such but successfully prosecuted, is a dumbed-down population. (shrink)

The Politics of Military Force uses discourse theory to examine the dynamics of discursive change that made participation in military operations possible against the background of German antimilitarist culture. Once considered a strict taboo, so-called out-of-area operations have now become widely considered by German policymakers to be without alternative. The book argues that an understanding of how certain policies are made possible (in this case, military operations abroad and force transformation), one needs to focus on processes of discursive change (...) that result in different policy options appearing rational, appropriate, feasible, or even self-evident. Drawing on Essex School discourse theory, the book develops a theoretical framework to understand how discursive change works, and elaborates on how discursive change makes once unthinkable policy options not only acceptable but even without alternative. Based on a detailed discourse analysis of more than 25 years of German parliamentary debates, The Politics of Military Force provides an explanation for: (1) the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse in German security policy after the end of the Cold War (discursive change), (2) the rearticulation of German antimilitarism in the process (ideational change/norm erosion) and (3) the resulting making-possible of military operations and force transformation (policy change). In doing so, the book also demonstrates the added value of a poststructuralist approach compared to the naive realism and linear conceptions of norm change so prominent in the study of German foreign policy and International Relations more generally. (shrink)

As many scholars have written about the Vietnam War, this thesis, Forgotten Memories: Re-Constructing the Vietnam War in Films, explores a different approach to this topic by examining films. Historical films are becoming increasingly important in shaping the way the past is understood and remembered. After the war ended, many Hollywood films have continued to capture the atrocities of the war that affected the war narrative of the Vietnam War. American politics and the public suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome, and (...) they lost confidence in the military and government structures. These emotions are translated into Hollywood films about the Vietnam War. The victory of the Gulf War in 1991 finally helped them to get out of the shadow of that psychological fear in foreign intervention. The Vietnam War films have made its comeback after the September 11th attacks. Many scholars have compared the war against terrorism is similar to the war against communism in the 1950s. Over the years, Hollywood has produced many films that are either directly about or set against the backdrop of the Vietnam War. The different representations of the Vietnam War presenting in both American and Vietnamese films produced between 1979 and 2005 explain how the film war narrative reconstruct the memory of history. By examining both American and Vietnamese films about the Vietnam War, this study calls attention to the importance of the Vietnamese experience in our understanding of the Vietnam War and brings an international perspective to the study of this subject in cultural and film studies. By identifying trends and discussing similarities and differences in film-narrative tropes across both American and Vietnamese films about the Vietnam War, this research argues that the film industry has shaped the collective memory of the Vietnam War. In doing so, Hollywood has highlighted the memorable and traumatic events that occurred during the war to construct the film narrative and generate a widespread perception of v the war. Vietnam’s government, due to the war’s destruction, made it a top priority to rebuild the economy and used films to deliver only social propaganda, expressing its gratitude and sympathy to families who lost their loved ones in the war. (shrink)

It was already Hannah Arendt, who, referring to Kant, emphasized the difference betweentruth and meaning, between practical common sense and opinions. It is interesting that the common sense approach is still completely dominant today, even among theologians, who are so often accused of irrationality – or perhaps just because of it. Theology seems to feel compelled to appeal to common sense, to show the modern world, that it is useful, or at least that it is not harmful. Our discussion in (...) this essay concerns the relationship between religion and violence. We will try and explore the problem on the fundamental level, with no pretensions to offer yet another proposal in the style of 'how to ...', that modern requirements for practicality require and expect. (shrink)

I analyse the political, economic, and cultural circumstances that have given rise to persistent political disputes about race (known colloquially as “the culture war”) among a subset of Americans. I argue that they point to a deep tension between widely held normative aspirations and pervasive and readily observable material facts about our society. The characterological pathologies this gives rise to are discussed, and a normatively preferable path forward for an individual attempting to reconcile themselves to the current social order (...) is suggested. (shrink)

Since World War II the concept of Information has received several new definitions. Information can be understood as knowledge in general, as theoretical, formalized knowledge in general or as knowledge related to specific domains or specific representational forms. Because of these mutually inconsistent concepts the common traits are to be found in a perspective transcendent to those theories. The central cultural changes, it is argued, take place on the level of the societal knowledge infrastructure, evolving from the knowledge infrastructure of (...) the industrial societies as a long-term secularization process, resulting in new forms for representation and manipulation of knowledge. The process is seen as rooted in changes of the primary domains for knowledge extraction and in a change in the human relations to the languages in which we interpret the relations to nature. (shrink)

Philosophy for Life is a bold call for the practice of philosophy in our everyday lives. Philosopher and writer Rupert Read explores a series of important and often provocative contemporary political and cultural issues from a philosophical perspective, arguing that philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but a practice, a vantage point from which life should be analysed and, more importantly, acted upon. -/- Philosophy for Life is a personal journey that explores four key areas of society today: Politics, (...) Religion, Art, and the Environment. Taking tangible examples from modern politics, from climate change to the war on terror, and culture, from Peter Jackson's Lord of the Rings film trilogy to the poetry of T.S. Eliot, Read shows that philosophy is already an active part of today's world. This captivating and timely book offers a philosophical response to some of the key questions facing today's society and encourages us to use philosophy as a kind of therapy. Philosophy for Life shows that we can improve our perspective on the world and our place in it by doing philosophy everyday. (shrink)

Dialogue between feminist and mainstream philosophy of science has been limited in recent years, although feminist and mainstream traditions each have engaged in rich debates about key concepts and their efficacy. Noteworthy criticisms of concepts like objectivity, consensus, justification, and discovery can be found in the work of philosophers of science including Philip Kitcher, Helen Longino, Peter Galison, Alison Wylie, Lorraine Daston, and Sandra Harding. As a graduate student in philosophy of science who worked in both literatures, I was often (...) left with the feeling that I had joined a broken family with two warring factions. This is apparent in the number of anthologies that have emerged on both sides in the aftermath of the “Science Wars” (Gross, Paul R., Norman Levitt, and Martin W. Lewis, eds. 1996; Koertge, Noretta, ed. 1998; Sokal, Alan and Jean Bricmont. 1998; etc.) Depending on one’s perspective on the Science Wars, the breadth of illustrative cases and examples found in Science and Other Cultures can either give more ammunition for the battle, or grounding for a much needed treaty of accord. The most important feature of this book is that it does not merely claim that science is only political, and it does not merely dismiss science as a social phenomenon to be deconstructed using the standard postmodern conceptual tools. Instead, the collection illustrates ways in which postcolonial analysis and multicultural examples can enrich our understanding of “good” science and ethics. Here, the concept of “strong objectivity” from Harding’s earlier books is fleshed out through a variety of cases. The anthology is the culmination of a series of research activities funded by a National Science Foundation grant to the American Philosophical Association. The grant, under the auspices of the NSF Ethics and Values Program, sponsored fourteen summer research projects and thirty-six presentations at four regional APA meetings. (shrink)

شنت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية حربا على العراق عام 2003 بدعوى أن العراق يمتلك أسلحة دمار شامل، ثم تبين للعالم عدم صحة هذه الدعوى، وقال الناس: لقد كذبت الإدارة الأمريكية. كانت نظرية المعرفة التقليدية تنسب المعرفة إلى الذات العارفة الفردية، وتركز على الفاعلين الأفراد وحالاتهم الاعتقادية، مثل "يعتقد أحمد بقضية معينة". أما أن ننسب الحالات المعرفية إلى الجماعات مثل " كذبت الإدارة الأمريكية"، فهذا تحول في الإبستمولوجيا إلى الفاعل الجماعي. إبستمولوجيا الجماعات epistemology of groups حقل فرعي من الإبستمولوجيا الاجتماعية. يهدف إلى (...) استكشاف الخصائص والعمليات المعرفية على مستوى الجماعة. ظهر بصورة واضحة مع مطلع القرن الحادي والعشرين، فعقدت له مؤتمرات وطنية ودولية، وظهرت البحوث والكتب التي تعنى بموضوعاته الأساسية مثل معرفة الجماعة، واعتقاد الجماعة، وتسويغ الجماعة، وفهم الجماعة، وعقلانية الجماعة وموضوعيتها، وفضيلة الجماعة، واختلاف الجماعة، واستقطاب الجماعة، وذكاء الجماعة، وَهَلُمَّ جَرّاً. ويضيف هذا الكتاب إلى المناقشات المتطورة في المعرفة الاجتماعية عامة، ونظرية المعرفة الجماعية خاصة. ويوفر مسارًا يسهل الوصول إليه في موضوع إبستمولوجيا الجماعات، مع فصول منظمة بشكل ملائم ومصطلحات فنية محددة ومفسرة بوضوح. ويطور نظريات لها جاذبية تتجاوز الفلسفة إلى تخصصات مثل الاقتصاد والقانون وعلم النفس الاجتماعي والعلوم السياسية. The United States of America launched a war against Iraq in 2003 claiming that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, then it became clear to the world that this claim was not true, and people said: The American administration lied. The traditional theory of knowledge attributed knowledge to the individual knowing subject, and focused on individual actors and their belief states, such as "Ahmed believes in a certain proposition". As for attributing cognitive states to groups, such as “the American administration lied,” this is a shift in epistemology to the collective actor. The epistemology of groups is a subfield of social epistemology. It aims to explore the characteristics and cognitive processes at the group level. It appeared clearly at the beginning of the twenty-first century, so national and international conferences were held for it, and research and books appeared that deal with its basic topics such as group knowledge, group belief, group justification, group understanding, group rationality, and objectivity, group virtue, group difference, group polarization, and group intelligence, and so on. This book adds to the cutting-edge debates on social epistemology generally, and collective epistemology more specifically. Provides a very accessible path into the topic of an epistemology of groups, with conveniently organized chapters and technical terms clearly defined and explained. Develops theories that have appeal beyond philosophy, for disciplines such as economics, law, social psychology, and political science. (shrink)

This chapter argues that for human, technological, and human-technological reasons, disagreement, critique, and counterspeech on social media fall squarely into the province of non-ideal theory. It concludes by suggesting a modest but challenging disposition that can help us when we are torn between opposing oppression and contributing to a flame war.

What makes public history more than just another hill to fight over in culture war politics? In this paper I propose a novel way of understanding the political significance of how public history creates and shapes identities: a contractarian one. I argue that public history can be sensibly understood as representing groups as a society’s contracting parties. One particular value of the contractarian approach is that it helps to elucidate the phenomenon of “signing on,” where a marginalized or oppressed (...) group is offered membership in a society without the social order being meaningfully changed. (shrink)

Through analysing different case studies in the Middle East, this section uses rooted cosmopolitanism as a theoretical lens to explore exported modernism and architecture between socialist and capitalist countries during the Cold War. This research analyses the circulation and local applications of urban development and modernisation paradigms in so-called ‘Third World’ countries. For assessing the socialist and capitalist-inspired modernisation processes in the Middle East, this chapter studies the cosmopolitan and trans-cultural architecture created by global and local influences. Comparing two types (...) of cosmopolitan architecture (socialist and capitalist) during the Cold War period in third-world contexts will help us to analyse and compare their relative rootedness and to learn from the interconnected, multifaceted, and multilayered planning transfers and architectural exportations. (shrink)

Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...) share with authors like Feldman and Earl Conee, that epistemology has important prescriptive functions, and that a sound, civic ethics of belief is of more than merely philosophic importance. One reason why an ethics of belief might be important to problems of practice is the need we have for tools to more effectively mediate the renewed round of ‘culture wars’ we are experiencing in Anglo-American cultures. I mean especially that grand cultural clash between science and religion, reason and faith, secularist atheism and religious fundamentalism, etc. Let us start with the genealogical question of why there is such a grand cultural debate in the first place, and why the debate especially as played out in public and popular forums and even in the courtrooms seems so volatile and so often to confusedly drag everything—beliefs, values, passions, etc., with it. These are questions that I think Sigmund Freud’s classic Civilization and its Discontents can help us understand. Freud was a major voice in criticism of the stern and often hypocritical Victorian morality, a voice pointing out the price of its sometimes high-handed, guiltinducing curtailments of the satisfactions sought by the individual. But for Freud while there are real differences in the moral demands that different societies or traditions place upon people, there is something inevitable about the conflict itself, for “replacement of the power of the individual by the power of a community constitutes the decisive step of civilization... (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has brought to surface new and puzzling manifestations of the culture wars between liberals and conservatives, especially in the US. One such manifestation is the one centered around mask-wearing as a way to protect others from viral infection. In public spaces, mask-wearing has become a signal as to whether one is a liberal or a conservative. Liberals tend to wear the mask and condemn as immoral conservatives, who tend not to wear it. I argue that (...) the liberal attitude does not cohere with liberal theory. I use the issue of the permissibility of abortion and the liberal consensus about it as the benchmark for what a genuine liberal attitude toward mask-wearing should be. (shrink)

As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies and (...) human cognitive ecology. Chapter Four is concerned with connections between psychological study of biases and heuristics, and the comparative study of fundamentalism. The first section looks at work by psychologists and philosophers on our bias blind spot. Later sections ask, ‘In what ways might biases and heuristics play a special role in aiding our understanding of, and response to, fundamentalist orientation?’. The judgments we make in ignorance of our own biases Montaigne calls our importunate presumptions, and he suggests a host of practical factors that make them appealing. Montaigne, as I discuss in the first section, associates many of our errors with one or another kind of presumption, often about our similarity or differences from others, or from God. Our obvious psychographic diversity, and the polemical ground dynamics involved in our ‘culture wars’ are compounded on the agential side by the invisibility of our biases to ourselves. A number of person and social biases are described that plausibly affect all of our beliefs in domains of controversial views, religious views included. The second section continues to study of how etiological symmetry (similar patterns of belief-uptake) gives rise to religious contrariety (diverse narratives and theologies) in testimonial faith traditions, and what the implications of this are for philosophy of religion, generally, and for an improved comparative study of fundamentalism, in particular. Utilizing the work of philosophers such as Rachel Fraser and psychologists such as Emily Pronin and her co-authors, I offer a four-step genealogical account for how etiological symmetry so easily gives rise to religious contrariety. This account begins with the narrative nature of testimony in the Abrahamic family of religions, and how narrative content confounds our “source monitoring.” My genealogy also introduces what I term biased-closure inferences (BCI) as one of the key enablers of religious exclusivism and absolutism. These are the seemingly ‘logical’ but actually very self-serving inferences people often make, inferences from their own belief being true, to any belief contrary to it being false. Those who claim unique truth, epistemic access, and/or virtue and religious value for the home religion are no exception to the broad pertinence of bias studies across domains of controversial view. The proximate causes of belief are all that we can study, and in these there may be significant etiological symmetries. Yet those groups themselves, especially to the extent that they are exclusivist, are tunnel-visioned on claims of doctrinal uniqueness: on content differences of a theological sort. Comparative philosophy is met with the puzzlement that symmetric or essentially similar doxastic strategies should give rise not just to cognitive diversity, but to what we can call polarized or polemical contrariety, contrariety of a kind where each view adamantly rejects all others. Arguably, the more that theologies offer explanations of a counter-inductive sort, or profess counter-inductive thinking as exemplary of faith, the better evidential ground there for inferring that bias involved in the acquisition or maintenance of beliefs. This provides more substance to the question of when censure, and etiological challenges to faith-based beliefs are philosophically well-motivated. (shrink)

In recent years, pronouns have become a white-hot interface between language and social and political issues. “My pronouns are he/they” signals allegiance to one side in the culture wars, as does “My pronouns are whatever.” But there is surprisingly little philosophical work at this interface; this paper aims to chart the main questions and argue for some answers, with the hope of stimulating more research.

Attitudes towards science and technology are closely aligning with Culture War attitudes towards secularism, sexuality, gender, civil liberties, race and nationalism.