8 found
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  1. Una presentación formal del falsacionismo.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - forthcoming - Analítica.
    In this paper I present the concepts of falsificationism omitting Popper's requirement of consistency. This omission makes (i) trivial theories falsifiable in an inappropriate sense of the term, but also (ii) some inconsistent non trivial theories in an appropriate sense of the term. This justifies a slight alteration of the definition of falsifiability that excludes (i) but allows (ii). Instead of requiring that a falsifiable theories be consistent, the new definition only requires that the intersection of its classes of potential (...)
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  2.  16
    Proper Names, Meaning and Context.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    From the apparently trivial problem of homonyms, I argue that proper names as they occur in natural languages cannot be characterised as strings of sounds or characters. This entails, first, that the proper names philosophers talk about are not physical entities, like strings, but abstractions that, second, may be better characterised as triples (s, m, C), where s is the string that conveys the meaning m in a set of contexts C. Third, the generality principle of compositionality may be put (...)
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  3.  14
    Inconsistency in Empirical Sciences.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper deals with a relatively recent trend in the history of analytic philosophy, philosophical logic, and theory of science: the philosophical study of the role of inconsistency in empirical science. This paper is divided in three sections that correspond to the three types of inconsistencies identified: (i) factual, occurring between theory and observations, (ii) external, occurring between two mutually contradictory theories, and (iii) internal, characterising theories that entail mutually contradictory statements.
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  4.  30
    El sentido lógico de la refutabilidad.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    In this paper, I analyse some of the classical criticism to falsificationism in the light of the distinction between the logical and practical sense of falsification. In the first section, I briefly characterise the basics of the falsificationist proposal. The second section presents the criticism of the logical empiricists Reichenbach and Neurath, and the third presents the criticism of Thomas Kuhn. In the fourth section, I introduce the reforms to falsificationism proposed by Lakatos, which allows me to distinguish the logical (...)
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  5.  9
    Argumentos contra la persona y conflictos de intereses.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - forthcoming - In Actas de la VI Jornada de Lógica y Argumentación.
    In this paper, I study the relation between arguments against the person (aka ad hominem or personal attack arguments) and disqualifications for conflicts of interests. I show that both types of arguments share a similar logical structure and that they can be considered to be acceptable in similar circumstances.
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  6.  19
    A Compatibility Relation for Sets.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    In this paper, I generalise the logical concept of compatibility into a set-theoretical one. The basic idea is that two sets are incompatible if they produce at least one pair of opposite or contrary objects. In section 1, I formalise opposition as an operation O: E→E, where E is the set of opposable elements of our universe U, and I propose some models in section 2. From this, I define in section 3 a relation C: ℘U × ℘U × ℘U^℘U, (...)
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  7.  16
    On Falsifying Empirical Contradictions.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    The possibility of testing contradictory statements about the factual world has been suggested but barely discussed in the relevant literature. Here I argue that if we assume that there are contradictory observation sentences, it would be logically impossible to falsify them. Accordingly, the extension of the dialetheist programme into empirical science would be non-advisable, for it would introduce logically unfalsifiable claims.
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  8.  19
    La contrastación de teorías inconsistentes no triviales.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - 2020 - Dissertation, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
    This dissertation offers a proof of the logical possibility of testing empirical/factual theories that are inconsistent, but non-trivial. In particular, I discuss whether or not such theories can satisfy Popper's principle of falsifiablility. An inconsistent theory Ƭ closed under a classical consequence relation implies every statement of its language because in classical logic the inconsistency and triviality are coextensive. A theory Ƭ is consistent iff there is not a α such that Ƭ ⊢ α ∧ ¬α, otherwise it is inconsistent. (...)
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