13 found
Order:
See also
Colin Marshall
University of Washington
Philosophy Bulletin
University of Washington
  1. Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception.Colin Marshall - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1411-1433.
    It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the puzzle have deep (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?Colin Marshall - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.
    Kant's philosophy promises to explain various synthetic a priori claims. Yet, as several of his commentators have noted, it is hard to see how these explanations could work unless they themselves rested on unexplained synthetic a priori claims. Since Kant appears to demand explanations for all synthetic a priori claims, it would seem that his project fails on its own terms. I argue, however, that Kant holds that explanations are required only for synthetic a priori claims about (purportedly) experience-independent entities, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3.  16
    Kant's (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism.Colin Marshall - forthcoming - Kantian Review.
    Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  39
    Never Mind the Intuitive Intellect: Applying Kant’s Categories to Noumena.Colin Marshall - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (1):27-40.
    According to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant believes there are noumenal substances and causes. Proponents of these readings have shown that these readings can be reconciled with Kant’s claims about the limitations of human cognition. An important new challenge to such readings, however, has been proposed by Markus Kohl, focusing on Kant’s occasional statements about the divine or intuitive intellect. According to Kohl, how an intuitive intellect represents is a decisive measure for how noumena are for Kant, but an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-Itself Distinction.Colin Marshall - 2013 - Kant-Studien 104 (4):421-441.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 104 Heft: 4 Seiten: 421-441.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects.Colin Marshall - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545.
    The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):293-316.
    schopenhauer has been ignored in contemporary metaethics, and his commentators rarely attempt to analyze his metaethical views in contemporary terms. This is unfortunate. Schopenhauer has something important to teach us about moral realism.1I have both philosophical and interpretive aims in this paper. My philosophical aim is to show how Schopenhauer's views challenge the contemporary understanding of moral realism. The challenge arises from the fact that, while Schopenhauer's view implies that morality is "real" in a metaphysically- and epistemologically-robust sense, that view (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason.Colin Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
    Spinoza claims we can control any passion by forming a more clear and distinct idea of it. The interpretive consensus is that Spinoza is either wrong or over-stating his view. I argue that Spinoza’s view is plausible and insightful. After breaking down Spinoza’s characterization of the relevant act, I consider four existing interpretations and conclude that each is unsatisfactory. I then consider a further problem for Spinoza: how his definitions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ make room for passions becoming action. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Hume Versus the Vulgar on Resistance, Nisus, and the Impression of Power.Colin Marshall - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):305-319.
    In the first Enquiry, Hume takes the experience of exerting force against a solid body to be a key ingredient of the vulgar idea of power, so that the vulgar take that experience to provide us with an impression of power. Hume provides two arguments against the vulgar on this point: the first concerning our other applications of the idea of power and the second concerning whether that experience yields certainty about distinct events. I argue that, even if we accept (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Lockean Empathy.Colin Marshall - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):87-106.
    This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke's theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone's pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel.Colin Marshall - 2016 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Bewusstsein/Consciousness. De Gruyter. pp. 281-285.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  69
    Skorupski, John., The Domain of Reasons. [REVIEW]Colin Marshall - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 66 (4):852-854.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  49
    Reason in the Short Treatise.Colin Marshall - forthcoming - In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making. Oxford University Press.
    Spinoza’s account of reason in the Short Treatise has been largely neglected. That account, I argue, has at least four features which distinguish it from that of the Ethics: in the Short Treatise, (1) reason is more sharply distinguished from the faculty of intuitive knowledge, (2) reason deals with things as though they were ‘outside’ us, (3) reason lacks clarity and distinctness, and (4) reason has no power over many types of passions. I argue that these differences have a unified (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark