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Deborah Heikes
University of Alabama, Huntsville
  1. Can Mind Be a Virtue?Deborah K. Heikes - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):119-128.
    While feminist philosophy has had much to say on the topic of reason, little has been done to develop a specifically feminist account of the concept. I argue for a virtue account of mind grounded in contemporary approaches to rationality. The evolutionary stance adopted within most contemporary theories of mind implicitly entails a rejection of central elements of Cartesianism. As a result, many accounts of rationality are anti-modern is precisely the sorts of ways that feminists demand. I maintain that a (...)
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  2. Let’s Be Reasonable.Deborah K. Heikes - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):127-134.
    Feminist philosophy is highly critical of Cartesian, and more broadly Enlightenment, conceptions of rationality. However, feminist philosophers typically fail to address contemporary theories of rationality and to consider how more current thoeories address feminist concerns. I argue that, contrary to their protestations, feminists are “obsessing over an outdated conception of reason” and that even the most suspect of “malestream” philosophers express an understanding of rationality that is closer to feminist concerns than Cartesian ones. I begin by briefly examining key features (...)
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  3. Being Reasonable.Deborah K. Heikes - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):187-195.
    Although feminists have spilled a great deal of ink criticizing Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, the time has come to consider constructing a positive account. Recent attempts to construct an account of rationality as a virtue concept reflect many feminist complaints concerning Enlightenment rationality, and, thus, I maintain that feminism should take seriously such a conception. Virtue rationality offers a more diverse account of rationality without sacrificing the fundamental normativity of the concept. Furthermore, the narrower concept of reasonableness, promises to provide (...)
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  4. The Realism in Quasi-Realism.Deborah K. Heikes - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):75-83.
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  5.  72
    Wittgenstein and the Private Language of Ethlcs.Deborah K. Heikes - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):27-38.
    Beyond “A Lecture on Ethics,” Wittgenstein says little on the topic of ethics, despite professing a great respect for ethics. I argue that while Wittgenstein ceases to speak of ethics, his account fits equally within his Tractarian and post-Tractarian writing. On both accounts of language, ethics remains nonsense, but it is not insignificant nonsense. However, because Wittgenstein holds ethics to concern absolute values that are in principle inexpressible, his anti-theoretical conception of ethics fails to offer guidance in how one ought (...)
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