I call the activity of assessing and developing improvements of our representational devices ‘conceptual engineering’.¹ The aim of this chapter is to present an argument for why conceptual engineering is important for all parts of philosophy (and, more generally, all inquiry). Section I of the chapter provides some background and defines key terms. Section II presents the argument. Section III responds to seven objections. The replies also serve to develop the argument and clarify what conceptual engineering is.

New technologies are the source of uncertainties about the applicability of moral and morally connotated concepts. These uncertainties sometimes call for conceptual engineering, but it is not often recognized when this is the case. We take this to be a missed opportunity, as a recognition that different researchers are working on the same kind of project can help solve methodological questions that one is likely to encounter. In this paper, we present three case studies where philosophers of technology implicitly engage (...) in conceptual engineering (without naming it as such). We subsequently reflect on the case studies to find out how these illustrate conceptual engineering as an appropriate method to deal with pressing concerns in the philosophy of technology. We have two main goals. We first want to contribute to the literature on conceptual engineering by presenting concrete examples of conceptual engineering in the philosophy of technology. This is especially relevant, because the technologies that are designed based on the conceptual work done by philosophers of technology potentially have crucial moral and social implications. Secondly, we want to make explicit what choices are made when doing this conceptual work. Making explicit that some of the implicit assumptions are, in fact, debated in the literature allows for reflection on these questions. Ultimately, our hope is that conscious reflection leads to an improvement of the conceptual work done. (shrink)

Since the release of ChatGPT, there has been a lot of debate about whether AI systems pose an existential risk to humanity. This paper develops a general framework for thinking about the existential risk of AI systems. We analyze a two-premise argument that AI systems pose a threat to humanity. Premise one: AI systems will become extremely powerful. Premise two: if AI systems become extremely powerful, they will destroy humanity. We use these two premises to construct a taxonomy of ‘survival (...) stories’, in which humanity survives into the far future. In each survival story, one of the two premises fails. Either scientific barriers prevent AI systems from becoming extremely powerful; or humanity bans research into AI systems, thereby preventing them from becoming extremely powerful; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because their goals prevent them from doing so; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because we can reliably detect and disable systems that have the goal of doing so. We argue that different survival stories face different challenges. We also argue that different survival stories motivate different responses to the threats from AI. Finally, we use our taxonomy to produce rough estimates of ‘P(doom)’, the probability that humanity will be destroyed by AI. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is now a central topic in contemporary philosophy. Just 4-5 years ago it wasn’t. People were then engaged in the engineering of various philosophical concepts (in various sub-disciplines), but typically not self-consciously so. Qua philosophical method, conceptual engineering was under-explored, often ignored, and poorly understood. In my lifetime, I have never seen interest in a philosophical topic grow with such explosive intensity. The sociology behind this is fascinating and no doubt immensely complex (and an excellent case study for (...) those interested in the dynamics of academic disciplines). That topic, however, will have to wait for another occasion. Suffice it to say that if Fixing Language (FL) contributed even a little bit to this change of focus in philosophical methodology, it would have achieved one of its central goals. In that connection, it is encouraging that the papers in this symposium are in fundamental agreement about the significance and centrality of conceptual engineering to philosophy. That said, the goal of FL was not only to advocate for a topic, but also to defend a particular approach to it: The Austerity Framework. These replies have helped me see clearer the limitations of that view and points where my presentation was suboptimal. The responses below are in part a reconstruction of what I had in mind while writing the book and in part an effort to ameliorate. I’m grateful to the symposiasts for helping me get a better grip on these very hard issues. (shrink)

In this Introduction, we aim to introduce the reader to the basic topic of this book. As part of this, we explain why we are using two different expressions (‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’) to describe the topics in the book. We then turn to some of the central foundational issues that arise for conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, and finally we outline various views one might have about their role in philosophy and inquiry more generally.

”Meaningful human control” is a term invented in the political and legal debate on autonomous weapons system, but it is nowadays also used in many other contexts. It is supposed to specify conditions under which an artificial system is under the right kind of control to avoid responsibility gaps: that is, situations in which no moral agent is responsible. Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven have recently suggested a framework that can be used by system designers to operationalize this (...) kind of control. It is the purpose of this paper to facilitate further operationalization of ”meaningful human control”. -/- This paper consists of two parts. In the first part I resolve an ambiguity that plagues current operationalizations of MHC. One of the design conditions says that the system should track the reasons of the relevant agents. This condition is ambiguous between the kind of reasons involved. On one interpretation it says that a system should track motivating reasons, while it is concerned with normative reasons on the other. Current participants in the debate interpret the framework as being concerned with (something in the vicinity of) motivating reasons. I argue against this interpretation by showing that meaningful human control requires that a system tracks normative reasons. Moreover, I maintain that an operationalization of meaningful human control that fails to track the right kind of reasons is morally problematic.When this is properly understood, it can be shown that the framework of MHC is committed to the agent-relativity of reasons. More precisely, I argue in the second part of this paper that if the tracking condition of MHC plays an important role in responsibility attribution (as the proponents of the view maintain), then the framework is incompatible with first-order normative theories that hold that normative reasons are agent-neutral (such as many versions of consequentialism). In the final section I present three ways forward for the proponent of MHC as reason-responsiveness. (shrink)

Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2-3, Page 221-237, April 2022.

Machery’s book is an effort to show how experimental philosophy can be valuable without the perephenelia of intuitions. I argue that the effort fails.

This paper presents an argument that certain AI safety measures, rather than mitigating existential risk, may instead exacerbate it. Under certain key assumptions - the inevitability of AI failure, the expected correlation between an AI system's power at the point of failure and the severity of the resulting harm, and the tendency of safety measures to enable AI systems to become more powerful before failing - safety efforts have negative expected utility. The paper examines three response strategies: Optimism, Mitigation, and (...) Holism. Each faces challenges stemming from intrinsic features of the AI safety landscape that we term Bottlenecking, the Perfection Barrier, and Equilibrium Fluctuation. The surprising robustness of the argument forces a re-examination of core assumptions around AI safety and points to several avenues for further research. (shrink)

This essay critically examines some classic philosophical and legal theories of privacy, organized into four categories: the nonintrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control theories of privacy. Although each theory includes one or more important insights regarding the concept of privacy, I argue that each falls short of providing an adequate account of privacy. I then examine and defend a theory of privacy that incorporates elements of the classic theories into one unified theory: the Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory of privacy. Using (...) an example involving data-mining technology on the Internet, I show how RALC can help us to frame an online privacy policy that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to address a wide range of privacy concerns that arise in connection with computers and information technology. (shrink)

Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present moral risks, often leading to harm or ethical violations. We propose a (...) second-order ‘duty of moral control’ that mandates closing these gaps to reduce risks within acceptable moral limits. Our analysis encompasses both autonomous machines and collective agents, acknowledging their similarities and key differences in constitution and moral status. We suggest four methods to close control gaps: ensuring artificial agents attain moral agency, providing meaningful human control, implementing safety engineering, and employing social control. These methods aim to responsibly integrate artificial agents into society. We conclude that a realistic approach, which addresses the practical problems posed by control gaps, is essential. This approach provides solutions to manage the risks posed by artificial agents while maintaining acceptable moral standards, ensuring we responsibly harness their potential and address the ethical challenges they present. (shrink)

The linguistic turn provided philosophers with a range of reasons for engaging in careful investigation into the nature and structure of language. However, the linguistic turn is dead. The arguments for it have been abandoned. This raises the question: why should philosophers take an interest in the minutiae of natural language semantics? I’ll argue that there isn’t much of a reason - philosophy of language has lost its way. Then I provide a suggestion for how it can find its way (...) again. (shrink)

There’s an interesting debate in moral and political philosophy about the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theory. In this paper we discuss whether an analogous distinction can be drawn in philosophy of language. Our conclusion is negative: Even if you think that distinction can be put to work within moral and political philosophy, there’s no useful way to extend it to work that has been done in the philosophy of language.

Metasemantic inferentialismhas gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions of combining inferentialism and deflationism are easy to see, deflationism is also a controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain that truth (...) is an insubstantive property, but it is not altogether clear what an insubstantive property is. Secondly, as deflationists maintain that truth does not play an explanatory role, it is incompatible with the position that truth can explain the normativity of truth talk. Given that deflationism faces these objections, it would be preferable if the success of inferentialism did not depend on the deflationist’s ability to respond to these objections. I argue that someone attracted to inferentialism for its ability to accommodate antirealist intuitions about a domain (e.g. morality) is not committed to deflationism about truth. More specifically, I will show that inferentialism combined with a straightforward account of inferentialist truth-conditions is compatible with a version of truth pluralism. I call this position Inferentialist Truth Pluralism. (shrink)

In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...) one successful impersonal action rationalization. In what follows we bolster our case against an essential connection between action and the de se (or indexicality), first by developing a range of new action models and secondly by responding to challenges from Dilip Ninan, Stephan Torre, and José Luis Bermúdez . (shrink)

By focussing on the logical relations between scientific theories and religious beliefs in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga overlooks the real conflict between science and religion. This conflict exists whenever religious believers endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning the supernatural. They thereby violate an important rule of scientific method and of common sense, according to which factual claims should be endorsed as true only if they result from validated epistemic methods or sources.

Articles and clinical studies by psychologists, physicians, psychiatrists, theologians and philosophers explore human response to death and the treatment of death in modern art.

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

During the past decade, a fairly extensive literature on the digital divide has emerged. Many reports and studies have provided statistical data pertaining to sociological aspects of ‘the divide,’ while some studies have examined policy issues involving universal service and universal access. Other studies have suggested ways in which the digital divide could be better understood if it were ‘reconceptualized’ in terms of an alternative metaphor, e.g. a ‘divide’ having to do with literacy, power, content, or the environment. However, with (...) the exception of Johnson and Koehler, authors have tended not to question ‐ at least not directly ‐ whether the digital divide is, at bottom, an ethical issue. Many authors seem to assume that because disparities involving access to computing technology exist, issues underlying the digital divide are necessarily moral in nature. Many further assume that because this particular ‘divide’ has to do with something that is digital or technological in nature, it is best understood as a computer ethical issue. The present study, which examines both assumptions, considers four questions: What exactly is the digital divide? Is this ‘divide’ ultimately an ethical issue? Assuming that the answer to is ‘yes,’ is the digital divide necessarily an issue for computer ethics? If the answer to is ‘yes,’ what can/should computer professionals do bridge the digital divide? (shrink)

VAN PRAAG (Paul), Introduction : le Père Henri Bosmans, histo­rien des mathématiques (pp. 7-16). SAUVAGE (Pierre), Notice biographique du Père Henri Bosmans (pp. 17-25). HERMANS (Michel), Henri Bosmans : sa formation et ses réseaux de rela­tions (pp. 27-72). DELANGHE (Richard), Quelques aspects de la vie et de l’œuvre de Paul Mansion (1844-1919) (pp. 73-82). BRIGAGLIA (Aldo), Saccheri vu par Corrado Segre en Italie et par Mansion et Bosmans en Belgique / traduit de l’italien par Bruna GAINO et Patricia RADELET-DE GRAVE (...) (pp. 83-104). MAWHIN (Jean), La tentative belge d’édition des œuvres complètes d’Euler vue par Henri Bos­mans (pp. 105-133). GOLVERS (Noël), Henri Bosmans, s.j., et la mission jésuite en Chine / traduit du néerlandais par Anne-Sophie MEURICE (pp. 135-152). ROMANO (Antonella), Henri Bosmans, jésuite et historien des mathéma­tiques dans la Belgique du premier XXe siècle (pp. 153-168). SAUVAGE (Pierre), Le Père Henri Bosmans et l’historiographie au tournant du XXe siècle (pp. 169-187). RADELET-DE GRAVE (Patricia), Le fonds Henri Bos­mans / avec un ajout de Michel HERMANS (pp. 189-215). MANSION (Paul), Correspondance de Paul Mansion adres­sée à Henri Bosmans / introduction, trans­cription et annotation par Michel HERMANS (pp. 217-251). HEEFFER (Albrecht) – HERMANS (Michel) – STOFFEL (Jean-François), Bibliographie d’Henri Bosmans (pp. 253-298). (shrink)

The capacity to act in accordance with one’s morality (broadly construed) is constitutive of moral agency. This capacity can be undermined—in whole or in part—by for instance, hypnosis, addiction, or obsessive-compulsion. Another way this capacity can be undermined is through poor moral reasoning. Moral irrationality can frustrate one’s capacity to act in accordance with one’s morality and in turn, stunt one’s moral agency. In a similar respect, improving moral rationality can strengthen this capacity and enhance moral agency. The empirical research (...) program on (non-moral) cognitive debiasing inspires developing techniques to improve our moral rational capacities—i.e., moral debiasing. Yet, moral debiasing presupposes moral biases—that is, systematic moral errors. So, what are moral errors exactly? The pertinent kind is subjective moral errors. Ultimately, A’s φ-ing is a subjective moral error insofar as φ-ing deviates from A’s genuine morality per instrumental subjective moral rationality (ISMR)—i.e., insofar as φ-ing frustrates A+’s morally-relevant ends, wherein A+ is a counterfactual idealization of A upon whom is bestowed those endowments that A considers authoritative under ordinary optimal conditions. The provision of an in-principle standard of subjective moral error lays important theoretical groundwork for future empirical inquiry into subjective moral debiasing. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogs of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors—i.e., cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event’s probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events, such as airplane crashes, are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research program on cognitive heuristics (...) and biases (e.g., Daniel Kahneman’s work) has been scientifically successful and has yielded useful error-prevention techniques—i.e., cognitive debiasing. I attempt to apply this framework to moral reasoning to yield moral heuristics and biases. For instance, a moral bias of unjustified differences in the treatment of particular animal species might be partially explained by a moral heuristic that dubiously infers animals’ moral status from their aesthetic features. While the basis for identifying judgments as cognitive errors is often unassailable (e.g., per violating laws of logic), identifying moral errors seemingly requires appealing to moral truth, which, I argue, is problematic within science. Such appeals can be avoided by repackaging moral theories as mere “standards-of-interest” (a la non-normative metrics of purportedly right-making features/properties). However, standards-of-interest do not provide authority, which is needed for effective debiasing. Nevertheless, since each person deems their own subjective morality authoritative, subjective morality (qua standard-of-interest and not moral subjectivism) satisfies both scientific and practical concerns. As such, (idealized) subjective morality grounds a moral analog of cognitive biases—namely, subjective moral biases (e.g., committed anti-racists unconsciously discriminating). I also argue that "cognitive heuristic" is defined by its contrast with rationality. Consequently, heuristics explain biases, which are also so defined. However, such contrasting with rationality is causally irrelevant to cognition. This frustrates the presumed usefulness of the kind, heuristic, in causal explanation. As such, in the moral case, I jettison the role of causal explanation and tailor categories solely for contrastive explanation. As such, “moral heuristic” is replaced with "subjective moral fallacy," which is defined by its contrast with subjective morality and explains subjective moral biases. The resultant subjective moral biases and fallacies framework can undergird future empirical research. (shrink)

This research was conducted on the basis of research references from Microsoft Indonesia regarding the adoption of artificial intelligence in Indonesia which obtained research results that there were 14% of employees and leaders of technology-based companies in Indonesia who were still skeptical of the adoption of artificial intelligence. This study aims to provide a theoretical overview from the point of view of the philosophy of communication science in responding to considerations about the good and bad 'doubt' or skepticism of 14% (...) of employees and company leaders towards the adoption of the Artificial Intelligence platform by Microsoft companies in Indonesia. This study uses a qualitative method using a literature study approach. The reference books in the form of books that are the primary sources in this research are books entitled Aristotle Physic Book VIII and the book Philosophy of Communication Studies: Introduction to Ontology, Epistemology, Axiology. The results show that from the point of view of the philosophy of science, the essence of AI is a tool or means as well as a machine that is created with components that resemble and play a role as if the mind is capable of creating or creating like humans. AI is made human as a co-creator which in principle remains limited and will never be perfect 'in se' so it is appropriate that a tone of skepticism accompanies it. (shrink)

The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

A filosofia político-social de Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) ainda é pouco conhecida no Brasil. Esse livro, resultado de minhas pesquisas no Mestrado de Filosofia da Universidade Federal da Paraíba, apresenta e discute a perspectiva teórica dooyeweerdiana sobre a ordem de uma sociedade complexa. A filosofia de Herman Dooyeweerd pode contribuir para a reflexão e ação cristã em uma sociedade moderna e plural. Em Dooyeweerd, é possível encontrar uma teoria política e social abrangente para pensar e atuar no ambiente público, (...) rejeitando orientações ideológicas secularistas. Herman Dooyeweerd pode nos ajudar a refletir sobre política e sociedade na medida em que nos faz reconhecer princípios estruturais na realidade criada por Deus que estruturam cada esfera e relação social em seu âmbito de soberania. Em contraponto ao positivismo e ao historicismo, Dooyeweerd nos indica caminhos para compreender as normas divinas para cada centímetro quadrado da existência. Além de denunciar o comprometimento religioso do imanentismo das ideologias políticas, Dooyeweerd tem muito a dizer sobre como pensar política e sociedade na ordem da história. (shrink)

Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) foi um filósofo neerlandês que, em diálogo com a filosofia alemã e o pensamento neocalvinista, desenvolveu uma reflexão original sobre as leis e a ordem do cosmos. A filosofia de Dooyeweerd é conhecida como “Filosofia da Ideia de Lei” ou “Filosofia da Ideia Cosmonômica”. A partir de sua teoria modal – que identifica quinze aspectos ônticos em que coisas concretas, eventos, relações e esferas sociais funcionam ou existem – Dooyeweerd desenvolveu uma filosofia político-social crítica às teorias (...) sociais individualistas e universalistas. O problema da presente pesquisa é: que objeto teórico caracteriza a filosofia político-social de Herman Dooyeweerd? A hipótese de investigação é que a preocupação político-social dooyeweerdiana diz respeito ao “problema da ordem”, i.e., a identificação teórica da ordem político-social nos limites das normas transcendentais divinas. O objetivo é analisar a concepção de Herman Dooyeweerd sobre a ordem político-social. Argumenta-se que a filosofia política de Dooyeweerd nem é nem se preocupa em ser comunitarista. O interesse de Herman Dooyeweerd é apreender teoricamente, a partir da análise da estrutura dos modos de experiência, quais são os princípios, as estruturas, as funções e a natureza das coisas, dos eventos e das relações e esferas sociais. Dooyeweerd busca compreender a estrutura típica de cada relação social, a fim de compreender os princípios de uma ordenação política plural e harmoniosa. Conclui-se que a preocupação da filosofia político-social de Herman Dooyeweerd é a compreensão da ordem dentro dos parâmetros cosmonômicos da criação divina. (shrink)

Herman Melville’s Moby Dick is open to many readings, but one that has yet to be explored is the existential reading of Ahab’s pursuit from a gender perspective. By weaving together biblical, mythical, and mystical elements, the novel promises that Captain Ahab’s vengeance on the whale actually transcends the expected qualities of a maritime quest. A self-made man, Ahab endures his ever-present obsession and relentlessly clings to his deadliest struggle, which echoes Sartre’s proclamation, “Man is nothing else but what (...) he makes of himself.” Yet, intricately entwined with the spirit of nineteenth-century America, Ahab's character also assumes a canonical representation of American ideals. Thus, his hunting pursuit is overlaid onto America’s expansionist and imperialist mindset in the nineteenth century, which complements the hegemonically masculine manner camouflaged under this political ethos. Bearing this in mind, Melville subtly indicates that Ahab’s urge to assert his superiority over the whale is related to the biblical context of appointing females as something to take revenge on. In this narrative, Ahab's embodiment of the American hero undergoes a metamorphosis into an American Adam figure by asserting dominance over the whale that symbolises female subjugation. Interrogating Ahab's portrayal as an American Adam-type within the broader societal and political contexts of supremacist ideals, this article delves into Ahab's pursuit through the lens of Sartrean Existentialism. By doing so, this article interprets Ahab’s idealistic quest to hunt down the whale as a metaphor for hegemonic masculinity and subordinate femininity by exploring the subject/object, and the pursuer/pursued dynamics. (shrink)

In her book Morality as Rationality: A Study of Kant’s Ethics, Barbara Herman set a clear goal: to show that the central claims of Kant’s ethics can be properly understood only if we accept the thesis that morality is a form of rationality. In other words, Herman argues that within Kant’s practical philosophy all moral principles are rational and when we act in accordance with them we act rationally.

This is a critical review of Herman Cappelen’s Fixing Language (2018), an excellent and thought-provoking introduction to a hot topic in metaphilosophy: conceptual engineering, which defines the process of evaluating and improving/revising our representational devices (popularly known as concepts). Here, I first present an overview of the book, summarizing his General Theory of conceptual engineering. Second, I point out some limits of the General Theory, in particular the putative consequence of his semantic externalism, the Lack of Control thesis. According (...) to it, the processes behind changes in meaning are too complex and amorphous for revisionary projects to be generally successful. However, I claim that a proper investigation of Lack of Control demands us to look at the sciences, especially the social sciences, something absent in Cappelen’s book. Furthermore, I remember that many conceptual engineers do not put forward large-scale revisions, but rather local ones – i.e., restricted to specific scientific and institutional contexts, and therefore more feasible and potentially relevant. (shrink)

In the Netherlands, the poet Herman Gorter is mostly known as the author of the neo-romantic poem May and the “sensitivistic” Poems, but internationally he became famous as a propagandist of radical Marxism: the author of influential brochures and of an “open letter” to comrade W.I. Lenin in 1920. During the 1890s, Gorter became increasingly dissatisfied with his poetry, considering it as ego-centric, disinterested and “bourgeois”, unconnected with what was happening in the real world. He wanted to put his (...) poetry on a scientific footing, notably by endorsing a dialectical materialist worldview. In the communist society he envisioned, science would become poetry and poetry would become science. In his opus magnum Pan, two terms are rather prominent, namely heelal and kristal. These signifiers not only reflect important themes, but also two friendships which began around 1900, namely with prominent astronomer and marxist Anton Pannekoek and with Ada Prins, the first woman in the Netherlands who acquired a PhD in chemistry, specialised in liquid crystal research. Whereas Ada Prins is mostly remembered as one of Gorter’s secret lovers, she was first and foremost his educated guide into the complex and enigmatic world of twentieth-century chemistry research. Liquid crystal chemistry became an important source of inspiration for Gorter’s work and the main objective of this paper is to demonstrate her influence on Gorter’s Pan as a scientific poem After presenting the two heroes of this paper, and their work in poetry and chemistry respectively, I will analyse the role of liquid crystals in Herman Gorter’s Pan, highlighting important connections with Ada Prins’ research into liquid crystal chemistry. (shrink)

Herman Gorter (1864-1927) became famous as the author of May (1889) and Poems (1890). His opus magnum Pan, published in 1916, hardly acquired any readership at all, which is remarkable, given the monumental size and scope of this unique achievement, celebrating the imminent proletarian revolution and the advent of the communist era: a visionary work of global proportions. Gorter’s Pan will be assessed as thinking poetry, more precisely: as dialectical materialist poetry, as a work of art which articulates a (...) dialectical materialist worldview, not only concerning political economy and society, but also concerning nature and the universe as such, from the stars and galaxies of modern astrophysics down to the atoms and molecules of modern chemistry and quantum physics. Gorter’s monumental work is ‘thinking poetry’ in the Heideggerian sense of the term, sensitive to an imminent upheaval of Being as such, as well as a dialectical materialist artwork (albeit with a tinge of Spinozism) contributing (via the ‘school of poetry’) to a dialectical understanding of space, time, life and matter. In this article, I will focus on two crucial recurring motives: the motif of the shining crystal and the motif of the beaming galaxy. Via these motifs, so I suggest, Gorter aspires to bridge the gap between his epic-lyrical poetry and twentieth-century science. (shrink)

In Chapter 9 of The Practice of Moral Judgment and her later article Making Room for Character, Barbara Herman offers a distinctive response to a familiar set of concerns with the room left for character and personal relationships in Kantian ethics. She begins by acknowledging the shortcomings of her previous response on this issue and by distancing herself from a standard kind of indirect argument for the importance of personal commitments according to which these have moral weight in virtue (...) of their connection with the psychological health of individuals. Agreeing with an imagined critic’s concern that Kantian ethics must do more than merely tolerate motives of connection, she proposes that we adopt a deliberative field account of practical deliberation incorporating a developmental model of desire formation. I argue that, while this is a subtle and interesting account of desire development, it is not one that will satisfy the critic and should not satisfy the Kantian. I claim that the Kantian cannot forgo instrumental arguments for the importance of personal relationships and commitments and that they should not be shy of endorsing these arguments. (shrink)

Introdução: Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), juspositivista austríaco, e Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), jusfilósofo neerlandês, foram pensadores contemporâneos que presenciaram o avanço do poder totalitário do Estado expresso por meio de normas jurídicas. Ambos se preocuparam em discutir sobre a relação entre Estado e direito, mas se afastaram na formulação de suas jusfilosofias: Kelsen defendeu uma concepção em que o Estado se tornou a personificação da ordem jurídica, Dooyeweerd distinguiu o direito da estrutura do Estado. Objetivo: analisar os comprometimentos teóricos e os (...) problemas político-jurídicos do pensamento de Hans Kelsen a partir da filosofia de Herman Dooyeweerd. Problemáticas: 1) A relação entre Estado e direito em Hans Kelsen é incapaz de proteger a sociedade civil e os indivíduos do poder do Estado, como afirmam os jusnaturalistas?; 2) Toda filosofia que postula princípios normativos limitadores à produção do direito é uma metafísica atemporal que resulta em uma concepção política antipluralista, como defende Hans Kelsen?. Hipóteses: 1) Jusnaturalistas estão corretos ao afirmarem que a Teoria Pura do Direito de Kelsen possibilita um ilimitado poder ao ente estatal face à sociedade civil, sendo incapaz de oferecer-lhe subsídios teóricos para sua proteção; 2) Kelsen não está certo ao entender que toda filosofia que postula princípios normativos limitadores à produção do direito é uma metafísica atemporal que resulta em uma concepção política antipluralista. Justificativas da pesquisa: 1) Analisa, a partir da crítica transcendental dooyeweerdiana, se os compromissos assumidos por Kelsen acerca da realidade o levaram a uma teoria reducionista capaz de tornar a sociedade desprotegida diante do poder do Estado; 2) Investiga se a teoria dooyeweerdiana tem capacidade de superar a tópica jusnaturalismo e juspositivismo. Resultados: 1) Como alegam os jusnaturalistas, a perspectiva política e jurídica de Kelsen, que reduz o direito ao aspecto lógico e delega as discussões de justiça ao âmbito político, não possibilita à sociedade uma proteção jurídica ao poder normativo do Estado; 2) A concepção político-jurídica dooyeweerdiana demonstra ser possível uma filosofia que encontra princípios limitadores à produção do direito na ordem da realidade e reconhece a pluralidadesocial devido à abertura da experiência histórica. Conclusão: sociedades democráticas profundamente polarizadas precisam descobrir normas objetivamente dispostas na realidade capazes de gerar consenso político e positivação legitimada, não por uma metafísica atemporal ou pela vontade impositiva de uma elite, mas pelo reconhecimento de que há uma ordem capaz de gerar mais benefícios para o bem comum. (shrink)

A história da filosofia é a história das ideias. Porém, para Herman Dooyeweerd, a história da filosofia imanentista é a história de antíteses teóricas radicadas em dialéticas religiosas insolúveis. O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar o conceito de “motivos básicos religiosos” no pensamento de Herman Dooyeweerd. Em primeiro lugar, será apresentado a concepção de religião em Dooyeweerd e, em seguida, serão apresentados o conceito e o desenvolvimento dos “motivos básicos religiosos” no pensamento ocidental. As conclusões do texto (...) são que esse conceito contribui em demonstrar que há uma dimensão tácita e comunitária na reflexão filosófica e que a impossibilidade de síntese teórica entre polos de “motivos básicos religiosos” imanentistas diz respeito à “dialética religiosa”. (shrink)

Objetiva-se expor o pensamento de Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), prolífico jusfilósofo holandês, no que diz respeito à maneira como destaca o aspecto jurídico da realidade e formula sua concepção de enciclopédia da ciência do Direito. Problematiza-se em que medida a teoria dooyeweerdiana permite o desenvolvimento de um conceito de Direito relevante para a teoria da decisão judicial. Neste afã, após exposição sintética das bases de seu pensamento, verticaliza-se o estudo do aspecto jurídico da realidade e da noção-base de sua Enciclopédia (...) da Ciência do Direito. Explora-se a original perspectiva filosófica dooyeweerdiana sobre a positivação do direito e a interpretação jurídica, ambas limitadas seja pelo inafastável núcleo distintivo do aspecto jurídico (a retribuição), seja pelo dever de considerar o todo dos aspectos da experiência humana e das esferas sociais envolvidas. Conclui-se que o conceito de enciclopédia jurídica em Dooyeweerd, à luz de uma densa e intrigante filosofia cosmonômica, enriquece sobremaneira a clássica discussão jusfilosófica que envolve o papel do direito positivo e os limites da interpretação jurídica, na medida em que oferece valioso prisma integrativo do aspecto jurídico frente aos demais aspectos da experiência humana, colaborando para uma visão jurídica não reducionista, preservadora da irredutibilidade do Direito e conferidora de limites mais claros à decisão judicial. A pesquisa é qualitativa, eminentemente bibliográfica, tendo sido utilizado o método hipotético dedutivo. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen, juspositivista austríaco, e Herman Dooyeweerd, jusfilósofo cristão neerlandês, foram pensadores contemporâneos que desenvolveram importantes reflexões sobre a relação entre Estado e direito. -/- Esse livro, além de apresentar e comparar suas perspectivas, analisa os comprometimentos teóricos e os problemas políticos e jurídicos do pensamento de Hans Kelsen a partir da filosofia de Herman Dooyeweerd. -/- A obra pode contribuir para as discussões contemporâneas acerca da relação entre Estado e direito e suas consequências para a teorização sobre (...) política e justiça em uma sociedade plural. (shrink)

In dealing with arguments against the Christian faith in his book The Philosophy of Religion, Herman Bavinck uses a series of argumentative strategies. One of these strategies is the apologetic of despair. This study tries to fi gure out whether this strategy tends to be observed in most essays of the book or its use is only circumstantial.

The essay has been written to contribute to the debate on Dooyeweerd’s social philosophy. The goal is to argue that the central focus of his social philosophy is the “problem of order,” not communitarian issues. This article emphasizes that Dooyeweerd’s social theory was not oriented by communitarian concerns, but in comprehending the relation between creational order and social order.

Review of Marco Brusotti & Herman Siemens (eds.), Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant and the Kantian Legacy, Volume I: Nietzsche, Kant, and the Problem of Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury, 2017. xix + 298 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4742-7477-7. Hardcover, $114.00 (volume); $256.00 (collection).

This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy norm-constituted power completes’ practical reason or rational agency.

Herman Philipse considers “religious beliefs, faith and religion [to be] incompatible with science or reason”; he defines religion scientifically and specifically rejects religious doctrine. He describes reason “… as the whole of methods of empirical scientific research and critical discursive thinking as they have evolved in the scientific tradition and will continue to develop in the future” and he defines “… the phenomenon of conscience as a mental organ that can be scientifically explained and that makes the religious explanation (...) superfluous …”. Herman Philipse classifies science as the highest in rank, discards religion and sees philosophy, a rational view of the world, as based solely on the sciences. For his subject, Hans Achterhuis “… primarily cites biologists, ethologists and evolutionary psychologists with a philosophical interest” because “they presently have more to offer [him] than do his immediate colleagues”. Furthermore, “… it will be clear that ethologists and sociobiologists are of the opinion that the violent behaviour of human beings must be understood in part from the point of view of the evolutionary history of the sort ….. most philosophers and anthropologists are not aware of this. Their considerations suggest that violence only entered our world together with humankind”. Achterhuis’s choice is a “historic concept of violence”. (shrink)

Linguistic outputs generated by modern machine-learning neural net AI systems seem to have the same contents—i.e., meaning, semantic value, etc.—as the corresponding human-generated utterances and texts. Building upon this essential premise, Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever's Making AI Intelligible sets for itself the task of addressing the question of how AI-generated outputs have the contents that they seem to have (henceforth, ‘the question of AI Content’). In pursuing this ambitious task, the book makes several high-level, framework observations about how (...) a meta-semantic account of the content of AI-generated outputs should proceed. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to localize Herman and Chomsky’s analysis of the commercial media and use this concept to fit in the Philippine media climate. Through the propaganda model, they introduced the five interrelated media filters which made possible the “manufacture of consent.” By consent, Herman and Chomsky meant that the mass communication media can be a powerful tool to manufacture ideology and to influence a wider public to believe in a capitalistic propaganda. Thus, they call their (...) theory the “propaganda model” referring to the capitalist media structure and its underlying political function. Herman and Chomsky’s analysis has been centered upon the US media, however, they also believed that the model is also true in other parts of the world as the media conglomeration is also found all around the globe. In the Philippines, media conglomeration is not an alien concept especially in the presence of a giant media outlet, such as, ABS-CBN. In this essay, the authors claim that the propaganda model is also observed even in the less obvious corporate media in the country, disguised as an independent media entity but like a chameleon, it camouflages into an invisible creature leaving predators without any clue. Hence, the reason to analyze and scrutinize a highly reputable news organization in the country, namely, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) in relation to their portrayal of the Duterte presidency. (shrink)