The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates (...) in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017). (shrink)

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about (...) the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation often make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. This paper is about how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions. (shrink)

It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. (...) In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false. (shrink)

Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...) Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning. (shrink)

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...) includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

[ES] En recientes décadas se ha observado un renovado interés por algunos de los temas clásicos de la ontología, desde áreas de conocimiento externas a la filosofía, sin embargo, este renacimiento ontológico ha «estimulado» una multiplicidad y diversidad de teorías y concepciones «ontológicas» que ha dado como consecuencia una proliferación de «ontologías» y de interminables batallas para determinar qué tipo de «entidades» estudian sus respectivos «dominios», que a su vez se consideran autónomos e independientes entre sí, inclusive de la propia (...) ontología. En este sentido, el propósito de este trabajo es caracterizar y representar de manera adecuada estas «ontologías», dentro del marco general del debate acerca de la naturaleza de la ontología. Es así que, en la primera sección haré un diagnostico de la ontología contemporánea; en la segunda proporcionaré algunas definiciones y caracterizaciones de las principales concepciones, en especial de las denominadas «ontologías aplicadas»; y en la tercera analizaré sí estas concepciones pueden ser consideradas diversos tipos de ontología o simplemente son diversos niveles de ontología. El marco de la discusión no se centrará en confrontar todas estas nociones, sino en describirlas y analizarlas para ofrecer un enfoque sobre el estado actual de la ontología y sus problemas. [EN] In recent decades there has been a renewed interest in some of the classic themes of ontology, from areas of knowledge external to philosophy; however, this ontological revival has «stimulated» a multiplicity and diversity of «ontological» theories and concepts that has resulted in a proliferation of «ontologies» and endless battles to determine what kind of «entities» study their respective «domains», which in turn are considered autonomous and independent, even of ontology itself. In this sense, the purpose of this work is to adequately characterize and represent these «ontologies», within the general framework of the debate about the nature of ontology. Thus, in the first section I will make a diagnosis of contemporary ontology; in the second I will provide some definitions and characterizations of the main concepts, especially the so-called «applied ontologies»; and in the third I will analyze whether these concepts can be considered different types of ontology or simply are different levels of ontology. The framework of the discussion will not center on confronting all these notions, but to describe and analyze them to provide a focus on the current state of ontology and its problems. (shrink)

Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...) interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of the “Third Man” argument. (shrink)

Aproximación a los problemas que implica la obtención y posterior tratamiento de muestras biológicas en menores para desarrollar investigación científica. Este trabajo se ha realizado en el marco y gracias al Proyecto I+D+i Minoría de edad, vulnerabilidad e investigación biomédica (Minor-Inbio) Ref. nº. DER2013-47232-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.

Relying on evidence from fifteen epigraphic collections and sixty-odd ancient sources as well as discussing a literature of over five hundred titles, the essay’s highly unorthodox conclusions are a case in point of the micrological ideal of achieving novelty on any given subject by way of transcribing and studying first-hand all relevant materials – edited and unedited alike. The paper’s ambition was to shed new light on one of the most intriguing analogies of the whole Aristotelian corpus, namely the comparison (...) between words and pebbles. A review of all material evidence and virtually all extant sources made short work of two related, albeit mutually exclusive, misconception about ancient reckoning boards and their workings: (1) the idea that – for all practical purposes – the abacus’ arrangement mirrored the decimal system, its columns and rows conveniently matching units, tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. (2) the idea that the inscriptions on several surviving counting boards were a nuisance to the extent that, being inconsistent to a fault with the decimal system itself, they made actual calculations harder than they already were (as opposed to making them easier, as one would expect). The paper demonstrated that the first assumption – the « decimal » bias – is simply mistaken and betrays little or no awareness of the epigraphic and archaeological evidence. The paper also demonstrated that the second assumption – the « abacus riddled with complications » bias – simply defeats the purpose of resorting to the abacus in the first place and betrays a poor understanding of its practical vocation which, most assuredly, was not to add to the very problem it was meant to solve. After bulldozing its way through both misunderstandings, the essay focused on the abacus most distinctive features, that is positionality (i.e. the abacus being a positional system through and through) and hybridity (i.e. the abacus’ place value system being monetary in nature and purpose, as opposed to it being abstract and homogeneous). The final result is an interpretation that moves away from the received views by showing that the prologue of the Sophistici elenchi offers no support to the notion that, when Aristotle referred to counters, he was leaning on a kinship of sorts – or any kinship, for that matter – between abstract calculation and speech. Once we turns the pebble’s simile on its head and set it back upon its feet (Aristotle’s pebble analogy is about pebbles, what else?), it becomes clear that it presupposed numeracy all right, but it was not about numeracy itself. Moreover its goal was not to explain why computational and linguistic symbolisms succeed, but to explain how they fail – failure being the whole point; in this particular instance, failure to detect and prevent abusive value shifts affecting words and counters alike. (shrink)

El proceso de aprehensión de lo cognoscible, en la filosofía contemporánea, ha sido tratado desde diversas perspectivas, entre ellas la fenomenológica y la analítica. Cada una de estas perspectivas aportan unos presupuestos filosóficos y procesos metodológicos que nos proporcionan marcos de trabajo para indagar en las vías de aprehensión del conocimiento; sin embargo, empleadas por separado son insuficientes y limitadas. En absoluto se trata de procurar un método universal, sino de integrar e indagar sobre diversos presupuestos, procesos, patrones y estructuras (...) para avanzar en la indagación de la aprehensión del conocimiento. En este sentido, en la primera parte, abordaremos la necesidad de tener reglas (definitorias y estratégicas) para ser parte y avanzar en cualquier «juego», en especial el del conocimiento. En la segunda y tercera, describiremos los «métodos» desarrollados por José Ferrater Mora (operaciones filosóficas) y Nicolai Hartmann (pensar sistemático), los que pueden ser un punto de partida, vías a considerar en este proceso. En la parte final, a modo de contraste, se ofrece en un gráfico un esquema metodológico de los dos métodos analizados. (shrink)

[ES] En este trabajo propedéutico, a través de los propios textos de Kant, intentaré ofrecer una descripción equilibrada y una reconstrucción sucinta de los argumentos que ofrece Kant acerca de la posibilidad e imposibilidad de la metafísica. En primer lugar presentaré algunas críticas a la metafísica, luego visualizaré la noción kantiana de metafísica, así como sus razones y momentos constitutivos; y finalmente, analizaré que tipo de conocimiento es la metafísica y las características y naturaleza de esta para que sea viable (...) dicha «ciencia». Para realizar este cometido, asumiré la hipótesis de que la metafísica para Kant, en correspondencia con la resolucion de la tercera cuestion del conocimiento, es una ciencia que integra razón práctica y teórica en un sistema universal que busca la transcendencia. Si la metafísica tiene alguna posibilidad, ésta probablemente sería la vía. [EN] In this propaedeutic work, through Kant’s own texts, I will try to offer a balanced description and a succinct reconstruction of Kant’s arguments about the possibility and impossibility of Metaphysics. In the first place I will present some criticisms of Metaphysics, then I will visualize the Kantian notion of Metaphysics, as well as its constitutive reasons and moments; and finally, I will analyze what kind of knowledge is Metaphysics and the characteristics and nature of it, so that this «science» is viable. In order to carry out this task, I will assume the hypothesis that Kant’s Metaphysics, in correspondence with the resolution of the third question of knowledge, is a science that integrates practical and theoretical reason into a universal system that seeks transcendence. If Metaphysics has any chance, this would probably be the way. (shrink)

La noción de mundos posibles, sostiene que nuestro mundo es un mundo entre otros, un subconjunto de todas las cosas que existen. Esto implica aceptar que existen mundos estructuralmente equivalentes con sus propios lenguajes [formales], que entre sí no tienen ningún estatuto privilegiado, p.e., el mundo y lenguaje del arte o el mundo y lenguaje de la física; no obstante, la idea de aceptar otros mundos equivalentes como mundos posibles epistémica y ontológicamente legítimos para acceder y expresar lo cognoscible del (...) mundo no goza de gran aceptación. En este sentido, de entre las múltiples dimensiones de la noción de mundos posibles anotada, su dimensión lógica, es una de las más extendidas, ésta se entiende como un posible estado de cosas o un posible curso de eventos. Empero, esta concepción es la más restrictiva de la noción de mundos posibles, no sólo porque dicha noción transmuta en una especie de «técnica predictiva» que nos permite analizar y visualizar posibles escenarios de un estado de cosas o un curso de eventos, sino porque fundamentalmente, la noción de mundos posibles pierde gran parte de su potencia conceptual. Hablar de proposiciones como conjuntos de mundos posibles, no es un error, pero es limitar innecesariamente el alcance y campo de acción de la noción de mundos posibles. Si entendemos dicha noción en la versión primaría de Lewis [«Nuestro mundo actual es sólo un mundo entre otros»], sería plausible recuperar, entre otras, las dimensiones ontológica y epistémica de la noción de mundos posibles, y por ende la posibilidad objetiva de indagar en formas alternativas y legitimas de acceder y expresar lo cognoscible del mundo; en este sentido, en este trabajo me propongo: (1) retomar la noción primaria de mundos posibles de Lewis, para analizar y explicitar brevemente sus limitaciones, virtudes y requerimientos; (2) examinar las condiciones de posibilidad de un mundo; y, (3) sugerir los lineamientos epistémicos que deberían considerarse y explicitarse cuando se habla de y desde un mundo posible a la hora de expresar un enunciado. (shrink)

Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of the (...) phenomenon. I will point out several problems presented by them and I will hint to how this phenomenon could be explained by making minor adjustments to our semantic theory. Sentenças avaliativas (julgamentos morais, expressões de gosto, modos epistêmicos) são relativas aos padrões do falante. Recentemente, um fenômeno desafiou a explicação tradicional dessa relatividade: sempre que dois falantes discordam entre si, eles contradizem um ao outro sem estarem errados. Por isso, pensa-se que a correção das asserções envolvidas deve ser relacionada a um padrão desprovido de privilégio e não necessariamente ao padrão do falante. Eu sustentarei, ao contrário, que até agora nem esta nem alguma outra proposta forneceu uma explicação do fenômeno. Eu assinalarei diversos problemas apresentados por essas propostas e sugerirei o modo como este fenômeno poderia ser explicado ao fazer pequenos ajustes em nossa teoria semântica. (shrink)

Este volumen contiene los trabajos presentados en el I Simposio de Pensamiento Contemporáneo, celebrado en la Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (UTPL) durante los días 23 y 24 de enero de 2019 y cuyo tema central fue las «Nuevas Tecnologías en la Educación» (SPC–NTE). Este Simposio tuvo como objetivo fomentar la interacción entre personas de diferentes formaciones e intereses en la discusión de problemas y soluciones relevantes para la educación en la era digital, a fin de intercambiar ideas sobre prácticas (...) e investigaciones que busquen comprender, mejorar y ampliar el uso de las nuevas tecnologías en los procesos de enseñanza–aprendizaje en los más diferentes contextos de enseñanza. 28 trabajos analizan abordan temáticas de especial interés para los futuros docentes, así como para quienes ya se desempeñan como tales en los diversos niveles educativos. Estos textos son instantáneas breves, ágiles y claras de las contribuciones teóricas o de experiencias pedagógicas que tratan sobre ambientes, softwares y hardwares para apoyar la enseñanza y aprendizaje; TIC en la educación universitaria; técnicas y estrategias lúdicas en educación; experiencias pedagógicas con las TIC y humanidades digitales en la educación. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

El artículo presenta un análisis de cuatro temas centrales de Sen: su visión sobre el ser humano, la libertad individual, la evaluación moral y los derechos, y la igualdad. Con esto quiero mostrar que estas ideas no sólo son consistentes, sino que explican muchas de las reflexiones sobre temas sociales y económicos que lo han convertido en un referente en estas áreas. En las conclusiones presentaré una síntesis e interpretación de estas ideas fundamentales, mostrando cómo constituyen un núcleo filosófico y (...) qué relaciones mantienen entre ellas. Mi objetivo no es encasillarlo en algunas de las corrientes de filosofía actuales, sino destacar la solidez y pertinencia de su aporte filosófico, algo sumamente útil en un tiempo como el nuestro, deseoso de ideas frescas para los acuciantes problemas de siempre. (shrink)

La actitud del diseño es una estrategia interpretativa propuesta por Dennett, que consiste en tratar al sistema, cuyo “comportamiento” se quiere predecir, bajo el supuesto de que sus partes cumplen funciones que obedecen a un diseño satisfactorio. Sin embargo, estudios recientes sobre atribución funcional en artefactos técnicos consideran que la actitud del diseño supone una estrategia inadecuada para entender qué hace un artefacto técnico. En particular, dos críticas han ganado visibilidad. Por una parte, Vermaas et al. (2013) señalan una inconsistencia (...) en la propuesta dennettiana de la actitud del diseño: las intenciones del diseñador a veces desempeñan un papel en la interpretación de los artefactos y a veces no lo hacen, sin tener finalmente una intuición clara sobre su rol. Por otra parte, Vaesen y Van Amerongen (2008) sostienen que la actitud del diseño admite dos interpretaciones, una descriptiva y una normativa, y que ambas son implausibles. No obstante, en este trabajo argumentamos que estas críticas son rebatibles y que el problema reside en que ambas acusaciones, i.e. inconsistencia e implausibilidad, suponen una interpretación incorrecta de la posición de Dennett. The design attitude is an interpretive strategy proposed by Dennett, which consists of treating the system, whose “behavior” is to be predicted, under the assumption that its parts fulfill functions that accomplish a satisfactory design. Recent studies on technical artifacts' functional attribution claim that the design attitude is an inadequate strategy to elicit what a technical artifact does. In particular, two criticisms have gained visibility. On the one hand, Vermas et al (2013) remark an inconsistency in Dennett’s design stance. The very designer's intentions sometimes play a role in the interpretation of artifacts and sometimes they don´t, without finally having a clear intuition about their role. On the other hand, Vaesen and Van Amerongen (2008) argue that the design stance admits two interpretations, a descriptive and a normative one and that both are implausible. However, we argue that these criticisms miss the point given that both accusations, i.e. of inconsistency and of implausibility, result from a wrong interpretation of Dennett's position. (shrink)

Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres clases (...) de entidades, Concreta,a e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii) este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”. Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article, we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs. (shrink)

Originally published as「歴史的世界の個性的な自己創造と国家：西田哲学における〈国家〉と〈民族〉」, in「西田哲学会年報第七号」[ Jahrbuch der Nishida-Gesellschaft] 7 : 55–76. Übersetzt von Leon Krings. In diesem Aufsatz wird der Frage nachgegangen, in welcher Weise der „Staat“ im späten Denken des Philosophen Nishida Kitarō thematisiert wird. Dies geschieht anhand der Staatstheorie Nishidas, wie sie sich in seinen Aufsätzen Das Problem der Staatsraison und Das Problem der japanischen Kultur sowie im Anhang zur Philosophischen Aufsatzsammlung iv darstellt. Zusätzlich werden Nishidas Schriften, die nach den Grundproblemen der Philosophie geschrieben wurden und den theoretischen Hintergrund (...) seiner Staatstheorie bilden, miteinbezogen. In diesen Schriften fragt Nishida – ausgehend von der genetischen Struktur der historischen Wirklichkeit – nach der Daseinsberechtigung sowie der Bedeutung des Staates, d. h. danach, was ein Staat ist und welche Art von Gemeinschaft es verdient, als „Staat“ bezeichnet zu werden. Mithilfe des im Folgenden dargestellten Leitfadens werde ich versuchen, Nishidas Gedankengang genauer nachzuverfolgen. Dabei wird sich zeigen, dass er den „Staat“ als eine im höchsten Maße paradoxe Form der Gemeinschaft interpretiert. (shrink)

Gravity is the foundation of the current physical paradigm. Due to that gravity is strongly linked to the curvature of space-time, we research that it lacks of a valid physical concept of space-time, nevertheless that from the science philosophy, via substantivalism, it has tried respond. We found that is due to that the gnoseological process applied from the general relativity, necessarily us leads to metaphysic because ontologically space-time is a metaphysical entity. Thus, we arrive to the super substantivalism that from (...) metaphysics gives an answer on space-time rigorously exact with the vision of Einstein on physics. The result is that matter is nothing since all is space-time, i.e. geometry, therefore is a imperative of the physical science break the current paradigm. (shrink)

General Relativity defines gravity like the metric of a Lorentzian manifold. Einstein formulated spacetime as quality structural of gravity, i.e, circular definition between gravity and spacetime, also Einstein denoted "Space and time are modes by which we think, not conditions under which we live" and “We denote everything but the gravitational field as matter”, therefore, spacetime is nothing and gravity in first approximation an effect of coordinates, and definitely a geometric effect. The mathematical model generates quantitative predictions coincident in high (...) grade with observations without physical meaning. Philosophy intervened: in Substantivalism, spacetime exists in itself while in Relationalism as metrical relations. But, it does not know what spacetime. The outcomes of model have supported during a century, validity of the General Relativity, interpreted arbitrarily. Einstein formulated, from quadrupoles of energy, the formation of ripples in spacetime propagating as gravitational waves abandoned, in 1938, when he said that they do not exist. LIGO announced the first detection of gravitational waves from a pair of merging black holes. They truly are waves of quantum vacuum. (shrink)

Einstein structured the theoretical frame of his work on gravity under the Special Relativity and Minkowski´s spacetime using three guide principles: The strong principle of equivalence establishes that acceleration and gravity are equivalents. Mach´s principle explains the inertia of the bodies and particles as completely determined by the total mass existent in the universe. And, general covariance searches to extend the principle of relativity from inertial motion to accelerated motion. Mach´s principle was abandoned quickly, general covariance resulted mathematical property of (...) the tensors and principle of equivalence inconsistent and it can only apply to punctual gravity, no to extended gravity. Also, the basic principle of Special Relativity, i.e., the constancy of the speed of the electromagnetic wave in the vacuum was abandoned, static Minkowski´s spacetime was replaced to dynamic Lorentz´s manifold and the main conceptual fundament of the theory, i.e. spacetime is not known what is. Of other hand, gravity never was conceptually defined; neither answers what is the law of gravity in general. However, the predictions arise of Einstein equations are rigorously exacts. Thus, the conclusion is that on gravity, it has only the equations. In this work it shows that principle of equivalence applies really to punctual and extended gravity, gravity is defined as effect of change of coordinates although in the case of the extended gravity with change of geometry from Minkowski´s spacetime to Lorentz´s manifold; and the gravitational motion is the geodesic motion that well it can declare as the general law of gravity. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more explicit (...) what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

Las relaciones familiares tienen una cualidad única que no se producen en otros entornos y cada familia vive diferentes prácticas que la hacen ser irrepetible; esto permite un aprender–aprender como padres e hijos, además estás relaciones tienen correspondencia con el desarrollo de los valores que se manifiesta en familia y que finalmente son transmitidos en la sociedad. La investigación se realizó a nivel nacional a 1200 niños y niñas en edades comprendidas entre 8 a 11 años, pudiendo observar con más (...) influencia de valores a la responsabilidad, amistad, orden, religiosidad y naturaleza. (shrink)

Il "Principe" di Machiavelli e, soprattutto i "Discorsi sopra la prima decade di Tito Livio" figurarono certamente tra i libri proibiti che Giordano Bruno lesse segretamente in convento. Essi ebbero una significativa influenza sul suo pensiero. THE FOX AND THE LION. Giordano Bruno, reader of Machiavelli. Machiavelli's Prince and, above all, the Discourses on Livy were certainly among the forbidden works that Giordano Bruno read secretly in the convent. They had a significant influence on him. -/- .

In this paper, I engage with a recent contextualist account of gender terms proposed by Díaz-León, E. 2016. “Woman as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle.” Hypatia 31 : 245–58. Díaz-León’s main aim is to improve both on previous contextualist and non-contextualist views and solve a certain puzzle for feminists. Central to this task is putting forward a view that allows trans women who did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures to use the gender terms of their choice (...) to self-identify. My goal is to investigate Díaz-León’s proposal, point out several shortcomings of the view and discuss possible replies on her part. (shrink)

Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism from Jennifer Saul that Esa Diaz-Leon develops doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political (...) practices concerning our uses of these words. I then float the view that terms like 'woman' or 'man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology. (shrink)

A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.

This chapter provides an overview and critical discussion of cosmological arguments for theism, with special focus on the Kalam argument and arguments from contingency.

The primary aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether considerations about a priori domains and abstract objects favor atheism over theism.

El presente artículo tiene como objeto llevar a cabo un estudio pragmático y analítico sobre la acción de valoración, el valor y los valores a la luz de la ciencia semiótica y de la ciencia cibernética. Por ello, se desarrollará un proceso axiológico que ilustre cómo sucede el ingreso, la transición y la salida de códigos morales en función de un esquema cognitivo. Así pues, el proceso axiológico se postula, primero, en fundamento de tres sistemas: de mentalidad, de valores y (...) de biomoralidad y, segundo, conforme a la teoría de la información y de la teoría general de sistemas. (shrink)

En su trabajo acerca del debate Putnam-Rorty, Luis Robledo supone una concepción reduccionista de la justificación en Rorty, y defiende contra ella la indepen-dencia entre justificación y consenso, a través del argumento de la posibilidad de un consenso sin justificación. A su juicio, el no sostener una independencia tal conduciría a problemas desfavorables para el pragmatismo. En este trabajo buscaré presentar una interpretación alternativa y no reduccionista de la justificación rortiana, que aún sin reconocer una total independencia entre ambas instancias, (...) no sólo evita estos proble-mas, sino que además muestra que es poco pragmático el ejemplo proporcionado por Robledo en su argumentación. (shrink)

El objetivo principal del artículo es hacer notar la dimensión jurídico-normativa del problema del aborto, considerando que acentuar excesivamente su dimensión ético-moral conduce a una estéril contraposición que impide una discusión serena del abortoy de su dimensión irremediablemente pública. En este sentido, aún reconociéndole su perspectiva moral, en el artículo se plantea la posibilidad de pensar el aborto como una conducta que pueda reconducirse a un modelo de regulación jurídica “blando”, dondela perspectiva moral del legislador no adquiera las características de (...) una moral común, igual para todos ,y que,por el contrario,mediante la modalidad jurídica del permiso, cada individuo ponga en acto su propia convicción moral. De ahí puede surgir una legislación en la que el aborto no sea objeto ni de un deber jurídico ni de una prohibición: abortaro no abortar, en este modelo de regulación jurídica, son decisiones que los individuos toman con base en sus propias convicciones. (shrink)

Las descripciones definidas pueden ser interpretadas de acuerdo con las dos lecturas propuestas por Donnellan. El presente trabajo presenta una interpretación contextualista de la lectura referencial de estas expresiones.

La teoría de los hacedores de verdad, como la vieja teoría correspondentista, intenta comprender la relación que, ligando proposiciones y hechos, resulta en la verdad (o falsedad) de las primeras. Esta teoría presenta una versión débil, que da cuenta de dicha relación en términos de la noción de implicación, y una fuerte, fundada en la relación de "ser verdadero en virtud de". La diferencia fundamental entre ambas es la adhesión y el rechazo, respectivamente, del Principio de Implicación, según el cual (...) dos proposiciones ligadas por implicación serán hechas verdaderas por el mismo hecho. El presente trabajo muestra cómo esta adhesión conduce a las versiones débiles al colapso, por lo cual sólo las versiones fuertes tienen oportunidades de prosperar. (shrink)

L. Gazziero, « “Οἰκείως τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ” (Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, 12.11). Contraintes disciplinaires – anciennes et modernes – de l’interprétation logique des Catégories d’Aristote », dans V. Brière et J. Lemaire (éd.), Qu’est-ce qu’une catégorie ? Interprétations d’Aristote, Leuven, Peeters, 2019, p. 9-59 [ISBN 9789042936621] -/- In addition to understanding the very notion of « category » according to its different Aristotelian contexts, the first order of business of an archaeology of Aristotle’s categories is to inquire into its (...) influential evolution at the hands of Late Ancient commentators. The essay retraces the origin and development of the « logical » interpretation which held sway both in ancient and modern times. It shows first that the key to understand the debate between Benveniste and Derrida over Aristotle’s categories is to be found in the Neoplatonic exegesis of the work of the same name. It shows next the powerful dynamic that led the commentators to dismiss more than a few hints in the text itself in order to build a remarkably consistent interpretation that understood the notion of category as the simplest and most fundamental element in a building block theory of linguistic expression and argumentation. -/- Face au foisonnement qui caractérise l’instruction contemporaine du dossier des « catégories » d’Aristote, il est encore et toujours utile de suivre le fil historique inauguré par Adolf Trendelenburg, réinventé par Emile Benveniste et élevé par Jacques Derrida au rang d’impératif méthodologique. Le geste inaugural d’une archéologie de la notion de « catégorie » consiste donc à se prémunir contre le risque d’évacuer le problème historique des catégories à la faveur d’une catégorialité anachronique ou passe-partout : ce qui n’est possible qu’à condition de replacer les « catégories » dans les différents contextes aristotéliciens où elles sont utilisées et d’interroger les contraintes disciplinaires qui ont structuré le débat autour de leur nature chez les commentateurs de l’Antiquité tardive. (shrink)

The present piece, first presented on 19 November 2016 at the Centre Léon Robin (CNRS-Univ. Paris-Sorbonne-ENS Ulm) as part of the“Présocratiques” Seminar, is an investigation of the relationship between Empedocles and Freud. The analysis is divided into three parts: the first section examines the nature of Freud’s engagement with Empedocles; next, consideration is given to the similarities between their doctrines, based on the extant fragments of the Empedoclean corpus; finally, I offer a series of observations about Empedocles’ poetic style, which (...) shares strong affinities with the spoken word in a manner typical of the oral tradition and is freighted with corporeal and emotional significance. It is here that we see the emergence of one of the key concepts of psychoanalysis: the relationship between logos and alogon, between that which can be rationally analysed and that which can be intuited but which eludes the domain of logos. (shrink)

The relation between slurs and their neutral counterparts has been put into question recently by the fact that some slurs can be used to refer to subsets of the referential classes determined by their associated counterparts. This paper aims to reinforce this relation by offering a way of explaining referential restriction that distinguishes between two kinds of slurs: those performing a normalizing role upon (some) individuals inside a class (mostly, a gender) and those used to derogate a marginalized out- group.

Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...) tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito criticar y reformular la teoría de valores del autor y filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi. Para ello, se someterán a falsacionismo las tesis según las cuales la cualidad estructural es, primero, estructuralista y no analítica y, segundo, empírica, de acuerdo con la metodología holista de la ciencia. La crítica, así, se desarrollará a partir de los siguientes interrogantes. Inicialmente, ¿el autor acude al holismo o al reduccionismo como enfoques metodológicos de desarrollo? Finalmente, ¿cuál es la (...) distinción lógica entre el valor como cualidad sui géneris y el valor como cualidad estructural? (shrink)

Scholarly dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s fallacy of accident has traditionally focused on his examples, whose compatibility with the fallacy’s definition has been doubted time and again. Besides a unified account of the fallacy of accident itself, the paper provides a formalized analysis of its several examples in Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi. The most problematic instances are dealt with by means of an internal reconstruction of their features as conveyed by Aristotle’s text and an extensive survey of their interpretation in the Byzantine and (...) Latin exegetical tradition. Carefully handled a doxographical approach, as opposed to rapid results oriented practices, proves to be most effective in that it supplies both useful albeit ordinarily overlooked insights and a comprehensive framework of reference for further investigations. (shrink)

Marjorie Perloff is a distinguished commentator on the literature of this century, best known for her work on Futurism, one of the pre-First War international and inter-art avant garde movements. Radical Artifice takes on the avant garde since 1960, observed from the angle of the institutions of popular culture -- in particular television talk shows, and graphic advertisements. The project of the book is to respond to Charles Bernstein's decree: "There is no natural look or sound to a poem. Every (...) element is intended, chosen. That is what makes a thing a poem" (qtd. 35). "Why, Perloff asks, "is the natural now regarded with such suspicion?" (35). (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...) tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects. (shrink)

Selected Bibiliography and Overview of Japanese Philosophy by reference to major Japanese Anthologies of Traditional and Modern Japanese Thought / Philosophy, listing a wide range of Japanese philosophers and thinkers from ancient times to the present.

W. J. T. Mitchell's "Spatial Form in Literature: Toward a General Theory" (Critical Inquiry 6 [Spring 1980]: 539-67) raises some fundamental questions about the concept of form itself and makes some large claims for the centrality of spatial form not only in modern criticism but in our entire culture. I wish to address a few of the questions raised by his discussion. First, Mitchell posits an identity between spatial form and "synchronic structural models" as if all explanatory models abstracted from (...) temporal alteration were necessarily spatial. (shrink)