The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel between The Road and a 19th century Hungarian dramatic poem, The Tragedy of Man, the paper goes on to argue that the most plausible – although admittedly not the only possible – interpretation of The Road is that it advocates a (...) religious account of the meaning of life that is able to accommodate all other possible interpretations of how the question of meaning figures in the novel. (shrink)

The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel between The Road and a 19th century Hungarian dramatic poem, The Tragedy of Man, the paper goes on to argue that the most plausible – although admittedly not the only possible – interpretation of The Road is that it advocates a (...) religious account of the meaning of life that uses what I call a practical conception of God (that borrows some of its aspects from Kant’s philosophy of religion). (shrink)

Pentru a analiza conceptele de euristica și toleranță metodologică dezvoltate de Lakatos, m-am concentrat pe secțiunea ”Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes”, publicată pentru prima dată ca articol în 1970 și apoi în cartea The methodology of scientific research programmes, Volume I (Lakatos 1978). Am analizat, în acest text, exemplificarea autorului pentru programul de cercetare al emisiei de lumină (în fizica cuantică timpurie) al lui Bohr. O exemplificare detaliată a conceptelor este prezentată de Lakatos în secțiunea ”Newton's effect (...) on scientific standards” din aceeași carte. De asemenea, am făcut dese referiri la cartea Proofs and Refutations (Lakatos 1976) publicată de Lakatos în 1976, în care expune viziunea sa euristică printr-o aplicare directă la evoluția matematicii, și am apelat și la articole ale altor autori pentru analiza celor două concepte în viziunea lui Lakatos. -/- Cuvinte cheie: Imre Lakatos, euristica, toleranța metodologică -/- CUPRINS -/- Abstract 1 Prezentarea generală 1.1 Falsificaţionismul dogmatic (sau naturalist) 1.2 Falsificarea metodologică 1.3 Falsificaţionismul metodologic sofisticat 2 Toleranţa metodologică 3 Euristica 3.1 Euristica negativă: "nucleul dur” al programului 3.2 Euristica pozitivă: "centura de protecţie" a programului 3.3 Bohr: un exemplu de program de cercetare 3.4 Proofs and Refutations 4 Concluzii Bibliografie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35405.28649. (shrink)

La falsification méthodologique est une marque du conventionnalisme. Il y a une importante délimitation entre les théories de la connaissance « passives » et « actives ». « Les passivistes prétendent que la vraie connaissance est l'empreinte de la nature sur un esprit parfaitement inerte : l'activité mentale ne peut qu'engendrer des biais et des distorsions. » L'école passiviste la plus influente est l'empirisme classique. « Les activistes » affirment que nous ne pouvons pas lire le livre de la nature (...) sans activité mentale, sans l'interpréter à la lumière de nos attentes ou de nos théories. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29156.73607. (shrink)

Falsificaționismul dogmatic admite falsificabilitatea tuturor teoriilor științifice fără calificare, dar păstrează un fel de bază empirică infailibilă. Este strict empiricist fără a fi inductivist: neagă faptul că certitudinea bazei empirice poate fi transmisă teoriilor. Astfel, falsificabilitatea dogmatică este cea mai slabă marcă a justificării. Semnul distinctiv al falsificării dogmatice este recunoașterea faptului că toate teoriile sunt la fel de conjecturale. Știința nu poate dovedi nicio teorie, dar le poate respinge. Onestitatea științifică constă astfel în aceea de a specifica un experiment (...) în așa fel încât, dacă rezultatul contrazice teoria, trebuie să renunțăm la teorie. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15335.70561. (shrink)

Proofs and Refutations este scrisă ca o serie de dialoguri socratice între un grup de elevi care dezbat demonstrația caracteristicilor Euler definite pentru poliedre. În carte sunt explicate multe idei logice importante, accentuându-se pe ideea de euristică pozitivă. Cartea include două anexe. În prima, Lakatos dă exemple ale procesului euristic în descoperirea matematică în special și în cea științifică în general. În al doilea rând, el contrastează abordările deductiviste și euristice și oferă analize euristice ale unor concepte de ”dovezi”. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.31059.53280. (shrink)

La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique est une collection d'articles publiés au fil du temps, exprimant une révision radicale du critère de démarcation de Popper entre science et non-science, conduisant à une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité scientifique. Le volume I aborde des aspects de la philosophie des sciences et le volume II contient des travaux sur la philosophie des mathématiques. Pour un historien des sciences, la reconstruction proposée par Lakatos est attrayante et explique l’évolution de la science à (...) un niveau jamais atteint auparavant. L'unité d'évaluation de base proposée par Lakatos est le programme de recherche. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22465.92006 . (shrink)

The methodology of scientific research programmes is a collection of papers published over time expressing a radical review of Popper's demarcation criterion between science and non-science, leading to a new theory of scientific rationality. Volume I address aspects of the philosophy of science, and volume II contains works on the philosophy of mathematics. For a science historian, the reconstruction proposed by Lakatos is attractive and explains the evolution of science to a level that has not been achieved before. The basic (...) evaluation unit proposed by Lakatos is the research programme, and especially the dynamics of these programmes. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31605.01767. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos holds a well-deserved primary place in current philosophy of science. In this essay, Leslie Allan critically examines Lakatos' theory of knowledge in two key areas. The first area of consideration is Lakatos' notion that knowledge is gained through a process of competition between rival scientific research programmes. Allan identifies and discusses four problems with Lakatos' characterization of a research programme. Next, Allan considers Lakatos' proposed test of adequacy for theories of rationality using his methodology of historiographical research (...) programmes. Allan discovers tensions within Lakatos' criteria and suggests ways of strengthening his test. (shrink)

Neuroenhancement involves the use of neurotechnologies to improve cognitive, affective or behavioural functioning, where these are not judged to be clinically impaired. Questions about enhancement have become one of the key topics of neuroethics over the past decade. The current study draws on in-depth public engagement activities in ten European countries giving a bottom-up perspective on the ethics and desirability of enhancement. This informed the design of an online contrastive vignette experiment that was administered to representative samples of 1000 respondents (...) in the ten countries and the United States. The experiment investigated how the gender of the protagonist, his or her level of performance, the efficacy of the enhancer and the mode of enhancement affected support for neuroenhancement in both educational and employment contexts. Of these, higher efficacy and lower performance were found to increase willingness to support enhancement. A series of commonly articulated claims about the individual and societal dimensions of neuroenhancement were derived from the public engagement activities. Underlying these claims, multivariate analysis identified two social values. The Societal/Protective highlights counter normative consequences and opposes the use enhancers. The Individual/Proactionary highlights opportunities and supports use. For most respondents these values are not mutually exclusive. This suggests that for many neuroenhancement is viewed simultaneously as a source of both promise and concern. (shrink)

Une analyse des concepts d'heuristique et de tolérance méthodologique développée par Lakatos, basée sur l'article "Falsification et méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique", publié pour la première fois en 1970, puis dans l'ouvrage La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique, volume I. J'ai analysé dans ce texte l'exemplifiant de l'auteur pour le programme de recherche de l'émission de lumière (en physique quantique au début). Un exemple détaillé des concepts est présenté par Lakatos dans la section "Effet de Newton sur les (...) normes scientifiques" du même livre. J'ai également fait souvent référence au livre Preuves et Réfutations, publié par Lakatos en 1976, dans lequel il expose sa vision heuristique par une application directe à l'évolution des mathématiques. J'ai également fait référence à des articles d'autres auteurs pour l'analyse des deux concepts dans la vision de Lakatos. SOMMAIRE: Abstract 1 Vue d'ensemble 1.1 Le falsificationnisme dogmatique (ou naturaliste) 1.2 La falsification méthodologique 1.3 La falsification méthodologique sophistiquée 2. La tolérance méthodologique 3 L'heuristique 3.1 Heuristique négative : le « noyau dur » du programme 3.2 L'heuristique positive : la « ceinture de protection » du programme 3.3 Bohr : un exemple de programme de recherche 3.4 Preuves et Réfutations 4 Conclusions Bibliographie DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30348.46729 . (shrink)

In this comprehensive work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan builds on the seminal insights of Imre Lakatos. Allan begins by critically reviewing Lakatos' theory of rationality (MSRP) and his meta-theory of rationality (MHRP) and suggesting improvements to his scheme. Allan's main task is developing a theory of rationality that avoids Lakatos' Achilles' heel; the presupposition that science is a rational enterprise. To achieve this, he attempts to draw out from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology the various (...) criteria of dependence and independence applying to evidence-statements. He concludes by considering two serious objections to his framework. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend initially both accepted Popper's philosophy of science, but then reacted against it, and developed it in different directions. Lakatos sought to reconcile Kuhn and Popper by characterizing science as a process of competing research programmes, competing fragments of Kuhn's normal science. Feyerabend emphasized the need to develop rival theories to facilitate severe empirical testing of accepted theories, but then, as a result of a disastrous mistake, came to hold that theories that are incompatible with (...) one another cannot be compared empirically. He ended up rejecting method in science. All four philosophers, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend missed the decisive defect in Popper's philosophy of science: persistent acceptance of unified theories only when endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are available means that physics makes a big, highly problematic metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe: it is such that some kind of underlying unity exists in nature. We need to adopt a new conception of science. In order to subject this implicit metaphysical conjecture to sustained critical assessment in an attempt to improve it, we need to see science as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions about the knowability and comprehensibility of the universe, these assumptions becoming less substantial and more likely to be true as we ascend the hierarchy. Elements of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos are to be found in this picture, but it also differs radically from all three. It more closely resembles Einstein's mature views about the nature of science. (shrink)

Chengguan (738–839), the fourth patriarch of the Huayan school of Chinese Buddhism, declared the primacy of Buddhism over Confucianism and Daoism and criticised these philosophies from a Buddhist stance. In his subcommentary to the Avata?saka Sutra, he defines ten differences between Buddhism and indigenous philosophies, which are discussed in this paper. However, he also often quoted from Chinese Classics to clarify the meaning of a Buddhist tenet. On these occasions he sometimes adds that he only borrows the words but not (...) their meaning. We investigate how he places these words into a new, Buddhist context. (shrink)

Preuves et Réfutations est écrit comme une série de dialogues socratiques entre un groupe d'étudiants discutant de la démonstration des caractéristiques d'Euler définies pour les polyèdres. Le livre explique de nombreuses idées logiques importantes, mettant l'accent sur l'idée d'heuristique positive. Le livre comprend deux annexes. Dans le premier, Lakatos donne des exemples du processus heuristique de la découverte mathématique en particulier et du processus scientifique en général. Deuxièmement, il oppose les approches déductives et heuristiques et propose des analyses heuristiques des (...) concepts « preuves ». DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20798.31042. (shrink)

L'heuristique est un concept central de la philosophie de Lakatos. Selon Lakatos, la méthodologie ne fait plus référence à l'ensemble des règles et stratégies à adopter dans le contexte de la découverte. Seules les heuristiques le font. Mais les principes heuristiques (par opposition aux méthodologiques) ne sont pas objectifs et autonomes, ils sont sujets à changement, de même que les changements dans la science. Les séries de théories scientifiques les plus importantes dans le développement de la science se caractérisent par (...) une certaine continuité qui lie leurs membres et qui découle d'un programme de recherche établi depuis le début, constitué de règles méthodologiques. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22615.62886 . (shrink)

Programele de cercetare permit dezvoltarea unor teorii mai complexe. Termenii pot fi aplicați atât la teorii individuale cât și la programe. În cazul în care se aplică teoriilor din cadrul unui program de cercetare, consider că acestea devin la rândul lor programe de cercetare, pe care le putem numi subprograme de cercetare. Spre deosebire de revoluțiile științifice ale lui Kuhn, Lakatos a presupus că existența simultană a mai multor programe de cercetare este norma. Știința se confruntă în prezent cu o (...) astfel de situație inedită: două teorii incompatibile, dar ambele acceptate de comunitatea științifică descriu aceeași realitate în două moduri diferite. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11153.28005. (shrink)

Research programs allow the development of more complex theories. The terms can be applied to both individual theories and programs. Unlike Kuhn's scientific revolutions, Lakatos assumed that the simultaneous existence of several research programs is the norm. Science is currently facing such an unusual situation: two incompatible theories, but both accepted by the scientific community describe the same reality in two different ways. Research programs may at one time compete with single theories, single theories between them, or research programs between (...) them. We can speak of a "research unit" as a singular theory or a research program. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31863.98729. (shrink)

Lakatos a proposé une méthodologie pour étudier l'évolution de la science par le biais de programmes de recherche, une combinaison de la falsifiabilité de Popper, des révolutions scientifiques de Kuhn et de la tolérance méthodologique de Feyerabend. Les programmes de recherche peuvent en même temps concurrencer des théories uniques, des théories uniques entre eux ou des programmes de recherche entre eux. On peut parler d'une « unité de recherche » en tant que théorie singulière ou d'un programme de recherche. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.31636.65925. (shrink)

Euristica este un concept central al filosofiei lui Lakatos. În timp ce euristica în Proofs and Refutations a fost un set de reguli care să ghideze rezolvarea problemelor pentru omul de știință individual, The methodology of scientific research programmes nu oferă niciun sfat euristic oamenilor de știință individuali, dar oferă recomandări pentru comunitatea științifică rațională asupra modului în care ar trebui să acționeze. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31140.63369.

Neuroenhancement involves the use of neurotechnologies to improve cognitive, affective or behavioural functioning, where these are not judged to be clinically impaired. Questions about enhancement have become one of the key topics of neuroethics over the past decade. The current study draws on in-depth public engagement activities in ten European countries giving a bottom-up perspective on the ethics and desirability of enhancement. This informed the design of an online contrastive vignette experiment that was administered to representative samples of 1000 respondents (...) in the ten countries and the United States. The experiment investigated how the gender of the protagonist, his or her level of performance, the efficacy of the enhancer and the mode of enhancement affected support for neuroenhancement in both educational and employment contexts. Of these, higher efficacy and lower performance were found to increase willingness to support enhancement. A series of commonly articulated claims about the individual and societal dimensions of neuroenhancement were derived from the public engagement activities. Underlying these claims, multivariate analysis identified two social values. The Societal/protective highlights counter normative consequences and opposes the use enhancers. The Individual/proactionary highlights opportunities and supports use. For most respondents these values are not mutually exclusive. This suggests that for many neuroenhancement is viewed simultaneously as a source of both promise and concern. (shrink)

Rapid advances in genome editing and its potential application in medicine and enhancement have been hotly debated by scientists and ethicists. Although it has been proposed that germline gene editing be discouraged for the time being1, the use of gene editing in somatic human cells in the clinical context remains controversial, particularly for interventions aimed at enhancement2. In a report on human genome editing, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS; Washington, DC) notes that “important questions raised (...) with respect to genome editing include how to incorporate societal values into salient clinical and policy considerations”3. We report here our research that opens a window onto what the public thinks about these issues. (shrink)

Recenzie: Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical papers, volumul I, editată de John Worrall și Gregory Currie, Cambridge University Press, 1995, ISBN 0-521-28031-1, paperback Metodologia programelor de cercetare științifică este o colecție de lucrări publicate de-a lungul timpului, în care Imre Lakatos exprimă o revizuire radicală a criteriului de demarcație al lui Popper între știință și neștiință, conducând la o teorie nouă a raționalității științifice.

Évaluation: Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical papers, volume I, edité par John Worrall et Gregory Currie, Cambridge University Press, 1995, ISBN 0-521-28031-1, paperback La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique est une collection d'articles publiés au fil du temps, dans laquelle Imre Lakatos exprime une révision radicale du critère de démarcation de Popper entre science et non-science, conduisant à une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité scientifique. -/- Mots-clés: Imre Lakatos, science, méthodologie, programmes de (...) recherche, heuristique -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25516.31364 . (shrink)

Imre Lakatos' conception of the history of science is explicated with the purpose of replying to criticism leveled against it by Thomas Kuhn, Ian Hacking, and others. Kuhn's primary argument is that the historian's internal—external distinction is methodologically superior to Lakatos' because it is "independent" of an analysis of rationality. That distinction, however, appears to be a normative one, harboring an implicit and unarticulated appeal to rationality, despite Kuhn's claims to the contrary. Lakatos' history, by contrast, is clearly the (...) history of a normatively defined discipline; of science and not scientists and their activities. How such history can be written, the historiographic and critical tools available for its construction, and its importance as history, are considered in detail. In an afterword, the prevalence of Lakatos' treatment of history in philosophical discussion is indicated: A related approach is shown to arise in social contract theory. (shrink)

Review of: Husain Sarkar. A Theory of Method. xvii+ 229 pp., bibl., indexes. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1983. $29.95. The subject of this book is best stated in the author's words: "A theory is about the world; a method is about theories; and, a theory of method is about methods" (p. 1). A theory of method seeks to offer a general framework within which to choose among methods. Through critical examination of the positions of Karl Popper, Imre (...) Lakatos, and Larry Laudan, Sarkar develops his own framework for evaluating methods, which includes two bold proposals: that the history of science cannot be used as an arbitrator among methods, and that methods should be chosen by testing the heuristic advice they give about which lines of scientific research to pursue further. (shrink)

Modern generally accepted models of the growth of knowledge are scrutinized. It is maintained that Thomas Kuhn’s growth of knowledge model is grounded preeminently on Heidegger’s epistemology. To justify the tenet the corresponding works of both thinkers are considered. As a result, the one-to-one correspondence between the key propositions of Heideggerian epistemology and the basic tenets of Kuhn’s growth of knowledge model is elicited. The tenets under consideration include the holistic nature of a paradigm, the incommensurability thesis, conventional status of (...) a paradigm caused by pragmatist way of its vocabulary justification and even the basic instance – connection between Aristotelean and Newtonian mechanics. It is conjectured that an indirect influence of Heidegger upon Kuhn should be taken into account to explain the isomorphism. For instance, through the works of Alexandre Koyré admired by Kuhn. As is well-known, Koyré had close professional links with another Russian émigré – Alexandre Kojev – who presented in his 1933-1939 Paris lectures Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” seen through the cognitive lens of Heideggerian phenomenology. Key words: Martin Heidegger, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, growth of knowledge, paradigm, incommensurability thesis, holism, pragmatism. (shrink)

"Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for advancing (...) beyond verificationism and Hume’s problem of induction, but faults both Kuhn and Popper for being unable to show that and how their work could lead nearer to the truth." —Dr. LLOYD EBY teaches philosophy at The George Washington University and The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC "Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism is in my opinion a very significant contribution to the philosophy of science. I hope that it will be widely discussed and debated." – ALAN SOKAL, Professor of Physics, New York University "Maxwell takes up the philosophical challenge of how natural science makes progress and provides a superb treatment of the problem in terms of the contrast between traditional conceptions and his own scientifically-informed theory—aim-oriented empiricism. This clear and rigorously-argued work deserves the attention of scientists and philosophers alike, especially those who believe that it is the accumulation of knowledge and technology that answers the question."—LEEMON McHENRY, California State University, Northridge "Maxwell has distilled the finest essence of the scientific enterprise. Science is about making the world a better place. Sometimes science loses its way. The future depends on scientists doing the right things for the right reasons. Maxwell's Aim-Oriented Empiricism is a map to put science back on the right track."—TIMOTHY McGETTIGAN, Professor of Sociology, Colorado State University - Pueblo "Maxwell has a great deal to offer with these important ideas, and deserves to be much more widely recognised than he is. Readers with a background in philosophy of science will appreciate the rigour and thoroughness of his argument, while more general readers will find his aim-oriented rationality a promising way forward in terms of a future sustainable and wise social order."—David Lorimer, Paradigm Explorer, 2017/2 "This is a book about the very core problems of the philosophy of science. The idea of replacing Standard Empiricism with Aim-Oriented Empiricism is understood by Maxwell as the key to the solution of these central problems. Maxwell handles his main tool masterfully, producing a fascinating and important reading to his colleagues in the field. However, Nicholas Maxwell is much more than just a philosopher of science. In the closing part of the book he lets the reader know about his deep concern and possible solutions of the biggest problems humanity is facing."—Professor PEETER MŰŰREPP, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia “For many years, Maxwell has been arguing that fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, especially the problem of induction, cannot be solved granted standard empiricism (SE), a doctrine which, he thinks, most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted. A key tenet of SE is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence. For a number of reasons, Maxwell argues, we need to adopt a rather different conception of science which he calls aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). This holds that we need to construe physics as accepting, as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, a hierarchy of metaphysical theses about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, which become increasingly insubstantial as we go up the hierarchy. In his book “Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism”, Maxwell gives a concise and excellent illustration of this view and the arguments supporting it… Maxwell’s book is a potentially important contribution to our understanding of scientific progress and philosophy of science more generally. Maybe it is the time for scientists and philosophers to acknowledge that science has to make metaphysical assumptions concerning the knowability and comprehensibility of the universe. Fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, which cannot be solved granted SE, may be solved granted AOE.” Professor SHAN GAO, Shanxi University, China . (shrink)

Evoluția testelor gravitaționale dintr-o perspectivă epistemologică încadrată în conceputul de reconstrucție rațională al lui Imre Lakatos, pe baza metodologiei acestuia a programelor de cercetare. Perioada evaluată este foarte vastă, începând cu filosofia naturală a lui Newton și până la teoriile gravitației cuantice din zilele noastre. Pentru a explica mai rațional evoluția complexă a conceptului de gravitație din ultimul secol, propun o extindere naturală a metodologiei programelor de cercetare pe care o folosesc apoi pe parcursul lucrării. Consider că această abordare (...) oferă o nouă perspectivă asupra modului în care au evaluat în timp conceptul de gravitație și metodele de testare a fiecărei teorii a gravitației, prin observații și experimente. Argumentez, pe baza metodologiei programelor de cercetare și a studiilor oamenilor de știință și filosofilor, că actualele teorii ale gravitației cuantice sunt degenerative, datorită lipsei dovezilor experimentale pe o perioadă îndelungată de timp și a auto-imunizării împotriva posibilității falsificării. Mai mult, în prezent este în curs de dezvoltare un curent metodologic care atribuie un rol secundar, neimportant, verificărilor prin observații și/sau experimente. Din această cauză, nu va fi posibilă o teorie completă a gravitației cuantice în forma actuală care să includă la limită relativitatea generală, întrucât teoriile fizice au fost dintotdeauna ajustate, în decursul evoluției lor, pe baza testelor observaționale sau experimentale, și verificate prin predicțiile făcute. De asemenea, contrar unei opinii răspândite și a unor programe active actuale privind unificarea tuturor forțelor fundamentale ale fizicii într-o singură teorie finală, pe baza teoriei corzilor, argumentez că este puțin probabil în general să se realizeze această unificare, și nu este posibil oricum ca unificarea să se elaboreze pe baza teoriilor actuale ale gravitației cuantice, inclusiv prin teoria corzilor. În plus, susțin punctele de vedere ale unor oameni de știință și filosofi că în prezent se consumă mult prea multe resurse pe ideea dezvoltării teoriilor gravitației cuantice, și în special teoria corzilor, care să includă relativitatea generală și să unifice gravitația cu celelalte forțe, în condițiile în care știința nu impune astfel de programe de cercetare. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.14582.75842 . (shrink)

Imre Lakatos a proposé une modification du critère de Popper, qu'il a qualifié de « falsification sophistiquée (méthodologique) ». De ce point de vue, le critère de délimitation ne devrait pas s'appliquer à une hypothèse ou à une théorie isolée, mais plutôt à l'ensemble d'un programme de recherche. La falsification méthodologique sophistiquée change le problème du mode d’évaluation théorique en problème de l’évaluation des séries théoriques. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25555.73761.

Imre Lakatos' views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and they have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this respect is the lack of detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and its implications for the methodology of mathematics, particularly its implications with respect to argumentation and the matter of how truths are established in mathematics. The most important themes that run through his work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminate in the 1976a (...) paper are (1) the (quasi-)empirical character of mathematics and (2) the rejection of axiomatic deductivism as the basis of mathematical knowledge. In this paper Lakatos' later views on the quasi-empirical nature of mathematical theories and methodology are examined and specific attention is paid to what this view implies about the nature of mathematical argumentation and its relation to the empirical sciences. (shrink)

Dogmatic (naturalist) falsificationism accepts the falsifiability of all scientific theories without qualification but preserves an infallible empirical basis. He is strictly empiric without being inductivist: he denies the fact that certainty of the empirical basis can be conveyed to theories. Thus, dogmatic falsificationism is the weakest mark of justification. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15196.33927 .

According to the scientific "justificationist" method, knowledge consisted of proven sentences. Classical intellectuals (or "rationalists," in the narrow sense of the term) have accepted extremely varied - and powerful "proofs", through revelation, intellectual intuition, experience. These, with the help of logic, have allowed them to prove any kind of scientific statement. Classical empiricists accepted as axioms only a relatively small set of "factual propositions" that expressed "hard facts". The value of their truth has been established by experience and has been (...) the empirical basis of science. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28722.25288. (shrink)

Drawing on insights from Imre Lakatos' seminal work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan develops seven criteria for rational theory choice that avoid presuming the rationality of the scientific enterprise. He shows how his axioms of rationality follow from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology. Allan concludes by considering two weighty objections to his framework.

Here is a dilemma concerning the history of science. Can the history of scientific thought be reduced to the history of the beliefs, motives and actions of scientists? Or should we think of the history of scientific thought as in some sense independent from the history of scientists? The aim of this paper is to carve out an intermediate position between these two. I will argue that the history of scientific thought supervenes on, but not reducible to, the history of (...) scientists. There is a legitimate level of description for analyzing the history of scientific thought that does not reduce to the individual level of scientists. Yet, every aspect of the history of scientific thought is determined by the actual motives and actions of individual scientists. Maybe surprisingly, I use Imre Lakatos’s controversial concept of the rational reconstruction of the history of science in order to argue for this intermediate position. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...) to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. [Back to Top]. (shrink)

This paper presents a reconstruction of and some constructive comments on Thomas Pogge’s conception of global justice. Using Imre Lakatos’s notion of a research program, the paper identifies Pogge’s “hard core” and “protective belt” claims regarding the scope of fundamental principles of justice, the object and structure of duties of global justice, the explanation of world poverty, and the appropriate reforms to the existing global order. The paper recommends some amendments to Pogge’s program in each of the four areas.

Falsificaționismul metodologic este o marcă a convenționalismului. Există o delimitare importantă între teoriile "pasiviste" și "activiste" ale cunoașterii. "Pasiviștii susțin că adevărata cunoaștere este amprenta naturii pe o minte perfect inertă: activitatea mentală poate duce numai la părtinire și distorsiune. Cea mai influentă școală pasivistă este empirismul clasic. "Activiștii" susțin că nu putem citi cartea naturii fără activitate mentală, fără a o interpreta în lumina așteptărilor sau a teoriilor noastre. "Activiștii" conservatori susțin că suntem născuți cu așteptările noastre de bază; (...) cu ele transformăm lumea în "lumea noastră", dar trebuie să trăim pentru totdeauna în închisoarea lumii noastre. Activiștii revoluționari consideră că aceste cadre conceptuale ale noastre pot fi dezvoltate și înlocuite de altele noi și mai bune; noi suntem cei care ne creen "închisorile" și putem, de asemenea, să le demolăm. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.36731.05920. (shrink)

Tant qu'un programme de recherche en herbe peut être reconstitué de manière rationnelle en tant que problème progressif, il doit être protégé pendant un certain temps d'un rival puissant existant. Ces considérations, dans leur ensemble, soulignent l’importance de la tolérance méthodologique. Même les fameuses « expériences cruciales » n'auront aucune force pour renverser un programme de recherche. Dans le cadre d'un programme de recherche, des « expériences cruciales mineures » entre versions ultérieures sont assez courantes. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.17935.53922.

Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...) or responses to Popper of such people are thus similarly mistaken. I draw some distinctions necessary to the provision of an adequate account of the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation, and try to rid the debate about this practice of at least one red herring. I analyse one case of 'avoiding' a refutation in detail to show how the rationality of scientific practice eludes both Popper and many of his commentators. Popper's skepticism about contingent knowledge prevents him from providing an acceptable account of contingent refutation, and so his method is really the method of conjecture and conjecture. He cannot do without the concepts of knowledge and refutation, however, if his account of science is to be plausible or persuasive, and so he equivocates between, amongst other things, refutation as disproof and refutation as the weaker notion of discorroboration. I criticise David Stove's account of this matter, in particular to show how he misses this point. An additional advantage Popper would secure from this equivocation is that if refutations were mere discorroborations they would be easier to achieve, and hence more common in science, than is the case. On Popper's weak notion of refutation, it would be possible to refute true theories since corroboration does not entail truth. There are two other related doctrines Popper holds about refutation which, if accepted, make some refutations seem easier to obtain than is the case. I call these doctrines 'Strong Popperian Falsificationism' (SPF) and 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). SPF is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is refuted. Popper does not always endorse SPF. In particular, when confronted with a counterexample to it, he retreats to WPF, which is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is prima facie refuted. WPF , or even SPF, can seem plausible if one has in mind predictions derived from theories in strong or conclusive tests of those theories, which I suggest Popper characteristically does. v Popper is disposed to describe any such case of predictive failure which does not lead to the refutation of the theory concerned as one in which that refutation has been avoided. To reinforce his portrayal of the refutation, or the attempted refutation, of major scientific theories as the rational core of scientific practice, Popper treats the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation as untypical of science, and much so-called avoidance he dismisses as unscientific or pseudo-scientific. I argue that his notion of avoiding a refutation is incoherent. Popper is further driven to believe that such avoidance is possible, however, because he conflates sentences with propositions and propositions with propositional beliefs. Also, he wishes to avoid being saddled with the relativisim that is a consequence of his weak account of refutation as discorroboration. Popper believes that ad hoc hypotheses are the most important of the unscientific means of avoiding a refutation. I argue that his account of such hypotheses is also incoherent, and that several hypotheses thought to be ad hoc in his sense are not. Such hypotheses appear to be so largely because of Popper's use of rhetoric and partly because these hypotheses are unacceptable for other reasons. I conclude that to know that a hypothesis is ad hoc in Popper's sense does not illuminate scientific practice. Popper has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of some undesirable, or allegedly undesirable, properties of hypotheses or the explanations they would provide. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which is not. In the former case I argue that non-circularity is clearly preferable to non-ad hocness as a criterion for a satisfactory explanation or explanans, as the case may be, and in the latter case that Popper is barking up the wrong tree. Some cases of so-called avoidance are obviously not unscientific. The discovery of Neptune from a prediction based on the reasonable belief that there were residual perturbations in the motion of Uranus is an important case in point, and one that is much discussed in the literature. The manifest failure of astronomers to account for Uranus's motion did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitiation, yet significant scientific progress obviously did result. Retreating to WPF, Popper claims that Newton's law was prima facie refuted. In general, astronomers have never shared this view, and they are correct in not doing so. I argue that the law of gravitation would have been prima facie refuted only if there had been good reason at the time to believe as false what is true, namely, that an unknown trans-Uranian planet was the cause of those Uranian residuals. Knowledge of the trans-Uranian region was then so slight that it was merely a convenient assumption, one which there was little reason to believe was false, that the known influences on Uranus's motion were the only such influences. I conclude that in believing vi or supposing that it was this assumption that was false, rather than the law of gravitation, Leverrier and Adams, the co-predictors of Neptune, were acting rationally and intelligently. Popper's commentators offer a variety of accounts of the alleged practice of avoiding a refutation, and of this case in particular. I analyse a sample of their accounts to show how common is the acceptance of some of Popper's basic mistakes, even amongst those who claim to reject his falsificationism, and to display the effects on their accounts of this acceptance of his mistakes. Many commentators recognize that anomalies are typically dealt with by changes in the boundary conditions or in other of the auxiliary propositions employed. Where many still go wrong, however, is in retaining the presupposition of WPF which encouraged Popper to hold the contradictory view about anomalies in the first place. Thus Imre Lakatos and others, for example, have developed a 'siege mentality' about major scientific theories; they see them as under continual threat of refutation from anomalies, and so come to believe that dogmatism is essential in science if such theories are to survive as they do. I examine various such doomed attempts to reconcile Popper with the history of science. It is a common failure in this literature to conflate or to fail to see the need to distinguish a belief from a supposition, and an epistemic reason from a pragmatic reason. I argue that only if one does draw these distinctions can one give an adequate account of how anomalies are rationally dealt with in science. The other important strand in Popper's thinking about 'avoidance' of refutation which has seriously misled some of his commentators is his unfounded belief in the dangers of ad hoc hypotheses. I examine the accounts that a sample of such commentators provide of the trans-Uranian planet hypotheses of Leverrier and Adams. These commentators imply or assert what Popper only hints at, namely, that there is something fishy about this hypothesis. I provide a further defence of the rationality of entertaining this hypothesis at the time. I conclude with a few remarks about Popper's dilemma in respect of scientific practice and his long standing emphasis on refutations. (shrink)

Philosophy of science and history of science both have a significant relation to science itself; but what is their relation to each other? That question has been a focal point of philosophical and historical work throughout the second half of this century. An analysis and review of the progress made in dealing with this question, and especially that made in philosophy, is the focus of this thesis. Chapter one concerns logical positivist and empiricist approaches to philosophy of science, and the (...) significance of the criticisms levelled at them by analytic epistemologists such as Willard Quine and 'historicist' philosophers, especially Thomas Kuhn. Chapter two details the attempts by Kuhn and Lakatos to integrate these historicist criticisms with historically oriented philosophy of science, in their separate attempts at providing rational explanations of historical developments. Kuhn's latest work seeks to mend fences with philosophy, but his efforts remain too closely tied to the epistemological approaches strongly criticized in his earlier work. Lakatos' treatment of history is much more subtle than most have understood it to be, but the conception of scientific rationality that arises out of it is transformed into an abstract cultural product, more reminiscent of Hegel's geist than of individual human rationality. Chapters three and four discuss the recommendations of Lakatos and Laudan to historians with regard to historiography, and the actual historiographies and philosophy of history of practicing historians and historians of science. The philosophers' contributions indicate little concern for the historians' own methods, materials, and purposes; and the historians' writings present methodologies for history of science that are independent of the normative demarcations of philosophy of science, pace Lakatos and Laudan. Chapter five develops a philosophical position that fosters a more productive engagement between philosophy and history of science, a 'methodological historicism' that embraces the possibility of an important role for social and political factors in a philosophical study of scientific development. The epistemological relativism that might accompany such a historicist position need not be the radical epistemological anarchism of Feyerabend, though it will allow for a significant underdetermination of scientific development by reason nonetheless. (shrink)

Monsters lurk within mathematical as well as literary haunts. I propose to trace some pathways between these two monstrous habitats. I start from Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s influential account of monster culture and explore how well mathematical monsters fit each of his seven theses. The mathematical monsters I discuss are drawn primarily from three distinct but overlapping domains. Firstly, late nineteenth-century mathematicians made numerous unsettling discoveries that threatened their understanding of their own discipline and challenged their intuitions. The great French mathematician (...) Henri Poincaré characterised these anomalies as ‘monsters’, a name that stuck. Secondly, the twentieth-century philosopher Imre Lakatos composed a seminal work on the nature of mathematical proof, in which monsters play a conspicuous role. Lakatos coined such terms as ‘monster-barring’ and ‘monster-adjusting’ to describe strategies for dealing with entities whose properties seem to falsify a conjecture. Thirdly, and most recently, mathematicians dubbed the largest of the sporadic groups ‘the Monster’, because of its vast size and uncanny properties, and because its existence was suspected long before it could be confirmed. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn criticized falsifiability because it characterized "the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts," and it cannot be generalized. In Kuhn's view, a delimitation criterion must refer to the functioning of normal science. Kuhn objects to Popper's entire theory and excludes any possibility of rational reconstruction of the development of science. Imre Lakatos said that if a theory is scientific or non-scientific, it can be determined independently of the facts.He proposed a modification (...) of Popper's criterion, which he called "sophisticated (methodological) falsification". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30572.82568. (shrink)

L'évolution des tests gravitationnels dans une perspective épistémologique encadré dans le concept de reconstruction rationnelle d'Imre Lakatos, fondée sur sa méthodologie de programmes de recherche. Contrairement à d'autres travaux sur le même sujet, la période évaluée est très longue, allant de la philosophie naturelle de Newton aux théories de la gravité quantique d'aujourd'hui. Afin d'expliquer de manière plus rationnelle l'évolution complexe du concept de gravité du siècle dernier, je propose une extension naturelle de la méthodologie des programmes de recherche (...) que j'utilisais ensuite au cours de la communication. Je pense que cette approche offre une nouvelle perspective sur la manière dont le concept de gravité et les méthodes de test de chaque théorie de la gravité ont évalué dans le temps, par le biais d'observations et d'expériences. Je soutiens, sur la base de la méthodologie des programmes de recherche et des études des scientifiques et des philosophes, que les théories actuelles de la gravité quantique sont dégénératives, en raison du manque de preuves expérimentales sur une longue période et d'auto-immunisation contre la possibilité de la réfutabilité. De plus, un courant méthodologique est en cours de développement, attribuant un rôle secondaire, sans importance, aux vérifications par le biais d'observations et / ou d'expériences. Pour cette raison, il ne sera pas possible d'avoir une théorie complète de la gravité quantique sous sa forme actuelle qui inclura à la limite la relativité générale, car les théories physiques ont toujours été ajustées, au cours de leur évolution, sur la base d'essais d'observation ou expérimentaux, et vérifiées par les prédictions effectuées. En outre, contrairement à une opinion répandue et aux programmes en cours concernant l'unification de toutes les forces fondamentales de la physique dans une théorie finale unique, basée sur la théorie des cordes, je soutiens que cette unification est généralement improbable et, de toute façon, impossible pour que l'unification soit développée sur la base des théories actuelles de la gravité quantique, y compris la théorie des cordes. En outre, je partage l’avis de certains scientifiques et philosophes selon lequel on consacre actuellement trop de ressources à l’idée de développer des théories de la gravité quantique, et en particulier de la théorie des cordes, qui devrait inclure la relativité générale et unifier la gravité avec d’autres forces, en particulier conditions dans lesquelles la science n’impose pas de tels programmes de recherche. (shrink)

The evolution of gravitational tests from an epistemological perspective framed in the concept of rational reconstruction of Imre Lakatos, based on his methodology of research programmes. Unlike other works on the same subject, the evaluated period is very extensive, starting with Newton's natural philosophy and up to the quantum gravity theories of today. In order to explain in a more rational way the complex evolution of the gravity concept of the last century, I propose a natural extension of the (...) methodology of the research programmes of Lakatos that I then use during the paper. I believe that this approach offers a new perspective on how evolved over time the concept of gravity and the methods of testing each theory of gravity, through observations and experiments. I argue, based on the methodology of the research programmes and the studies of scientists and philosophers, that the current theories of quantum gravity are degenerative, due to the lack of experimental evidence over a long period of time and of self-immunization against the possibility of falsification. Moreover, a methodological current is being developed that assigns a secondary, unimportant role to verification through observations and/or experiments. For this reason, it will not be possible to have a complete theory of quantum gravity in its current form, which to include to the limit the general relativity, since physical theories have always been adjusted, during their evolution, based on observational or experimental tests, and verified by the predictions made. Also, contrary to a widespread opinion and current active programs regarding the unification of all the fundamental forces of physics in a single final theory, based on string theory, I argue that this unification is generally unlikely, and it is not possible anyway for a unification to be developed based on current theories of quantum gravity, including string theory. In addition, I support the views of some scientists and philosophers that currently too much resources are being consumed on the idea of developing quantum gravity theories, and in particular string theory, to include general relativity and to unify gravity with other forces, as long as science does not impose such research programs. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35350.70724 . (shrink)

Principiul esențial de coordonare în teoria generală a relativității este principiul echivalenței, incluzând o euristică negativă în conformitate cu metodologia programelor științifice de cercetare a lui Imre Lakatos. Argumentul ”nu este acela că toate cadrele de referință sunt echivalente, ci că coordonarea clasică a mișcării uniforme în linie dreaptă cu căile particulelor fără forță aplicată nu poate fi realizată fără nicio ambiguitate sau inconssistență.” Principiul echivalenței afirmă că descompunerea mișcării gravitaționale într-o mișcare uniformă și o accelerație gravitațională nu poate (...) fi unică, deoarece căderea liberă nu se distinge la nivel local de mișcarea uniformă. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26839.62884. (shrink)

Le modèle atomique de Bohr a été l'un des exemples les plus brillants de la méthodologie des programmes de recherche d'Imre Lakatos. Les grandes lignes du programme de recherche de Bohr (Bohr 1913) peuvent être caractérisées par : 1. Le problème initial ; 2. Ses heuristiques négatives et positives ; 3. Les problèmes qu'il a tenté de résoudre au cours du développement ; 4. Son point de dégénérescence (point de saturation) et, enfin, 5. Le programme par lequel il a (...) été remplacé. 10.13140/RG.2.2.21718.68166 . (shrink)

Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1986 to 2009 /// Historical background -- An imposed legacy -- Twentieth century contemporaneity -- Appendix: The philosophy of teaching legal philosophy in Hungary /// HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / István Losonczy 29 // (...) ON THE SURVIVAL OF ILMAR TAMMELO’S LETTER AND MANUSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR MOÓR [2009] 41–44 // PROFESSIONAL DISTRESS AND SCARCITY: ALEXANDER HORVÁTH AND THE LEGACY OF NATURAL LAW IN HUNGARY [2005] 45–50 // HUNGARIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY [2011] 51–72: I. The Pre-war Period [1. Bódog (Felix) Somló (1871–1920) 52] / II. The Inter-war Period [2. Gyula (Julius) Moór (1888–1950) 54 / 3. Barna Horváth (1896–1973) 55 / 4. József Szabó (1909–1992) 57 / 5. István Bibó (1911–1979) 58 / 6. Tibor Vas (1911–1983) 59 / 7. István Losonczy (1918–1980) 60] III. The Post-war Period (Communism) 61 [8. Imre Szabó (1912–1991) 62 / 9. Vilmos Peschka (1929–2006) 63 / 10. Kálmán Kulcsár (1928–2010) 65] IV. Contemporary Trends and Perspectives 66 [11. Csaba Varga (b. 1941) 66 / 12. András Sajó (b. 1949) 69 / 13. Béla Pokol (b. 1950) 70] V. Our Understanding of the Law Today 71 --- AN IMPOSED LEGACY -- LOOKING BACK [1999] 75–94: 1. On Ideologies and Marxism in general 75 / 2. Life of an Intellectual in Communism 79 / 3. On Marxism and its Socialist Cultivation in Particular 82 / 4. Legal Philosophising [4.1. Approaches to Law 87 / 4.2. Arriving at a Legal Ontology 91] 5. Conclusion 94 // LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARXISM OF SOCIALISM: HUNGARIAN OVERVIEW IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [2003] 95–151: I. Development and Balance of Marxist Philosophising on Law in Hungary [1. Preliminaries (until 1948) 96 / 2. Stalinism (from the Soviet Occupation on) {a) Liquidation of the »Residues« 98 / b) Soviet-type Uniformisation [Gleichschaltung] 99 / c) Denial of the Past, with a Dual Effect 99 / d) »Socialist Legality«, Drawn from the Progressive Past of Western Europe 103 / e) Search for the Germs of Scholarly Evolution 103} 3. Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation (from the 1960s) [a) Epigonism Becoming the Scholarly Ideal 104 / b) Stalinism in a Critical Self-perspective 105 / c) Disciples Diversified Launching their own Trends 107 / d) Comparatism 110 / e) (Re)discovery of the Western Legal Philosophy as a Competitor 112 / f) A Leading Mediatory Role within the »Socialist World Order« 114} 4. Disintegration (in the 1980s) {a) Attempt at Laying New Foundations for Marxism with Epigonism Exhausted 115 / b) Competitive Trends Becoming Exclusive 115 / c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged as a Fellow-traveller within the Socialist Orbit Proper 116 / d) Hungarian Legal Theory Transforming into a National Corpus 118 / e) The Practical Promotion of Some Balance 119} 5. End-game for a Substitute State Religion (in the 1990s) 120] II. Marxist Legal Philosophising in an International Perspective [Ad 1: To the Preliminaries 122 / Ad 2: To Stalinism 124 / Ad 3: To Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation {a) Late Separation from Vishinskiy’s Theory 125 / b) From Ideological Self-closure to an Apparently Scholarly Openness 127 / c) From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 130 / d) International Recognition of Socialist Jurisprudence as an Independent Trend 135 / e) Together with Western Trends 137} Ad 4: To Disintegration {a) Loss of Attraction as Mere Epigonism 139 / b) Exclusivity of Competing Trends 139 / c) Fellowship with »Bourgeois« Trends 140 / d) An own Trend, Internationally Recognised 141 / e) A yet Progressive Role 142} Ad 5: To the Present state 143] III. A Temporary Balance 145 // AUTONOMY AND INSTRUMENTALITY OF LAW IN A SUPERSTRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE [1986] 151–175: 1. The Strange Fate of Concepts 151 / I. A Relational Category 2. Basis and Superstructure: The Genuine Meaning 154 / 3. Exerting Social Influence as a Conceptual Minimum 156 / 4. Relationships within the Prevailing Totality 158 / 5. Attempts at Interpretation in Hungary 159 / 6. The Lukácsian Stand 162 / 7. Lukács’s Recognitions 168 / 8. Some Criticism 169 / II. The Law’s Understanding 171 / 9. Law Interpreted as Superstructure 171 / 10. Conclusions Drawn for the Law’s Understanding 173 // LEGAL THEORY IN TRANSITION (A PREFACE FROM HUNGARY) [2000] 177–186 // DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM [2006] 187–215: 1. International Environment 188 / 2. The Situation in Hungary 190 / 3. Outlook I: The Historical-comparative Study of Legal Cultures and of the Lawyerly Way of Thinking 203 / 4. Outlook II: The Paradigmatic Enigma of the Transition to Rule of Law 207 / 5. Incongruity in Practice 213 / 6. Perspectives 214 --- TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEMPORANEITY -- CHANGE OF PARADIGMS IN LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION: CARL SCHMITT AND THE TEMPTATION TO FINALLY REACH A SYNTHESIS [2002] 219–234: 1. Dangers of Intellectualism 219 / 2. Schmitt in Facts 221 / 3. Schmitt and Kelsen 222 / 4. On Bordering Conditions 226 / 5. With Kelsen in Transubstantiation 230 / 6. Polarisation as the Path of Theoretical Development 232 // KELSENIAN DOCUMENTS IN HUNGARY: CHAPTERS ON CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE GENESIS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY [2006] 235–243: 1. Preludes 235 / 2. The Search for Moór’s Bequeath 235 / 3. Moór’s Collegiality 238 / 4. Bibó as a Disciple Translating 241 // THE »HART-PHENOMENON« [2002] 245–267: I. The Hart-miracle 246 [1. The Scene of Britain at the Time 247 / 2. The Personal Career 250 / 3. The Opus’ Career 252 / 4. Verbal Sociologism 255 / 5. Growing into the British Pattern 259] II. The Hart-phenomenon 260 [6. Origination of a Strange Orthodoxy 261 / 7. Mastering Periods of the 20th Century 263 / 8. Raising the Issue of Reception in Hungary 365] // LITERATURE? A SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? [2007] 269–287: 1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 269 / 2. “Law and Literature” 271 / 3. Varieties of “Law and Literature” 274 / 4. The German Study of Artistic Representations 280 / 5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 285 / 6. Conclusion 287 --- APPENDIX -- THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY [2007] 291–320: I. Why and How to Philosophise in Law? 291 / II. The State of Teaching Legal Philosophy 294 / III. The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy 296 / IV. Programme at the Catholic University of Hungary 300 [1. Graduate Studies 300 {a) Basic Subjects 301 / b) Facultative Seminars 305 / c) Closing Subjects 309 / d) Written Memoranda and the Thesis 312} 2. Postgraduate Studies 313 / 3. Conclusion 317] V. Perspectives 318 /// Index of Subjects 321 / Index of Normative Materials 328 / Index of Names 329 . (shrink)