Coincidiendo con su entrada como miembro del equipo de trabajo del Institut für Sozialforschung, Herbert Marcuse comienza a desarrollar una teoría materialista de la sociedad alejada del heideggerianismo de su juventud. Durante el período comprendido entre 1933 y 1936, el autor berlinés escribe una serie de artículos cuestionando la deriva política de la filosofía existencial en Alemania. En ellos se confronta con las versiones vulgarizadas de la Lebensphilosophie y de la fenomenología -encabezadas por Heidegger- que proveyeron una suerte de fundamentación (...) filosófica a la “concepción del mundo” (Weltanschauung) del realismo heroico y a las políticas socio-económicas del Estado total-autoritario. (shrink)

En el particular contexto filosófico de la Alemania de entreguerras, el joven H. Marcuse llevó a cabo una original recepción en clave marxista de la fenomenología existencial y de la Lebensphilosophie (I). En sus primeros artículos, «Contribuciones a una fenomenología del materialismo histórico» (1928) y «Sobre filosofía concreta» (1929), esa recepción se orientó al proyecto de elaboración de una fenomenología dialéctica y, vinculado con ello, al intento de fundamentar la acción radical en el concepto ontológico de historicidad (Geschichtlichkeit) sin descuidar (...) su componente material (II, III, IV). Asimismo, en la situación de caída (Verfallen) del Dasein, Marcuse va a otorgar una misión primordial a la filosofía concreta (V). (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda la recepción de los 'Manuscritos de economía y filosofía' (1844) de K. Marx en la obra de H. Marcuse. En sus ensayos «Nuevas fuentes para la fundamentación del materialismo histórico» (1932) y «Sobre los fundamentos filosóficos del concepto científico-económico de trabajo» (1933), Marcuse empieza a tomar distancia respecto de su anterior pretensión de hallar un soporte ontológico para el materialismo histórico recurriendo exclusivamente a la fenomenología existencial de Heidegger. A partir de la primera publicación de los (...) 'Manuscritos de economía y filosofía' en 1932, el autor berlinés buscará fundamentar ontológicamente el materialismo histórico con el recurso a la obra juvenil de Marx. (shrink)

La interpretación de la dialéctica hegeliana que el joven Marcuse lleva a cabo en sus escritos tempranos «Sobre el problema de la dialéctica I y II» (1930-1931) y «Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad» (1932) contrarresta las críticas de Heidegger a la dialéctica de Hegel. La lectura de ambos autores también diverge en su comprensión acerca del estatuto y el alcance del fenómeno de la temporalidad en la filosofía hegeliana. Sin embargo, cuando dilucida el concepto de historicidad (Geschichtlichkeit) (...) en Hegel, Marcuse advierte la tensión existente en su sistema entre el concepto ontológico de «vida» y la idea del «saber absoluto». A partir de su entrada en el Institut für Sozialforschung, el autor berlinés abandonará la tematización del concepto de historicidad —tarea que había ocupado un lugar central en sus primeros escritos— por considerar que dicho concepto, demasiado distorsionado por la tradición ontológico-existencial, es inconciliable con la dialéctica materialista. (shrink)

El influjo de temáticas heideggerianas en la obra tardía de H. Marcuse, todavía implícito en 'Eros y civilización' (1955) ante al peso determinante del psicoanálisis freudiano (1), reaparece de modo explícito en 'El hombre unidimensional' (1964). Ello acontece en dos planos mutuamente interdependientes: el análisis de la reificación en las sociedades unidimensionales de posguerra (2) y la crítica de la racionalidad tecnológica (4). Algunas debilidades conceptuales de ambas obras, derivadas en gran parte de esta recepción de Heidegger, ya fueron subrayadas (...) en su momento por autores pertenecientes a la llamada izquierda husserliana (P. A. Rovatti y P. Piccone, etc.) (3). (shrink)

Partiendo de un análisis introductorio en torno a las diversas interpretaciones del concepto de historicidad (Geschichtlichkeit) en las obras de W. Dilthey, P. Yorck von Wartenburg y M. Heidegger, se considera seguidamente el modo como esta polémica fue recepcionada por el joven H. Marcuse (1). En discusión con la sociología alemana de su época (K. Mannheim, S. Landshut, H. Freyer), Marcuse pretende continuar el proyecto de inclusión de la historicidad en las ciencias del espíritu iniciado por Dilthey con una orientación (...) ontológica procedente de Heidegger (2). Si primero interpreta a G. W. F. Hegel desde parámetros próximos a la filosofía de la vida (Dilthey) y a la ontología fundamental (Heidegger), a medida que se acerca a la obra de K. Marx el enfoque ontológico y vitalista deja paso a una aproximación materialista, donde conceptos como razón, mediación, libertad y actualidad adquieren un papel preponderante (3). (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende dilucidar los motivos fundamentales de la recepción de F. W. J. Schelling en los jóvenes hegelianos (I), el marxismo (II) y la Teoría Crítica (III) estableciendo ciertos paralelismos y divergencias respecto al modo en que fue acogida su obra en el seno de estas tres tradiciones. En el primer apartado se toma en consideración el alcance de este influjo en la obra de L. Feuerbach, así como en algunos escritos de juventud de F. Engels. A continuación, (...) se examinan los aspectos centrales de su recepción en G. Lukács y, en menor medida, en la obra de otros autores como E. Bloch o E. Dussel. Por último, vienen a apuntarse las temáticas principales de esa recepción en la Teoría Crítica, especialmente allí donde es más pronunciada, en los casos de H. Marcuse, J. Habermas y Th. W. Adorno. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...) sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. An alternative approach aimed at incorporating those lessons will be offered in section 4 by drawing on the literature on functionalism. In section 5, I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering. (shrink)

Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...) are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can (...) shed some light on the experience of mental time travel. This is the view that, when a subject remembers some fact episodically, their memory represents itself as coming from a perception of that fact. I propose that the experience of mental time travel in memory is the experience of representing one of the elements in this complex content, namely, the past perceptual experience of the remembered fact. In defence of this proposal, I offer two considerations. Firstly, the proposal is consistent with the idea that memories enjoy a temporal phenomenology (specifically, a feeling of pastness). Secondly, the proposal is consistent with the possibility that some of our other cognitive capacities might yield an experience of mental time travel which can be oriented towards the future. I argue that the received conception of mental time travel is in tension with those two ideas. (shrink)

Con la obra de los jóvenes hegelianos (Junghegelianer) concluye el período clásico de la filosofía alemana. Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) fue uno de sus máximos exponentes, considerado en muchos aspectos como mentor del movimiento. En el primer apartado del presente artículo, se contextualiza la figura de Bauer en el trasfondo de las disputas generadas en el seno de la escuela hegeliana. A continuación, se analizan con mayor detenimiento dos nociones centrales en su pensamiento, especialmente durante el período comprendido entre 1829 y (...) 1848: su dialéctica de la autoconciencia infinita (unendlichen Selbstbewußtsein) y la forma adoptada por su crítica pura. (shrink)

In a well-known paper, Reginald Jackson expresses a sentiment not uncommon among readers of Locke: “Among the merits of Locke’s Essay…not even the friendliest critic would number consistency.”2 This unflattering opinion of Locke is reiterated by Maurice Mandelbaum: “Under no circumstances can [Locke] be counted among the clearest and most consistent of philosophers.”3 The now familiar story is that there are innumerable inconsistencies and internal problems contained in Locke’s Essay. In fact, it is probably safe to say that there is (...) not another canonical, well-respected, and seminal philosopher whose work is so widely thought to be swarming with inconsistencies. I, however, do not think that the common, unflattering view of Locke is accurate as a general view of the Essay. But despite my wishes to the contrary, I do believe that Locke’s chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (2.27)4 leads to (at least) one intractable problem, a problem that is the subject of this paper. (shrink)

According to the Monist Interpretation of Descartes, there is really only one corporeal substance—the entire extended plenum. Evidence for this interpretation seems to be provided by Descartes in the Synopsis of the Meditations, where he claims that all substances are incorruptible. Finite bodies, being corruptible, would then fail to be substances. On the other hand, ‘body, taken in the general sense,’ being incorruptible, would be a corporeal substance. In this paper, I defend a Pluralist Interpretation of Descartes, according to which (...) there are many corporeal substances. In particular, I show that none of the claims in the Synopsis about incorruptibility and substance entail either that finite bodies are not substances, or that the only corporeal substance is the entire plenum. (shrink)

Review of Witzel's "The Origin of World Mythologies".

The central concept of this edited volume is "blended cognition", the natural skill of human beings for combining constantly different heuristics during their several task-solving activities. Something that was sometimes observed like a problem as “bad reasoning”, is now the central key for the understanding of the richness, adaptability and creativity of human cognition. The topic of this book connects in a significant way with the disciplines of psychology, neurology, anthropology, philosophy, logics, engineering, logics, and AI. In a nutshell: understanding (...) better humans for designing better machines. It contains a Preface by the editors and 12 chapters. (shrink)

Creativity pervades human life. It is the mark of individuality, the vehicle of self-expression, and the engine of progress in every human endeavor. It also raises a wealth of neglected and yet evocative philosophical questions: What is the role of consciousness in the creative process? How does the audience for a work for art influence its creation? How can creativity emerge through childhood pretending? Do great works of literature give us insight into human nature? Can a computer program really be (...) creative? How do we define creativity in the first place? Is it a virtue? What is the difference between creativity in science and art? Can creativity be taught? The new essays that comprise The Philosophy of Creativity take up these and other key questions and, in doing so, illustrate the value of interdisciplinary exchange. Written by leading philosophers and psychologists involved in studying creativity, the essays integrate philosophical insights with empirical research. CONTENTS I. Introduction Introducing The Philosophy of Creativity Elliot Samuel Paul and Scott Barry Kaufman II. The Concept of Creativity 1. An Experiential Account of Creativity Bence Nanay III. Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art 2. Creativity and Insight Gregory Currie 3. The Creative Audience: Some Ways in which Readers, Viewers and/or Listeners Use their Imaginations to Engage Fictional Artworks Noël Carroll 4. The Products of Musical Creativity Christopher Peacocke IV. Ethics & Value Theory 5. Performing Oneself Owen Flanagan 6. Creativity as a Virtue of Character Matthew Kieran V. Philosophy of Mind & Cognitive Science 7. Creativity and Not So Dumb Luck Simon Blackburn 8. The Role of Imagination in Creativity Dustin Stokes 9. Creativity, Consciousness, and Free Will: Evidence from Psychology Experiments Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, and C. Nathan DeWall 10. The Origins of Creativity Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers 11. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: a Contradiction in Terms? Margaret Boden VI. Philosophy of Science 12. Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind-Variation and Selective-Retention Dean Keith Simonton VII. Philosophy of Education (& Education of Philosophy) 13. Educating for Creativity Berys Gaut 14. Philosophical Heuristics Alan Hájek. (shrink)

The overarching thesis of this essay is that despite the etymological relationship between the word ‘philosophy’ and wisdom—the word ‘philosophos’, in Greek, means ‘lover of wisdom’—and irrespective of the longstanding tradition of identifying philosophers with ‘wise men’—mainline philosophy, historically, has had little interest in wisdom and has been preoccupied primarily with knowledge. Philosophy, if we are speaking of the mainline tradition, has had and continues to have more in common with the natural and social sciences than it does with the (...) humanities and liberal arts. In advancing this thesis, I divide the history of philosophy into three competing traditions: the mainline tradition of philosophy and two philosophical ‘countercultures,’ one conservative the other radical. At issue between these rival traditions is precisely the relative significance of knowledge and wisdom and their respective places in inquiry. I also provide an account of the distinction between knowledge and wisdom—which I argue is greater than has perhaps been appreciated—and between the natural and applied sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities and liberal arts on the other. (Published Online February 27 2006). (shrink)

Vere Chappell has pointed out that it is not clear whether Locke has a well-developed ontology or even whether he is entitled to have one.2 Nevertheless, it is clear that Locke believes that there are organisms, and it is clear that he thinks that there are substances. But does he believe that organisms are substances? There are certainly parts of the Essay in which Locke seems unequivocally to state that organisms are substances. For instance, in 2.23.3 Locke uses men and (...) horses as examples of substances. In Locke’s most explicit the account of abstraction, given in 3.3.7-9, organism [vivens] is treated as a sub-species of body and body as a sub-species of substance; so, by transitivity, organism is a kind of substance. Finally, in his discussion of essences in 3.6, Locke uses all of the following organisms as examples of substances: horses, mules, men, sheep, goats, plants, drills, changelings, asses, bulls, cats, and rats. This textual evidence would seem to settle the matter about the ontological status of organisms. However, there are other parts of the Essay in which the ontological status of organisms is less clear, to say the least. In fact, there are texts in which Locke seems to state (or at least to be committed to the.. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...) on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

La crítica de Horkheimer al empirismo lógico del Círculo de Viena en su ensayo “El último ataque a la metafísica” (1937) motivó la respuesta de Neurath, principal blanco de las críticas, con la redacción del texto “Ciencia unificada y empirismo lógico: una réplica” (1937). En el presente artículo nos ocupamos de dilucidar el contexto de la polémica entre la Teoría Crítica y el empirismo lógico. Tomamos como eje argumental de nuestra exposición el conjunto de temáticas sobre las que Horkheimer fundamentó (...) sus críticas, así como las distintas respuestas que ofreció Neurath ante tales invectivas. Asimismo, se muestran los paralelismos existentes que vinculan esta primera polémica con la “disputa sobre el positivismo” (Positivismusstreit). (shrink)

Creativity pervades human life. It is the mark of individuality, the vehicle of self-expression, and the engine of progress in every human endeavor. It also raises a wealth of neglected and yet evocative philosophical questions. The Philosophy of Creativity takes up these questions and, in doing so, illustrates the value of interdisciplinary exchange.

The connection between brain and mind is an important scientific and philosophical question that we are still far from completely understanding. A crucial point to our work is noticing that thermodynamics provides a convenient framework to model brain activity, whereas cognition can be modeled in information-theoretical terms. In fact, several models have been proposed so far from both approaches. A second critical remark is the existence of deep theoretical connections between thermodynamics and information theory. In fact, some well-known authors claim (...) that the laws of thermodynamics are nothing but principles in information theory. Unlike in physics or chemistry, a formalization of the relationship between information and energy is currently lacking in neuroscience. In this paper we propose a framework to connect physical brain and cognitive models by means of the theoretical connections between information theory and thermodynamics. Ultimately, this article aims at providing further insight on the formal relationship between cognition and neural activity. (shrink)

Both Philip and Andrew are philosophy students whose interests converge around the philosophy of technology broadly understood. Philip's interest is specifically aimed toward the ethics of Transhumanism and depictions of Transhumanism in works of fiction. On the other hand, Andrew finds himself more focused on religious behavior in the technological world. While the two perspectives might not seem that close, there is certain to be an overlap in Andrew and Philip's shared understanding of how technological phenomena play a crucial role (...) concerning religion and society. (shrink)

El afán de hallar un soporte antropológico u ontológico fundamental capaz de otorgar validez normativa a la crítica de la sociedad devino un recurso filosófico habitual en las contribuciones teóricas de numerosos autores a lo largo de los siglos XIX y XX. En contraste con la crítica inmanente, que se esfuerza por localizar en la propia realidad social los parámetros normativos y las posibilidades históricas para la crítica y la transformación de esa misma realidad, la crítica antropológica tomaba como criterio (...) para la crítica y la transformación social la remisión a parámetros normativos externos, en concreto la referencia a un concepto de esencia o naturaleza humana ubicado en un nivel ontológico o antropológico fundamental. La facticidad histórica del capitalismo se cuestionaba porque invertía la esencia genérica (Gattungswesen) del ser humano, o bien porque obstaculizaba su adecuada plasmación en el plano óntico de la realidad. Se trataba, en definitiva, de crear las condiciones oportunas para una apropiación por parte del ser humano de su propia naturaleza, de su verdadera esencia. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordamos la confrontación que ciertos autores pertenecientes al llamado marxismo occidental mantuvieron con la concepción de la vida cotidiana de “término medio” (Durchschnittlichkeit) de "Ser y tiempo" (1927). Nos centramos principalmente en la obra del filósofo checo Karel Kosík (1926-2003), quien, a lo largo de su trayectoria intelectual, llevó a cabo una recepción crítica de la analítica existencial heideggeriana, así como también en los aspectos divergentes y convergentes entre la concepción de la cotidianidad de Martin Heidegger (...) y de György Lukács. En la última sección, se apuntan las posibles sendas de encuentro para un develamiento fenomenológico-marxista de la “verdad” de la cotidianidad. (shrink)

La crítica de Horkheimer al empirismo lógico del Círculo de Viena en su ensayo “El último ataque a la metafísica” (1937) motivó la respuesta de Neurath, principal blanco de las críticas, con la redacción del texto “Ciencia unificada y empirismo lógico: una réplica” (1937). En el presente artículo nos ocupamos de dilucidar el contexto de la polémica entre la Teoría Crítica y el empirismo lógico. Tomamos como eje argumental de nuestra exposición el conjunto de temáticas sobre las que Horkheimer fundamentó (...) sus críticas, así como las distintas respuestas que ofreció Neurath ante tales invectivas. Asimismo, se muestran los paralelismos existentes que vinculan esta primera polémica con la “disputa sobre el positivismo” (Positivismusstreit). (shrink)

The Precautionary Principle (PP) is an influential principle of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental legislation, and it plays an important role in most international environmental agreements. Yet, there is little consensus on precisely how to understand and formulate the principle. In this paper I prove some impossibility results for two plausible formulations of the PP as a decision-rule. These results illustrate the difficulty in making the PP consistent with the acceptance of any trade-offs between catastrophic risks (...) and more ordinary goods. (shrink)

En el primer apartado del artículo nos ocupamos de la relación que Karl Korsch mantuvo con el Instituto de Investigación Social y con sus figuras más representativas, desde sus primeros años de funcionamiento en Frankfurt hasta el exilio en los Estados Unidos (1). En la segunda parte se lleva a cabo un contraste entre lo que Korsch y la primera Teoría Crítica entendían por ‘realización de la filosofía’ (2). Se añade un apéndice estructurado en tres temáticas suplementarias: la recepción del (...) positivismo en la obra de Korsch (a), su vinculación con el leninismo (b) y sus críticas a la ‘teoría del colapso’ (Zusammenbruchstheorie) (c). (shrink)

The blockchain social movement led to the emergence of Web3, a new, token-orchestrated iteration of the World Wide Web comprised of decentralized applications. With Web3, users can adopt a unique digital identity, known as a self-sovereign identity, that allows them to have access to their data and be central administrators of their transportable and interoperable identity. An inherent feature of digital identity in Web3 is that, in some cases, it can live forever. Web3 users, therefore, may accumulate digital assets, such (...) as non-fungible tokens, in an attempt to leave a digital legacy behind. Terror-management theory, a social and evolutionary psychology theory, was theoretically applied to the act of digital asset accumulation as a potential mechanism of escaping death-related fears. In contrast, the current uses of non-fungible tokens (ie, proof-of-ownership) and soulbound tokens (ie, proof-of-character) were evaluated from a Logotherapy perspective to inform how Web3 could evolve toward a Decentralized Society. (shrink)

"Thinking a university for the 21st century" is the name of the research group at San Dámaso University (Madrid) that promotes this book. Over the last few years this group has held regular meetings to discuss the raison d'être of the university: what is a university?, what is its purpose?, what episodes of academic life have been most inspiring in the past?, which difficulties does university life face today?, what will be the future of the university?, what do we want (...) it to become? These are some of the questions that have been asked over the years and which now take the form of writing. Several of the contributions contained in this book have a certain historical orientation: the authors examine the highlights of the search for and communication of knowledge, from antiquity to the present day. Great figures such as Socrates, Thomas Aquinas, Vitoria, Newman, Ratzinger and Ortega are featured in these pages. However, this is not a history of university life in the past, but a reflection on the future. The examples of the past set us on the road to the university of the future. Such is the intention of this group of researchers, linked to different Spanish universities and also experienced in other institutions outside our country: they have gathered here to discuss the university we want to build in our present, with an eye to the future. (shrink)

As Bitcoin continued to make headlines in 2021, additional digital assets such as non-fungible tokens brought more users into the blockchain ecosystem. As more individuals and entities took a closer look at the use cases for blockchain technology, the term metaverse began to emerge across news outlets and social media platforms. With Mark Zuckerberg, the Chief Executive Officer of Facebook, announcing that the organization would become a metaverse company and change the organization’s name to Meta, this announcement came with some (...) criticism in that the Meta metaverse would be centralized. In this case study, the current state of nation-states was viewed through the lens of Hobbes’ The Leviathan to assess whether decentralized metaverses will transition to a Digital Leviathan using Bit. Country-a metaverse within the Polkadot blockchain ecosystem. The case study was conducted through interviews and uncovered that the quadruple bottom line implemented in conventional business could be transferrable to a digital world built on various blockchains, non-fungible tokens, and governance in a Digital Leviathan governed by the people. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Offsetting your lifetime emissions may increase aggregated life expectancy by at most seven years, while giving the amount it costs to offset your lifetime emissions to a malaria charity saves in expectation the life of at least one child. Is there any moral reason to offset rather than giving to some charity that does good so much more effectively? There might be such a reason if your offsetting compensated or somehow (...) benefitted the victims of your emission, since that could mean that you would satisfy the duty not to harm others by emitting and offsetting. But that is typically not true. If your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are most likely different people. Hence, I conclude, we have a stronger reason to give to effective charities than we have to offset our emissions. (shrink)

Part of a book symposium for Peter Langland-Hassan's Explaining Imagination (2020).

El fermento psicológico del fascismo en las sociedades capitalistas tardías aparece vinculado al proceso de debilitamiento del yo y al necesario entrelazamiento de las disposiciones subjetivas con factores situacionales. Desentrañar los mecanismos que inciden en la expansión del carácter potencialmente fascista requiere de un análisis de las tendencias de la personalidad que favorecen su arraigo y cómo se ven fomentadas por determinados procesos sociales. El presente artículo se centra en el influjo y la interacción de tres factores objetivos y tres (...) factores subjetivos. Para ello nos apoyamos principalmente en los estudios sobre la propaganda fascista y la cultura de masas llevados a cabo por los autores de la primera Teoría Crítica. (shrink)

Im besonderen philosophischen Kontext des Zwischenkriegsdeutschlands entwickelte der junge Marcuse eine originelle Rezeption in marxistischer Perspektive der existenziellen Phänomenologie und der Lebensphilosophie (I). In seinen ersten Aufsätzen »Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des Historischen Materialismus« (1928) und »Über konkrete Philosophie« (1929) orientierte sich diese Rezeption am Projekt der Erarbeitung einer dialektischen Phänomenologie und in Verbindung damit an dem Versuch, die radikale Tat auf den ontologischen Begriff der Geschichtlichkeit zu gründen, ohne eine materielle Komponente zu vernachlässigen (II, III, IV). In der Auseinandersetzung (...) mit dem fundamentalontologisch anmutenden ›Verfall‹ des Daseins entwarf Marcuse überdies die Grundlagen seiner konkreten Philosophie der Praxis (V). (shrink)

El concepto de “maquinación” (Machenschaft) ocupa un lugar central en la obra de Heidegger durante el período comprendido entre 1936 y 1940. En su análisis de la esencia de la época moderna, el filósofo checo de orientación marxista Karel Kosík se apropia de importantes elementos conceptuales procedentes de esta etapa del pensamiento de Heidegger. En concreto, emplea nociones análogas a la de “maquinación”, como “sistema de manipulabilidad”. Ponemos de relieve las semejanzas y puntos de fricción en la descripción de la (...) esencia de la época moderna de ambos pensadores, así como sus respectivas propuestas para poner coto a la primacía técnica y al pensamiento calculador y las resonancias políticas derivadas de sus análisis. (shrink)

El filósofo checo Karel Kosík (1926-2003) desempeñó un rol prominente en el seno del movimiento de oposición a los regímenes de Novotný y Husák, contribuyendo tanto a la gestación como a la pervivencia de los anhelos expresados por la población checoslovaca durante la Primavera de Praga. Junto a la contextualización histórica de su obra, se pone también de manifiesto cómo Marx y Heidegger incidieron con igual relevancia en la conformación de su pensamiento. La filosofía de Kosík reviste por ello una (...) singularidad propia que la aleja de las versiones tradicionales del humanismo marxista predominantes a mediados del siglo pasado en el bloque oriental y occidental. (shrink)

El filósofo checo Karel Kosík (1926-2003) llevó a cabo en su obra una recepción crítica del pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. En determinados capítulos de "Dialéctica de lo concreto" (1963), así como en otros ensayos tardíos, elaboró una crítica de la analítica existencial heideggeriana, principalmente a la concepción de la estructura del ser del Dasein como “preocupación” o “cuidado” (Sorge). Nos ocupamos aquí de dilucidar el sentido y el alcance de esta crítica a "Ser y tiempo" (1927).

Signing Ceremony of MOU on Professional Legal Diploma, Government of Dubai 2020.

This essay rethinks the concept of biocommunism by rearticulating it via a sensitivity towards individual suffering rather than the human species as a whole. The essay is divided into three parts. The first part outlines Marx’s concept of alienation because of the central role that the fourth kind of alienation plays in Dyer-Witheford’s original conception of biocommunism. The second part briefly elaborates on the discussion of species in the Kyoto School. These two parts lead to the third part, where a (...) novel interpretation of biocommunism is outlined, focusing on individual suffering rather than the human species. (shrink)

According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)

Jordan agreed to extensive liberalization undertakings under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) that would open some sectors that were previously closed or restricted to foreign suppliers and investors. It undertook horizontal commitments in cross-border movement of individuals and commercial presence covering all types of services.

Dieser Text beinhaltet nichts Neues. Nur hinlänglich Bekanntes, Erinnerungen an Gelesenes und Reflektiertes, vor allem zur Philosophie der Kunst mit ihrer zentrale Frage, was Kunst ist. Und eng damit verknüpft die Frage, was ein Kunstwerk ist und was einen Künstler und eine Künstlerin auszeichnet. In diesem Essay wird es aber nicht um die Kunst im Allgemeinen gehen, sondern um die abstrakte Kunst und die abstrakte Malerei im Besonderen. Was zeichnet sie aus und was ist ihr Wesen? Ist es die Freiheit?

In this field questions arise which are certainly difficult; but as I listened last time to members of the group, I felt that the main difficulty perhaps lay in determining precisely what questions we are trying to answer. I have the conviction that if we could only say clearly what the questions are, the answers to them might not appear so elusive. So I have begun with a simple list of questions about discretion which in one form or another were, (...) as it seemed to me, expressed by the group last time. I may indeed have omitted something and inserted something useless: if so, no doubt I shall be informed of this later. The central questions then seem to me to be the following: 1. What is discretion, or what is the exercise of discretion? 2. Under what conditions and why do we in fact accept or tolerate discretion in a legal system? 3. Must we accept discretion or tolerate discretion, and if so, why? 4. What values does the use of discretion menace, and what values does it maintain or promote? 5. What can be done to maximize the beneficial operation of the use of discretion and to minimize any harm that it does? (shrink)

I anledning af Judith Butlers forelæsning om klimasorg på KU er jeg blevet bedt om at besvare spørgsmålet om, hvad man kan bruge Butlers tænkning til i dag og om den stadig er aktuel. Min første tanke var at besvare spørgsmålet med svaret: Man kan bruge Butlers tænkning til ALT! Men for at fokusere mit svar, har jeg besluttet mig for at gennemgå Butlers tænkning i forhold til spørgsmålet om prekære liv og vold og ikke-vold, og hvordan disse emner udspringer (...) af Butlers tænkning om køn i 1990’erne. /// In connection with Judith Butler's lecture on climate grief at KU, I have been asked to answer the question of how Butler's thinking could be used today and whether it is still relevant. My first thought was to answer the question with the answer: You can use Butler's thinking for EVERYTHING! However, to focus my answer, I have decided to review Butler's thinking in relation to the issues of precarious lives and violence and non-violence and how these issues stem from Butler's thinking on gender in the 1990s. (shrink)