Introduction - From the Illiad to the Studies on Hysteria: A chronology of the discovery of the unconscious mind - Freud's theories of the unconscious mind - Jung's collective unconscious - Lacan's linguistic paradigm.

Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate ‘trickled in’ elements of (...) truth as correspondence. Results, though often intuitive, prove more complex than in simpler models (Hegselmann & Krause 2002, 2006; Grim, Singer, Reade & Fisher 2015). The optimistic finding is that pressures toward internal coherence can exploit and expand on small elements of truth as correspondence is introduced into epistemic networks. Less optimistic results show that pressures for coherence can also work directly against the incorporation of truth, particularly when coherence is established first and new data is introduced later. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill advocated for increased interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions for the reason that it would improve society. Whether Mill and similar arguments that advocate for opinion diversity are valid depends on background assumptions about the psychology and sociality of individuals. The field of opinion dynamics is a burgeoning testing ground for how different combinations of sociological and psychological facts contribute to phenomena that affect opinion diversity, such as polarization. This paper applies some recent results from the opinion (...) dynamics literature to assess the impacts of the Millian suggestion. The goal is to understand how the scope of the validity of Mill-style arguments depends on plausible assumptions that can be formalized using agent-based models, a common modeling approach in opinion dynamics. The most salient insight is that homophily (increased interactions between like-minded individuals) does not sufficiently explain decreased opinion diversity. Hence, decreasing homophily by increasing interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions is not the simple solution that a Millian-style argument may advocate. (shrink)

Vector models of language are based on the contextual aspects of language, the distributions of words and how they co-occur in text. Truth conditional models focus on the logical aspects of language, compositional properties of words and how they compose to form sentences. In the truth conditional approach, the denotation of a sentence determines its truth conditions, which can be taken to be a truth value, a set of possible worlds, a context change potential, or similar. In the (...) vector models, the degree of co-occurrence of words in context determines how similar the meanings of words are. In this paper, we put these two models together and develop a vector semantics for language based on the simply typed lambda calculus models of natural language. We provide two types of vector semantics: a static one that uses techniques familiar from the truth conditional tradition and a dynamic one based on a form of dynamic interpretation inspired by Heim’s context change potentials. We show how the dynamic model can be applied to entailment between a corpus and a sentence and provide examples. (shrink)

The theory of imperatives is philosophically relevant since in building it — some of the long standing problems need to be addressed, and presumably some new ones are waiting to be discovered. The relevance of the theory of imperatives for philosophical research is remarkable, but usually recognized only within the field of practical philosophy. Nevertheless, the emphasis can be put on problems of theoretical philosophy. Proper understanding of imperatives is likely to raise doubts about some of our deeply entrenched and (...) tacit presumptions. In philosophy of language it is the presumption that declaratives provide the paradigm for sentence form; in philosophy of science it is the belief that theory construction is independent from the language practice, in logic it is the conviction that logical meaning relations are constituted out of logical terminology, in ontology it is the view that language use is free from ontological commitments. The list is not exhaustive; it includes only those presumptions that this paper concerns. (shrink)

We present a model of the distribution of labour in science. Such models tend to rely on the mechanism of the invisible hand . Our analysis starts from the necessity of standards in distributed processes and the possibility of multiple standards in science. Invisible hand models turn out to have only limited scope because they are restricted to describing the atypical single-standard case. Our model is a generalisation of these models to J standards; single-standard models such (...) as Kitcher are a limiting case. We introduce and formalise this model, demonstrate its dynamics and conclude that the conclusions commonly derived from invisible hand models about the distribution of labour in science are not robust against changes in the number of standards. (shrink)

A model of consciousness and conscious experience is introduced. Starting with a non-Lipschitz Chaotic dynamics of neural activity, we propose that the synaptic transmission between adjacent as well as distant neurons should be regulated in brain dynamics through quantum tunneling. Further, based on various studies of different previous authors, we consider the emergence of very large quantum mechanical system representable by an abstract quantum net entirely based on quantum-like entities having in particular the important feature of expressing self-reference similar to (...) what occurs in consciousness. The properties of such quantum-like mind entities are discussed in detail. A quantum-like model of conscious experience is also discussed. It is shown that such quantum mechanical entities are able to arrange themselves alternatively on the basis of the subject story, memory, and pain-pleasure in response to an external stimulus, thus giving the subject the possibility to response to the stimulus on the basis of his emotion as well as cognitive state. Finally, we discuss the possible connections between the quantum-like model introduced in this paper and the chaotic behaviors often identified experimentally in studies on brain dynamics. Part I of this article contains: Introduction; 1. Non Lipschitz Terminal Dynamics of Single Neuron Activity; and References; 2. Quantum Mechanical Properties of Neuron Dynamics; and 3. A Quantum Model of Consciousness I. (shrink)

We give a new argument supporting a gravitational role in quantum collapse. It is demonstrated that the discreteness of space-time, which results from the proper combination of quantum theory and general relativity, may inevitably result in the dynamical collapse of thewave function. Moreover, the minimum size of discrete space-time yields a plausible collapse criterion consistent with experiments. By assuming that the source to collapse the wave function is the inherent random motion of particles described by the wave function, we further (...) propose a concrete model of wavefunction collapse in the discrete space-time. It is shown that the model is consistent with the existing experiments and macroscopic experiences. (shrink)

Recent fndings illustrate how changes in consciousness accommodated by neural correlates and plasticity of the brain advance a model of perceptual change as a function of meditative practice. During the mindbody response neural correlates of changing awareness illustrate how the autonomic nervous system shifts from a sympathetic dominant to a parasympathetic dominant state. Expansion of awareness during the practice of meditation techniques can be linked to the Default Mode Network (DMN), a network of brain regions that is active when the (...) one is not focused on the outside world and the brain is restful yet awake (Chen et al., 2008). A model is presented illustrating the dynamic mindbody response before and after mindfulness meditation, and connections are made with prefrontal cortex activity, the cardiac and respiratory center, the thalamus and amygdala, the DMN and cortical function connectivity. The default status of the DMN changes corresponding to autonomic modulation resulting from meditation practice. (shrink)

On the long and well-worn road of many, but justifiable attempts of human to discover his origin, his trajectory as a species, and a suitable understanding consciousness, his system allowing the connection to the environment and to his own organism, the concepts and models of philosophy enunciated or experienced by millennia, meet today with modern science concepts of physics and of science of information. Based on recent discoveries of quantum physics and astrophysics, revealing a new understanding of our environment (...) and starting from some philosophical concepts on information of matter and of living structures, this work discusses the dynamics of information within the frame of the Informational Model of Consciousness as an informational system of the human body, connected both to the environment and to the body itself, to control the adaptation for survival. It is shown that consciousness is actually an informational projection in the mind of seven informational subsystems, three of which forming the operative system of consciousness for the short-term adaptation, and other three forming the programmed operating system, dedicated to the maintenance of body and to the long-term survival of species, showing various inputs and outputs of information. The seventh subsystem is the information pole, connecting the organism with the external information, especially related to the extra-sensorial properties of the mind, the human body appearing as a bipolar info-matter structure, managed by the brain. The received information is progressively integrated into the informational system of the organism, which absorbs and emanates information as a reactive system for adaptation, able to operate both with matter-related (codified) and non-matter related (virtual) information. As both connections with external and internal environment (body itself) can be described in terms of information, this model opens the gate to investigate consciousness by means of the tools of the information science, offering also answers to the philosophic “mind-body” problem and to the “hard” problem and showing correspondences with some ancient philosophies. (shrink)

The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...) of logic. In this paper, we argue that existing impossible-worlds models of belief fail to describe agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. To model such agents, we argue, we need to ‘dynamize’ the impossible-worlds framework in a way that allows us to capture not only what agents believe, but also what they are able to infer from what they believe. In light of this diagnosis, we go on to develop the formal details of a dynamic impossible-worlds framework, and show that it successfully models agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to some generalizations of explanatory potential of connectionist approaches to theoretical problems of the philosophy of mind. Are considered both strong, and weaknesses of neural network models. Connectionism has close methodological ties with modern neurosciences and neurophilosophy. And this fact strengthens its positions, in terms of empirical naturalistic approaches. However, at the same time this direction inherits weaknesses of computational approach, and in this case all system of anticomputational critical arguments becomes applicable to the connectionst (...) models of mind. The last developments in the field of deep learning gave rich empirical material for cognitive sciences. Multilayered networks, mathematical models of associative dynamics of learning, self-organizing neuronets and all that allow to explain the principles of human conceptual organizing and after this to emulate these processes in computer systems. At all engineering achievements of this technology there is a traditional criticism from representatives of cognitive psychology who cannot accept a thesis about learning ability of a neuronet on the basis of redistribution of scales. Process of learning of natural intelligence, according to cognitive models, happens due to attraction of knowledge broadcast in a symbolical form (mental representations, concepts) at the expense of the systems of output knowledge expressed in the propositional contents. Some philosophical aspects of «neural metaphor» in modern cognitive sciences create the problem field which demands comprehensive understanding, the first step towards which is taken in this work. (shrink)

Understanding the mechanics of consciousness remains one of the most important challenges in modern cognitive science. One key step toward understanding consciousness is to associate unconscious physiological processes with subjective experiences of sensory, motor, and emotional contents. This article explores the role of various cellular membrane potential differences and how they give rise to the dynamic infrastructure of conscious experience. This article explains that consciousness is a body-wide, biological process not limited to individual organs because the mind and (...) body are unified as one entity; therefore, no single location of consciousness can be pinpointed. Consciousness exists throughout the entire body, and unified consciousness is experienced and maintained through dynamic repolarization during inhalation and expiration. Extant knowledge is reviewed to provide insight into how differences in cellular membrane potential play a vital role in the triggering of neural and non-neural oscillations. The role of dynamic cellular membrane potentials in the activity of the central nervous system, peripheral nervous system, cardiorespiratory system, and various other tissues (such as muscles and sensory organs) in the physiology of consciousness is also explored. Inspiration and expiration are accompanied by oscillating membrane potentials throughout all cells and play a vital role in subconscious human perception of feelings and states of mind. In addition, the role of the brainstem, hypothalamus, and complete nervous system (central, peripheral, and autonomic)within the mind-body space combine to allow consciousness to emerge and to come alive. This concept departs from the notion that the brain is the only organ that gives rise to consciousness. (shrink)

It was shown recently that information is the central concept which it is to be considered to understand consciousness and its properties. Arguing that consciousness is a consequence of the operational activity of the informational system of the human body, it was shown that this system is composed by seven informational components, reflected in consciousness by corresponding cognitive centers. It was argued also that consciousness can be connected to the environment not only by the common senses, but also by a (...) special connection pole to the bipolar properties of the universe, allowing to explain the associated phenomena of the near-death experiences and other special phenomena. Starting from the characteristics of this model, defined as the Informational Model of Consciousness and to complete the info-communication panorama, in this paper it is analyzed the info-connectivity of the informational system with the body itself. The brain areas where the activity of each informational component are identified, and a definition of consciousness in terms of information is proposed. As the electrical connectivity by means of the nervous system was already proved, allowing the application of the analysis and developing tools of the information science, a particular attention is paid to the non-electrical mechanisms implied in the internal communication. For this, it is shown that the key mechanisms consists in embodiment/disembodiment processes of information during the inter and intra communication of the cells. This process can be modeled also by means of, and in correlation with specific concepts of the science and technology of information, referred to network communication structures, and is represented by epigenetic mechanisms, allowing the acquired trait transmission to the offspring generation. From the perspective of the informational model of consciousness, the human organism appears therefore as a dynamic reactive informational system, actuating in correlation with matter for adaptation, by embodiment/disembodiment processes of information. (shrink)

Quality Space Theory is a holistic model of qualitative states. On this view, individual mental qualities are defined by their locations in a space of relations, which reflects a similar space of relations among perceptible properties. This paper offers an extension of Quality Space Theory to temporal perception. Unconscious segmentation of events, the involvement of early sensory areas, and asymmetries of dominance in multi-modal perception of time are presented as evidence for the view.

Computer simulations constitute a significant scientific tool for promoting scientific understanding of natural phenomena and dynamic processes. Substantial leaps in computational force and software engineering methodologies now allow the design and development of large-scale biological models, which – when combined with advanced graphics tools – may produce realistic biological scenarios, that reveal new scientific explanations and knowledge about real life phenomena. A state-of-the-art simulation system termed Reactive Animation (RA) will serve as a study case to examine the contemporary (...) philosophical debate on the scientific value of simulations, as we demonstrate its ability to form a scientific explanation of natural phenomena and to generate new emergent behaviors, making possible a prediction or hypothesis about the equivalent real-life phenomena. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists of diverse orientations have suggested that the pragmatics of semiosis is germane to a dynamic account of meaning as process. Semiosis, the central focus of C. S. Peirce's pragmatic philosophy, may hold a key to perennial problems regarding meaning. Indeed, Peirce's thought should be deemed seminal when placed within the cognitive sciences, especially with respect to his concept of the sign. According to Peirce's pragmatic model, semiosis is a triadic, time-bound, context-sensitive, interpreter-dependent, materially extended (...) class='Hi'>dynamic process. Semiosis involves inter-relatedness and inter-action between signs, their objects, acts and events in the world, and the semiotic agents who are in the process of making and taking them. (shrink)

The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...) additional emergent behaviours via cognitive re-use, hence the Emergic prefix throughout. Nevertheless, the model is robust and parameter free. Differential re-use occurs in the nature of model interaction with a particular testing paradigm. -/- ECM has a novel decomposition due to the requirements of handling motion and of supporting unified modelling via finer functional grains. The breadth of phenomenal behaviour covered is largely to lend credence to our novel decomposition. -/- The Emergic Network architecture is a hybrid between classical connectionism and classical computationalism that facilitates the construction of unified cognitive models. It helps cutting up of functionalism into finer-grains distributed over space (by harnessing massive recurrence) and over time (by harnessing continuous change), yet simplifies by using standard computer code to focus on the interaction of information flows. Thus while the structure of the network looks neurocentric, the dynamics are best understood in flowcentric terms. Surprisingly, dynamic system analysis (as usually understood) is not involved. An Emergic Network is engineered much like straightforward software or hardware systems that deal with continuously varying inputs. Ultimately, this thesis addresses the problem of reduction and induction over complex systems, and the Emergic Network architecture is merely a tool to assist in this epistemic endeavour. -/- ECM is strictly a sensory model and apart from perception, yet it is informed by phenomenology. It addresses the attribution problem of how much of a phenomenon is best explained at a sensory level of analysis, rather than at a perceptual one. As the causal information flows are stable under eye movement, we hypothesize that they are the locus of consciousness, howsoever it is ultimately realized. (shrink)

Here we present an experimental model to be applied to the storage and retrieval of information based on an associative information system’s sensory and motor state change data, aiming to represent the dynamics of a dynamic perceptual system. The model and database implementation use a universal information storage structure holding both data and metadata within the same structure. This model is characterized by the emphasis on associative information about the represented system derived from raw data, which are in their (...) turn produced by the associative system’s interactions with the environment. Instead of defining objects using descriptive relations, this model stores relations between occurents where the represented system is not replicated in its various components, but defined by its relations when they occur. This model therefore represents the dynamics and interaction of systems such as human perception, rather than imposing artificial boundaries and qualities. In essence, the model is an alternative to perceptual knowledge accumulation, which, as we show, can be applied to a database design. (shrink)

In this four part essay I present a comprehensive model of health based on the generalized empirical method of Bernard Lonergan, which integrates the empirical method of natural science and the phenomenological method of historical and related human sciences in a way that is unique among contemporary thinkers. The GEM model, in turn, offers a unique framework - a higher viewpoint - for integrating the manifold viewpoints of clinical practice, the humanities (the drama and narrative of human living), health science (...) and health policy in a methodically dynamic and critically progressive fashion in order to address the many pressing problems of contemporary healthcare. (shrink)

Emotions and feelings (i.e. affects) are a central feature of human behavior. Due to complexity and interdisciplinarity of affective phenomena, attempts to define them have often been unsatisfactory. This article provides a simple logical structure, in which affective concepts can be defined. The set of affects defined is similar to the set of emotions covered in the OCC model, but the model presented in this article is fully computationally defined, whereas the OCC model depends on undefined concepts. Following Matthis, affects (...) are seen as unconscious, emotions as preconscious and feelings as conscious. Affects are thus a superclass of emotions and feelings with regards to consciousness. A set of affective states and related affect-specific behaviors and strategies can be defined with unconscious affects only. -/- In addition, affects are defined as processes of change in the body state, that have specific triggers. For example, an affect of hope is defined as a specific body state that is triggered when the agent is becomes informed about a future event, that is positive with regards to the agent’s needs. -/- Affects are differentiated from each other by types of causing events. Affects caused by unexpected positive, neutral and negative events are delight, surprise and fright, respectively. Affects caused by expected positive and negative future events are hope and fear. -/- Affects caused by expected past events are as follows: satisfaction results from a positive expectation being fulfilled, disappointment results from a positive expectation not being fulfilled, fears-confirmed results from a negative expectation being fulfilled, and relief results from a negative expectation not being fulfilled. Pride is targeted towards a self-originated positive event, and shame towards a self-originated negative event. Remorse is targeted towards a self-originated action causing a negative event. Pity is targeted towards a liked agent experiencing a negative event, and happy-for towards a liked agent experiencing a positive event. Resentment is targeted towards a disliked agent experiencing a positive event, and gloating towards a disliked agent experiencing a negative event. An agent is liked/loved if it has produced a net utility greater than zero, and disliked/hated if the net utility is lower than zero. An agent is desired if it is expected to produce a positive net utility in the future, and disliked if the expected net utility is negative. -/- The above model for unconscious affects is easily computationally implementable, and may be used as a starting point in building believable simulation models of human behavior. The models can be used as a starting point in the development of computational psychological, psychiatric, sociological and criminological theories, or in e.g. computer games. -/- [please cite using the arXiv url below.]. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish two models of personal integrity. The first, wholeheartedness, regards harmonious unity of the self as psychologically healthy and volitional consistency as ethically ideal. I argue that it does so at the substantial cost of framing ambivalence and conflict as defects of character and action. To avoid these consequences, I propose an alternate ideal of humility that construes the self as multiple and precarious and celebrates experiences of loss and transformation through which learning, growth, innovation, (...) and dynamic relationship become possible. This ideal not only sustains prospects for integrity but is more suitable than wholeheartedness for recognizing practices of contestation, such as those involving potentially destabilizing encounters with difference that is common within pluralistic societies, as vital for rich, well-lived lives. (shrink)

Although it seems intuitively clear that acts of requesting are different from acts of commanding, it is not very easy to sate their differences precisely in dynamic terms. In this paper we show that it becomes possible to characterize, at least partially, the effects of acts of requesting and compare them with the effects of acts of commanding by combining dynamified deontic logic with epistemic logic. One interesting result is the following: each act of requesting is appropriately differentiated from (...) an act of commanding with the same content, but for each act of requesting, there is another act of commanding with much more complex content which updates models in exactly the same way as it does. We will also consider an application of our characterization of acts of requesting to acts of asking yes-no questions. It yields a straightforward formalization of the view of acts of asking questions as requests for information. (shrink)

The following considerations concern modelling Belief Dynamics (BD) not just in the sense of a formalization, but rather in the sense of building a computational model and implementing the corresponding data structures and algorithms of recomputing beliefs. The purpose of such a project is to illustrate some ideas about belief changes in a Web of Beliefs (WoB) to explore and deepen one's understanding of belief changes by trying to implement or improve corresponding algorithms.

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they (...) interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. (shrink)

This work presents a post-positivist research framework to explain any surprising fact in the evolutionary path of a complex, dynamic and contingent social phenomenon. Primarily, it reconciles the ontological and epistemological assumptions of Critical Realism with the principles of American Pragmatism. Then, the research approach is presented: theoretical propositions about a social structure are translated into a set of grammar rules that acknowledges a pattern of sequences of events of either individual action or social interaction between actors within a (...) real social system. The result is a discrete mathematical model for a concrete category of social process based on these rules. Finally, data-grounded refinement of the theory is possible by the comparison between cases belonging to the same category, but differing about some contingent pattern of sequences of event outcomes. Consequently, their grammars differ in some pairs of context-sensitive rules that can explain this surprising fact, such that the derivation of this alternative historical trajectory of event outcomes becomes an extension to the early category of social process. In this sense, the proposed framework suggests there is a hierarchy of classes of grammars for middle-range explanations based upon the ontological assumption of the generative nature of social reality. (shrink)

Free will is difficult to classify with respect to determinism or indeterminism, and its phenomenology in consciousness often shows both aspects. Initially, it is felt as unlimited and indeterminate will power, with the potentiality of multiple choices. Thereafter, reductive deliberation is led by determinism to the final decision, which realises only one of the potential choices. The reductive deliberation phase tries to find out the best alternative and simultaneously satisfying vague motivations, contextual conditions and personal preferences. The essential sense of (...) free will is the introduction of personal preferences, which allows a higher diversity of reactions to vague motivations. With an oversimplified model of determinism as a chain of events, incompatibilists define “free” as “undetermined” so that determinism becomes incompatible with any free choice between alternatives. In consciousness, free will requires a more complex model of network determinism as well as the consideration of unconsciousness as a causal factor. When “free” defined as “undetermined” is applied to the context of consciousness, it should be reinterpreted as “unconscious of being determined” or not aware of underlying determinism. Lacking information on determinism generates a feeling of “free” in consciousness and, therefore, gives the impression of indeterminism. Lacking information may be induced by an uncertain future without determined events—an unconscious past with biological reactions suddenly emerging from the unconsciousness or an unknown present unable to distinguish determinism of complex events. Therefore, at the level of human consciousness, the experience of free will is associated with apparent indeterminism although it is based on unconscious determinism. The concepts of compatibilism and incompatibilism are only two different aspects of the same phenomenon and correspond to consciousness and unconsciousness. Nevertheless, they can be considered together with a free will concept based on relativity depending on two different reference frames—the first person’s experience frame or the Laplace’s demon frame with knowledge on every molecule of the universe. Only relativity of the free will concept avoids the contradiction between “free” and “unfree” for the same phenomenon and could be a compromise for considering compatibilism and incompatibilism equally. (shrink)

When does opinion formation within an interacting group lead to consensus, polarization or fragmentation? The article investigates various models for the dynamics of continuous opinions by analytical methods as well as by computer simulations. Section 2 develops within a unified framework the classical model of consensus formation, the variant of this model due to Friedkin and Johnsen, a time-dependent version and a nonlinear version with bounded confidence of the agents. Section 3 presents for all these models major analytical (...) results. Section 4 gives an extensive exploration of the nonlinear model with bounded confidence by a series of computer simulations. An appendix supplies needed mathematical definitions, tools, and theorems. (shrink)

Human civilization is very clearly reaching a point of critical mass when it comes to technology and how it transforms culture and the economics that is therefore driven forward. The conversation around the practical aspects of generative artificial intelligence (Chat GPT, Q Star, Bard, Claude, Genesis, Firefly, and others) and their ethical implications is massively trending. The political conversations around it are slow to catch up but will soon take over once the general public feels their impact, which is likely (...) to happen in the next two to three years. -/- What is not being spoken of is the need for new economic models that can integrate the enormous and continuous shifts in trade that will occur, as we continue to implement more efficient manufacturing and logistics. Things like 3D printing in hub regions, the automation of transportation, augmented and virtual reality, and new creativity-based industries will all disrupt capital markets as well as social systems due to what we could call "meta-scarcity", which is to say, "the scarcity of scarcity"; In effect, we will lack the scarcity to maintain predictive power over the future. This is because when technology is capable of optimizing for creativity, people come up with new demands, and when new demands are supplied as quickly as they arise, no one is capable of knowing what kind of trends the market will take, yet it is necessary to try as public discussion could beneficially shape the economic landscape. (shrink)

Many biological processes and objects can be described by fractals. The paper uses a new type of objects – blinking fractals – that are not covered by traditional theories considering dynamics of self-similarity processes. It is shown that both traditional and blinking fractals can be successfully studied by a recent approach allowing one to work numerically with infinite and infinitesimal numbers. It is shown that blinking fractals can be applied for modeling complex processes of growth of biological systems including their (...) season changes. The new approach allows one to give various quantitative characteristics of the obtained blinking fractals models of biological systems. (shrink)

One challenge faced by aesthetics is the development of an account able to trace out the continuities and discontinuities between general experience and aesthetic experiences. Regarding this issue, in this paper, I present an enactive model of some raw cognitive dynamics that might drive the progressive emergence of aesthetic experiences from the stream of general experience. The framework is based on specific aspects of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and embodied aesthetic theories, while also taking into account research in ecological psychology, (...) cognitive sciences, and dynamic systems theory. The model focuses on dynamically relevant nodes at the pre-reflective and the reflective side of experience that would work as nested rhythmic constraints at different cognitive timescales with the potential to shunt experiences toward the aesthetic in everyday situations. My proposal constitutes a way to explore aesthetic experiences from an enactive perspective that regards them as transformative events in which cognitive processes entrain and are entrained by changes taking place in the environment, the brain, and the body. (shrink)

The INBIOSA project brings together a group of experts across many disciplines who believe that science requires a revolutionary transformative step in order to address many of the vexing challenges presented by the world. It is INBIOSA’s purpose to enable the focused collaboration of an interdisciplinary community of original thinkers. This paper sets out the case for support for this effort. The focus of the transformative research program proposal is biology-centric. We admit that biology to date has been more fact-oriented (...) and less theoretical than physics. However, the key leverageable idea is that careful extension of the science of living systems can be more effectively applied to some of our most vexing modern problems than the prevailing scheme, derived from abstractions in physics. While these have some universal application and demonstrate computational advantages, they are not theoretically mandated for the living. A new set of mathematical abstractions derived from biology can now be similarly extended. This is made possible by leveraging new formal tools to understand abstraction and enable computability. [The latter has a much expanded meaning in our context from the one known and used in computer science and biology today, that is "by rote algorithmic means", since it is not known if a living system is computable in this sense (Mossio et al., 2009).] Two major challenges constitute the effort. The first challenge is to design an original general system of abstractions within the biological domain. The initial issue is descriptive leading to the explanatory. There has not yet been a serious formal examination of the abstractions of the biological domain. What is used today is an amalgam; much is inherited from physics (via the bridging abstractions of chemistry) and there are many new abstractions from advances in mathematics (incentivized by the need for more capable computational analyses). Interspersed are abstractions, concepts and underlying assumptions “native” to biology and distinct from the mechanical language of physics and computation as we know them. A pressing agenda should be to single out the most concrete and at the same time the most fundamental process-units in biology and to recruit them into the descriptive domain. Therefore, the first challenge is to build a coherent formal system of abstractions and operations that is truly native to living systems. Nothing will be thrown away, but many common methods will be philosophically recast, just as in physics relativity subsumed and reinterpreted Newtonian mechanics. -/- This step is required because we need a comprehensible, formal system to apply in many domains. Emphasis should be placed on the distinction between multi-perspective analysis and synthesis and on what could be the basic terms or tools needed. The second challenge is relatively simple: the actual application of this set of biology-centric ways and means to cross-disciplinary problems. In its early stages, this will seem to be a “new science”. This White Paper sets out the case of continuing support of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for transformative research in biology and information processing centered on paradigm changes in the epistemological, ontological, mathematical and computational bases of the science of living systems. Today, curiously, living systems cannot be said to be anything more than dissipative structures organized internally by genetic information. There is not anything substantially different from abiotic systems other than the empirical nature of their robustness. We believe that there are other new and unique properties and patterns comprehensible at this bio-logical level. The report lays out a fundamental set of approaches to articulate these properties and patterns, and is composed as follows. -/- Sections 1 through 4 (preamble, introduction, motivation and major biomathematical problems) are incipient. Section 5 describes the issues affecting Integral Biomathics and Section 6 -- the aspects of the Grand Challenge we face with this project. Section 7 contemplates the effort to formalize a General Theory of Living Systems (GTLS) from what we have today. The goal is to have a formal system, equivalent to that which exists in the physics community. Here we define how to perceive the role of time in biology. Section 8 describes the initial efforts to apply this general theory of living systems in many domains, with special emphasis on crossdisciplinary problems and multiple domains spanning both “hard” and “soft” sciences. The expected result is a coherent collection of integrated mathematical techniques. Section 9 discusses the first two test cases, project proposals, of our approach. They are designed to demonstrate the ability of our approach to address “wicked problems” which span across physics, chemistry, biology, societies and societal dynamics. The solutions require integrated measurable results at multiple levels known as “grand challenges” to existing methods. Finally, Section 10 adheres to an appeal for action, advocating the necessity for further long-term support of the INBIOSA program. -/- The report is concluded with preliminary non-exclusive list of challenging research themes to address, as well as required administrative actions. The efforts described in the ten sections of this White Paper will proceed concurrently. Collectively, they describe a program that can be managed and measured as it progresses. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between cognitive styles of managers working in tourism companies and dynamic capabilities of these companies. Design – The research relies on a quantitative questionnaire. Methodology – To answer the research question, the bivariate (Pearson) correlation was applied. A number of 268 answers from people working in tourism were received. Findings – We found a positive correlation between different dimensions of dynamic capabilities of tourism companies. These capabilities (...) are influenced by managers’ cognitive characteristics. The organizational culture plays a mediating role in the latter relationship. Implications for theory – The paper offers an alternative understanding of dynamic capabilities in tourism and hospitality; the paper also opens new paths for academic research on the impact of cognitive characteristics of managers on the dynamic capabilities of tourism companies. Implications for practitioners – Making accurate psychological portrait of the candidate can predict his/her behavior in certain situation, such as response towards environmental change using dynamic capabilities and when making the necessary changes to the organizational culture. Originality – This study proposes model of influence of a manager’s cognitive style on dynamic capabilities, whereby organizational culture moderates this relationship. (shrink)

Public health care interventions—regarding vaccination, obesity, and HIV, for example—standardly take the form of information dissemination across a community. But information networks can vary importantly between different ethnic communities, as can levels of trust in information from different sources. We use data from the Greater Pittsburgh Random Household Health Survey to construct models of information networks for White and Black communities--models which reflect the degree of information contact between individuals, with degrees of trust in information from various sources (...) correlated with positions in that social network. With simple assumptions regarding belief change and social reinforcement, we use those modeled networks to build dynamic agent-based models of how information can be expected to flow and how beliefs can be expected to change across each community. With contrasting information from governmental and religious sources, the results show importantly different dynamic patterns of belief polarization within the two communities. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that Information, Cognition and a Principle of Existence are intrinsically structured in the quantum model of reality. We reach such evidence by using the Clifford algebra. We analyze quantization in some traditional cases of quantum mechanics and, in particular in quantum harmonic oscillator, orbital angular momentum and hydrogen atom.

Traditionally, philosophers have appealed to the phenomenological similarity between visual experience and visual imagery to support the hypothesis that there is significant overlap between the perceptual and imaginative domains. The current evidence, however, is inconclusive: while evidence from transcranial brain stimulation seems to support this conclusion, neurophysiological evidence from brain lesion studies (e.g., from patients with brain lesions resulting in a loss of mental imagery but not a corresponding loss of perception and vice versa) indicates that there are functional and (...) anatomical dissociations between mental imagery and perception. Assuming that the mental imagery and perception do not overlap, at least, to the extent traditionally assumed, then the question arises as to what exactly mental imagery is and whether it parallels perception by proceeding via several functionally distinct mechanisms. In this review, we argue that even though there may not be a shared mechanism underlying vision for perception and conscious imagery, there is an overlap between the mechanisms underlying vision for action and unconscious visual imagery. On the basis of these findings, we propose a modification of Kosslyn’s model of imagery that accommodates unconscious imagination and explore possible explanations of the quasi-pictorial phenomenology of conscious visual imagery in light of the fact that its underlying neural substrates and mechanisms typically are distinct from those of visual experience. (shrink)

We comment some recent results obtained by using a Clifford bare bone skeleton of quantum mechanics in order to formulate the conclusion that quantum mechanics has its origin in the logic, and relates conceptual entities. Such results touch directly the basic problem about the structure of our cognitive and conceptual dynamics and thus of our mind. The problem of exploring consciousness results consequently to be strongly linked. This is the reason because studies on quantum mechanics applied to this matter are (...) so important for neurologists and psychologists. Under this profile we present some experimental results showing violation of Bell inequality during the MBTI test in investigation of C.V. Jung’s theory of personality. (shrink)

Active materials are self-propelled non-living entities which, in some circumstances, exhibit a number of cognitively interesting behaviors such as gradient-following, avoiding obstacles, signaling and group coordination. This has led to scientific and philosophical discussion of whether this may make them useful as minimal models of cognition (Hanczyc, 2014; McGivern, 2019). Batterman and Rice (2014) have argued that what makes a minimal model explanatory is that the model is ultimately in the same universality class as the target system, which underpins (...) why it exhibits the same macrobehavior. We appeal to recent research in basal cognition (Lyon et al., 2021) to establish appropriate target systems and essential features of cognition as a target of modeling. Looking at self-propelled oil droplets, a type of active material, we do not find that organization alone indicates that these systems exhibit the essential features of cognition. We then examine the specific behaviors of oil droplets but also fail to find that these demonstrate the essential features of cognition. Without a universality class, Batterman & Rice’s account of the explanatory power of minimal models simply does not apply to cognition. However, we also want to stress that it is not intended to; cognition is not the same type of behavioral phenomena as those found in physics. We then look to the minimal cognition methodology of Beer (1996, 2020a, b) to show how active materials can be explanatorily valuable regardless of their cognitive status because they engage in specific behaviors that have traditionally been expected to involve internal representational dynamics, revealing misconceptions about the cognitive underpinnings of certain, specific behaviors in target systems where such behaviors are cognitive. Further, Beer’s models can also be genuinely explanatory by providing dynamical explanations. (shrink)

According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision, require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has added to this (...) a number of phenomena (the "new unconscious") in which behavior is completely unconscious or in which the decision or its execution is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behavior, habitualized behavior, actions based on plain unconscious deliberations, intrusion of information from the dorsal pathway, etc. However, since this makes up the largest part of the behavior which is generally regarded as action, intentionality, yet agency, responsibility and even compatibilist freedom of decision for the largest part of our behavior may be threatened. Such considerations have led to a lively debate, which, however, suffers from generalizations that lump all these unconscious phenomena together. In contrast, the aim of this article is to discuss individual unconscious influences on our behavior separately with respect to what extent they require changes in traditional conceptualizations. The first part (2-4) of the article outlines the "traditions" and their elaborations: the intentional causalist concept of action, an associated empirical theory of action and standard concepts of responsibility and compatibilist freedom of decision, as well as the challenges for them. In the second part (5-9), the aforementioned unconscious influences on our actions (except for automated and habitualized actions, which I discuss elsewhere) are examined: 1. unconscious priming, 2. dynamically unconscious motives, 3. dorsal pathway information influencing conscious decisions, 4. unconsciously altered execution of conscious intentions, 5. unconscious deliberations and decisions. To what extent do these phenomena C1. require a change in the concept of action, C2. curtail intentionality or agency, C3. responsibility and C4. freedom? The result is: The curtailments prove to be far less dramatic than they initially appear; they require more watchfulness but no conceptual change. (shrink)

The book is very well structured to support practical skills development in understanding DSGE modelling through exercises to graduate a user knowledge on macroeconomic application relevant for policy decisions through use of scientific programs like DYNARE /IRIS, appropriate for use with MatLab/Octave. The author also provided useful references for the more inquisitive reader or practitioner to develop his / her ontological quest for further knowledge in the macroeconomic management of a state (Jackson, 2016). On the basis of relevance of its (...) contents pertaining to theoretical application of macroeconomic policy and management of an economy, I strongly recommend this book to anyone preparing for graduate courses in Economics and related areas like Econometrics, Economic Policy Management and also, to the practitioner-researcher engaged in macroeconomic model construction and policy formulation. (shrink)

How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of (...) belief change to model how they function, and that this gives Perry’s (1977) two tier account the advantage over Lewis’s (1979) theory -/- . (shrink)

A method of identifying banks’ business models and studying the features of their risk profile, considering the system of indicators featuring the structure of assets, liabilities, income, expenses, and other qualitative indicators based on monthly statistical reporting. Kohonen's self-organizing maps (SOM) are used to process large data sets, revealing objects’ hidden features by forming homogeneous groups according to similar values of a large system of indicators. The choice of the system of indicators that play the most significant role in (...) describing the business models of modern banks is substantiated. The proposed method makes it possible to group banks with homogeneous characteristics into so-called structural-functional groups and studies the change in the characteristics of groups of banks over time to compare their behavior during periods of active development of the system and during a crisis. That approach is useful for studying the banking system at the macro level, as it provides a quantitative measure of its financial stability. The more banks are in groups with negative values of parameters, increased risks, and unprofitable performance, the worse the general state of the system. The method also allows studying the features of each structural and functional group and the business models’ features at the meso-level. The number and composition of banks inherent in any group change dynamically, which characterizes the features of the relevant business model in a particular period. The averages of each group reflect the objective changes in the banking system structure. In addition, the SOM trajectory can be built for each individual bank determining the development of its strategy, features of a particular business model, and risk profile. At the micro-level, it allows comparing the features of individual banks within the SFGB and models ways to improve efficiency and financial stability by forecast values for SOM. An extensive system of indicators used to form structural and functional groups of banks allows to quickly respond to changes in the banking system, identify areas of increased risk and explore the adequacy and effectiveness of banks’ business models. (shrink)

The construction of space-time in a physical system without time and dynamics is considered. It is shown that the anthropic principle and causality principle inevitably arise in models without time and dynamics. It is shown that for any physical model based on a system without time and dynamics, the anthropic principle is a scientific principle and, in principle, can be falsified. It is shown that, in principle, there is the possibility of experimental verification of what is true - realism (...) or idealism. (shrink)

The construction of spacetime in a physical system without time and dynamics is considered. It is shown that in models without time and dynamics anthropic principle and causality principle inevitably arise. It is shown that for any physical model based on a system without time and dynamics, the anthropic principle is a scientific principle and, in principle, can be falsified. It is shown that, in principle, there is the possibility of experimental verification of what is true - realism or (...) idealism. (shrink)

It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice (...) ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically. (shrink)

Philosophy of science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a structural analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses of climate models. The debate over the analogy can and should be separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. The kind of sensitivity that matters in epistemology is one that induces unsafe beliefs, and the existence of a structural analogue (...) to chaos is better seen as an explanation for known safety failures than as providing evidence for unknown ones. (shrink)

Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection (...) for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren’t re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function. (shrink)

Human linguistic phenomenon is at one and the same time an individual, social, and political fact. As such, its study should bear in mind these complex interrelations, which are produced inside the framework of the sociocultural and historical ecosystem of each human community. Understanding this phenomenon is often no easy task, due to the range of elements involved and their interrelations. The absence of valid, clearly developed paradigms adds to the problem and means that the theoretical conclusions that emerge may (...) be unclear on certain points. It is true that in the last fifty years sociolinguistic studies have advanced considerably, and today we have access to an impressive set of data and a wide variety of theoretical reflections. But as a discipline sociolinguistics does not yet have unified, powerful theoretical models able to account rigorously and clearly for the phenomena it studies. Sociolinguistic studies are today a diverse set of contributions in which certain and theoretical schools and lines of research emerged; but as is to be expected in a relatively new field, there is not enough communication between the various schools and they cannot yet be said to be integrated in terms of their conceptual and theoretical postulates. Against this background, our work aims to contribute to the overall, integrated understanding of the processes of language contact. Via an interdisciplinary, eclectic approach, it also aims to aid the theoretical grounding and integration of a unified, common sociolinguistic paradigm. Our strategy will not be merely to combine the contributions from ongoing research lines, but to address the question from a more global viewpoint which, together with the more innovative contemporary scientific disciplines, permits a harmonious integration of the various sociolinguistic perspectives in a broad, deep and unitary approach to the reality. The materials used to construct this unified approach are taken from many sources: Theoretical physics, ecology, the philosophy of science and mind, anthropology, phenomenological and process sociology, cognitive sciences, political science, pragmatics, history, systems theory, approaches to complexity and obviously sociolinguistics, are all involved in a dialogue in this desire for integration. (shrink)

I examine to what extent accounts of mechanisms based on formal interventionist theories of causality can adequately represent biological mechanisms with complex dynamics. Using a differential equation model for a circadian clock mechanism as an example, I first show that there exists an iterative solution that can be interpreted as a structural causal model. Thus, in principle, it is possible to integrate causal difference-making information with dynamical information. However, the differential equation model itself lacks the right modularity properties for a (...) full integration. A formal mechanistic model will therefore have to leave out either noncausal or causal explanatory relations. (shrink)

This work addresses a broad range of questions which belong to four fields: computation theory, general philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. Dynamical system theory provides the framework for a unified treatment of these questions. ;The main goal of this dissertation is to propose a new view of the aims and methods of cognitive science--the dynamical approach . According to this view, the object of cognitive science is a particular set of dynamical systems, which I (...) call "cognitive systems". The goal of a cognitive study is to specify a dynamical model of a cognitive system, and then use this model to produce a detailed account of the specific cognitive abilities of that system. The dynamical approach does not limit a-priori the form of the dynamical models which cognitive science may consider. In particular, this approach is compatible with both computational and connectionist modeling, for both computational systems and connectionist networks are special types of dynamical systems. ;To substantiate these methodological claims about cognitive science, I deal first with two questions in two different fields: What is a computational system? What is a dynamical explanation of a deterministic process? ;Intuitively, a computational system is a deterministic system which evolves in discrete time steps, and which can be described in an effective way. In chapter 1, I give a formal definition of this concept which employs the notions of isomorphism between dynamical systems, and of Turing computable function. In chapter 2, I propose a more comprehensive analysis which is based on a natural generalization of the concept of Turing machine. ;The goal of chapter 3 is to develop a theory of the dynamical explanation of a deterministic process. By a "dynamical explanation" I mean the specification of a dynamical model of the system or process which we want to explain. I start from the analysis of a specific type of explanandum--dynamical phenomena--and I then use this analysis to shed light on the general form of a dynamical explanation. Finally, I analyze the structure of those theories which generate explanations of this form, namely dynamical theories. (shrink)