Results for 'Hilary S. Callahan'

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  1. Developmental Phenotypic Plasticity: Where Ecology and Evolution Meet Molecular Biology.Hilary S. Callahan, Massimo Pigliucci & Carl D. Schlichting - 1997 - Bioessays 19 (6):519-525.
    An exploration of the nexus between ecology, evolutionary biology and molecular biology, via the concept of phenotypic plasticity.
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  2. Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam [Bibliography of Hilary Putnam's Writings].Vincent C. Müller - 1993 - In Hilary Putnam: Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Schriften zu Sprache und Wirklichkeit. pp. 278-294.
    Bibliography of the writings by Hilary Putnam: 16 books, 198 articles, 10 translations into German (up to 1994).
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  3.  79
    Commentary: Rationalizing Naturalism; On Hilary Kornblith's "Naturalizing Rationality".Duncan MacIntosh - 1986 - In Newton Garver & Peter H. Hare (eds.), Naturalism and Rationality. Prometheus Books. pp. 135-139.
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  4.  69
    Putnam’s Last Papers: Hilary Putnam: Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity, Edited by Mario De Caro. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016, 248 Pp, $51.50 HB. [REVIEW]Panu Raatikainen - 2019 - Metascience 28 (3):487-489.
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  5. The Unattainability of the True World: The Putnamian and Kripkensteinian Interpretation of Nietzsche’s The History of an Error.Henrik Sova - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (2):1-19.
    In this article I am interpreting Friedrich Nietzsche's piece of writing "How the "True World" finally became a fable - The History of an Error" in the context of 20th-century analytical philosophy of language. In particular, I am going to argue that the main theme in this text - the issue of abolishing "the true world" - can be interpreted as Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against external realism and Saul Kripke's Wittgensteinian arguments against truth-conditional meaning theories. Interpreting this Nietzsche's (...)
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  6. Defending Gödel Against Floyd-Putnam's Wittgenstein.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscript
    I argue against Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam's (2000, 2004) reading of Wittgenstein's "notorious" paragraph on Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
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  7.  54
    The Dilemma Imposed on the Realist by Putnam's and Kripkensteinian Argument.Henrik Sova - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 10 (1):62-82.
    In this article, I have two aims. Firstly, I argue that Hilary Putnam's model theoretic indeterminacy argument against external realism and Saul Kripke's so-called Kripkensteinian argument against semantic realism have the same dialectical structure and the same conclusion---both force the opponent to face the same dilemma. Namely: either adopt meaning minimalism or postulate unobservable semantic facts. Secondly, I analyze more closely the first horn of the dilemma---meaning minimalism. This is the position according to which there are no truth conditions (...)
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  8. Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity.Anders Öberg - 2011 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents (...)
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  9.  74
    (Zen And The Art Of) Post-Modern Philosophy: A Partially Interpreted Model.N. Nyberg - manuscript
    (ZEN AND THE ART OF) POST-MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A PARTIALLY INTERPRETED MODEL Many years have passed since Hilary Putnam first asked us to suppose ourselves to be “brains in a vat.” According to Putnam, we in no way appear to ourselves to be in a vat because we are subjected to a collective hallucination imposed upon us by an evil scientist who has so obliterated our memories that we are unable to recall any other life but that of the vat. (...)
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  10. Philosophy of Logic. Hilary Putnam.John Corcoran - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (1):131-133.
    Putnam, Hilary FPhilosophy of logic. Harper Essays in Philosophy. Harper Torchbooks, No. TB 1544. Harper & Row, Publishers, New York-London, 1971. v+76 pp. The author of this book has made highly regarded contributions to mathematics, to philosophy of logic and to philosophy of science, and in this book he brings his ideas in these three areas to bear on the traditional philosophic problem of materialism versus (objective) idealism. The book assumes that contemporary science (mathematical and physical) is largely correct (...)
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  11. Truth, Reference, and Realism: Putnam's Challenge.Allen Porter - manuscript
    The question of truth is perhaps a perennial question of philosophy. Is truth “merely” epistemological, a function of contingent human practices and conventions, or should we adopt a stonger, metaphysical conception of truth along realist lines, understood as correspondence with objectively existing reality? In this paper I examine a famous debate in the analytic philosophy of language that hinges on the status of truth – specifically, the challenge to traditional or metaphysical realism posed by Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument and (...)
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  12. ‘Quine’s Meaning Nihilism: Revisiting Naturalism and Confirmation Method,’.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2017 - Philosophical Readings (3):222-229.
    The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is aware of linguistic (...)
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  13. Stoljar’s Twin-Physics World.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):127-136.
    In his recent book Physicalism, Daniel Stoljar argues that there is no version of physicalism that is both true and deserving of the name. His argument employs a variation of Hilary Putnam’s famous twin-earth story, which Stoljar calls “the twin-physics world.” In this paper, I challenge Stoljar’s use of the twin-physics world. The upshot of that challenge, I argue, is that Stoljar fails to show, concerning the versions of physicalism for which he grants the possibility of being true, that (...)
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  14.  41
    Review of Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life. [REVIEW]Donna Dickenson - 1995 - Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (3):188-191.
    Review of Daniel Callahan's book The Troubled Dream of Life.
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  15.  14
    On Reflection, by Hilary Kornblith.Chris Tweedt - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (5):656-659.
    Hilary Kornblith argues that reflection is not more valuable than unreflective processes, because reflection is not different in kind from unreflective processes. Reflection, then, has no special role in whether we know, are reasonable, are able to exercise free will, or are able to act as we should. I summarize Kornblith’s arguments and provide a reason to think that Kornblith’s arguments fail; if the arguments are successful, they give us reason to believe that reflection is more valuable than his (...)
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  16.  49
    Physics Avoidance & Cooperative Semantics: Inferentialism and Mark Wilson’s Engagement with Naturalism Qua Applied Mathematics.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History 16 (1):560-644.
    Mark Wilson argues that the standard categorizations of "Theory T thinking"— logic-centered conceptions of scientific organization (canonized via logical empiricists in the mid-twentieth century)—dampens the understanding and appreciation of those strategic subtleties working within science. By "Theory T thinking," we mean to describe the simplistic methodology in which mathematical science allegedly supplies ‘processes’ that parallel nature's own in a tidily isomorphic fashion, wherein "Theory T’s" feigned rigor and methodological dogmas advance inadequate discrimination that fails to distinguish between explanatory structures that (...)
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  17. Does Putnam's Argument Beg the Question Against the Skeptic? Bad News for Radical Skepticism.Olaf Müller - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):299-320.
    Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and externalism) can be (...)
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  18. Putnam's Internal Realism in Retrospect.Howard Sankey - 2018 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 5 (1):27-50.
    As is well known, Putnam changed his philosophical position on a number of occasions throughout his career. In this paper, I reconsider the position of internal realism which Putnam defended from the mid-1970’s until around 1990. The paper opens with a discussion of the position that Putnam called “metaphysical realism”, since his internal realism emerged out of a critique of that position. The paper then briefly presents the internal realist view as one which involves an epistemic conception of truth, as (...)
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  19. What Is Realistic About Putnam’s Internal Realism?David L. Anderson - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):49-83.
    Failure to recognize the "realistic" motivations for Putnam's commitment to internal realism has led to a widely shared misunderstanding of Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. Realist critics of these arguments frequently offer rebuttals that fail to confront his arguments. Simply put, Putnam's arguments --the brains in a vat argument as well as the model-theoretic argument -- are "reductios" that are intended to show that "metaphysical realism itself is not sufficiently realistic". If that claim can be substantiated then Putnam can go (...)
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  20. Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox.Michael Campbell - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):151-173.
    In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis that epistemic (...)
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  21.  63
    Making Good Sense: Pragmatism's Mastery of Meaning, Truth, and Workable Rule of Law.Harold Anthony Lloyd - forthcoming - Wake Forest Journal of Law and Policy.
    The hermeneutic pragmatism explored in this article timely examines how “post-truth” claims over-estimate semantic freedoms while at the same time underestimating semantic and pre-semantic restraints. Such pragmatism also timely examines how formalists err by committing the reverse errors. Drawing on insights from James, Peirce, Putnam, Rorty, Gadamer, Derrida, and others, such hermeneutic pragmatism explores (1) the necessary role of both internal and objective experience in meaning, (2) the resulting instrumental nature of concepts required to deal with such experience, (3) the (...)
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  22. Non-Metaphysical Realism: A Dummett-Inspired Implementation of Putnam’s Internal Realism.Karin Johannesson - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1):3--18.
    The amount of realist positions put forward by philosophers of religion and theologians is impressive. one can certainly doubt whether there is a need for yet another alternative. However, most realist positions employed in studies on religion fall prey to Hilary Putnam’s criticism against metaphysical realism. This gives rise to a dilemma that I aim at solving by introducing yet another realist position, namely non-metaphysical realism.
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  23.  8
    The Problem of Meaning Change in Friedman's Notion of Constitutive a Priori Principle.Roberto Angeloni - 2012 - Kairos (misc) 5 (1):57-76.
    What I want to point out is the “meaning change” that Friedman ascribes to terms and principles, which he calls a priori, in the transition from the old framework to the new: -/- 'This captures the sense, in particular, in which there has indeed been a ”meaning change” in the transition from the old framework to the new: even if the same terms and principles reappear in the new framework they do not have the same meaning they had in the (...)
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  24. Reflection On: On Reflection.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):55-69.
    In his book, On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes what he regards as a chronic tendency in philosophy towards inflating the significance of reflection in ways that manifest a combination of philosophical naiveté and scientific ignorance about how reflection actually works. In these comments, I respond to Kornblith's challenge by sketching an account of the philosophical significance of reflection in the theory of epistemic justification.
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  25. Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge.Timothy Perrine - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):351-360.
    In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges.
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  26. Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities.Ken Levy - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):139-151.
    Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann's particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what (...)
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  27. Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: Some Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts (...)
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  28. More on Putnam and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
    Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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  29.  16
    Naturalizing Semantics and Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument.Andrea Bianchi - 2002 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 22 (1):1-19.
    Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has on many occasions proposed an argument, founded on some model-theoretic results, to the effect that any philosophical programme whose purpose is to naturalize semantics would fail to account for an important feature of every natural language, the determinacy of reference. Here, after having presented the argument, I will suggest that it does not work, because it simply assumes what it should prove, that is that we cannot extend the metatheory: Putnam appears to think that (...)
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  30. A Plea for a Peircean Turn in Analytic Philosophy.Jaime Nubiola - 1998 - Paideia, Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy.
    Criticisms of analytic philosophy have increased in intensity in the last decade, denouncing specifically its closing in on itself, which results in barrenness and ignorance of real human problems. The thought of C. S. Peirce is proposed as a fruitful way of renewing the analytic tradition and obviating these criticisms. While this paper is largely a reflection on Hilary Putnam’s study of the historical development of analytic philosophy, not only can some of its main roots be traced back to (...)
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  31. Disagreement and Philosophical Progress.Brent Ables - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1): 115-127.
    In “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” Hilary Kornblith argues for a radical form of epistemic modesty: given that there has been no demonstrable cumulativeprogress in the history of philosophy – as there has been in formal logic, math, and science – Kornblith concludes that philosophers do not have the epistemic credibility to be trusted as authorities on the questions they attempt to answer. After reconstructing Kornblith's position, I will suggest that it requires us to adopt a different conception (...)
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  32. Salvaging Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Jackson & Andrew Rogers - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (1):59-84.
    Many think that Pascal’s Wager is a hopeless failure. A primary reason for this is because a number of challenging objections have been raised to the wager, including the “many gods” objection and the “mixed strategy” objection. We argue that both objections are formal, but not substantive, problems for the wager, and that they both fail for the same reason. We then respond to additional objections to the wager. We show how a version of Pascalian reasoning succeeds, giving us a (...)
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  33. Prisoner's Dilemma Doesn't Explain Much.Robert Northcott & Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 64-84.
    We make the case that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, notwithstanding its fame and the quantity of intellectual resources devoted to it, has largely failed to explain any phenomena of social scientific or biological interest. In the heart of the paper we examine in detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success, namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why this negative verdict is likely true generally and not just (...)
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  34. Kant on Moral Agency and Women's Nature.Mari Mikkola - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (1):89-111.
    Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of Kant’s (...)
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  35.  75
    What Was Molyneux's Question A Question About?Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook on Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially (...)
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  36.  82
    Killing Schrodinger's Cat: Why Macroscopic Quantum Superpositions Are Impossible In Principle.Andrew Knight - manuscript
    The Schrodinger's Cat and Wigner's Friend thought experiments, which logically follow from the universality of quantum mechanics at all scales, have been repeatedly characterized as possible in principle, if perhaps difficult or impossible for all practical purposes. I show in this paper why these experiments, and interesting macroscopic superpositions in general, are actually impossible in principle. First, no macroscopic superposition can be created via the slow process of natural quantum packet dispersion because all macroscopic objects are inundated with decohering interactions (...)
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  37. Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce's Theory of Abduction.Mousa Mohammadian - 2019 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 55 (2):138-160.
    I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation (...)
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  38. The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: On the Descriptive Adequacy of Kant's Conception of Moral Evil.Mark Timmons - 2017 - In Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics. New York, USA: pp. 293-330.
    This chapter argues for an interpretation of Kant's psychology of moral evil that accommodates the so-called excluded middle cases and allows for variations in the magnitude of evil. The strategy involves distinguishing Kant's transcendental psychology from his empirical psychology and arguing that Kant's character rigorism is restricted to the transcendental level. The chapter also explains how Kant's theory of moral evil accommodates 'the badass'; someone who does evil for evil's sake.
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  39. Females in Aristotle’s Embryology.Jessica Gelber - 2017 - In Andrea Falcon and David Lefebvre (ed.), Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: A Critical Guide. pp. 171-187.
    How does Aristotle view the production of females? The prevailing view is that Aristotle thinks female births are teleological failures of a process aiming to produce males. However, as I argue, that is not a view Aristotle ever expresses, and it blatantly contradicts what he does explicitly say about female births: Aristotle believes that females are and come to be for the sake of something, namely, reproduction. I argue that an alternative to that prevailing view, according to which the embryo’s (...)
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  40.  40
    Molyneux’s Question and Interpersonal Variations in Multimodal Mental Imagery Among Blind Subjects.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - In Brian Glenney (ed.), Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    If the sight of cortically blind people were restored, could they visually recognize a cube or a sphere? This is Molyneux’s question. I argue that the answer to this question depends on the specificities of the mental setup of these cortically blind people. Some cortically blind people have (sometimes quite vivid) visual imagery. Others don’t. The answer to Molyneux’s question depends on whether the blind subjects have had visual imagery before their sight was restored. If they did, the answer to (...)
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  41. Simpson's Paradox and Causality.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Don Dcruz & Venkata Raghavan - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):13-25.
    There are three questions associated with Simpson’s Paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP?, and (iii) What should be done about SP? By developing a logic-based account of SP, it is argued that (i) and (ii) must be divorced from (iii). This account shows that (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with causality, which plays a role only in addressing (iii). A counterexample is also presented against the causal account. Finally, the causal and logic-based (...)
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  42. What Is the Validity Domain of Einstein’s Equations? Distributional Solutions Over Singularities and Topological Links in Geometrodynamics.Elias Zafiris - 2016 - 100 Years of Chronogeometrodynamics: The Status of the Einstein's Theory of Gravitation in Its Centennial Year.
    The existence of singularities alerts that one of the highest priorities of a centennial perspective on general relativity should be a careful re-thinking of the validity domain of Einstein’s field equations. We address the problem of constructing distinguishable extensions of the smooth spacetime manifold model, which can incorporate singularities, while retaining the form of the field equations. The sheaf-theoretic formulation of this problem is tantamount to extending the algebra sheaf of smooth functions to a distribution-like algebra sheaf in which the (...)
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  43. Kant's Theory of Motivation: A Hybrid Approach.Benjamin S. Yost - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 71 (2):293-319.
    To vindicate morality against skeptical doubts, Kant must show that agents can be moved to act independently of their sensible desires. Kant must therefore answer a motivational question: how does an agent get from the cognition that she ought to act morally to acting morally? Affectivist interpretations of Kant hold that agents are moved to act by feelings, while intellectualists appeal to cognition alone. To overcome the significant shortcomings of each view, I develop a hybrid theory of motivation. My central (...)
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  44. Pascal’s Wager and the Origins of Decision Theory: Decision-Making by Real Decision-Makers.James Franklin - 2018 - In Paul Bartha & Lawrence Pasternack (eds.), Pascal's Wager. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27-44.
    Pascal’s Wager does not exist in a Platonic world of possible gods, abstract probabilities and arbitrary payoffs. Real decision-makers, such as Pascal’s “man of the world” of 1660, face a range of religious options they take to be serious, with fixed probabilities grounded in their evidence, and with utilities that are fixed quantities in actual minds. The many ingenious objections to the Wager dreamed up by philosophers do not apply in such a real decision matrix. In the situation Pascal addresses, (...)
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  45. Rethinking Plato’s Forms.Necip Fikri Alican & Holger Thesleff - 2013 - Arctos: Acta Philologica Fennica 47:11–47.
    This is a proposal for rethinking the main lines of Plato’s philosophy, including some of the conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Drawing on a new interpretive paradigm for Plato’s overall vision, the central focus is on the so-called Forms. Regarding the guiding paradigm, we propose replacing the dualism of a world of Forms separated from a world of particulars, with the monistic model of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of reality. Regarding the tools of (...)
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  46. C. S. Peirce and the Hispanic Philosophy of the Twentieth Century.Jaime Nubiola - 1998 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 24 (1):31-49.
    A surprising fact in the historiography of the Hispanic philosophy of this century is its almost total opacity towards the American philosophy, in spite of the real affinity between the central questions of American pragmatism and the topics addressed by the most relevant Hispanic thinkers of the century: Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, d'Ors, Vaz Ferreira. In this paper that situation is studied, paying special attention to Charles S. Peirce, his personal connections with the Hispanic world, the reception of his texts (...)
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  47. Peirce's Final Account of Signs and the Philosophy of Language.Albert Atkin - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (1):pp. 63-85.
    In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights (...)
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  48. Motive and Rightness in Kant's Ethical System.Mark Timmons - 2002 - In Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Some contemporary intepreters of Kant maintain that on Kant's view fulfilling duties of virtue require doing so from the motive of duty. I argue that there are interpretive and doctinal reasons for rejecting this interpretation. However, I argue that for Kant motives can be deontically relevant; one's motives can affect the deontic status of actions.
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  49. Zeno's Metrical Paradox of Extension and Descartes' Mind-Body Problem.Rafael Ferber - 2010 - In Stefania Giombini E. Flavia Marcacci (ed.), Estratto da/Excerpt from: Il quinto secolo. Studi di loso a antica in onore di Livio Rossetti a c. di Stefania Giombini e Flavia Marcacci. Aguaplano—Of cina del libro, Passignano s.T. 2010, pp. 295-310 [isbn/ean: 978-88-904213-4-1]. pp. 205-310.
    The article uses Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s fundamental paradox, as a thought-model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate Zeno’s fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then I construct a mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible to copy the solutions to the fundamental paradox on the (...)
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  50. Wittgenstein’s Method: The Third Phase of Its Development (1933–36).Nikolay Milkov - 2012 - In Marques Antonio (ed.), Knowledge, Language and Mind: Wittgenstein’s Early Investigations. de Gruyter.
    Wittgenstein’s interpreters are undivided that the method plays a central role in his philosophy. This would be no surprise if we have in mind the Tractarian dictum: “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (4.112). After 1929, Wittgenstein’s method evolved further. In its final form, articulated in Philosophical Investigations, it was formulated as different kinds of therapies of specific philosophical problems that torment our life (§§ 133, 255, 593). In this paper we follow the changes in Wittgenstein’s (...)
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