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Constantin C. Brîncuș
Institute of Philosophy and Psychology, Romanian Academy
  1. What Makes Logical Truths True?Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 249-272.
    The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control (...)
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  2.  52
    Are the open-ended rules for negation categorical?Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7249-7256.
    Vann McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the propositional logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. The main assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. (...)
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  3.  83
    Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths.Constantin C. Brîncuş - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):369-383.
    Starting from certain metalogical results, I argue that first-order logical truths of classical logic are a priori and necessary. Afterwards, I formulate two arguments for the idea that first-order logical truths are also analytic, namely, I first argue that there is a conceptual connection between aprioricity, necessity, and analyticity, such that aprioricity together with necessity entails analyticity; then, I argue that the structure of natural deduction systems for FOL displays the analyticity of its truths. Consequently, each philosophical approach to these (...)
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  4. The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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  5. Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2019 - In The Logica Yearbook 2018. London: College Publications. pp. 57-66.
    We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.
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  6.  37
    Logical Maximalism in the Empirical Sciences.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2021 - In Parusniková Zuzana & Merritt David (eds.), Karl Popper's Science and Philosophy. Springer. pp. 171-184.
    K. R. Popper distinguished between two main uses of logic, the demonstrational one, in mathematical proofs, and the derivational one, in the empirical sciences. These two uses are governed by the following methodological constraints: in mathematical proofs one ought to use minimal logical means (logical minimalism), while in the empirical sciences one ought to use the strongest available logic (logical maximalism). In this paper I discuss whether Popper’s critical rationalism is compatible with a revision of logic in the empirical sciences, (...)
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  7.  85
    ”Carnap’s Ideal of explication and naturalism, Edited by Pierre Wagner, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012". [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2).
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  8.  61
    ”John P. Burgess, Philosophical Logic, Princeton University Press, 2009”. [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2013 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):90-92.
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  9.  27
    Inferential Quantification and the ω-rule.Constantin C. Brîncuș - forthcoming - In Antonio D’Aragona (ed.), Perspectives on Deduction.
    Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...)
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  10.  22
    The Non-categoricity of Logic (I). The Problem of a Full Formalization.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2022 - In Probleme de Logică/Problems of Logic. București, România: pp. 137-156.
    A system of logic usually comprises a language for which a model-theory and a proof-theory are defined. The model-theory defines the semantic notion of model-theoretic logical consequence (⊨), while the proof-theory defines the proof- theoretic notion of logical consequence (or logical derivability, ⊢). If the system in question is sound and complete, then the two notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent. The concept of full formalization is a more restrictive one and requires in addition the preservation of the standard (...)
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