A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to Molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by Leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of ‘possibilistic’ (...) (Molinist) complete concepts. They ground middle knowledge within the very being of the agents themselves. Molinist Complete Concepts can thus serve to reject consequence-style arguments against Molinism. They also allow the Molinist to safeguard a robustly libertarian notion of the ability to do otherwise. (shrink)
In the world there are concrete particulars that exhibit the kind of substantial unity that allows them to be called substances or “natural individuals”, as opposed to artifacts or mere conglomerates. Persons, animals, and possibly the most fundamental physical simples are all natural individuals. What gives these entities the ontological status of a substantial unity? Arguments from the philosophy of mind and arguments from general metaphysics show that physical properties alone cannot account for substantial unity. The ultimate intrinsic properties of (...) natural individuals resemble phenomenal mental properties rather than any other kind of known properties. Pan(proto-)psychism is thus supported by systematically related arguments from different areas of philosophical inquiry. A certain amount of skepticism regarding the full nature of absolutely intrinsic properties is nevertheless well-advised. (shrink)
Paper on personal identity and the possibility of survival within a framework of a process-oriented metaphysics that combines elements of four-dimensionalism and three-dimensionalism.
Dieser Text will versuchen, Philosophie und psychologische Motivationsforschung wieder miteinander ins Gespräch zu bringen. Innerhalb der Philosophie herrscht bis heute oft eine sehr vereinfachte Auffassung der Motivation vor. Vor allem die Humesche Konzeption dominiert (vgl. Smith 2010), nach der Motivation als Zusammenhang von intrinsischen Wünschen und Zweck-Mittel-Überzeugungen verstanden wird. Ein motivierter Mensch hat also das Bedürfnis, das die Welt auf eine bestimmte Art verändert werde und sein Handeln genau in dieser Veränderung resultieren kann. Das ist eine sehr verkürzte Auffassung, wenn (...) man sich den Stand der psychologischen Motivationstheorien vor Augen führt. Die psychologischen Theorien ihrerseits tun sich naturgemäß schwer, wenn der Bereich des empirisch Messbaren verlassen wird und begriffliche Fragen wie die des Freiheitsproblems oder normative Fragen der Ethik herangezogen werden. Das interdisziplinäre Gespräch kann hier weiterhelfen. (shrink)
Article on the problem of free will and determinism. A defense of the so-called "consequence argument" arguing that free will and determinism are incompatible.
The main topic of this paper will not be the notoriously difficult metaphysical question of freedom and determinism. An act of will is either determined by a causal chain of previous events or is a mere chance event. In either case there seems to be no room for freedom. This question is of such a high level of conceptual generality that it applies not only to human freedom but to any being that acts for reasons, even beings that lack a (...) brain. In this paper I try to answer the question whether freedom is possible for beings endowed with a brain. Can a being whose mental life involves a functioning brain determine its own actions? I will proceed in two steps. First, I will discuss a recent experiment that seems to prove empirically that freedom of the will is an illusion. I will argue that this kind of research is methodologically misguided. Then I will go on to discuss some of the metaphysical issues that must be dealt with if one wants to address the question whether freedom of the will is possible for a being endowed with a brain. And then I will ask if such a metaphysics is compatible with our best empirical theories. (shrink)
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