AI researchers and ethicists have long worried about the threat that automation poses to human dignity, autonomy, and to the sense of personal value that is tied to work. Typically, proposed solutions to this problem focus on ways in which we can reduce the number of job losses which result from automation, ways to retrain those that lose their jobs, or ways to mitigate the social consequences of those job losses. However, even in cases where workers keep their jobs, their (...) agency within those roles might be severely downgraded. For instance, human employees might work alongside artificial intelligence (AI) but not be allowed to make decisions or not be allowed to make decisions without consulting with or coming to agreement with the AI. Here, we argue that this is a kind of epistemic harm (which could be an injustice if it is distributed on the basis of identity prejudice). It diminishes human agency (in constraining people's ability to act independently), and it fails to recognize the workers' epistemic agency as qualified experts. Workers, in this case, aren't given the trust they are entitled to. This means that issues of human dignity remain even in cases where everyone keeps their job. Further, job retention focused solutions, such as designing an algorithm to work alongside the human employee, may only enable these harms. In response to this, we propose an alternative design solution, adversarial collaboration, which addresses the traditional retention problem of automation, but also addresses the larger underlying problem of epistemic harms and the distribution of trust between AI and humans in the workplace. (shrink)

The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Platonism, he offers a new understanding of the relationship between sense and reference. However, his account faces three strong objections: against non-causal ways of accessing abstract Platonic entities (Benacerraf–Field–Cheyne), against intuition as the faculty to a priori knowledge of grammar facts (Horwich–Cheyne–Oliver), and against the medial status of finite intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s (...) proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language. (shrink)