The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author presents a brief definition of the substance view; argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such, why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it (...) follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception. (shrink)

We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology, in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in (...) their "armchairs of an afternoon", to use J.L. Austin’s phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of "know" that so far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing. (shrink)

The late Kenyan Prof. H. Odera Oruka (1944-1995), from his base in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Nairobi, contributed significantly to the growth of contemporary African philosophy, and helped locate African philosophy within the global philosophical discourse. His work in areas such as normative and applied ethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and, most notably, philosophic sagacity, continues to play a pivotal role in the current discourse on African philosophy. Prof. Oruka was also one of the (...) founders of Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya. -/- The chapters in this volume examine various aspects of Oruka’s prolific contribution to philosophy in general, and to African philosophy in particular. Earlier versions of the chapters were presented at the three-day Odera Oruka International Symposium held from 19th to 21st November 2013, organised by the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Nairobi in collaboration with the Goethe Institute. (shrink)

Among the most animating debates in eighteenth-century British ethics was the debate over psychological egoism, the view that our most basic desires are self-interested. An important episode in that debate, less well known than it should be, was the exchange between Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull. In the early editions of his Inquiry into Virtue, Hutcheson argued ingeniously against psychological egoism; in his Foundation of Morality, Clarke argued ingeniously against Hutcheson’s arguments. Later, Hutcheson attempted new arguments against (...) psychological egoism, designed to overcome Clarke’s objections. This article examines the exchange between these philosophers. Its conclusion, influenced partly by Clarke, is that psychological egoism withstands Hutcheson’s arguments. This is not to belittle those arguments—indeed, they are among the most resourceful and plausible of their kind. The fact that egoism withstands them is thus not a mere negative result, but a stimulus to consider carefully the ways in which progress in this area may be possible. (shrink)

In this article I address a puzzle about one of Francis Hutcheson’s objections to psychological egoism. The puzzle concerns his premise that God receives no benefit from rewarding the virtuous. Why, in the early editions of his Inquiry Concerning Virtue (1725, 1726), does Hutcheson leave this premise undefended? And why, in the later editions (1729, 1738), does he continue to do so, knowing that in 1726 John Clarke of Hull had subjected the premise to plausible criticism, geared to the (...) very audience (mainly Christian) for whom Hutcheson’s objection to egoism was written? This puzzle is not negligible. Some might claim that Hutcheson ruins his objection by ignoring Clarke’s criticism. To answer the puzzle we must consider not only Hutcheson’s philosophy but also some theological assumptions of Hutcheson’s time. (shrink)

En su más reciente ensayo, Francis Fukuyama aborda uno de los temas centrales de la teoría política contemporánea: los desafíos que representan las exigencias de los grupos identitarios para la democracia liberal.

The language of phenomenology includes terms such as intentionality, phenom- enon, insight, analysis, sense, not to mention the key term of Edmund Husserl’s manifesto, “the things themselves” to return to . But what does the “things them- selves” properly mean? How come the term is replaced by the “findings” over time? And what are the findings for? The investigation begins by looking at the tricky legacy of the modern turn, trying to clarify ties to past masters, including Francis- co (...) Suárez and Augustine of Hippo . The former, because his influence goes beyond René Descartes reaching undoubtedly Franz Brentano and his students, as well as Martin Heidegger . The latter, because Augustine gives a personal component to the Greek inheritance, marked by the “inward turn .” However, it would not be possible to review the history of thought without the help offered by Jan Patočka's analyses . Patočka discloses the “care” of the Greek philosophers, Plato and Dem- ocritus among others, “for the soul”, we would say with Patočka for “being,” whose sense “does not leave us indifferent” as the leitmotiv of Ancient Philosophy . Nev- ertheless, in his lectures on Plato and Europe, Patočka points out that you must be careful not to confuse the phenomena of things, of existens, with the phenomena of being . Finally, Patočka’s legacy is found in the efforts to reconcile the life-feeling with the modern construction of reality, which means “a radical reconstruction of the naive and natural world of common sense .” In some ways, intentionality is to be revised . (shrink)

Dans ce texte, je réponds aux commentaires et aux critiques qui ont été adressées à mon texte de 2007 qui mettait en rapport l’action directe et la démocratie délibérative. Je concède que j’ai fait preuve d’un peu trop d’optimisme, en particulier dans un cadre politique libéral, à vouloir chercher dans ce face-à-face une voie permettant de déboucher sur un dialogue. Je reprends certains des commentaires qui me permettent de distinguer plusieurs formes de débats publics et de les pluraliser, pour faire (...) place à des publics et des voix discordantes, dont un public anarchiste, qui par des actions directes revendique une voix égale aux autres publics. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’analyse à la lumière des normes libérales de la politique délibérative le bien-fondé de l’action directe contre les institutions internationales associées au néolibéralisme et à la mondialisation du capitalisme (Banque mondiale, Organisation mondiale du commerce, etc.). Le processus délibératif de ces organismes étant illégitime du point de vue de la théorie de la politique délibérative, les activistes du mouvement altermondialiste sont en droit de contester ces organismes. De plus, une attitude de contestation peut avoir en elle-même une (...) valeur délibérative pour au moins sept raisons : (1) lancer une délibération ; (2) élargir la participation à la délibération ; (3) renforcer la représentativité ; (4) faire circuler l’information et faire connaître les arguments (publicité) ; (5) stimuler l’imagination ; (6) pousser à l’action ; (7) relancer la délibération. Finalement, les mouvements sociaux tels que le mouvement altermondialiste peuvent être vus comme des forums délibératifs. Ainsi, qui veut évaluer la légitimité de l’action directe doit prendre en considération la nature délibérative du processus par lequel les activistes choisissent les moyens les plus efficaces à utiliser pour corriger les défauts du processus délibératif officiel et pour faire avancer l’égalité, la liberté et la justice. (shrink)

Some of the most forceful objections to William Wollaston's moral theory come from his early critics, namely, Thomas Bott (1688-1754), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), and John Clarke of Hull (1687-1734). These objections are little known, while the inferior objections of Hume, Bentham, and later prominent critics are familiar. This fact is regrettable. For instance, it impedes a robust understanding of eighteenth-century British ethics; also, it fosters a questionable view as to why Wollaston's theory, although at first well received, soon faded (...) in esteem among philosophers. This paper gives Wollaston's early critics some of the attention they deserve. It reconstructs some of their objections to Wollaston's philosophy, addresses replies to those objections, and shows that despite some minor flaws, the objections succeed. A fact that becomes clear is that Wollaston's philosophy had suffered devastating criticism years before Hume wrote anything against it. (shrink)

Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheson's objection and its intellectual context. And nowhere in the scholarship on Hutcheson do (...) we find these questions addressed. This paper addresses them. A fact that emerges is that the apparent errors or shortcomings the questions may highlight are just that – apparent errors or shortcomings; in reality they are nothing of the kind. (shrink)

This paper challenges Francis Hutcheson's and John Clarke of Hull's alleged demonstrations that William Wollaston's moral theory is inconsistent. It also present a form of the inconsistency objection that fares better than theirs, namely, that of Thomas Bott (1688-1754). Ultimately, the paper shows that Wollaston's moral standard is not what some have thought it to be; that consequently, his philosophy withstands the best-known efforts to expose it as inconsistent; and further, that one of the least-known British moralists is more (...) important than hitherto thought, in that he uncovers the inconsistency Clarke and Hutcheson try in vain to elicit. (shrink)

Despite the end of the Cold War and the ascendancy of liberal democracy celebrated by Francis Fukuyama as “the end of history”, a growing number of scholars and political activists point to its inherent shortcomings. However, they have tended to dismiss it on the basis of one or two of its salient weaknesses. While this is a justifiable way to proceed, it denies the searching reader an opportunity to see the broad basis for the growing rejection of liberal democracy (...) among African political theorists. Consequently, in this article, I argue that from an African perspective, the almost hegemonic status of liberal democracy can be challenged on at least five grounds, namely, logical inconsistency, impracticability due to the largely communalistic outlook of many africans, inconsistency between affirmation and action, violation of the right to ethnic identity, and the moral imperative to assert the right to cultural emancipation. -/- I conclude by calling upon African and Africanist political theorists to utilise indigenous African political thought, coupled with emancipatory aspects of political thought from other parts of the world, to design practicable models of democracy for contemporary African states. I further conclude that in order to promote genuine inter-cultural dialogue on democratisation, people from Western cultures ought to acknowledge the equality of all cultures, and to recognise that systems of governance are part and parcel of those cultures. (shrink)

John Clarke of Hull, one of the eighteenth century's staunchest proponents of psychological egoism, defended that theory in his Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice. He did so mainly by opposing the objections to egoism in the first two editions of Francis Hutcheson's Inquiry into Virtue. But Clarke also produced a challenging, direct argument for egoism which, regrettably, has received virtually no scholarly attention. In this paper I give it some of the attention it merits. In addition to (...) reconstructing it and addressing interpretive issues about it, I show that it withstands a tempting objection. I also show that although Clarke's argument ultimately fails, to study it is instructive. It illuminates, for example, Hutcheson's likely intentions in a passage relevant to egoism. (shrink)

This short paper, written for a wide audience, introduces "science and values" topics as they have arisen in the context of eugenics. The paper especially focuses on the context of 20th century eugenics in western Canada, where eugenic legislation in two provinces was not repealed until the 1970s and thousands of people were sterilized without their consent. A framework for understanding science-value relationships within this context is discussed, and so too is recent relevant work in philosophy of science.

As the Zika virus pandemic continues to bring worry and fear to health officials and medical scientists, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO) have recommended that residents of the Zika-infected countries, e.g., Brazil, and those who have traveled to the area should delay having babies which may involve artificial contraceptive, particularly condom. This preventive policy, however, is seemingly at odds with the Roman Catholic Church’s position on the contraceptive. As least since the promulgation of (...) Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae, the Church has explicitly condemned artificial birth control as intrinsic evil. However, the current pontiff, Pope Francis, during his recent visit to Latin America, remarked that the use of artificial contraception may not be in contradiction to the teaching of Humanae Vitae while drawing a parallel between the current Zika Crisis and the 1960’s Belgian Congo Nun Controversy. The pope mentioned that the traditional ethical principle of the lesser of two evils may be the doctrine that justified the exceptions. The authors of this paper attempt to expand the theological rationale of the pope’s suggestion. In so doing, the authors rely on casuistical reasoning as an analytic tool that compares the Belgian Congo Nun case and the given Zika case, and suggest that the former is highly similar to, if not the same as, the latter in terms of normative moral feature. That is, in both cases the use of artificial contraception is theologically justified in reference to the criteria that the doctrine of the lesser of two evils requires. The authors wish that the paper would provide a solid theological-ethical ground based on which condom-use as the most immediate and effective preventive measure can be recommended in numerous Catholic hospitals as well as among Catholic communities in the world, particularly the most Zika-affected and largest Catholic community in the world, Brazil – 123 million present Brazilian citizens are reported to be Roman Catholic. (shrink)

In a well-known footnote in Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume calls William Wollaston's moral theory a "whimsical system" and purports to destroy it with a few brief objections. The first of those objections, although fatally flawed, has hitherto gone unrefuted. To my knowledge, its chief error has escaped attention. In this paper I expose that error; I also show that it has relevance beyond the present subject. It can occur with regard to any moral theory which, (...) like Wollaston's, locates the wrongness of an act in a property that can reside in non-actions no less than in actions. (shrink)

One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not part of that attempt. Mainly, (...) it is part of Hutcheson’s comeback to Gilbert Burnet’s objections to Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725). (shrink)

This paper will analyze three historical cases (Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei and Margaret Cavendish) that exemplify the complexity of the interaction between science and religion in the Scientific Revolution and confirm the interpretation of J. H. Brooke, according to which, in this historical context –rather than a separation- a differentiation took hold between them. We will hold that although these authors agreed in proposing the separation of science and religion as an ideal, each in their own way made an (...) articulation between the two that in the long run prevented a complete separation. This articulation was due to both epistemic and extra-epistemic reasons and manifests a tension that was characteristic of the Scientific Revolution. (shrink)

While J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings and other creations enthrall readers through immersive adventures and captivating characters, a deeper understanding of the author’s faith unlocks a new dimension of appreciation. Tolkien declared his works “fundamentally religious and Catholic,” but their subtle nuances often escape surface-level readings. Delving into his faith journey unveils crucial threads woven into the very fabric of his narratives. -/- In the expansive corpus of literature dedicated to J.R.R. Tolkien, his faith has often been overshadowed (...) by the towering legacies of Middle-earth. Holly Ordway’s Tolkien’s Faith: A Spiritual Biography is a seminal work that meticulously unravels the interplay between Tolkien’s devout Catholicism and his literary creations. Ordway, the Cardinal Francis George Professor of Faith and Culture at the Word on Fire Institute, brings to the fore a long-neglected dimension of Tolkien’s life—his spiritual journey. -/- Ordway’s biography distinguishes itself through its rigorous exploration of Tolkien’s spiritual development, from his environment to the profound Catholic faith he maintained throughout his life. Ordway delves into the complexities of Tolkien’s life, including the pivotal moments that shaped his religious beliefs and, by extension, his literary work. The biography is not merely a chronological recounting of events but a deep, thematic exploration of the influence of faith on Tolkien’s creativity. Ordway’s scholarship shines in her ability to weave together Tolkien’s letters, unpublished works, and the socioreligious context of his time, offering readers a holistic view of the man behind Middle-earth. Ordway’s balanced approach further enriches the narrative. She neither critiques nor endorses Tolkien’s religious beliefs but presents them with an academic rigor that allows readers to form their interpretations. This objectivity is crucial for the work’s target academic audience, providing a foundation for further scholarship in Tolkien studies and the study of literature and religion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. BIBLIOGRAPHY Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., & Kim, J. (eds.) (1992). Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of Naturalism. New York: Routledge. Bhaskar, R., Danermark, B. & Price, L. (2018). Interdisciplinarity and wellbeing: A critical realist general theory of interdisciplinarity. London and New York: Routledge. Blau, P.M. (1981). Introduction: diverse views of social structure and their common denominator. In Blau, P.M. & Merton, R.K. (eds.), Continuity in Structural Inquiry (pp. 1–23). Beverly Hills: Sage. Blau, P.M. (1987). Microprocess and macrostructure. In K.S. Cook (ed.), Social Exchange Theory (pp. 83–100). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Brooks, R.A., & Maes, P. (eds). (1994). Artificial life IV; proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Coleman, J. S. (1987). Microfoundations and macrosocial behavior. In: J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, R. Munch, & Neil J. Smelser (Eds.). The Micro-Macro Link (pp. 153–73). Berkeley: University of California. Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Elster, J. (1985). Making sense of Marx. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, J.A. (1974). Special sciences (Or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 28(2), 97–115. Fodor, J.A. (1989). Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics, 17, 59-79. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hempel, C.G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press. Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world. Mind, 102, 555-586. Humphreys, P. (1997). How properties emerge”. Philosophy of Science, 64, 1-17. Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3–36. Kincaid, H. (1997). Individualism and the unity of science. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Lewis, D.K. (1986). The plurality of worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nigel, G., & Conte, R. (eds.) (1995). Artificial societies; The computer simulation of social life. London: UCL Press. O’Connor, T. (1994). Emergent properties. American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 91-104. Popper, K.R. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. Sawyer, R. K. (2001). Emergence in sociology: contemporary philosophy of mind and some implications for sociological theory. American Journal of Sociology, 107, 551-585. Sawyer, R. K. (2004). The mechanisms of emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34, 260–282. Sawyer, R. K. (2005). Social emergence: societies as complex systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sawyer, R.K. (2003). Nonreductive individualism: Part 2, Social causation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, 203–224. Winch, P. (1993). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy‭ (SAMT, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: SAMT. (shrink)

"Kapitał społeczny ludzi starych na przykładzie mieszkańców miasta Białystok" to książka oparta na analizach teoretycznych i empirycznych, która przedstawia problem diagnozowania i używania kapitału społecznego ludzi starych w procesach rozwoju lokalnego i regionalnego. Kwestia ta jest istotna ze względu na zagrożenia i wyzwania związane z procesem szybkiego starzenia się społeczeństwa polskiego na początku XXI wieku. Opracowanie stanowi próbę sformułowania odpowiedzi na pytania: jaki jest stan kapitału społecznego ludzi starych mieszkających w Białymstoku, jakim ulega przemianom i jakie jest jego zróżnicowanie? Ludzie (...) starzy są tu postrzegani jako kategoria społeczna, czyli zbiór osób podobnych do siebie pod względem społecznie istotnych cech (takich jak wiek, posiadane role społeczne i świadomość korzystania ze świadczeń społecznych), którzy są świadomi tego podobieństwa i swojej odrębności od innych. Przyjmuje się ponadto, iż osoby takie przekroczyły 60. rok życia. Zakłada się też, że w zasobach ludzkich skumulowany jest kapitał ludzki, społeczny i kulturowy. Kapitał społeczny jest tu ujmowany szeroko jako potencjał współdziałania osadzony w powiązaniach międzyludzkich i normach społecznych, który może przynosić korzyści osobom, grupom i społeczeństwom. W części teoretycznej przedstawiono informacje o starości jako etapie w życiu jednostki, wyjaśniono pojęcie ludzi starych, omówiono społeczne teorie starzenia się, historyczne czynniki oddziaływające na położenie kategorii społecznej ludzi starych, zmiany ich miejsca w społeczeństwie polskim w trakcie transformacji ustrojowej i na początku XXI wieku, możliwe konsekwencje wzrostu długości życia w warunkach demokracji i kapitalizmu oraz charakterystykę problemu starzenia się ludności Białegostoku jako miasta pogranicza. Zaprezentowano też różnorodne koncepcje kapitału społecznego, sfery jego oddziaływania na rozwój społeczno-gospodarczy, jego stan w Polsce oraz wytyczne do strategicznego budowania jego zasobów. Przybliżono również wybrane informacje o aktywności ludzi starych w życiu publicznym, społecznym i gospodarczym jako kluczowych cechach ich kapitału społecznego. Porządkując różne stanowiska teoretyczne, wyniki badań i dane statystyczne, dążono do powiązania wielu rozproszonych źródeł w przekonaniu, iż jest to istotne w celu określenia i zagospodarowania zasobów kapitału społecznego seniorów, jak również niwelacji opóźnienia polskiej socjologii w zakresie badań nad ludźmi starymi. Pomimo, iż za podstawową perspektywę teoretyczną publikacji uznana została koncepcja kapitału P. Bourdieu, autor bierze również pod uwagę propozycje badawcze J.S. Colemana, R.D. Putnama, F. Fukuyamy, A. Giddensa, P. Sztompki i A. Sadowskiego. Drugi rozdział zawiera określenie ram metodologicznych badań przeprowadzonych na potrzeby tej publikacji. Omówiono przyjęte założenia badawcze oraz przybliżono sposób i przebieg realizacji badań. Przede wszystkim zdecydowano się na korzystanie z metody jakościowej i zastosowanie techniki wywiadu swobodnego ukierunkowanego. Uznano, iż podmiotowy kontakt z ludźmi starymi umożliwi dokładniejsze rozpoznanie kontekstu, w którym znajdują się zasoby ich kapitału społecznego. Jest to ważne, gdyż przenoszenie na rodzimy grunt opracowanych za granicą interpretacji działań ludzi starych i rozwiązań aktywizujących, może okazać się nieskuteczne lub wywołać negatywne efekty zewnętrzne. Ponadto w literaturze przedmiotu zwraca się uwagę na niedostatek badań gerontologicznych zgodnych z paradygmatem interpretatywnym. Badaniu poddano 26 respondentów w wieku od 60 do 89 lat żyjących w mieście Białystok związanych z jedną z dwóch różnych instytucji: Domem Pomocy Społecznej i Uniwersytetem Trzeciego Wieku. Poprzez porównywanie osób znajdujących się na dwóch biegunach aktywności społecznej możliwe było dostrzeżenie podobieństw i różnic w ich wyposażeniu kapitałowym, a zarazem w osiągniętych w ciągu życia pozycjach w strukturze klasowej i zasobach służących pomyślnej starości6. W trzecim rozdziale przedstawiona została część wyników analiz empirycznych. Przybliżono tu sposób, w jaki ludzie starzy myślą o podobnych sobie przodkach i osobach współczesnych, a także czynniki, w zależności od których zmienia się ich pozycja społeczna w mieście oraz problemy społeczne, jakie uznają za najważniejsze dla ludzi starych. Analizie poddano opinie o ich czasie wolnym, szansach i barierach aktywności ekonomicznej. Wyróżniono typy kapitału społecznego ludzi starych w zależności od instytucji, z którymi są związani oraz podejścia do postrzegania i wykorzystywania zróżnicowania wewnętrznego seniorów. Omówiono wizerunek seniorów w środkach masowego przekazu. Publikacja nie zawiera ścisłego zakończenia. W ostatnim rozdziale wskazano jedynie na główne wnioski płynące z badań oraz na potencjalne dalsze kierunki analiz. Uzupełnienie tego podejścia stanowią zamieszczone w aneksie zestawienia oddolnych technik budowania kapitału społecznego oraz podstawowych cech Miast Przyjaznych Starszemu Wiekowi. Z opracowania tego z pewnością będą mogli skorzystać nie tylko naukowcy zajmujący się tematyką ludzi starych, ale i pracownicy socjalni, politycy, pracodawcy, przedstawiciele mediów i organizacji pozarządowych oraz obywatele Białegostoku i innych miast. ** "Social Capital of Old People on the Example of Bialystok Residents" is a book based on theoretical and empirical study, which presents an issue of diagnosing and using of old people social capital in the local and regional development processes. This issue is significant because of the threats and challenges associated with process of rapid ageing of Polish society at the beginning of 21st century. Publication, in particular, is an attempt to give answers to the following questions: what is the state of old people social capital in Bialystok, what transformations it undergoes and how is it differentiated? In this study old people are viewed as a social category, which is a set of people similar to each other in terms of socially significant features (such as age, possessed social roles and awareness of received social benefits), who are aware of these similarities and differences between each other. Moreover, it is assumed, that such persons exceeded the 60 years of age. It is also assumed that human, social and cultural capital is accumulated in the human resources. Social capital is recognized here broadly as a potential for collaboration embedded in interpersonal relationships and social norms that may benefit individuals, groups and societies. The book consists of three chapters. The first, which is the theoretical part of work, includes information about: old age as a stage of individual life and explanation of the old people notion. It discusses social theories of ageing, historical factors affecting on the social position of old people category, changes in their place in Polish society during the system transformation and in the early 21st century. It describes the possible consequences of increased life expectancy for democracy and capitalism - including the concepts of society for all ages, silver economy. It also features ageing population issue, as well as social policy towards the elderly and old age in Bialystok as the borderland city. A variety of social capital concepts were presented; the spheres of its influence on socio-economic development, its status in Poland and guidelines for strategic building of its resources. Selected information on the activity of old people in public, social and economic life as key features of their social capital was brought closer. Putting various theoretical positions, results of research and statistical data in order was aimed to link many dispersed sources considering that it is relevant to identify and develop seniors' social capital resources, as well as leveling the delay of Polish sociology research on the elderly. Fundamental theoretical perspective of publication is the concept of capital according to P. Bourdieu. However, the proposals of J.S. Coleman, R.D. Putnam, F. Fukuyama, A. Giddens, P. Sztompka and A. Sadowski were also used. The second chapter contains a methodological framework for the purposes of study. Research assumptions, method and course of implementation of studies were discussed. The study is based on the qualitative method and the application of in-depth interview techniques. It was considered that the personal contact with old people will be more accurate than other research techniques to identify the context in which they social capital resources can be found. It is important because the transfer of developed abroad activating solutions and interpretations of old people actions may be ineffective or have negative external effects in the Polish context. Moreover, in the Polish science literature attention is paid to scarcity of gerontological research in accordance with the interpretive paradigm. Study involved 26 respondents aged 60 to 89 years living in Bialystok associated with one of two different institutions: nursing home for the elderly and University of the Third Age. By comparing the persons on two extremes of social activity it was possible to see similarities and differences in their capital equipment, and also in achievements of the life positions in the class structure and resources aimed at successful ageing. The third chapter presents the empirical analysis of the research results. This part outlines the way in which old people think about their ancestors and contemporary people. It also shows factors according to changes in their social position in the city, social issues which they consider most important for old people, their opinions about leisure time, opportunities and barriers of economic activity and types of old people social capital depending on the institution with which they are associated. Approach to the perception and use of internal disparities of seniors were also discussed. The analysis additionally contains the evaluation of senior citizens image in the polish mass media. This publication does not contain a strict ending. It only identifies the main conclusions of the research and potential directions of future analysis. Above all, older people could improve their position not by demanding increases in social benefits from which major parts are often taken away by their family members, but by highlighting their human, social and cultural capital. It is necessary to create favorable conditions for social and professional life of old people and their cooperation with members of local communities. Important role in this regard is played by institutions implementing three tasks: stimulating senior citizens' desire to satisfy previously unrealized needs; creating relationships between them so that they can solve their own problems and work for the others; and providing legal, social and vocational guidance. Stimulating cooperation between existing public, commercial and non-governmental sector organizations may serve to achieve these goals. The dissemination of bottom-up techniques of social capital building and checklist of essential features of Age-friendly Cities may also be important. -/- . (shrink)

This paper contributes to answering the question how physicalism can be defined for a world without fundamental physical phenomena. In a recent paper in this journal, Torin Alter, Sam Coleman, and Robert J. Howell propose a necessary condition on physicalism. They argue that physicalism is true only if there is no infinitely descending chain of mentally constituted phenomena. I argue that this alleged necessary condition faces counterexamples. An infinitely descending chain of mentally constituted phenomena is compatible with physicalism. Afterwards (...) I propose a simpler definition of physicalism that does not fall prey to my counterexample. (shrink)

L’article de Francis Dupuis-Déri, « Contestation internationale contre élites mondiales : l’action directe et la politique délibérative sont-elles conciliables ? »[1] soulève bon nombre de questions. Sur le fond, quoiqu’il m’eût été beaucoup plus agréable de multiplier les points d’accord en réponse à une aimable invitation à discuter cet article, je dois me résoudre à exprimer de nombreux désaccords, dont je ne sais pas toujours à quel point ils sont profonds, sauf sur une question, d’ordre éthique, où je suis (...) sûr qu’ils le sont ; car j’ai souvent été dans l’embarras quant à l’identification de la véritable conception que l’auteur se fait de la politique délibérative. Mon propos consistera essentiellement à introduire des distinctions conceptuelles qui me semblent négligées par l’auteur. Ces désaccords ne vont pas, heureusement, sans quelques points d’accord sur des questions qui me semblent dénuées d’équivocité et que j’espère importantes pour l’auteur. (shrink)

În acest articol încerc să argumentez opinia că, așa cum este definită eugenia, este foarte dificil de făcut o diferențiere clară între știință (medicină, ingineria genetică) și eugenie. Și de stabilit o linie peste care ingineria genetică nu ar trebui să treacă, conform unor norme morale, juridice și religioase. Atâta timp cât acceptăm ajutorul geneticii în găsirea unor modalități de combatere a cancerului, diabetului sau HIV, acceptăm în mod implicit și eugenia pozitivă, conform definiției actuale. Și atâta timp cât acceptăm (...) screening-ul genetic, și intervenții asupra fătului nenăscut, sau avortul, acceptăm în mod implicit și eugenia negativă. În plus, la nivel de guverne, deși oficial eugenia este repudiată, ea a fost legalizată în foarte multe țări până de curând, și încă mai este acceptată și legalizată, chiar dacă în forme mai subtile, și în prezent. În Introducere definesc termenul și modurile de clasificare. Urmează Istoria eugeniei pornind din perioada antică, introducerea eugeniei de Francis Galton, practica eugeniei ca politică de stat în diverse țări, și eugenia actuală (eugenia liberală). Analizez apoi diverse probleme ridicate de Etica eugeniei liberale, și am dezvoltat o secțiune aparte pentru Viitorul eugeniei, cu accent pe proiectul genomului uman. În final, în secțiunea Concluzii expun opiniile personale cu privire la practica actuală a eugeniei. Am folosit ca surse principale de investigație articolele lui Kenneth M. Ludmerer, ”American Geneticists and the Eugenics Movement: 1905-1935”, Kathy J. Cooke, ”Duty or Dream? Edwin G. Conklin's Critique of Eugenics and Support for American Individualism”, Jonathan Anomaly, ”Defending Eugenics”, John R. Harding Jr. ”Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugenics”, Michael Boulter, ”Bloomsbury Scientists”, Chapter Title: The rise of eugenics, 1901–14, Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson, ”Moral Philosophy as Applied Science” și Goering, Sara, "Eugenics". (shrink)

The dominance of Augustine of Hippo in philosophy during the second quarter of the fourteenth century is testified to by three evidences: (1) the wide use of quotations from his works, (2) the flourishing of commentaries on them, especially at Oxford, as reconstructed by William J. Courtenay; (3) the historical-critical treatment of the writings of the Fathers, of the theological and philosophical auctoritates, and of contemporary Scholastic authors at Paris by the Augustinians, as reconstructed by Onorato Grassi. In this article, (...) I focus on the second kind of evidence, taking into account some commentaries on Augustine’s De civitate Dei, namely those of Nicholas Trevet and Thomas Waleys in the English area, and that Francis of Meyronnes in the French area. These commentaries became the basis for Raoul de Presles’s translation of Augustine’s work into Middle French. Moreover, I analyze books 1–5 of Raoul’s translation, showing that it was by no means accidental to his intellectual endeavors and that Raoul employed innovative, Humanist techniques of translation, and shedding light on the comparison of Charles V of France to Charlemagne in the rediscovery of the Augustinian corpus. (shrink)

INTRODUÇÃO O anestro pós-parto é o período após o parto no qual a fêmea não apresenta ciclos estrais (atividade cíclica). Na vaca leiteira, o parto é seguido de um período de inatividade ovariana de duração variável, que é principalmente afetada pelo estado nutricional, produção leiteira, ganho ou perda de condição corporal antes e depois do parto, e por condições patológicas como hipoplasia dos ovários, cistos ovarianos, mumificação uterina, piometra entre outras, além, também, de condições ambientais como instalações que podem causar (...) estresse etc. 1. Controle neuroendócrino do anestro Entre os 12 e 15 dias pós-parto, as células gonadotróficas presentes na adenohipófise começam a produzir e secretar o FSH (hormônio folículo estimulante), o qual estimula a primeira onda folicular; entretanto, nenhum folículo dominante do(s) ovário(s) chega a completar seu desenvolvimento devido à carência de estímulo apropriado do LH (hormônio luteinizante) que também é produzido pelas mesmas células e que deve estar presente em altas concentrações. Nas 2 primeiras semanas pós-parto (primeiros 15 dias), as concentrações circulantes de LH são baixas, o que se deve à ausência de reservas do LH e à incapacidade temporal da hipófise para responder ao estímulo da GnRH (hormônio liberador de gonadotrofina). Entre os dias 15 e 20 pós-parto, a hipófise aumenta a sua capacidade para responder ao GnRH; entretanto, o estabelecimento do padrão de secreção do LH adequado para estimular a maturação e a ovulação do folículo dominante das primeiras ondas foliculares depende fundamentalmente do balanço energético. 2. Fatores que determinam o início da atividade ovariana pós-parto Na vaca leiteira, é frequente que algum dos primeiros folículos dominantes que se desenvolvem durante as primeiras duas ou três semanas complete a sua maturação e chegue à ovulação, isto é, madure e ovule. O fator limitante para o reinício da atividade ovariana é o balanço energético negativo (BEN). No gado leiteiro, o consumo de matéria seca (CMS), após o parto, deverá ser aumentado em até quatro vezes, para cobrir a demanda de nutrientes para a produção de leite e mantença; no entanto, a vaca é incapaz de consumir a exigência de matéria seca, por isso recorre a suas reservas de gordura e proteína, e cai em BEN. As vacas que consomem menos matéria seca, produzem menos leite, têm um BEN mais profundo e o período do parto à primeira ovulação é maior. O nível mais baixo do BEN é alcançado entre os 10 a 20 dias pós-parto e a vaca continua em BEN até os 70 a 80 dias pós-parto e, em alguns casos, até aos 100 dias pós-parto (vacas primíparas). Entretanto, mesmo com BEN, uma proporção elevada das vacas inicia sua atividade ovariana normal nas primeiras 8 semanas pós-parto. As vacas que alcançam um nível baixo de BEN rapidamente e saem deste ponto mínimo de forma rápida, iniciam sua atividade ovariana mais rápido também (20 a 30 dias pós-parto) do que aquelas que têm um BEN mais profundo e duradouro, essas muitas vezes permanecem em anestro aos 70 dias pós-parto (figura 1). As mudanças na condição corporal estão correlacionadas positivamente com as concentrações séricas de insulina, IGF-I e leptina; assim, a maior qualificação da condição corporal é maior mediante a concentração sérica desses hormônios, que atuam principalmente como sinais que chegam ao hipotálamo e modificam a frequência de secreção do GnRH e, consequentemente, de LH. A leptina é um hormônio que é produzido pelos adipócitos e tem sido proposto que sua concentração é o sinal mais importante de alterações de condição corporal. A transição do anestro para a ciclicidade coincide com um aumento das concentrações séricas de insulina, IGF-I e leptina. Além das mensagens dadas pelos hormônios supracitados, outras substâncias presentes no sangue fornecem informações sobre o estado metabólico do animal. Por exemplo, os ácidos graxos não esterificados e o β-hidroxibutirato são indicadores da mobilização e utilização da gordura corporal; assim, o aumento destas substâncias proporciona uma mensagem inibidora de reprodução. O intervalo médio entre o parto e a primeira ovulação, em vacas leiteiras em sistemas de produção não intensiva, é em torno de 30 dias; enquanto em vacas em sistemas de produção intensiva, é de 40 dias. Deve-se sinalar que é comum aos 70 dias pós-parto, que 20% das vacas ainda não ovulem. Verifica-se frequentemente que as vacas leiteiras desenvolvem folículos que crescem mais que os folículos ovulatórios, os quais convertem em cistos foliculares. Esta condição está associada com insensibilidade do hipotálamo ao retorno positivo do estradiol, o que não desencadeia o pico pré-ovulatório de LH (figura 2). 3. O corpo lúteo dos primeiros ciclos pós-parto Durante um ciclo estral o corpo lúteo tem uma meia-vida fisiológica de 12 a 14 dias; no entanto, na primeira ovulação pós-parto cerca de 25% das vacas desenvolvem corpos lúteos de vida curta (<10 dias), 30% de vida longa (21 a 50 dias) e 45% da vida normal (11 a 20 dias). A regressão prematura do corpo lúteo é uma condição frequente nos ruminantes no primeiro ciclo estral, da transição do anestro à ciclicidade. Ou seja, na vaca é frequente que no primeiro ciclo de pós-parto e da puberdade sejam ciclos curtos; isto deve-se à liberação antecipada da PGF2α. Por outro lado, a causa dos corpos lúteos de vida longa (corpos lúteos persistentes) não é clara, mas está relacionada com alterações na secreção da PGF2α devido a infecções uterinas (tabela 1). 4. Anestro patológico 4.1 Alterações do aparelho genital que causam anestro Na vaca foi calculado que as alterações do aparelho genital que afetam a atividade ovariana representam apenas 10% do total das causas de anestro. Entre as alterações do aparelho genital se encontram os cistos foliculares, cistos luteinizados, aplasia segmentar, piometra e mumificação fetal. . 4.2 Cistos foliculares Os cistos foliculares são a patologia ovariana mais comum nos bovinos leiteiros, causando perdas econômicas devido ao atraso do período do parto ao primeiro serviço, pelo custo dos tratamentos e pelo risco que têm as vacas de serem descartadas. A incidência aumentou à medida que a produção de leite se intensificou. Entre 5 e 30% das vacas desenvolvem cistos foliculares nos primeiros 60 dias do pós-parto; no entanto, cerca de 60% destas se recuperam espontaneamente. Sinais clínicos de vacas com cistos foliculares descritos na literatura são: ninfomania, ciclos curtos, masculinização e relaxamento dos ligamentos pélvicos. Atualmente uma alta proporção de vacas com cistos foliculares apresentam anestro. Por muitos anos um cisto folicular foi definido como um folículo com um diâmetro de 2,5 mm, presente em um ou em ambos os ovários durante um período mínimo de 10 dias, na ausência de um corpo lúteo. Os conhecimentos atuais modificaram o conceito clássico; assim, nem todos os cistos foliculares têm um diâmetro de 2,5 mm; além disso, alguns podem persistir mais de 10 dias. Outros são estruturas dinâmicas, que sofrem regressão e podem ser substituídas por novos cistos. Por esta razão, a definição mais precisa e técnica de um cisto folicular é: folículo de um diâmetro, de pelo menos 20 mm, que está presente em um ou ambos os ovários na ausência de tecido lúteo que interfere com o ciclo estral normal (figura 3). A patogênese dos cistos foliculares não é conhecida. Propõe-se que as vacas que desenvolvem esta patologia têm uma anomalia nos mecanismos de retroalimentação entre o hipotálamo e a hipófise, em conjunto com uma disfunção a nível folicular. É pesquisado e sugerido que em vacas com cistos foliculares, o pico pré-ovulatório de LH não ocorre ou é de menor amplitude, ou não tem uma relação síncrona com o amadurecimento do folículo, o que provoca a falha ovulatória. A alteração na secreção de LH pode obedecer a falta de sensibilidade do hipotálamo ao feedback positivo de estrogênio. Observa-se também que algumas anormalidades a nível folicular, tais como alterações na síntese de hormônios esteroides e uma menor sensibilidade à LH, podem contribuir com a patogenia. Uma vez que o cisto folicular foi estabelecido, observou-se um aumento na frequência de secreção pulsátil de LH, o que contribui com a persistência desta patologia. Existem fatores associados com a incidência de cistos foliculares que, de acordo com a patogenia proposta, podem influenciar ao nível do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-ovário. Os cistos foliculares ocorrem principalmente durante a transição do anestro pós-parto para a ciclicidade. Neste período as vacas estão em BEN, e tem sido observado que as vacas que sofrem de um BEN mais profundo tendem a apresentar uma incidência maior de cistos foliculares. Por outra parte, há uma correlação positiva entre a produção de leite e a incidência de cistos, o que indica que as vacas que produzem mais leite têm maior risco de sofrer com esta patologia. Também existem outros fatores relacionados com a incidência de cistos foliculares tais como estresse, genéticos, infecções uterinas, estresse calórico e presença de fitoestrogênios na dieta (tabela 2). O tratamento indicado consiste na administração do GnRH, que provoca a luteinização do cisto. É recomendável a combinação com uma dose luteolítica de PGF2α, 7 a 10 dias depois da injeção de GnRH. Também é indicado o tratamento com hCG em vez de GnRH. Em alguns estudos foi possível integrar vacas com cistos foliculares em programas de sincronização da ovulação e inseminação em tempo fixo, com resultados aceitáveis de fertilidade (figura 4). 4.3 Cistos luteinizados Esse tipo de cisto pode se desenvolver a partir de um cisto folicular, também ocorre quando o saco libera um óvulo e, em seguida, se fecha novamente e enche-se de líquido. O tecido luteinizado produz progestágenos do qual os sinais incluem anestro persistente. São bastante mais raros e originam-se pelo contínuo aumento do espaço cavitário central normalmente existente nos corpos lúteos (figura 5). Normalmente, a parede do cisto contém células lúteogranulosas grandes e células tecaluteais pequenas. Se diferenciam com dificuldade de corpos lúteos recém-formados durante o período em que ainda possuem um antro. Os cistos luteínicos únicos, pelo menos os menores, necessitam de importância clínica. Se os cistos são funcionais, a sintomatologia mais destacada é o anestro ou pseudogestação. É preciso lembrar que esses cistos agem como uma fonte de secreção contínua de progesterona, diminuindo assim a resistência do útero a infecções, podendo desencadear-se uma endometrite (figura 6). Se eles forem diagnosticados é recomendável a administração de PGF2α. 4.4 Aplasia segmentar As vacas com esta condição podem gestar quando a ovulação ocorre do lado do corno uterino presente. Se a ovulação acontece do lado onde falta o corno uterino causa anestro. 4.5 Piometra A piometra, por definição, é a acumulação de material purulento no interior da luz uterina que ocorrem geralmente durante ou imediatamente após o período de domínio da progesterona. É uma condição que ocorre mais frequentemente nos primeiros 30 dias pós-parto; no entanto, algumas vacas em anestro que são revisadas no dia 50 pós-parto chegam a ter piometra. O tratamento indicado consiste na administração de PGF2α. 5. Anestro relacionado com o tempo de serviço O anestro em bovinos também é classificado como anestro pré-serviço e pós-serviço. 5.1 Anestro pré-serviço Inclui vacas e novilhas que não tenham mostrado estro, isto é, manifestado cio, no período em que devem ser servidas. Em alguns estudos observou-se que o anestro antes do serviço pode afetar até 50% das vacas elegíveis para apresentar estro. 5.1 Anestro pós-serviço Neste grupo incluem-se as vacas que não retornam ao estro, ou seja, que não retornaram ao cio, 21 dias depois da inseminação e não estão prenhes. Essas vacas são conhecidas como vacas fantasma (The Phantom Cow). A causa principal do atraso do retorno ao estro é a baixa eficiência na detecção de estros; mas também foram descritas outras causas como: inseminação em um estro anovulatório, inseminação em tempo fixo em vacas em anestro, suspensão da ciclicidade após o serviço, fases lúteas longas e morte embrionária. O diagnóstico precoce da gestação é de grande ajuda para conhecer oportunamente o número de fêmeas que não estão prenhes. A ecografia no trigésimo dia pós-inseminação adianta, pelo menos 10 dias, a ressincronização de vacas vazias. 6. Falso anestro ou anestro funcional Este causa as maiores perdas econômicas de caráter reprodutivo em rebanhos leiteiros, e refere-se às vacas que estão ciclando, mas não são observadas em estro pelos trabalhadores. É um dos maiores problemas dentro de um sistema de criação extensivo e, às vezes, semiintensivo, uma vez que é de suma importância a observação técnica e precisa do comportamento da vaca para observar o possível retorno ao cio ou não. 7. Manejo da vaca anéstrica A probabilidade de que a vaca seja inseminada oportunamente depende da eficiência da detecção de estros. É comum que a metade das vacas apresentem estro e não sejam observadas, por essa razão, muitas não são inseminadas uma vez que termina o período de espera voluntária. Por outro lado, há vacas que, por causas patológicas ou por seu estado metabólico, ainda estão em anestro depois que termina o período voluntário de espera. Para identificar as causas da ausência de estros, todas as vacas que não tenham sido inseminadas no dia 60 pós-parto, devem ser revisadas por via retal para aplicar o tratamento ou manejo pertinentes. Durante esta revisão é dada especial atenção às características do útero e nas estruturas ovarianas, já que daqui depende o manejo subsequente. A palpação começa no útero; neste é importante determinar se não há gestação. Posteriormente, avalia-se sua consistência que pode ser normal, edematosa ou turgente. Depois de avaliar o útero procede-se a palpação dos ovários, começando com o direito e, em seguida, esquerdo. Abaixo estão descritas as diferentes descobertas que podem ser encontradas na literatura e seu tratamento ou manejo. O registo dos resultados à palpação é feito através de chaves reprodutivas. 7.1 UN CLD2-3 FE10 Útero normal (UN) com um corpo lúteo 2 ou 3 no ovário direito (CLD2-3) e um folículo no ovário esquerdo de 10 mm de diâmetro (FE10). A consistência normal do útero (é normal quando não há edema ou turgescência) é encontrado em vacas não prenhes durante o diestro, ou em vacas que estão em anestro. O CL 2 ou 3 é uma estrutura bem desenvolvida que deforma o ovário e em alguns casos representa mais de 50% da massa ovariana. Classificá-los como CL 2 ou 3 é uma apreciação subjetiva do tamanho do corpo lúteo e não tem significado prático, pois em qualquer dos casos o manejo é o mesmo. O CL indica que a vaca está em qualquer dia do diestro e, obviamente, indica que está ciclando. Durante o diestro pode-se encontrar folículos de tamanho diferente em qualquer um dos dois ovários, já que este depende das ondas de desenvolvimento folicular. É importante frisar que as estruturas mencionadas podem estar em ovários diferentes ou no mesmo ovário. O achado mais importante nesta fase é a presença do corpo lúteo o que permite o tratamento com a PGF2α, o que resulta na apresentação do estro nas próximas 48 a 120 horas. A presença de um corpo lúteo é o estado fisiológico que é mais frequentemente encontrado neste grupo de vacas, primeiro porque paradoxalmente a maior proporção de vacas em “anestro” está ciclando (anestro funcional) e, em segundo lugar, porque o diestro ocupa 65% dos dias do ciclo estral. 7.2 UE CLD1 FE10-15 Útero edematoso (UE) com um corpo lúteo 1 no ovário direito (CLD1) e um folículo 10 ou 15 mm de diâmetro no ovário esquerdo. O útero edematoso pode ser encontrado no proestro e metaestro. A presença do CL1 e um folículo grande indica que se trata de uma vaca que muito provavelmente é encontrado em proestro. A diferença entre um CL1 e um CL 2 ou 3 é basicamente o seu tamanho; um CL1 é uma estrutura pequena com consistência dura. As vacas que têm estas características devem ser marcadas para que os trabalhadores prestem mais atenção, já que apresentarão o estro nas próximas 48 a 72 horas. Se a vaca não apresentar estro nesse período, deverá ser palpada na semana seguinte. 7.3 UT DE FE10-15 Útero túrgido ou tonificado, ovário direito estático e ovário esquerdo com um folículo de 10 ou 15 mm de diâmetro. Estes achados, além da presença de muco estral, correspondem a uma vaca em estro. Frequentemente, na palpação das vacas do grupo de anestro, há vacas em estro; estas vacas deverão ser programadas para inseminação. 7.4 UE DE EE Útero estático e ovários estáticos. Estas observações correspondem a uma vaca em metaestro; esta decisão tem uma alta margem de erro uma vez que também pode corresponder a um animal no proestro ou em anestro verdadeiro. Um achado que permite ser mais bem sucedido no diagnóstico é a presença de sangue no muco cervical; neste caso, a presença de sangue indica, com certeza, que a vaca está em metaestro; no entanto, nem todas as vacas apresentam este sangramento. As vacas com estes achados devem ser palpadas sete dias depois para confirmar ou corrigir um primeiro diagnóstico. Se a primeira palpação foi correta, na segunda se encontrará um CL2-3. 7.5 UE CHD FE10 Útero edematoso, com corpo hemorrágico no ovário direito (CHD) e com folículo de 10 mm de diâmetro no ovário esquerdo. Estas observações são de uma vaca em metaestro. O corpo hemorrágico é considerado como a fase de transição entre o folículo e o corpo lúteo; o CH é palpado como uma estrutura com uma saliência em forma de papila e é muito suave ao toque. Será necessário esperar 4 ou 5 dias para que se converta num corpo lúteo maduro e assim destruí-lo com PGF2α. Na rotina, estas vacas são palpadas na seguinte revisão (sete dias depois). 7.6 UN DE EE Útero normal e ovários estáticos. Este caracteriza as vacas que estão no anestro verdadeiro. As vacas caem no anestro principalmente por se encontrar em balanço negativo de energia; este problema é mais grave em vacas de primeiro parto. O único tratamento eficaz consiste em melhorar o seu estado metabólico. Tratamentos hormonais não funcionam caso não seja resolvido primeiro o seu estado nutricional. 7.7 UN CFD EE Útero normal, cisto folicular no ovário direito e ovário esquerdo estático. Embora as vacas com cistos foliculares sejam caracterizadas por apresentar estros recorrentes, também chegam a apresentar anestro. O tratamento consiste na administração do GnRH ou hCG. 7.8 UN CLD EE Útero normal, cisto luteinizado no ovário direito e ovário esquerdo estático. Este cisto também é causado por uma deficiência na secreção de LH, só que neste caso a deficiência foi parcial, o que provoca um certo grau de luteinização. O cisto luteinizado é uma estrutura com mais de 20 mm de diâmetro de paredes grossas. O tratamento indicado é a administração de PGF2α. Na prática, é difícil diferenciar um cisto folicular de um luteinizado, pelo que o tratamento recomendado é, primeiro, a administração de GnRH ou hCG e sete dias depois é injetado PGF2α (figura 7). 7.9 Piometra CLD2-3 FE A piometra é uma condição que ocorre principalmente nos primeiros 30 dias pós-parto; no entanto, na revisão das vacas anéstricas são encontradas vacas com esta patologia. O tratamento indicado consiste na administração de PGF2α. 8. Tratamentos hormonais para indução da atividade ovariana O estabelecimento precoce da ciclicidade pós-parto favorece a involução uterina e está positivamente correlacionado com a fertilidade; ou seja, quanto mais ciclos estrais a vaca tenha antes da primeira inseminação, a percentagem de concepção é maior. Um tratamento utilizado para induzir a primeira ovulação pós-parto em vacas anéstricas, consiste na administração de GnRH quando à palpação retal se encontra um folículo grande (> 10 mm). Com isso se pretende fazer o folículo ovular e depois injeta-se PGF2α para provocar a regressão lútea. Outras combinações consistem na administração de GnRH e na inserção de dispositivos de liberação de progesterona e, ao retirar o progestágeno, injeta-se PGF2α (figura 8). No entanto, os tratamentos mencionados são de uso comum, não funcionam em todos os casos. Um requisito para se obter êxito é que as vacas devem ter boa condição corporal ou que estejam ganhando condição corporal. Embora os tratamentos hormonais possam ajudar em alguns casos, não deve-se esquecer que as causas do anestro não são corrigidos apenas com a administração de hormônios, já que a vaca não cicla porque toda a informação do estado metabólico que recebe o cérebro, indica que não o deve fazer. 9. Gonadotropina coriônica equina (eCG) Na égua, por volta do dia 30 de gestação, células do córion migram para o endométrio e formam umas estruturas conhecidas como copas endometriais. Entre o dia 40 e o dia 130 de gestação nestas estruturas é produzido o eCG (anteriormente conhecida como gonadotropina sérica da égua prenha ou PMSG, pela sua abreviatura em inglês). Na égua esse hormônio tem atividade de LH pelo qual estimula a função do corpo lúteo e promove a formação de corpos lúteos acessórios. Nos ruminantes, o eCG se une aos receptores de LH e FSH do folículo, estimulando o desenvolvimento folicular, e no corpo lúteo estimula a secreção de progesterona. O eCG tem sido utilizado com a finalidade de superovulação e em vacas de corte sob anestro é incluído em programas com progestágenos para induzir ciclicidade. Nestes programas é injetado eCG no momento da remoção do progestágeno, o que favorece o desenvolvimento folicular e apresentação do estro. Em rebanhos leiteiros na Nova Zelândia tem sido incrementado a taxa de prenhez sem aumentar a proporção de partos gêmeos, através da injeção de eCG na remoção do dispositivo de libertação de progesterona em programas combinados com a injeção de benzoato de estradiol. RESUMO ➢ Transcorrem 15 dias pós-parto para que a hipófase responda ao hormônio GnRH. ➢ Entre os dias 12 e 15 pós-parto começa-se a secreção de FSH e iniciam as ondas foliculares. ➢ As vacas chegam ao ponto mais baixo de BEN entre os dias 15 e 20 pós-parto. ➢ As vacas iniciam a atividade ovariana normal, em média, após os 40 dias pós-parto. ➢ Aos 70 dias pós-parto é normal que 20% das vacas ainda estejam em anestro. ➢ Na primeira ovulação pós-parto 25% das vacas desenvolvem corpos lúteos de vida curta e 30% mostram corpos lúteos de vida longa (persistentes). ➢ As anormalidades do aparelho reprodutor são responsáveis por 10% das causas de anestro. ➢ 5 a 30% das vacas desenvolvem cistos foliculares nos primeiros 60 dias pós-parto e 60% destas se recuperam de forma espontânea. ➢ No dia 30 pós-inseminação é possível identificar vacas vazias mediante a ecografia e reservá-las para a ressincronização. ➢ A proteína B específica da gestação aparece no soro a partir do 15º dia de gestação. ➢ Para o diagnóstico precoce de gestação é recomendado medir a PSPB no dia 30 pósinseminação e em vacas com mais de 90 dias pós-parto. ➢ Entre os dias 50 e 60 pós-parto todas as vacas não servidas devem ser examinadas via retal para programar seu serviço. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS AMBROSE, Divakar J. Postpartum anestrus and its management in dairy cattle. Bovine Reproduction, p. 408-430, 2021. BALL, P. J. H.; PETERS, A. R. Reprodução em bovinos. São Paulo: SP, 2006. Características Gerais dos Bovinos/General Characteristics of Cattle Bovine. 2020. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. 2020. Nutrição Sobre a Reprodução e Fertilidade dos Bovinos. DERIVAUX, Jules; BECKERS, Jean-François; ECTORS, Francis. L'anoestrus du postpartum. Vlaams Diergeneeskundig Tijdschrift, v. 53, p. 215-229, 1984. ELLI, Massimiliano. Manual de reproducción en ganado vacuno. Zaragoza, ES: Servet Edit., 2005. FERNÁNDEZ DE CÓRDOBA DE LA BARRERA, Luis. Reproducción aplicada en el ganado bovino lechero. 1993. FERREIRA, A. de M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Minas Gerais–Brasil, p. 422, 2010. GARVERICK, H. Allen. Ovarian follicular cysts in dairy cows. Journal of dairy science, v. 80, n. 5, p. 995-1004, 1997. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. 2004. HIDALGO, Galina et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. 2008. PETER, A. T.; VOS, P. L. A. M.; AMBROSE, D. J. Postpartum anestrus in dairy cattle. Theriogenology, v. 71, n. 9, p. 1333-1342, 2009. PETERS, A. R. et al. Reproducción del ganado vacuno. 1991. SPAIN, JAMES N.; LUCY, MATTHEW C.; HARDIN, DAVID K. Effects of nutrition on reproduction in dairy cattle. In: Current Therapy in Large Animal Theriogenology. WB Saunders, 2007. p. 442-450. UNGERFELD, Rodolfo. Reproducción de los animales domésticos. Edizioni LSWR, 2020. VILLA-GODOY, A. et al. Association between energy balance and luteal function in lactating dairy cows. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 71, n. 4, p. 1063-1072, 1988. WATHES, D. C. et al. Influence of negative energy balance on cyclicity and fertility in the high producing dairy cow. Theriogenology, v. 68, p. S232-S241, 2007. (shrink)

Dans son article « L’anarchie en philosophie politique », Francis Dupuis-Déri (2007) tente de réhabiliter l’anarchisme face au silence dont il est victime en philosophie politique. Dans cet article, j’entends accepter l’invitation de Dupuis-Déri à prendre au sérieux l’anarchisme et, plus particulièrement, le modèle général d’organisation politique qu’il propose en tentant de répondre à cette question : l’anarchisme est-il un régime politique moralement défendable ? Je réponds par la négative en montrant que l’anarchisme fait face à un trilemme qu’il (...) ne peut, par définition, résoudre. Ainsi, (1) soit l’anarchisme n’est pas moralement souhaitable, (2) soit il se confronte aux mêmes problèmes que rencontrent (selon les anarchistes) la démocratie ainsi que les autres régimes politiques concernant l’autorité et la coercition, (3) soit son application, dans sa version « pragmatique », se réduit à des communautés, ce qui permet en quelque sorte d’évacuer les problèmes soulevés dans les deux autres branches du trilemme, mais ne les résout pas pour autant. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

Antes de entrar cuidadosamente no estudo de cada filósofo, em suas respectivas ordens cronológicas, é necessário dar um panorama geral sobre eles, permitindo, de relance, a localização deles em tempos históricos e a associação de seus nomes com sua teoria ou tema central. l. OS FILÓSOFOS PRÉ-SOCRÁTICOS - No sétimo século antes de Jesus Cristo, nasce o primeiro filósofo grego: Tales de Mileto2 . Ele e os seguintes filósofos jônicos (Anaximandro: Ἀναξίμανδρος: 3 610-546 a.C.) e Anaxímenes: (Άναξιμένης: 586-524 a.C.) tentaram (...) expressar/elucidar o que é a arché, ou constitutivo fundamental do Universo. 4 Também sobressaem as teorias de Pitágoras (Ὁ Πυθαγόρας: 570 a.C.- 495 a.C.), completas de misticismo e Matemática; a de Heráclito (Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος: 540-470 a.C.), o filósofo do devir e o de seu oponente, Parmênides (Παρμενίδης: 530-460 a.C.), que elucida a primeira teoria do ser, e para qual é alcunhado como o iniciador da Metafísica. Anaxágoras (Ἀναξαγόρας: 500 a.C.- 428 a.C.) esboça uma teoria sobre o Nous, o espírito divino. Por outro lado, Demócrito (Δημόκριτος: Grécia: 460-370 a.C.) e Empédocles (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: 490 a.C.-430 a.C.) insistem no materialismo. Em contrapartida, os sofistas (Parmênides, Cálicles (Καλλικλῆς: personagem platônico cuja existência é duvidosa) e Górgias (Γοργίας: 485 a.C.-380 a.C.)) gozam das suas aptidões à dialética, e colocam o relativismo como uma posição filosófica. Sócrates será o inimigo mais temível dessa posição. Este é o começo do movimento filosófico de Atenas, que culmina nos séculos quinto e quarto, tal qual, posteriormente, veremos. 2. O APOGEU GREGO – Sócrates (Σωκράτης: 469 a.C.-399 a.C.), Platão (Πλάτων: 428/427- 348/347 a.C.) e Aristóteles (Ἀριστοτέλης: 384 a.C.-322 a.C.) formam o triunvirato dos grandes filósofos gregos. O primeiro (Sócrates), com seu método "maiêutico" e sua teoria do conceito; o segundo (Platão), com sua teoria das ideias e seu estilo literário (dialogista); e o terceiro (Aristóteles), com a estruturação dos principais ramos filosóficos, como a Lógica, a Metafísica, a Ética, a Psicologia racional e a Política; todos eles elevaram a Filosofia para um posto de primeira ordem. Doravante, todos os filósofos tornam-se credores das contribuições desses gênios. Em certos autores, é clara a influência de Platão ou de Aristóteles. Sendo que, ambos os filósofos, tiveram influência absoluta de Sócrates, uma vez que Platão fora seu discípulo, e Aristóteles discípulo de Platão. A Idade Média, por exemplo, foi toda ela, em sua gênese e desenvolvimento, alicerçada no pensamento e nas ideias platônicas; tal era histórica é caracterizada pela luta em favor de um ou de outro autor; o platonismo tomou precedência nos primeiros séculos do cristianismo; somente após o décimo século Aristóteles foi redescoberto. 3. A FILOSOFIA CRISTÃ MEDIEVAL - Santo Agostinho (354 a.C.-430 a.C.) se destaca, no quinto século, com sua teoria da iluminação e a aplicação da teoria platônica ao Cristianismo. No século XIII, São Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274), sintetiza Aristóteles com o Cristianismo. Os dois autores formam o núcleo da filosofia cristã em seus respectivos séculos. A escolástica teve seu tempo de decadência. Se mencionam, principalmente, dois autores: João Duns Escoto (1266-1308) e Guilherme de Ockham (1285-1347). O primeiro é o "Doutor Sutil ", e o segundo cai em um fideísmo e um nominalismo, para todos os conceitos criticáveis. Em uma segunda parte, tentaremos explicar os respectivos pensamentos dos autores mencionados, e outros que pertencem ao mesmo tempo, antigos e medievais. Naquela época, a Filosofia era puramente realista, aplicada ao mundo e ao homem. Somente na Idade Moderna, a Filosofia assumirá o problema do conhecimento como a base e o começo de todo filosofar. 4. A FILOSOFIA RACIONALISTA (MODERNA) - Na Idade Moderna, sobressai o racionalismo de Descartes (1596-1650) prolongado, então, com Malebranche (1638-1715) (ocasionalismo), Espinosa (1632 -1677) (panteísmo) e Leibniz (1646-1716) (teoria das mônadas). Estamos nos séculos XVII e XVIII. A atenção será focada nas disputas filosóficas da corrente empirista contra a racionalista. 5. A FILOSOFIA EMPIRISTA – O empirismo é florescido, principalmente, na Inglaterra. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), primeiro, e depois Locke (1632-1704) com sua rejeição de ideias inatas, Berkeley (1685-1753) com postura e ideias paradoxais, também idealistas e Hume (1711-1776), com suas famosas críticas contra o princípio da causalidade e o conceito de substância, são os principais autores. 6. KANT E OS IDEALISTAS ALEMÃES - Como a tentativa de sintetizar o racionalismo e empirismo, está a teoria de Kant (1724-1804), no século XVIII. Para o seu gênio seguido pelos três idealistas alemães mais importantes: Fichte (1762-1814) (idealismo subjetivo), Schelling (1775-1854) (idealismo objetivo) e Hegel (1770-1831) (idealismo absoluto). Esses Autores representam o ápice da especulação filosófica. A análise, a profundidade, a complexidade da expressão e o espírito sistemático são as características do gênio alemão idealista. 7. OS FILÓSOFOS DO SÉCULO XIX - Antes de tudo, é necessário mencionar, no século dezenove, aos dois grandes críticos de Hegel, que são Kierkegaard (1813-1855) (precursor do existencialismo) e Marx (1818-1883) (com seu materialismo dialético). O próximo é outro casal: Nietzsche (1844-1900) (teoria do Super-homem) e Schopenhauer (1788-1860) (com seu absoluto pessimismo). Comte (1798-1857) com sua doutrina positivista, completará o quadro desses filósofos. Numa outra oportunidade, vamos desmembrar sobre o pensamento e principais ideias acerca desses autores. 8. OS FILÓSOFOS DO SÉCULO XX - Antes de tudo, há um autor que iluminou a filosofia do século XX: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), fundador do método fenomenológico. Em seguida, existem dois fluxos que são derivados diretamente de Husserl, a saber, o existencialismo e a axiologia. Dentro da corrente axiológica, estudaremos Scheler (1874-2928). Por outro lado, o existencialismo tem quatro autores principais; dois são alemães: Heidegger (1889-1976) e Jaspers (1883-1969); e os demais são franceses: Sartre (1905-1980) e Marcel (1889-1973). Heidegger insiste em que seu tema tratado em sua filosofia não é a unicidade do homem, mas o ser em geral. Jaspers é famoso por seu conceito de transcendência (Deus). Sartre é um antiteísta sincero, e seu existencialismo é definido como um pensamento que assume todas as consequências da negação de Deus. Em contraste, Gabriel Marcel é um filósofo Católico, que conseguiu uma análise profunda das situações humanas, que aparecem em íntima concordância com as verdades cristãs. Vamos terminar com Russell (1872-1970), autor básico do positivismo lógico. Cronologia de filósofos e suas escolas até nossos dias ➢ Filosofia Antiga - Escola naturalista da Jônia: Tales, Anaximandro e Anaxímenes; - Escola matemática da Itália: Pitágoras e os pitagóricos; - Escola idealista de Eléia: Xenófanes (570-475 a.C.), Parmênides, Zenão (490/85-420 a.C.) e Meliso (h.443); - Escola empirista: Heráclito, Empédocles e Anaxágoras; - Escola atomista de Abdera: Leucipo (h.437) e Demócrito; - Escolas de Atenas: - Sofistas: Protágoras (480-410), Górgias (484-375?); Sócrates, Platão e Aristóteles; - Pirronismo: Pirro (h.365-h.275); - Estoicismo: Zenão de Cítio (359/33-262) e Crisipo (281/77-208); - Epicurismo: Epicuro (341-270); - Nova Academia: Arcesilau (315-241) e Carnéades (214-129); Romanos: Sêneca (4 a.C.-65 d.C.), Marco Aurélio (121-180) e Cícero (106-43). - Escola greco-judia: Fílon de Alexandria (25 a.C.-50 d.C.); - Neoplatonismo: Plotino (204/5-270), Porfirio (h.233-304), Jâmblico (h.250-330) e Proclo (h.411-485). ➢ Filosofia patrística - Apologistas: São Justino (100/10-165), Ireneu de Lyon (h.140-h.l 77) e Atenágoras (fines s. II); - Alexandrinos: São Clemente (h.145/50-215) e Orígenes (h.185-255); - Africanos: Tertuliano (h.160-230), Arnóbio (h.260-h.327) e Lactâncio (nascido h. 250); - Gregos: São Basílio (h.330-379), São Gregório de Nazianzo (330-390), São Gregório de Níssa (330-390) e Pseudo-Dionísio (h.500); - Latinos: São Hilário (h.315-367), Santo Ambrósio (333-397) e Santo Agostinho; - Outros: Claudiano (+h.473), Boécio (480-524), São Isidoro (h.560-633) e Beda (672/3-735). ➢ Filosofia Medieval/Escolástica - Judeus: Isaac Israeli (+h.940), Salomão Ibn Gabirol (h.l020-p.l058) e Maimônides (1135- 1204); - Árabes: Alquindi (h. 796-874), Al-Farabi (870-950), Avicena (980-1037), Algazali (1058- 1111) e Averróis (1126-1198); - Escola palatina: Alcuíno de Iorque (730/5-804), Rábano Mauro (h.784-856), Escoto Erígena (h.810-h.870) e Papa Silvestre II (+1003); - Dialéticos: Santo Anselmo (1033/4-1109) e Pedro Abelardo (1079-1142); - Tradutores: Domingo Gundisalvo (meados s. XII), Gerardo de Cremona (h. 1114-1187); - Enciclopedistas: Teodorico de Chartres (+1155), Hugo de São Vitor (+1141) e Vicente de Beauvais (+1264); - Universidades: Guilherme de Auvergne (1180- 1249) e Sigerio de Brabante (+h.l284); - Dominicanos: São Alberto Magno (1206-1280) e Santo Tomás de Aquino; - Franciscanos: Alexandre de Hales (1170/80-1245), São Boaventura (1217-1274), Roger Bacon (h.1210/14-1292), João Duns Escoto, Raimundo Lulio (1235-1315) e Guilherme de Ockham (h.1285-1349). ➢ Filosofia Moderna - Humanistas Renascentistas: Ficino (1433-1499), Erasmo (1467-1536), Maquiavel (1469- 1527), Thomas More (1480-1535), Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) e Giordano Bruno (1548- 1600); - Racionalismo: Descartes, Malebranche, Espinosa e Leibniz; - Empiristas: Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Locke, Berkeley e Hume; - Escola escocesa: Thomas Reid (1710-1796); Iluministas: Voltaire (1694-1778), Condillac (1715-1757), Diderot (1713-1784) e J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778). - Idealismo transcendental: Kant; - Idealismo subjetivo: Fichte; - Idealismo objetivo: Schelling; - Idealismo absoluto: Hegel; - Pessimismo: Schopenhauer; - Ecletismo: Cousin (1792-1867); - Positivismo: A. Comte, J. S. Mill (1806-1873) e H. Spencer (1820-1900); - Socialismo: H. Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Ch. Fourier (1772-1837) e K. Marx; - Vitalismo: Nietzsche e W. Dilthey (1833-1912). ➢ Filosofia Contemporânea - Intucionismo: H. Bergson (1859-1941); - Pragmatismo: Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914), W. James (1842-1910) e J. Dewey (1859-1952); - Fenomenologia: Husserl, Scheler, N. Hartmann (1882-1950) e M. Merleau-Ponty (1908- 1961); - Existencialismo: Jaspers, Heidegger, Marcel e Sartre; - Atomismo lógico: B. Russell (1872-1970) e L. Wittgenstein (1889-1951); - Positivismo lógico: M. Schlick (1882-1936), R. Carnap (1891-1970 ) e A. J. Ayer (1910- 1990). - Filosofia analítica: J. L. Austin (1911-1960), G. Ryle (1900-1976), W.V.O. Quine (1908- 2000), P. F. Strawson (1919-2003) e H. Putnam (1926-); - Hermenêutica: H. G. Gadamer (1900-2002), P. Ricoeur (1913-2007) e J. Habermas (1929-). - Estruturalismo e pós-estruturalismo: F. de Saussure (1857-1913), C. Lévi-Strauss (1908- 2009) e M. Foucault (1926-1984). - Filosofia pós-moderna: J. F. Lyotard (1924-1999), G. Deleuze (1925-1995), J. Derrida (1930- 2004), R. Rorty (1931-2007) e G. Vattimo (1936-). - Comunitaristas: A. Maclntyre (1929-), Ch. Taylor (1931-). REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS CHAUÍ, M. Iniciação à Filosofia. Vol. Único. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2013. 460 p. SANTOS, R. dos. Filosofia: Uma breve introdução. 1ª ed. Pelotas: Dissertativo Incipiens, 2014. 108 p. . Rua do Riachuelo, 303, Centro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ Casa Histórica de Osório CEP: 20230-011 E-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This paper introduces the reconstitutor as a comprehensive unit of heredity within the context of evolutionary research. A reconstitutor is the structure resulting from a set of relationships between different elements or processes that are actively involved in the recreation of a specific phenotypic variant in each generation regardless of the biomolecular basis of the elements or whether they stand in a continuous line of ancestry. Firstly, we justify the necessity of introducing the reconstitutor by showing the limitations of other (...) evolutionary conceptions of the unit of heredity, such as the replicator, the reproducer, and the Darwinian individual. We argue that these conceptions are based on the requirement of lineage formation, which we argue to be unnecessary for the existence of evolutionary heredity. In the second part, we introduce the reconstitutor, which we base on the concept of Stability of Traits, and illustrate how it covers cases of hereditary phenomena not covered by the previous accounts. Secondly, we illustrate how the reconstitutor could serve as a platform to rethink ecological inheritance and other forms of inheritance that have been recently introduced under the song/singer model of evolution. (shrink)

The view that it is better for life to be created free of disability is pervasive in both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we critique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of well-being and disability, and the second (...) by more briefly focusing on the idea of a significant reason. By placing these results against the broader historical and ongoing contexts in which the lives of those with disabilities have been deemed of inferior quality, we conclude with a call for greater humility about disability and well-being in thought and practice. (shrink)

Moral perceptualism is the theory that perception and perceptual experience is attuned to moral features in our environment. This idea has received renewed attention in the last 15–20 years, for its potential to do theoretical work in moral epistemology and moral psychology. In this paper, I review the main motivations and arguments for moral perceptualism, the variety of theories that go under the heading of “moral perception,” and the three biggest challenges to moral perception. https://youtu.be/9cc_1zykq80.

In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times – which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant’s primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160–1n – and the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant (...) have argued that this latter unity cannot be the product of categorial synthesis. While they are correct that this unity is not the product of any particular act of category-guided synthesis, I argue that conceptualists are right to nevertheless attribute this unity to the understanding. I argue that it is a result of what we can think of as the ‘original’ synthesis of understanding and sensibility themselves – it is a synthesis, moreover, in which the whole is logically prior to the parts. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While broadly Kantian aestheticians have defended the claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as offering an account of aesthetic attention. On the basis of Kant’s more general account of attention in other texts and his remarks on attention in the Critique of the Power of (...) Judgment, I reconstruct Kant’s account of aesthetic attention. On this account, aesthetic attention is simultaneously directed at the form of an object and at the judging subject’s own mental states as she attends to the object. In the experience of beauty, we specifically attend to the harmonious relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding. (shrink)

A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...) fail to fully account for this shared ground of communicative possibility. This paper argues that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intercorporeity helps reconcile the positive aspects of these accounts while also explaining how the genesis of the social world is continuous with perceptual life in general. This enables an account of the first-person plural as dependent on reciprocal communicative interaction without the need to posit a primitive or primordial “we-mode” of consciousness. “Intercorporeity” designates a bodily openness to others that is not fundamentally different in kind from the general style of bodily comportment found in Merleau-Ponty’s rich analyses of perceptual life. (shrink)

Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project, even if it is not essen- tial for defining expression in the First Investigation. For Husserl, motivation is a relation between mental acts whereby (...) the content of one act make some fur- ther meaningful content probable. I explicate the nature of this relation in terms of “evidentiary weight” and differentiate it from Husserl’s notion of Evidenz, often translated as “self-evidence”. I elucidate the importance of motivation in Husserl’s overall phenomenological project by focusing on his analyses of thing-perception and empathy. Through these examples, we can better understand the continuity between the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s later work. (shrink)

We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior to, the speech that expresses it. (...) He also claims, however, that thinking just is linguistic expression, and thus that language constitutes thought. The primary aim of this paper is to make sense of this constitutive claim while maintaining that, for Merleau-Ponty, there is an inner life of thought that exists independently of linguistic expression, and that this inner life rightly deserves the label “thought”. The upshot of this account is twofold. First, it explains why the mainstream view of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression seems plausible, but is ultimately inadequate. Second, it functions as a corrective to contemporary debates about the nature and scope of phenomenal consciousness and the sense in which conscious experience has content. (shrink)

One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine omnipotence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-powerful being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notoriously elusive. In this paper, I first consider some simple attempts to analyze omnipotence, showing how each fails. I then consider two more sophisticated accounts of omnipotence. The first of these is presented by Edward Wierenga; the second by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso. I argue that both of these accounts (...) fail. Finally, I propose and defend a novel account of omnipotence. (shrink)

What we call “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. Our chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical (...) theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, we suggest a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology. (shrink)

This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that conscious thoughts are related (...) to one another. I argue that these considerations are necessary for understanding why forms of cognitive extension may diminish our cognitive lives in different ways. This does not lead to a categorical rejection of cognitive enhancement as unethical or bad for human flourishing, but does warrant a conservative approach to the design and implementation of cognitive artifacts. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory role (...) of the first-person sense of embodiment, which leads to an emphasis on the transformative nature of empathy and a broadening of the scope of possible targets of empathic awareness. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophers have identified a number of moral and psychological harms associated with the attention economy (Alysworth & Castro, 2021; Castro & Pham, 2020; Williams, 2018). Missing from many of these accounts of the attention economy, however, is what exactly attention is. As a result of this neglect of the cognitive science of attention, many of these accounts are not empirically credible. They rely on oversimplified and unsophisticated accounts of not only attention, but self- control, and addiction as (...) well. Of note are accounts of the attention economy that rely on the ‘brain disease’ rhetoric of addiction and subsequent control failures (Aylsworth & Castro, 2021; Bhargava & Velasquez, 2021), accounts that rely on a strict dichotomy of top-down vs. bottom-up attention (Williams, 2018; Aylsworth & Castro, 2021), and accounts that construe attention as a limited resource (Williams, 2018). -/- Drawing on recent work from the neuroscience and psychology of attention, I demonstrate the shortcomings of these accounts and sketch a way forward for an empirically grounded account of the attention economy. These accounts tend to uphold strict dichotomies of voluntary control (e.g., compulsion versus choice, dual-process models of self-control, and top-down versus bottom-up) that cannot account for the complexities of attentional control, mental agency, and decision-making. As such, these empirically and conceptually impoverished accounts cannot adequately address the current so-called crisis of attention. To better understand the harms associated with the attention economy, we need an empirically responsible account of the nature and function of attention and mental agency. (shrink)

Debates about the genuine disease status of controversial diseases rely on intuitions about a range of factors. Adopting tools from experimental philosophy, this paper explores some of the factors that influence judgments about whether low sexual desire should be considered a disease and whether it should be medically treated. Drawing in part on some assumptions underpinning a divide in the literature between viewing low sexual desire as a genuine disease and seeing it as improperly medicalized, we investigate whether health and (...) disease judgments are affected by factors such as an individual’s gender, the cause of the low desire, whether the desire is high or low, and both personal and societal valuations of the condition. Our main findings indicate that (a) the cause of a condition influences whether it is judged a disorder, (b) how the individual values the condition influences whether the condition is seen as a proper target of medical intervention, and (c) perceived dysfunction influences judgments regarding health, disorder classification, medicalization, and medical intervention. Our findings help further illuminate the intricate interplay of factors that influence judgments about health and disease in controversial conditions. (shrink)

The first aim of the paper is to show that under certain conditions generative syntax can be made suitable for Montague semantics, based on his type logic. One of the conditions is to make branching in the so-called X-bar syntax strictly binary, This makes it possible to provide an adequate semantics for Noun Phrases by taking them as referring to sets of collections of sets of entities ( type <ett,t>) rather than to sets of sets of entities (ett).

In their Why Machines Will Never Rule the World, Landgrebe and Smith (2023) argue that it is impossible for artificial general intelligence (AGI) to succeed, on the grounds that it is impossible to perfectly model or emulate the “complex” “human neurocognitive system”. However, they do not show that it is logically impossible; they only show that it is practically impossible using current mathematical techniques. Nor do they prove that there could not be any other kinds of theories than those in (...) current use. Even if perfect theories were impossible or unlikely, perfection may not be needed and may even be unhelpful. (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of (...) intentionality through which the sense of the Other is constituted. Furthermore, his account of empathy is holistically integrated with his overall theory of intersubjectivity, including his discussions of the objectivity of nature, and the social, historical, and communal aspects of subjectivity. Husserl’s theory of empathy continues to cast a long shadow, influencing both the analytic and continental approaches to the problem of other minds, as well as contemporary account of social cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Todd (2016) proposes an analysis of future-directed sentences, in particular sentences of the form 'will(φ)', that is based on the classic Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. Todd's analysis is supposed to vindicate the claim that the future is metaphysically open while retaining a simple Ockhamist semantics of future contingents and the principles of classical logic, i.e. bivalence and the law of excluded middle. Consequently, an open futurist can straightforwardly retain classical logic without appeal to supervaluations, determinacy operators, or any further (...) controversial semantical or metaphysical complication. In this paper, we will show that this quasi-Russellian analysis of 'will' both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. In particular, we show that the standard arguments for Russell's treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form 'will(φ)'. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that genius is a talent for art, but not for science. Despite his restriction of genius to the domain of fine art, several recent interpreters have suggested that genius has a role to play in Kant’s account of cognition in general and scientific practice in particular. In this paper, I explore Kant’s reasons for excluding genius from science as well as the reasons that one might nevertheless be tempted to think that his account (...) allows room for the scientific genius. I then argue that Kant’s concerns are not only epistemic, but also moral, and together, they give us good reason for resisting the veneration of genius. (shrink)