In this paper we show how a student can learn the basics of the system databases using (W3school CSS) which was built as intelligent tutoring educational system by using the authoring tool called (ITSB). The learning material contains CSS and HTML. We divided the material in a group of lessons for novice learner which combines relational system and lessons in the process of learning. The student can learn using example of CSS, and types of CSS color. Furthermore, the intelligent tutoring (...) system supports not only lessons; but exercises of different difficult levels for each lesson. When a student finish successfully the first difficulty level in a lesson, the student is allowed to move to the next difficulty level of the exercises of the lesson. (shrink)

In this paper we show how a student can learn the basics of the system databases using (W3school CSS) which was built as intelligent tutoring educational system by using the authoring tool called (ITSB). The learning material contains CSS and HTML. We divided the material in a group of lessons for novice learner which combines relational system and lessons in the process of learning. The student can learn using example of CSS, and types of CSS color. Furthermore, the intelligent tutoring (...) system supports not only lessons; but exercises of different difficult levels for each lesson. When a student finish successfully the first difficulty level in a lesson, the student is allowed to move to the next difficulty level of the exercises of the lesson. (shrink)

forall x: Calgary is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity of arguments, the syntax of truth-functional propositional logic TFL and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic FOL with identity (first-order interpretations), symbolizing English in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as modal logic, soundness, and functional completeness. Exercises with solutions are available. (...) It is provided in PDF (for screen reading, printing, and a special version for dyslexics), HTML, and in LaTeX source code. (shrink)

Authors: Joseph M. Eble, John A. Di Camillo, Peter J. Colosi. --- NEWS RELEASE For Immediate Release February 27, 2024 Contact: Joseph M. Eble, MD Corresponding author 919-667-5206 -/- The statement, Catholics United on Brain Death and Organ Donation: A Call to Action (HTML), was published on February 27, 2024. It was prepared by Joseph Eble, a physician and President of the Tulsa Guild of the Catholic Medical Association; John Di Camillo, an ethicist of The National Catholic Bioethics Center; and (...) Peter Colosi, a philosophy professor at Salve Regina University. -/- Catholic United explains that the criteria for brain death establish only partial loss of brain function. This is now abundantly clear based on scientific studies, a recent effort to lower the legal standard for death, and updated brain death guidelines issued in October 2023. -/- Catholics United bridges a divide among faithful Catholics about whether the concept of brain death aligns with Church teaching. Some Catholics hold that brain death represents true death when there is complete and irreversible cessation of all brain activity, often called whole brain death. Others hold that brain death does not represent true death. Since the existing criteria establish only partial loss of brain function, all the endorsers—whether they accept or reject whole brain death as true death—agree that “the current brain death criteria in widespread use do not provide moral (prudential) certainty of death.” -/- Catholics United calls on health care professionals and institutions to cease organ harvesting that relies on the inadequate criteria, noting that 70% of all donors are declared dead using brain death criteria. “Given the lack of moral certainty of death whenever the current brain death criteria are used,” the statement affirms, “a clear majority of vital organ donors can be presumed alive at the time of organ harvesting.” Since the Catholic Church forbids removing vital organs when this would kill the patient, “it is therefore wrong to remove organs from patients declared dead using these inadequate criteria.” . (shrink)

http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ZIF/Publikationen/books/10_Baurmann_NormsAndValues.html.

"Philosophy of Happiness: A Critical Introduction" summarizes (a) what philosophy of happiness is, (b) why it should matter to us, (c) what assistance we can draw from philosophy, empiric science, religion, and self-help sources, and (d) why taking an independent approach is both necessary and feasible. -/- The article is in PDF format, 60 pages. The table of contents links directly to the listed captions. Also available in an html version under the phone variant of the referenced philosophy of happiness (...) website. -/- Table of Contents -/- 1. The Definition of Happiness. -/- 2. The Definition of Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 3. Taking Refuge from the Complexity of Happiness. -/- 4. Self-Help Contributions to Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 5. Religious Contributions to Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 6. Philosophical Authorities on Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 7. Happiness Studies by Sciences Beyond Philosophy. -/- 8. Independent Approaches Toward a Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 9. Further Reading. (shrink)

Berkeley in his Introduction to the Principles of Human knowledge uses geometrical examples to illustrate a way of generating “universal ideas,” which allegedly account for the existence of general terms. In doing proofs we might, for example, selectively attend to the triangular shape of a diagram. Presumably what we prove using just that property applies to all triangles.I contend, rather, that given Berkeley’s view of extension, no Euclidean triangles exist to attend to. Rather proof, as Berkeley would normally assume, requires (...) idealizing diagrams; treating them as if they obeyed Euclidean constraints. This convention solves the problem of representative generalization. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Berkeley and Proof in GeometryVolume 51, Issue 3RICHARD J. BROOK DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000686Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Berkeley and Proof in GeometryVolume 51, Issue 3RICHARD J. BROOK DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000686Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Berkeley and Proof in GeometryVolume 51, Issue 3RICHARD J. BROOK DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000686Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

If we had more powerful minds would we be puzzled by less - because we could make better theories - or by more - because we could ask more difficult questions? This paper focuses on clarifying the question, with an emphasis on comparisons between actual and possible species of thinker. A pre-publication version of the paper is available on my website at http://www.fernieroad.ca/a/PAPERS/papers.html .

In this paper, I ask whether mishpat ivri (Jewish Law) is appropriately conceived as a “legal system”. I review Menachem Elon’s use of a “Sources” Theory of Law (based on Salmond) in his account of Mishpat Ivri; the status of religious law from the viewpoint of jurisprudence itself (Bentham, Austin and Kelsen); then the use of sources (and the approach to “dogmatic error”) by halakhic authorities in discussing the problems of the agunah (“chained wife”), which I suggest points to a (...) theory more radical than the “sources” theory of law, one more akin to the ultimate phase of the thought of Kelsen (the “non-logical” Kelsen) or indeed to some form of Legal Realism (with which that phase of Kelsen’s thought has indeed been compared)? I finally juxtapose an account based on internal theological resources (a “Jurisprudence of Revelation”). Downloadable at at http://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/jsij1.html. (shrink)

This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...) science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use. This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience . From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate to it, but this view allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. Against its normative version, I argue that its descriptive version can best satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument while giving an answer to the Wrong Kind (...) of Reason Objection. Finally, I argue that the circularity that is involved is not vicious: understood epistemically, neo-sentimentalism remains instructive. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalismeVolume 51, Issue 1Christine Tappolet DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000212Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalismeVolume 51, Issue 1Christine Tappolet DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000212Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalismeVolume 51, Issue 1Christine Tappolet DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000212Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Reid, Constance. Hilbert (a Biography). Reviewed by Corcoran in Philosophy of Science 39 (1972), 106–08. -/- Constance Reid was an insider of the Berkeley-Stanford logic circle. Her San Francisco home was in Ashbury Heights near the homes of logicians such as Dana Scott and John Corcoran. Her sister Julia Robinson was one of the top mathematical logicians of her generation, as was Julia’s husband Raphael Robinson for whom Robinson Arithmetic was named. Julia was a Tarski PhD and, in recognition of (...) a distinguished career, was elected President of the American Mathematics Society. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julia_Robinson http://www.awm-math.org/noetherbrochure/Robinson82.html. (shrink)

http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ZIF/Publikationen/books/10_Baurmann_NormsAndValues.html.

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This portion of the report explores the question: What can Indian philosophy tell us about how we perceive the world?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This portion of the report explores the question: Can meditation give us moral knowledge?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This portion of the report explores the question: How can we train our attention, and what are the benefits of doing so?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is multisensory integration?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This part of the report explores the question: How does the understanding of attention in Indian philosophy bear on contemporary western debates?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Do multisensory percepts involve emergent features?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This portion of the report explores the question: Are there cross-cultural philosophical themes?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What can multisensory processing tell us about multisensory awareness?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is the purpose of multisensory integration?

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Is language processing a special kind of multisensory integration?

Anxiety is a main contributor to human psychological sufferings. Its evolutionary sources are generally related to alert signals for coping with adverse or unexpected situations [Steiner, 2002] or to hunter-gatherer emotions mismatched with today environments [Horwitz & Wakefield, 2012]. We propose here another evolutionary perspective that links human anxiety to an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. That approach introduces new relations between mental health and human mind. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts with the performance of primate identification with conspecifics [de Waal (...) 1998, 2008]. It is assumed that the evolution of that identification brought our ancestors to represent themselves as entities existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing in the environment. We consider that this process has implemented in the mind of our ancestors some first elements of self-consciousness [Menant 2014a]. But the same process has also produced new sufferings coming from identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics. In addition, the emerging performance of self-focus brought in the new feeling of being a suffering entity. We consider that all these new sufferings have created in the mind of our primate ancestors a huge anxiety increase, unbearable if not limited. Among the options available to limit that anxiety increase we focus on two of them that may have taken place. The first was a withdrawal from the process. Some primates may have simply rejected the evolution of identification (and with it self-consciousness). This may have led them to an ecological niche resulting in our today great apes. The second option was about limiting the causes of sufferings and taking advantage of possible resulting evolutionary benefits. This may have been achieved by developing performances like imitation, communication, simulation, synergy and ToM. Added to a positive feedback on identification these performances may have initiated an evolutionary engine that has accelerated the evolution toward human self-consciousness. That option is characterized by an early build up of anxiety limitation processes in an evolutionary nature of our human self-consciousness. This option corresponds to a human specificity and introduces anxiety management and self-consciousness as sharing a same evolutionary story. The build up of these anxiety management processes is now buried in the evolutiony story of our human mind. But these processes are still present in our minds at an unconscious level and participate to many of our human mental states and behaviors. Such positioning of anxiety management as part of the nature of human mind is new and makes available entry points for new understandings of human emotion, motivations and mental disorders. The proposed evolutionary scenario has been introduced in philosophy of mind [Menant 2011, 2014a, b] but it has not been so far explicitly part of primatology nor of psychology/psychiatry/ethics. We present here a drawing of the scenario with highlights on corresponding key points. More work is needed on these new evolutionary links between human mind and anxiety management. References: de Waal, F B.M. (1998). No imitation without identification. Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1998) 21:89. http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Abstracts/deWaal_98.html de Waal, F B.M. (2008). Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2008, 59. http://www.life.umd.edu/faculty/wilkinson/BIOL608W/deWaalAnnRevPsych2008.pdf Horwitz, A. V. and Wakefield, J. C. (2012). All We Have to Fear: Psychiatry’s Transformation of Natural Anxieties into Mental Disorders. Oxford Univ. Press. 2012. Menant, C. (2011). Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach. https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCOI Menant, C. (2014a). Proposal for an evolutionary approach to self-consciousness. https://philpapers.org/rec/MENPFA-3 Menant, C. (2014b). Consciousness of oneself as object and as subject. Proposal for an evolutionary approach. https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCOO Steiner, T. (2002). The biology of fear- and anxiety-related behaviors. Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2002 Sep; 4(3): 231–249. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3181681/. (shrink)

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霍维奇对维特根斯坦(W)进行了精妙的分析,是一位顶尖的W学者,但在我看来,他们都没有达到完全的欣赏,正如我在评论和许多其他评论中详细解释的那样。如果一个人不理解W(最好也是西尔),那么我看不出一个人怎 么会对哲学和更高层次的思想,从而对所有复杂的行为(心理学,社会学,人类学,历史,文学,社会)。简而言之,W 演示了当您演示了句子在感兴趣的上下文中的使用方式时,就没有什么可说的了。我将从几个值得注意的引言开始,然后给出我认为是理解维特根斯坦、哲学和人类行为所需的最低考虑因素。 首先,人们可能会注意到,把"元"放在任何单词前面都应该是值得怀疑的。例如,元数学和任何其他数学一样。我们可以走出哲学的概念(即更高层次思维的描述性心理学)本身就是一种深刻的困惑。这 里的另一个刺激(以及过去40年的学术写作)是"她"和"她"和"她"或"他/她"等不断的反向语言性别歧视,其中" 他们"和"他们"和"他们"会很好。同样,使用法语单词""汇编",其中英语的"汇编"将做得很好。主要的 不足是完全失败(虽然很常见),使用我所看到的浩浩特和西尔框架的非常强大和直观的两个系统视图,我已经概述了上面。这在关于含义 p111 及其 seq 的章节(特别是在脚注 2-7 中)中尤为尖锐,在非常泥泞的水中游泳,没有自动真正的 S1、命题处置 S2、COS 等框架。通过阅读约翰斯顿或巴德(见我的评论),还可以更好地了解内部和外部。然而,霍维奇却发表了许多尖锐的评论。我特别喜欢他关于W的反理论立场在第65页导入的总结。他需要更加强调"关于确定性& quot;,最近丹尼尔·莫亚尔-沙罗克、科利瓦等人努力的主题,并在我最近的文章中进行了总结。 霍维奇是一流的,他的工作非常值得付出努力。人们希望他(和每个人都)将学习西尔和一些现代心理学以及胡托,里德,哈钦森,斯特恩,莫亚尔-沙罗克,斯特罗,黑客和贝克等,以获得广泛的现代行为观。他们的大部分论 文都academia dot edu和philpapers dot org,但对于PMS黑客看http colon //info.sjc dortox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html。 他给出了一个最美丽的总结,其中对维特根斯坦的理解留给我们,我见过。 "绝不能像弗雷格将算术缩减为逻辑那样,试图解释我们的语言/概念活动 (PI 126);没有试图给它认识论基础(PI 124),如在基于意义的先验知识的帐户;没有试图将理想化的形式(PI 130)描述为感官逻辑;没有试图改革它(PI 124,132),如麦基的错误理论或杜梅特的直觉;没有试图精简它(PI 133),如在奎因的存在帐户;没有试图使它更一致(PI 132),如塔尔斯基对说谎悖论的反应;并且没有试图使它更完整 (PI 133), 在解决奇怪的假想"传送"场景的个人身份问题。 最后,让我建议,以我在这里鼓励的观点,W是当代哲学和心理学的中心,不是晦涩,困难或不相干,但闪烁,深刻和水晶般清晰,想念他是错过一个最伟大的智力冒险可能。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Mind 和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-201 9年第3次(2019 年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019).

Хорвич дает прекрасный анализ Витгенштейна (W) и является ведущим ученым W, но, на мойвзгляд, все они не дотягивают до полной оценки, как я подробно объяснить в этом обзоре и многие другие. Если одно не понимает W (и предпочтительно Searle также) после этого я не вижу как одно смогло иметь больше чем поверхностное вникание общего соображения и мысли более высокого заказа и таким образом всего сложного поведения (психология, социология, антропология, история, словесность, общество). В двух словах, W продемонстрировал, что, когда вы показали, (...) как предложение используется в контексте интересов, нет ничего более сказать. Я начну с нескольких заметных цитат, а затем дать то, что я думаю, являются минимальными соображениями, необходимыми для понимания Витгенштейна, философии и человеческого поведения. Во-первых, можно отметить, что положить "мета" перед любым словом должно быть подозреваемым. W заметил, например, что метаматематика математика, как и любой другой. Представление о том, что мы можем выйти за рамки философии (т.е. описательной психологии мысли высшего порядка), само по себе является глубокой путаницей. Еще одно раздражение здесь (и на протяжении академических письменной форме в течение последних 4 десятилетий) является постоянным обратным лингвистического сексизма "ее" и "ее" и "она" или "он / она" и т.д., где "они" и "свои" и "их" будет делать красиво. Аналогичнымобразом, использование французского слова "репертуар", где английский "репертуар" будет делать довольно хорошо. Основным недостатком является полный отказ (хотя и очень часто), чтобы использовать то, что я вижу, как чрезвычайно мощный и интуитивно понятный вид двух систем HOT и Карл рамки, которые я изложил выше. Это особенно остро в главе о значении p111 et seq. (особенно в сносках 2-7), где мы плаваем в очень мутной воде без рамки автоматизированной истинной только S1, пропозиционный диспозиционный S2, COS и т.д. Можно также получить лучшее представление о внутреннем и внешнем, читая, например, Джонстон или Бадд (см. мои отзывы). Хорвич однако делает много резких комментариев. Мне особенно понравилось его резюме импорта W анти-теоретической позиции на p65. Он должен уделять больше внимания "На определенности", в последнее время предметом много усилий Даниэле Мойал-Шаррок, Coliva и другие и кратко в моих последних статьях. Хорвич является первым курсом, и его работа стоит усилий. Хочется надеяться, что он (и все) изучат Сирла и некоторые современные психологии, а также Хатто, Рид, Хатчинсон, Стерн, Мойал-Шаррок, Прогулка, Хакер и Бейкер и т.д., чтобы достичь широкого современного взгляда на поведение. Большинство их работ на academia dot edu и philpapers dot org, но для PMS Хакер см. http colon //info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html dot Он дает один из самых красивых резюме, где понимание Витгенштейна оставляет нам, что я когда-либо видел. "Не должно быть никаких попыток объяснить нашу лингвистическую/концептуальную деятельность (PI 126), как в уменьшении арифметики Фрейда к логике; не попытка дать ему эпистемологические основы (PI 124), как в смысле основанных счетов априори знаний; не попытка охарактеризовать идеализированные формы его (PI 130) как в логике чувства; никаких попыток реформировать его (PI 124, 132), как в теории ошибок Маки или интуиции Дамметт; никаких попыток упорядочить его (PI 133), как в рассказе Квина о существовании; не попытка сделать его более последовательным (PI 132), как в ответ Тарски на парадоксы лжецов; и не попытка сделать его более полным (PI 133), как в урегулировании вопросов личной идентичности для странных гипотетических сценариев "телепортации". Наконец, позвольте мне предположить, что с точки зрения я призвал здесь, W находится в центре современной философии и психологии и не является неясным, трудным или неуместным, но мерцающий, глубокий и кристально чистый и что пропустить его, чтобы пропустить один из величайших интеллектуальных приключений возможно. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Horwichはウィトゲンシュタイン(W)の細かい分析を行い、Wの第一人者ですが、私の見解では、このレビューや他の多くの人が長々と説明しているように、それらはすべて完全な感謝に満ち不足しています。W( そして好ましくはサールも)を理解していないならば、私は哲学と高次思考、したがってすべての複雑な行動(心理学、社会学、人類学、歴史、文学、社会)の表面的な理解以上のものを持つことができる方法を見ません。 一言で言えば、Wは、あなたが興味のある文脈で文がどのように使用されているかを示したとき、これ以上言うことは何もあることを実証しました。私はいくつかの注目すべき引用から始め、その後、私はウィトゲンシュタ イン、哲学と人間の行動を理解するために必要な最小限の考慮事項であると思うものを与えます。 まず、単語の前に「meta」を置くことは疑わしいはずです。Wは、例えば、メタ数学は他の数学と同様に、言った。哲学の外に出ることができるという考え(すなわち、高次思考の記述心理学)は、それ自体が深い混乱 です。ここでのもう一つのいらだちは、「彼女」と「彼女」と「彼女」や「彼女/彼女」などの絶え間ない逆言語的性差別です。同様に、英語の「レパートリー」がうまくいくフランス語の「レパートリー」の使用もうまく いくでしょう。大きな欠陥は、私が上記で概説したHOTとサールのフレームワークの非常に強力で直感的な2つのシステムビューとして私が見ているものを採用する完全な失敗(非常に一般的ですが)です。これは、特に 意味p111 et seq.(特に脚注2-7)に関する章では、自動化された真のS1、命題の処分S2、COSなどの枠組みなしで非常に泥だらけの水の中で泳ぎます。ジョンストンやバッド(私のレビューを参照)などを読むことで、内 側と外側のより良いビューを得ることもできます。しかし、ホーウィッチは多くの切迫したコメントをします。私は特にp65に対するWの反理論的スタンスの輸入の彼の要約が好きでした。彼は最近、ダニエレ・モヤル・ シャーロック、コリバなどによる多くの努力の主題である「確実性について」にもっと重点を置く必要があり、私の最近の記事で要約されています。 ホーウィッチは一流であり、彼の仕事は努力の価値があります。彼(そして誰もが)サールといくつかの現代心理学だけでなく、ハット、リード、ハッチンソン、スターン、モヤアル・シャーロック、ストロール、ハッカー 、ベイカーなどを研究し、幅広い現代的な行動観を達成することを望んでいます。彼らの論文のほとんどはacademia dot eduとphilpapers dot orgにありますが、PMSハッカーにとってはhttp: slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot htmlを参照してください。 彼はウィトゲンシュタインの理解が私が今まで見た私たちを残す場所の最も美しい要約の一つを与えます。 「フレージの論理への算術の削減のように、言語的/概念的な活動(PI 126)を説明する試みがあってはならない。それを認識論的基盤(PI 124)に与える試みはありません。.意味論理のように理想化された形式(PI 130)を特徴付けようとする試みはありません。マッキーの誤り理論やダメットの直感のように、それを改革する試み(PI 124、132)はありません。クインの存在のアカウントのようにそれを合理化する試みはありません (PI 133)。嘘つきのパラドックスに対するタルスキーの反応のように、それをより一貫させる試み(PI 132)を作る試みはありません。奇妙な仮説的な「テレポーテーション」シナリオのための個人的なアイデンティティの質問の解決のように、それをより完全に(PI 133)にしようとする試みはありません。 最後に、私がここで奨励した視点で、Wは現代哲学と心理学の中心にあり、あいまいで困難でも無関係でもありませんが、シンチレーション、深遠でクリスタルクリアであり、彼を見逃すのは可能な限り最大の知的冒険の1 つを逃すということです。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Horwich gibt eine feine Analyse von Wittgenstein (W) und ist ein führender W-Stipendiat, aber meinerMeinung nach sind sie alle hinter einer vollen Wertschätzung zurück, wie ich in dieser Rezension und vielen anderen ausführlich erkläre. Wenn man W (und vorzugsweise auch Searle) nicht versteht, dann sehe ich nicht, wie man mehr als ein oberflächliches Verständnis von Philosophie und höherem Denken und damit von allem komplexen Verhalten (Psychologie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Gesellschaft) haben könnte. Kurz gesagt, W hat gezeigt, dass, wenn Sie (...) gezeigt haben, wie ein Satz im Zusammenhang mit Interesse verwendet wird, es nichts mehr zu sagen gibt. Ich beginne mit ein paar bemerkenswerten Zitaten und gebe dann, was ich denke, sind die minimalen Überlegungen notwendig, um Wittgenstein zu verstehen, Philosophie und menschliches Verhalten. Zunächst könnte man feststellen, dass es verdächtig sein sollte, "Meta" vor jedes Wort zu stellen. W bemerkte z.B., dass Metamathematik Mathematik wie jede andere ist. Die Vorstellung, dass wir aus der Philosophie austreten können (d.h. die beschreibende Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung), ist selbst eine tiefe Verwirrung. Eine weitere Irritation hier (und während des akademischen Schreibens in den letzten 4 Jahrzehnten) ist der ständige umgekehrte sprachliche Sexismus von "ihrem" und "ihr" und "sie" oder "er/sie" usw., wo "sie" und "ihre" und "sie" gut machen würden. Ebenso, wird die Verwendung des französischen Wortes "Repertoire", bei dem das englische "Repertoire" recht gut funktioniert. Der größte Mangel ist das (wenn auch sehr häufige) völlige Versäumnis, das zu verwenden, was ich als die enorm leistungsfähige und intuitive Zwei-System-Ansicht von HOT und Searles Framework betrachte, die ich oben skizziert habe. Dies ist besonders ergreifend im Kapitel über die Bedeutung p111 ff. (besonders in den Fußnoten 2-7), wo wir in sehr schlammigem Wasser ohne den Rahmen von automatisierten echten nur S1, propositional DispositionS, COS usw. schwimmen. Man kann auch einen besseren Blick auf das Innere und das Äußere bekommen, indem man z.B. Johnston oder Budd liest (siehe meine Rezensionen). Horwich macht jedoch viele einschneidende Kommentare. Besonders gefiel mir seine Zusammenfassung der Bedeutung von Wes antitheoretischer Haltung auf P65. Er muss "On Certainty" stärker in den Vordergrund stellen, das kürzlich von Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva und anderen mit viel Aufwand beworfen und in meinen jüngsten Artikeln zusammengefasst wurde. Horwich ist erstklassig und seine Arbeit lohnt sich. Man hofft, dass er (und alle) Searle und einige moderne Psychologie sowie Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker und Baker etc. studieren werden, um eine breite moderne Sicht des Verhaltens zu erreichen. Die meisten ihrer Papiere sind auf academia dot edu und philpapers dot org, aber für PMS Hacker siehe http slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot html Er gibt eine der schönsten Zusammenfassungen, wo uns ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein hinterlässt, das ich je gesehen habe. "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachliche/konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) zu erklären, wie in Freges Reduktion der Arithmetik auf logik; kein Versuch, ihr erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen zu geben (PI 124), wie sie auf der Grundlage von Berichten über ein vormethodikes Wissen beruhen; kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als in gewissem Sinne Logiken zu charakterisieren; kein Reformversuch (PI 124, 132) wie in Mackies Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuitionismus; kein Versuch, sie zu straffen (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; kein Versuch, es konsistenter zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügner-Paradoxien; und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) wie bei der Klärung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische 'Teleportation'-Szenarien." Abschließend möchte ich vorschlagen, dass W mit der Perspektive, die ich hier gefördert habe, im Zentrum der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und Psychologie steht und nicht obskur, schwierig oder irrelevant ist, sondern schillernd, tiefgründig und kristallklar ist und dass es ist, eines der größten intellektuellen Abenteuer zu verpassen, das möglichist. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen . (shrink)

Horwich donne une belle analyse de Wittgenstein (W) et est un érudit W de premier plan, mais à mon avis, ils sont tous en deçà d’une pleine appréciation, comme je l’explique longuement dans cet examen et beaucoup d’autres. Si l’on ne comprend pas W (et de préférence Searle aussi) alors je ne vois pas comment on pourrait avoir plus qu’une compréhension superficielle de la philosophie et de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur et donc de tout comportement complexe (psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie, (...) histoire, littérature, société). En un mot, W a démontré que lorsque vous avez montré comment une phrase est utilisée dans le contexte d’intérêt, il n’y a rien de plus à dire. Je vais commencer par quelques citations notables, puis donner ce que je pense sont les considérations minimales nécessaires pour comprendre Wittgenstein, la philosophie et le comportement humain. Tout d’abord, on pourrait noter que mettre "meta" en face de n’importe quel mot devrait être suspect. W a fait remarquer par exemple, que la métamathématique est mathématiques comme les autres. L’idée que nous pouvons sortir de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de haut ordre) est elle-même une profonde confusion. Une autre irritation ici (et tout au long de l’écriture académique pour les 4 dernières décennies) est le sexisme linguistique inverse constant de «elle» et «la sienne» et «elle» ou «il / elle», etc, où «ils» et «leur» et «eux» ferait bien. De même, l’utilisation du mot Français «répertoire» où le «répertoire» anglais se portera plutôt bien. La lacune majeure est l’échec complet (bien que très commun) d’employer ce que je considère comme la vue extrêmement puissante et intuitive de deux systèmes de HOT et Searle cadre que j’ai décrit ci-dessus. C’est particulièrement poignant dans le chapitre sur le sens p111 et seq. (en particulier dans les notes de bas de page 2-7), où nous nageons dans l’eau très boueuse sans le cadre de l’automatisé vrai seul S1, propositionnelle dispositionnelle S2, COS etc. On peut également avoir une meilleure vue de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur en lisant par exemple, Johnston ou Budd (voir mes commentaires). Horwich fait cependant beaucoup de commentaires incisifs. J’ai particulièrement aimé son résumé de l’importation de la position anti-théorique de W sur p65. Il doit mettre davantage l’accent sur 'On Certainty', récemment l’objet de beaucoup d’efforts de Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva et d’autres et résumé dans mes récents articles. Horwich est de premier ordre et son travail vaut bien l’effort. On espère qu’il (et tout le monde) étudiera Searle et une certaine psychologie moderne ainsi que Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker et Baker, etc. pour atteindre une large vision moderne du comportement. La plupart de leurs papiers sont sur academia dot edu et philpapers dot org, mais pour PMS Hacker voir http : info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/ scr / hacker / DownloadPapers dot html. Il donne l’un des plus beaux résumés de l’endroit où une compréhension de Wittgenstein nous laisse que j’ai jamais vu. « Il ne doit y avoir aucune tentative d’expliquer notre activité linguistique/conceptuelle (PI 126) comme dans la réduction de l’arithmétique à la logique de Frege ; aucune tentative de lui donner des fondations épistémologiques (PI 124) comme dans les comptes basés sur le sens d’une connaissance a priori; aucune tentative de caractériser des formes idéalisées de celui-ci (PI 130) comme dans le sens logique; aucune tentative de réforme (PI 124, 132) comme dans la théorie de l’erreur de Mackie ou l’intuitionnisme de Dummett; aucune tentative de rationaliser (PI 133) comme dans le récit de Quine de l’existence; aucune tentative pour le rendre plus cohérent (PI 132) comme dans la réponse de Tarski aux paradoxes menteurs; et aucune tentative pour le rendre plus complet (PI 133) comme dans le règlement des questions d’identité personnelle pour des scénarios hypothétiques bizarres de « téléportation ». Enfin, permettez-moi de suggérer qu’avec la perspective que j’ai encouragée ici, W est au centre de la philosophie et de la psychologie contemporaines et n’est pas obscure, difficile ou non pertinente, mais scintillante, profonde et limpide et que de lui manquer est de manquer l’une des plus grandes aventures intellectuelles possibles. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Horwich는 Wittgenstein (W)의 미세한 분석을 제공하고 선도적 인 W 학자이지만, 내관점에서, 그들은 모두 내가이 리뷰와 많은 다른 사람의 길이에 설명으로, 전체 감사에 미치지. 하나는 W를 이해하지 않는 경우 (그리고 바람직하게는 Searle도) 나는 사람이 철학과 높은 질서 생각의 피상적 인 이해이상을 가질 수있는 방법을 볼 수 없습니다 따라서 모든 복잡한 행동 (심리학, 사회학, 인류학, 역사, 문학, 사회). 간단히 말해서 W는 문장이 관심의 맥락에서 어떻게 사용되는지 보여 주었을 때 더 이상 말할 것이 없다는 것을 보여주었습니다. 나는 몇 가지 주목할만한 따옴표로 시작하고 내가 (...) Wittgenstein, 철학과 인간의 행동을 이해하는 데 필요한 최소한의 고려 사항이라고 생각하는 것을 줄 것이다. 먼저 어떤 단어 앞에 "메타"를 두는 것은 의심되어야한다는 것을 주의할 수 있습니다. W는 예를 들어, 메타 수학은 다른 것과 같은 수학이라고 말했습니다. 우리가 외부 철학 (즉, 높은 질서 생각의 설명 심리학)을 밟을 수 있다는 개념은 그 자체로 심오한 혼란입니다. 여기에 또 다른 자극 (그리고 지난 4 년 동안 학술 쓰기를 통해) "그녀"와 "그녀"와 "그녀"또는 "그 / 그녀"등의 지속적인 역 언어 적 성차별이다, 여기서 "그들"과 "그들"과 "그들"잘 할 것입니다. 마찬가지로,, 영어 '레퍼토리'가 아주 잘 할 프랑스어 단어 '레퍼토리'의 사용. 주요 결핍은 내가 위에서 설명 한 HOT와 Searle의 프레임 워크의 매우 강력하고 직관적 인 두 시스템보기로 보는 것을 사용하는 완전한 실패 (매우 일반적임에도 불구하고)입니다. 이것은 우리가 자동화 된 진정한 만 S1, 제안 처분 S2, COS 등의 프레임 워크없이 매우 진흙 투성이의 물에서 수영 p111 et seq. (특히 각주 2-7)에 대한 장에서 특히 신랄합니다. 하나는 또한 예를 들어, 존스턴 이나 버드 (내 리뷰 참조)를 읽고 내부와 외부의 더 나은 보기를 얻을 수 있습니다. 그러나 호위치는 많은 절개 코멘트를합니다. 나는 특히 p65에 W의 반 이론적 입장의 수입에 대한 그의 요약을 좋아했다. 그는 '확실성에'에 더 중점을 줄 필요가, 최근 다니엘레 모얄 - 샤록, 콜리바 와 다른 사람에 의해 많은 노력의 주제와 내 최근 기사에서 요약. Horwich는 첫 번째 속도이며 그의 작품은 노력할 만한 가치가 있습니다. 하나는 그 (그리고 모든 사람)가 행동의 넓은 현대보기를 달성하기 위해 허트, 읽기, 허친슨, 스턴, 모얄 샤록, 산책, 해커와 베이커 등뿐만 아니라 Searle과 일부 현대 심리학을 공부할 수 있기를 바랍니다. 그들의 논문의 대부분은 academia dot edu philpapers dot org, 하지만 PMS 해커에 대 한 http dot //info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html 참조. 그는 비트겐슈타인에 대한 이해가 내가 본 것을 우리에게 떠난 곳의 가장 아름다운 요약 중 하나를 제공합니다. (shrink)

Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, (...) W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likwise the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq.(esp. in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia.edu but for PMS Hacker see http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

The editors of this bulky volume tell us that an issue of the Stanford Humanities Review ‘constituted the seed of the project that culminated in this book’ (vii). They don’t say that it was the Spring 1995 issue of that pioneering open-access e-journal, nor do they tell us how many or which of the 19 papers in this book derive from it. But since that issue is still online (as at August 28, 2006), at http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/toc.html, any reader can see that (...) 12 of its 15 papers have been reprinted almost unaltered here, a decade later, while in addition almost all of the editors’ 1995 introduction appears again in their expanded text. (shrink)

https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?start=0&format=html&newWindow=on&freeOnly=&ap_c2=&publishedOnly=&o nlineOnly=off&ap_c1=&search_header=search_header.html&noFilter=1&limit=&direction=citations&hideAbst racts=&showCategories=on&sqc=&eId=KHUDLD&sort=firstAuthor&proOnly=off&langFilter=&filterByAreas=&cat egorizerOn=&jlist=&ap_c1=&ap_c2=.

This article focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s Categories by the first three representatives of Greek Neoplatonism: Plotinus (204/205–270 CE), Porphyry (ca. 234–ca. 305 CE), Iamblichus (ca. 242–ca. 325 CE). The first section argues that Plotinus’ acquaintance with Aristotle’s treatises marked a fresh start vis-à-vis the previous Platonist tradition. Aristotle’s views, arguments and vocabulary are ubiquitous in Plotinus writings (the Enneads) and they must be considered an essential part of his philosophical project. Plotinus, however, does not share some of Aristotle’s (...) key theories and is critical of them. The second section focuses on Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s Categories in the tripartite treatise On the Genera of Being (6.1–3). There he rejects the Peripatetic division into ten categories as providing an incomplete account of the genera of being that unduly omits “those which are most authentically beings”, i.e. Plato’s separate Forms. While drawing on earlier Platonist objections to Aristotle, Plotinus’ approach is original insofar as he criticizes Aristotle and his followers not only for omitting intelligible beings in the division of categories, but also for being unable, for this very reason, to work out an adequate division of sensible beings themselves. The third section is devoted to Porphyry, a student of Plotinus’ and the editor of his works. Porphyry worked intensively on Aristotle’s Categories, which he regarded as an introduction not only to logic, but to philosophy as a whole. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyry aimed to integrate Aristotle into Platonism and his engagement with the Categories was a key part of his project after Plotinus’ in-depth criticism. Porphyry’s approach is connected to his view of the subject-matter of the Categories, which he sees as focusing on words insofar as they signify beings, and not on beings as such. The fourth section focuses on some parallels between Plotinus’ Genera of Beings and Porphyry’s works, which may reflect the debate within Plotinus’ school. The fifth section focuses on Iamblichus of Chalcis. Both in theology and in the interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, Iamblichus aimed to both continue and supplant Porphyry’s work. While Plotinus criticizes Aristotle’s categories for omitting intelligible beings, and while Porphyry accepts Aristotle’s categories insofar as they focus on words signifying sensible things, Iamblichus incorporates his Neoplatonist and Pythagorizing metaphysics into the interpretation of the Categories. (shrink)

Meandering Sobriety- one among a few "to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention.".

This article derives from data collected over a six-month period between February and August 2022. Its sampling pertains to members of two general Twitter Lists of philosophy professionals: “Philosophers on Twitter”, limited to a maximum of 4500 active accounts, and “Philosophers”, restricted to accounts surpassing 1000 followers and currently including over 1,100 individuals. The totality of members of these two Lists is referenced in this article as “Philosophy Twitter”. -/- Data was collected in five principal ways from members of these (...) two Lists: 1) Monitoring the List streams, 2) addressing members, including following, retweeting, liking, endorsing, asking, commenting, and replying, 3) probing members’ Twitter activities in their Profiles (“Tweets & replies”), 4) reviewing members’ Twitter Bios, CVs, professional profiles, and websites, and 5) network analysis of members’ quantitative and qualitative association and interaction profiles. -/- The study of this material aimed at revealing interpersonal social structures and processes of philosophy professionals by their Twitter conduct. Its personal purview focused on creators, teachers, researchers, and students and thus excepted schools, colleges, universities, formal associations, and publishers. Particular attention was given to gaining insights on substantive orientation, cooperation, and constructive dialogue versus hierarchic and tribal characteristics. (shrink)

Soonya Vaada, the prime and significant contribution to Indian philosophical thought from Buddhism will be scientifically developed and presented. How this scientific understanding helped to sow seeds of origin of rationalism and its development in Buddhist thought and life will be delineated. Its role in the shaping of Buddhist and other Indian philosophical systems will be discussed. Its relevance and use in the field of cognitive science and development of theories of human consciousness and mind will be put forward. The (...) idea of absence as zero in number system, vacuum in physics and other natural sciences and state of absence of cognition in mind machine modeling will be presented. The use of significance of Soonya Vaada in philosophy, rational social life, natural sciences and technology, mathematics and cognitive science will be comprehensively discussed and a model for human cognition and communication will be arrived at. -/- . (shrink)

Tradução para o português do verbete sobre Sexto Empírico, de Charlotte Stough, retirado de Jonathan Dancy e Ernest Sosa (org.) A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 475-477.