The currently used humanity model is chaotic, devoid of logic or coherence. In Part 1 of this two-part paper, we examined human traits of a scientific model in absence of ‘born sinner’ starting point. We demonstrated that the so-called ‘viceroy model’ that is characterized as scientifically sustainable can replace the existing models that are based on fear and scarcity. Part Two of the paper deals with adequate definition of moral campus that conforms to the viceroy model. In this paper, it (...) is shown that the talk of morality or a moral compass is aphenomenal in absence of strict necessary and sufficient conditions. It also follows that natural justice can only be followed after defining the term ‘natural’ with the same scientific rigor as that of the viceroy model. Once these terms are consistently defined, one is well poised to talk about inalienable rights, moral compass, environmental sustainability, and humanity. The immediate consequence of this model is the demonstration that currently used governance models, such as democracy, is inherently implosive and must be replaced with a new model that is in conformance with the scientific definition of ‘natural’. This emerging model is free from inconsistencies and will remain effective as a governance tool that optimizes individual rights and balances with the right of the state as well as a Creator. It is concluded that this model offers the only hope of maximizing individual liberty without compromising universal peace and natural justice. At this point, morality and legality become equivalent to each. The implications of this paper are overwhelming, making all current judicial actions immoral, in essence repudiating the entire Establishment as little more than a mafia entity, bringing back ‘might is right’ mantra, packaged as ‘social progress’. The paper finally shows how a standard that is necessarily and sufficiently universal can become impetus for a true knowledge. (shrink)
This paper evaluates the economic effects of a politically communitarian model of family ties towards the pension crisis in developing countries. The use of a Canadian - an individualist-oriented political economic pension system - is compared to a religiously and culturally communitarian form of family care in Bangladesh, a country slowly feeling the effects of the pension crisis. The analysis concludes, based on theoretical and economic evidence, that it is not in the social or economic interest of Bangladesh or similar (...) countries to use the same policies currently being deployed by Canada and most other OECD countries. This paper is the first of its kind to apply socioeconomic costs and benefits of developed countries’ policies and apply them to the context of a developing country—keeping in mind the cultural aspect and its implications. It aims at bringing back original ethical and moral values with a social orientation that should inspire all stakeholders to ensure family self-regulation that converge toward a solid foundation of communitarian principles. (shrink)
This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical acquiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the interaction between these societies and the contemporary Western powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of the world is a manifestation (...) of this fright. The central concern of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards the end. (shrink)
Most literature on religious beliefs and disagreements among traditions focuses on a bit of mainstream assumptions: religions should be construed in substantive terms; religions are to be individuated by their core belief systems; adherents to a single tradition assent to the same belief system; religious beliefs have factual content; incompatible religious beliefs cannot be both true; and so on. In my work I question all these claims in order to defend a non kantian approach to deep pluralism. In the first (...) part I develop a narrative theory of doxastic practices. My fundamental intuition is that ambiguity, vagueness, and indeterminacy of meaning are non amendable features of any ordinary belief. Consequently, no proposition has a definite meaning, and there is no a priori reason to assume that if two believers assume the same belief, they both hold the same content. What I'm trying to do is to argue in support of a realist epistemology, without assuming a normative and rationalist stance. My evidential body is mainly drawn from psychology and psychoanalysis. In the second part I apply such a narrative theory to the study of the doxastic character of religions. I reject both functionalist and substantive approaches to religion, and I defend my own viewpoint which I label experentialism. After providing a characterization of religious beliefs, I refute how Alston, Ward and Hick account for the the doxastic features of religions. I then propose a definition of religious diversity which turns out to be alternative to the mainstream one. I work by empirical evidence from semiotics, sociology of religion and history of religions. In the third and conclusive part of my book, I give reasons against the mainstream approach to religious diversity, and I explain how my definition can be more appropriate to the sociological study of religious beliefs than the mainstream one. Finally, I provide an account of deep pluralism, I show that my approach to religious epistemology and religions is compatible with (and recommended by) deep pluralism, I differentiate kantian from non kantian pluralism, and I explain why non kantian deep pluralism resists the traditional objections to pluralism. Throughout the book I discuss relevant materials from Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. (shrink)
Dini çoğulculuk, dini dışlayıcılık ve kapsayıcılıktan farklı olarak, her dinsel inanış taraftarlarının kendi dinleri içinde kalarak ilahi selamete erişeceğini söyler. Temelde, teolojik ve felsefi boyutları olan dini çoğulculuk tartışmasının siyasete bakan bir yönü de vardır. İslam tarihinde Meşşâî felsefenin kurucusu ve mutluluk filozofu olarak bilinen Farabi, bir taraftan hakikate nasıl ulaşılacağı diğer taraftan ise “âlem” adını verdiği kozmopolitanizm nasıl inşa edileceği ile ilgilenmektedir. Siyasal toplumun amacının, insanların uygun ölçekte, en yüce iyi için yardımlaşmalarını sağlamak olduğunu savunan Farabi’ye göre, erdemli bir (...) yaşam kurulmasına imkan sağlayan üç örgütlenme biçimi vardır: Şehir, millet ve âlem. Platon ve Aristoteles gibi Antik düşünürlerden farklı olarak erdemli bir yaşamın sadece sitede kurulacağı düşüncesine karşı çıkan Farabi, sitenin yetkin bir yaşamın ilk basamağı olduğunu savunur. Ancak, erdemli yaşamı site ile sınırlamaz. Farabi’nin teorisinde, Antik düşünceyi aşan bir kozmopolitanizm söz konusudur. Bundan dolayı Farabi, farklı dinlerin varlığını, kendi siyasal düşüncesine uygun olarak meşru kabul eder. Eğer mutluluk için yardımlaşacaklarsa, insanların dinlerinin farklı olmasında bir beis görmez. Bu dini çoğulculuğun siyasal temelidir. Diğer taraftan Farabi, dinleri hakikatle eşitleyen anlayışa karşı çıkarak, farklı dinlerin hakikatin çeşitli imajlar, örnekler ve taklitler yolu ile halka benimsetilmesi olarak görülmesi gerektiğini savunur. Diğer bir ifade ile dinler, hakikatin kendisi değil, farklı tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamlarda oluşmuş sembolik ifadesidir. Bu bakımdan bütün dinler ile hakikat arasında bir mesafe bulunmaktadır ve hiçbir din hakikatin kendisi değildir. Buradan Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dinsel çoğulculuğunun sınırı olmadığı çıkmamalıdır. Farabi’ye göre din, felsefe yolu ile bulunan hakikatin ikna etme veya hayal ettirme yoluyla ya da her ikisiyle birden halka kabul ettirilmesidir. Ancak Farabi, hakiki felsefe ile sahte felsefe arasında bir ayrım yapar ve ancak hakiki felsefeyi takip eden dinlerin bir hakikat değeri olduğunu savunur. Hakiki felsefe ise evrenin bir ilk nedeni olduğunu ve ilk nedenin de nedensiz olduğunu söyler. Bu, evrenin tek bir yaratıcısı olduğu anlamına gelir ve çok tanrıcılığı dışlar. Bu bakımdan Farabi, sadece tek tanrılı dinleri çoğulculuk kapsamına alır. Bunun nedeni, tek tanrılı dinlerin hakikatle özdeş olmaları değil, hakiki felsefeyi takip etmeleridir. Çünkü felsefe dinden öncedir. Bu, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde çoğulculuğun sınırlarına işaret etmektedir. Farabi, dinleri hakikatle özdeş görmeyerek ve aynı hakikatin sembolik ifadeleri olduğunu söyleyerek çoğulculuğun yolunu açar. Buna karşın sahte felsefeyi takip eden dinler olduğu gerekçesiyle çok tanrılı dinleri dışarıda bırakarak sınırlarını çizer. Bu çalışma, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dini çoğulculuğun siyasal ve epistemolojik temellerini ve çoğulculuğun sınırlarını konu almaktadır. (shrink)
Her din ve mistik kültürde ortaya çıkan dinî tecrübelerin felsefe, kelam ve fıkıh gibi bilim alanlarında farklı açıklamaları yapılmış, akli olup olmadığı sorgulanmıştır. Vahiy, keramet, vecd, hulul, tecelli gibi kavramlara açıklamalar getirilmiştir. Fakat bu tür tecrübelerin insanın fizyolojik ve psikolojik mekanizmalarıyla ne tür bir bağlantısı olduğu İslam düşünce geleneğinde pek tartışılmamıştır. Bu tür tecrübe yaşayan kişilerin sorunlu olup olmadığı tıbbi açıdan değerlendirilmemiştir. Dini tecrübeleri tıbbî bir sorun olarak ele alıp bu tecrübeleri ‘deney’ konusu yaparak inceleyen ilk düşünür William James’tir (ö.1910). (...) O, The Varieties of Religious Experience adlı kitabında her türlü ‘dini’ olarak ifade edilen tecrübeleri ele alıp açıkladığı gibi, dini olmayan ama dini tecrübelere benzer mistik tecrübeleri de araştırıp, incelemiştir. Fakat James, araştırmasında dini ve mistik tecrübe ayırımı yapmamıştır. İkili bir ayırma tabi tutulmadan bütün tecrübelerin tek bir başlık altında incelenip ‘psikolojik durum’ olarak kabul edilmesi bu bildirinin ele aldığı ana sorundur. Bütün tecrübeler tek bir başlık altında ele alınırsa peygamberlerin tecrübeleri (vahiy) ile bunun dışında yer alan mistik tecrübelerin (vecd, keramet) bir farkı kalmayacaktır. Bu ikisini ayırmak için akli kriterleri ve tecrübelerinin ana iddialarını değerlendirip ele almak gerekir. Vahiy tecrübelerinin temel iddialarıyla mistik tecrübelerin iddialarını karşılaştırdığımızda vahiy tecrübelerinin akli kriterlere uygun olduğu ve tıbbi açıdan hastalıklı bir insanın tecrübesi olmadığı görülecektir. Mistik tecrübeler de ise durum bunun tersi görünmektedir. Mistik tecrübeler geçirenlerin çoğu zaman depresyon, manik ve çoğu zaman da uyuşturucu ile ortaya çıktığı, bunalımlı ve savaş dönemlerinde bu tür tecrübelerin arttığı görülür. Bu şekilde vahiy tecrübesinin doğruluğu ortaya konduğunda toplumu etkileyen dini inançların doğru kaynağına yönelmek mümkün olur. Mistik tecrübelerin ise hastalıklı zihnin ürünü olması nedeniyle insanları saptırıcı, dinden çıkarıcı ve akıl dışı olduğu ortaya çıkar. Bu şekilde dini inançların istikameti doğru bir şekilde çizilmiş olur. (shrink)
Recent developments in our globalized world are beginning the scholarly world to answer the question pertaining to the relationship between Islam—a “faith”—and politics and governance. In order to understand the Islamic worldview from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun, with whom many modern Islamists would agree with, a comparison is made with early progenitors of liberalism and the social contract, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. By understanding the fundamental differences between the theorists, and how Ibn Khaldun’s is completely separate from (...) the western tradition, it becomes easier to understand exactly why Islamic models of governance are at direct odds with the west. The main difference between the two models of governance is the use of a fundamental criteria determining right from wrong, as opposed to Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories being based purely on assumption that the validity of their respective arguments is based upon the theory’s acceptance among the people. In other words, western political theorists lack the consistency and justification for their theories, at least from the Islamist point of view. (shrink)
Recently two distinct forms of rule-utilitarianism have been introduced that differ on how to measure the consequences of rules. Brad Hooker advocates fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism, while Michael Ridge advocates variable-rate rule-utilitarianism. I argue that both of these are inferior to a new proposal, optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism. According to optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism, an ideal code is the code whose optimum acceptance level is no lower than that of any alternative code. I then argue that all three forms of rule-utilitarianism fall prey to two fatal (...) problems that leave us without any viable form of rule-utilitarianism. (shrink)
What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning (...) of their theoretical terms), and genuine conversation (which implies sharing the language and the meaning of ordinary as well as theoretical terms). I will then argue that our real concern with regard to the exchange between Islam and science is to be to specify the conditions under which their proponents can engage in a genuine conversation with each other and that such a conversation to take place essentially requires sharing a common ontology. Following Quine, I will argue that Muslims, like the followers of any religion, would have no other choice but to work from within science. Doing so, however, would not prevent Muslims from having a genuine conversation with the proponents of other worldviews because when the shared ontology fails to offer any potentially testable answer to our remaining questions about the world, the Islamic viewpoint can appear as a genuine alternative among other underdetermined ones, deciding between which would be a matter of pragmatic criteria. (shrink)
Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for (...) the intrinsic nature of the physical itself (Strawson 2006, Seager 2006). In this thesis, I show that panpsychism can also be defended on the basis of an argument from our (arguable) acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. This argument has made frequent appearances throughout the history of philosophy, with philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and James, and I construct and defend an updated version of it. Furthermore, I offer a solution to the combination problem: how can complex (human and animal-type) consciousness result from simple (fundamental particle-type) consciousness? This is generally regarded as the most serious problem facing contemporary panpsychism. I propose that mental combination can be construed as kind causal process culminating in a fusion, and show how this avoids the main difficulties with accounting for mental combination. (shrink)
No USA president in history has received as much opposition as Donald Trump has from all three components of the Establishment, namely the financial establishment, the political establishment and the corporate media establishment. The election of Donald Trump to the office of presidency is marked with dozens of historical first events that are anything but lackluster, yet a bleak picture of Fascism has been painted to describe Trump. This is an extraordinary piece of disinformation, as no modern president has been (...) more consistent in plainly saying what he will do regarding US military and geopolitical goals, both outside and in office. This, even though his stated position is clearly opposite to the wishes of the dominant cabal, supported by both parties, and to US foreign policy since WWII. USA history is not very long, but Trump presidency and his inaugural speech marked a historic starting point for this 'democracy'. Every sentence of Donald J. Trump's inaugural speech was a departure from diplomacy. Knowing what diplomacy actually means, it's a great step toward transparency. It is the best thing that happened in US political history. It is no surprise the Media established completely flipped, the political establishment gasped, and the financial establishment started to conspire a different strategy (George Soros declaring he wants Trump presidency to fail). In the mean time, the typically apolitical science and technology establishment declared Trump completely unfit for the office that he has just been elected to. Trump’s inaugural speech that contained phrases like, "It's time to remember that old wisdom our soldiers will never forget, that whether we are black or brown or white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots", was in sharp contrast to how Abraham Lincoln viewed America, when he said, "I, as much as any other man, stand in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race… I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races." Trump’s embrace of humanity and righteousness was reminiscent of Prophet Muhammad’s last sermon at the pilgrimage, where he said over 1400 years, "An Arab is no better than a non-Arab, and a non-Arab is no better than an Arab; a red man is no better than a black man and a black man is no better than a red man – except if it is in terms of piety." Yet, Trump took oath of office swearing on the bible used by Abraham Lincoln. In this two-part paper, the key research question answered is what Trump presidency stands for. In answering this question, the first part deconstructs some of the dominant theories of Fascism. Then, a delinearized history is constructed in order to understand how democracy, as applied in USA, has an inevitable outcome of achieving the same goals as a Fascist regime. The concept of religious extremism, including “Islamic terrorism” or “radical Islam” is also discussed with relevance to ‘war on terror’. The history of US presidency then shows that the office of presidency is used as a tool to advance a Fascist agenda, albeit being packaged as USA exceptionalism. The ground is set for part 2 that analyses the rise of Trump and the demise of DNC integrity, followed by deconstruction of various allegations against Trump. (shrink)
The aims of liberalism—which is often confused with value pluralism—are routinely challenged by persons whose primary commitments lie elsewhere. In his weighing the pros and cons of liberal democratic states versus an Islamic state, Ahmad Yousif has offered an impressive challenge to liberals, but in doing so has confused the aims of liberalism with the pre-liberal nation-state ideal. In this article, I will challenge his conclusions by demonstrating the competing aims of liberals without conflating them with the liberal state. Yousif (...) is right to draw attention to the inequities of Western liberal democracies, but I will contend that (a) wherever actually existing liberal democracies fail to show tolerance towards religious minorities, it is not the fault of liberalism, and that (b) Yousif’s counter ideal of an Islamic state is less than ideal. (shrink)
Is there such a thing called “Islamic philosophy”? If there is one, what is it? What does it mean for philosophy to be Islamic? How does Islamic philosophy differ from non-Islamic one? Why do some Muslim scholars reject philosophy, ban its instruction, and even scorn its proponents? The present article will address all these questions and seeks to offer a balanced perspective on controversial issues pertaining to philosophy in Islamic intellectual context, drawing upon authoritative, primary sources. The first section deals (...) with definition and terminology, including the disagreement among scholars over which of these is the best appellation: ‘Islamic philosophy’, ’Muslim philosophy’, or ’Arabic philosophy’. This will be followed by a discussion of the main sources of Islamic philosophy and its impacts, as well as the aims and benefits of studying philosophy according to its exponents. The final section provides a critical appraisal of the arguments for and against philosophy that have been put forward by its defenders and its critics. Furthermore, the article also discusses three current approaches to Islamic philosophy, namely the mystical- hermeneutical such as advocated by Leo Strauss and Henry Corbin, the historical- philological study such as practiced Richard Walzer and Dimitri Gutas, and the philosophical-analytical approach such as espoused by Oliver Leaman and Lenn E. Goodman. A final word about the challenges and prospect of Islamic philosophical studies is in order, taking into account recent developments in various parts of the world following revival of interest in Avicenna, Averroes and al-Ghazali. (shrink)
The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...) Harold Langsam—discuss how more precisely its answer to the challenge would go. (shrink)
In Feminist Edges of the Qur’an, Aysha Hidayatullah argues that certain Qur’anic verses are incorrigibly male-privileging and are themselves privileged. Hence, egalitarian readings of the Qur’an are unsupported and unsupportable. If, as egalitarians propose, such verses are unjust, then either the Qur’an is not God’s word or God is unjust. By contrast, I argue that no evidence suggests any such verses are incorrigibly male- privileging. Further I indicate egalitarian rereadings for relevant contenders and note that, in any case, no Qur’anic (...) evidence warrants the primacy of such verses. Finally, since controverting egalitarian readings of such verses are available, the logical form of Hidayatullah’s argument merely shows that if they are read to exhibit injustice, those readings cannot be God’s word. Since believers hold that the Qur’an is God’s word, there is no option but to reread them. (shrink)
This article reviews the political thought of one of the most important figures during the Islamic resurgence in the 20th century, Abul A’la Maududi. The thought of Maududi is often read superficially by either those desiring to portray him as politically ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ as well as ‘backwards’ and ‘conservative’. The core of debates surrounding Maududi’s support for liberal democratic principles such as equality, freedom, democratic elections, and the like are pinpointed and reviewed individually, according to two main primary texts, (...) Islamic Way of Life, and Islamic Law and Constitution. The themes that are covered by the article concern (a) the meaning of his term ‘theodemocracy’; (b) Maududi’s understanding of the ‘shurah council’ (advisory council to the Caliph) and its meaning in terms of popular sovereignty; and (c) the people’s role in maintaining rule of law and the office of the Caliph. It is argued that after a review of these concepts within their respective contexts, the argument attempting to show Maududi as an ‘innovator’ or ‘progressive’ in terms of his application of Islamic law in his modern-day ideal for an Islamic state collapses. Rather, it is shown that Maududi clearly envisioned the ideal Caliphate as one established by the prophet Muhammad and his companions (the ‘Rashidūn Caliphate’) and affirmed Divine sovereignty over the general concept of ‘popular sovereignty’ as conceived by western political thought. (shrink)
The sunflower seed is the seed of the sunflower (Helianthus annuus). The methanol extract of seeds of Helianthus annuus were screened for analgesic activity in mice model to systematically explore the medicinal values of the plant. Acetic acid induced writhing and hot plate methods were used to confirm the central and peripheral analgesic action. In case of acetic acid-induced writhing test the extract showed significant (P <0.05) analgesic potential at doses 100 and 200 mg/kg body weight (50.35 and 57.85% inhibition, (...) respectively). In the hot plate method, increase (p < 0.05) of latency period was also observed in comparison to standard aspirin. At 60 minutes, the latency period of two different doses (100 and 200 mg/kg body weight) was found at 13 ± 0.91 and 16.5 ± 1.55 second. The results obtained support the use of Helianthus annuus seeds in painful conditions acting both centrally and peripherally. (shrink)
Introduction: The incidence of chronic low back pain (LBP) is very high in Bangladesh. There is a high prevalence of psychiatric diseases among chronic low back pain patients. But primary care physicians and specialists do not screen this association. The aims of this study were to evaluate the incidence and pattern of psychiatric diseases in chronic low back pain patients. Materials and methods: A prospective cross-sectional hospital-based study of 135 chronic low back pain patients using simple, direct, standardized questionnaire including (...) history and detailed psychiatric evaluation by a consultant psychiatrist from January to December 2014. Results: A total 69 chronic low back pain patients (51.1%) were diagnosed with psychiatric problems. Predominant group were female (65.9%), above 40 years of age (60.7%). Depression (44.9 %) and anxiety (31.9%) were the major psychiatric illness diagnosed (76.8%). Only 17.4 % patients expects complete cure. Fear of disease outcome was the commonest precipitating factor found (66.6%). With the adjuvant psychiatric management, 81.1% showed improvement clinically. Conclusion: Detecting the level of psychiatric illness among chronic low back pain patients at early stage will improve the treatment outcome. A referral system to psychiatrists by physicians needs to develop to screen the mental disorder symptoms to treat the problem. (shrink)
Background: Leprosy is a chronic granulomatous infectious disease having major burden on humans over thousands of years. If untreated, it results in permanent damage to various systems and organs. So we designed this study to evaluate the neurological complications in early stage in adult leprosy patients. Objective: The aim of this study was to find out the pattern of neurological manifestations among adult leprosy patients. Materials and Methods: This cross-sectional hospital-based study on 85 adult tribal leprosy patients was conducted in (...) a district level health care facility from January to December 2014 using simple, direct, standardized questionnaire including history and neurological examinations. Results: The commonest age group affected was 18–30 years (62.4%). Male group was predominant (68.2%). Majority cases (66%) had multibacillary leprosy. At first visit 72.7% cases with neurological findings could not be diagnosed correctly by primary health care personnel. More than six months were required for correct diagnosis in 61.2% cases. Numbness was the commonest (74.5%) neurological symptom. In upper limb, motor findings were predominant with wasting in 50.9% cases. In lower limb, sensory findings were predominant with stock pattern sensory impairment being the commonest (56.4%). Ulnar nerve was the commonest peripheral nerve to enlarge with tenderness. Facial nerve was the commonest cranial nerve involved. All cases with multiple cranial nerves involvement were of multibacillary type. Due to physical disability 92.7% cases lost their jobs. (shrink)
Background: Leprosy is a chronic granulomatous infectious disease having major burden on humans over thousands of years. If untreated, it results in permanent damage to various systems and organs. So we designed this study to evaluate the neurological complications in early stage in adult leprosy patients. Objective: The aim of this study was to find out the pattern of neurological manifestations among adult leprosy patients. Materials and Methods: This cross-sectional hospital-based study on 85 adult tribal leprosy patients was conducted in (...) a district level health care facility from January to December 2014 using simple, direct, standardized questionnaire including history and neurological examinations. Results: The commonest age group affected was 18–30 years (62.4%). Male group was predominant (68.2%). Majority cases (66%) had multibacillary leprosy. At first visit 72.7% cases with neurological findings could not be diagnosed correctly by primary health care personnel. More than six months were required for correct diagnosis in 61.2% cases. Numbness was the commonest (74.5%) neurological symptom. In upper limb, motor findings were predominant with wasting in 50.9% cases. In lower limb, sensory findings were predominant with stock pattern sensory impairment being the commonest (56.4%). Ulnar nerve was the commonest peripheral nerve to enlarge with tenderness. Facial nerve was the commonest cranial nerve involved. All cases with multiple cranial nerves involvement were of multibacillary type. Due to physical disability 92.7% cases lost their jobs. Conclusion: In this study neurological involvement was found associated with severe disability. ! (shrink)
Pemanfaatan sel punca embrionik (Embryonic Stem Cells/ESCs) telah menjadi isu global dalam bidang bioteknologi modern yang selalu memicu perdebatan mendalam dari berbagai ilmuwan, filosof, agamawan, ahli hukum dan praktisi politik. Penelitian ini membahas gambaran umum dan manfaat sel punca embrionik, serta menganalisisnya berdasarkan pandangan hukum Islam. Metode yang digunakan adalah studi pustaka multidisiplin dari teks-teks ilmu medis, etika dan hukum Islam. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa meskipun masih terdapat perbedaan pandangan dari para ahli hukum Islam tentang kapan (...) awal mula kehidupan, namun ahli hukum Islam secara tegas membedakan antara “kehidupan aktual (actual life)” dan “kehidupan potensial (potential life)”. Kedua jenis kehidupan ini dibedakan oleh waktu peniupan roh pada manusia. Sehingga melalui pandangan ini dapat disimpulkan bahwa pemanfaatan sel punca embrionik dalam pengembangan bioteknologi dapat dibenarkan karena pengertian manusia pada tahap embrio dipahami sebagai manusia “potensial”, sebatas jasad yang belum memiliki roh, dan belum dapat dikatakan sebagai manusia “aktual” yang memiliki kehidupan “aktual” bersama roh dan jasad. (shrink)
I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)
This article compares James M. Buchanan's and John Rawls's theories of democratic governance. In particular it compares their positions on the characteristics of a legitimate social contract. Where Buchanan argues that additional police force can be used to quell political demonstrations, Rawls argues for a social contract that meets the difference principle.
Retributivists are often thought to give 'deontological' theories of punishment, arguing that we should punish not for the beneficial consequences of doing so such as deterrence or incapacitation, but purely because justice demands it. Kant is often regarded as the paradigmatic retributivist. In some passages Kant does appear to give a deontological theory of punishment. For example, Kant insists that on an island where all the people were to leave the next day, forever dissolving and dispersing the community, the last (...) murderer in jail would have to have his execution carried out before the diaspora--justice demands it. In other passages, however, Kant defends punishment by appealing to its beneficial consequences. For example, after supposing that one man on a life raft pushes the other off to save his own life, Kant says that the former man should not be legally punished "because that punishment would have to be death, and it would be an absurd law that threatened death to one who refuses to die voluntarily in a dangerous situation." In this passage Kant's reasoning is that state laws, by threatening us with sanctions, are intended to prevent us from violating rights--the point of these laws is to deter. A law that imposes a punishment that could not deter is an absurd law. I argue that while Kant rejects consequentialism in thinking about moral actions, he distinguishes law and morality, and in the sphere of law, an action we take is to be justified by appealing to the good it yields. The point of legal punishment is to deter violations of rights and protect us from a state of nature in which no one's freedom is assured. Kant's theory of legal (as opposed to moral) punishment is not deontological. Nevertheless we can characterize his consequentialist theory of legal punishment as retributive in some sense. The paper then considers how the passages about punishment in which Kant invokes consequentialist thinking can be reconciled with other passages where he insists on punishment regardless of the consequences. (shrink)
قراءة وتعليق لكتاب (فهم الإسلام في اليابان) للأستاذ الدكتور سمير نوح. يقع الكتاب في 256 صفحة من القطع المتوسط، ويتألف من مقدمة ومدخل وستة فصول، تتناول في مجملها طبيعة فهم اليابانيين للأديان بصفة عامة، وللدين الإسلامي بصفة خاصة، وفعاليات العلاقات العربية الإسلامية اليابانية منذ بدايتها وحتى وقتنا الراهن في معية المتغيرات الدولية المؤثرة، وطبيعة حياة المسلمين في اليابان: قضاياهم ومشكلاتهم وطموحاتهم، فضلاً عن أنشطة الجامعات اليابانية ومراكز البحوث والأكاديميين اليابانيين في مجال التعريف بالإسلام وبثقافته وحضارته. وتكمن أهمية الكتاب في كونه (...) يمثل مصدرًا ثريًا للقارئ العربي المهتم بالشأن الياباني مقارنة بالوضع الحضاري للعالم العربي – الإسلامي، بالإضافة إلى ما يحمله بين جنباته من إجابات لتساؤلات تؤرق بالضرورة كل من سمع أو عايش أو قرأ عن التجربة اليابانية. (shrink)
This paper is a part-review analysis into the modern conception of both the word and Jihād and the violent nature of Islam. In order to develop an overarching modern theory of Jihād, current opinions and general argumtations in the literature are examined. Two theories have emerged in defining Islam and the role of Jihād in Islam. The first is that of the so-called Muslim apologists; scholars who define Jihād as mainly a personal struggle, and whose physical application (...) (warfare) is only in self-defence of the Islamic community. The second sponsors the concept of ‘offensive’ Jihād: that Islam is imperialistic and has a vision of global domination. The stark contrast in the divisions that the scholarship have are indicative of two opposing parties, likely each basing their respective policy positions on beliefs on the nature of Islam as a violent of peaceful ‘religion’. (shrink)
The role of reason, and its embodiment in philosophical-scientific theorizing, is always a troubling one for religious traditions. The deep emotional needs that religion strives to satisfy seem ever linked to an attitudes of acceptance, belief, or trust, yet, in its theoretical employment, reason functions as a critic as much as it does a creator, and in the special fields of metaphysics and epistemology its critical arrows are sometimes aimed at long-standing cherished beliefs. Understandably, the mere approach to these beliefs (...) through organized philosophical activity, however well-intended, is viewed with suspicion by ecclesiastical authorities and the devout. The attitude towards philosophical inquiry on the part of the Islamic religious community might be thought to typify this reaction. As one of the great prophetic religions, the self-avowed image of Islam is of a tradition which already possesses the truth as set forth in the divine revelation of the Qur'an. What need is there for philosophizing on fundamental matters, e.g., the ultimate nature of reality, the foundations of morality, the modes whereby the divine is connected with the temporal? The structure of creation is already made clear, the "straight path" for living already manifest. how can philosophical activity be anything but a source of divisive controversy, for as it turns its gaze to the foundations upon which the Shari`a' (Islamic Law) rests, or to the grounds for religious belief itself, it cannot avoid turning up alternative viewpoints, different perspectives on divine revelation, noting various weaknesses in received 1 interpretations? In short, isn't the practice of philosophy a threat to Islam's promise of providing a comprehensive way of living devoid of skepticism and uncertainty about the place of a human in God's creation and his or her role in the 'umma (Islamic community)? This problem is not unique to Islam, nor is it a new one within Islam. We know that it has been debated by Islamic thinkers since the translations of the Greek philosophers began to appear in an organized Islamic world during the 8th Century A.. (shrink)
This thesis examines Mir-Hosseini’s hermeneutical strategies to reinterpret how Islam understands gender equality by evaluating whether she allows the text to speak or uses specific hermeneutical methods to create the desired egalitarian meaning. I argue that her strategies fail to succeed by examining her understanding of Qur’an 4:34, which she considers the linchpin to furthering gender oppression in Islam, by utilizing Aysha A. Hidayatullah’s work as a framework of examination. I evaluate the interpretive choices she uses to recover (...) gender equality in the Qur’anic and the hadith texts and show that her effort fails to show that the Islamic texts teach the gender equality she purports that they teach. (shrink)
This paper examines the complexity and fluidity of maternal identity through an examination of narratives about "real motherhood" found in children's literature. Focusing on the multiplicity of mothers in adoption, I question standard views of maternity in which gestational, genetic and social mothering all coincide in a single person. The shortcomings of traditional notions of motherhood are overcome by developing a fluid and inclusive conception of maternal reality as authored by a child's own perceptions.
Many different meanings are attributed to the term Sufi. From the philosophical standpoint the sufi sect leans towards the mystic tradition, while taken etymologically the word implies anything which is extracted from wool. Sufi was the term applied to those individuals who went through life wearing a woolen gown, spending their life in mediation and prayer. Other scholars are of the opinion that the terms sufi is derived from the root “Suffa” which is applicable to the platform built by Mohammad (...) in the mosque at Madina. Hence the term sufi applied to those benevolent and pure but homeless people who spent their time sitting on this platform and meditating upon this life and the hereafter. According to Gazzzali , the term sufi implies a man’s remaining at peace with the world, in mediation upon God. We can say that the Sufis are example of pure spiritual discipline which require a sense of dedication and humanity to get the ultimate goal of life i.e. self-realisation. (shrink)
According to a naïve view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, ‘ought’ often expresses a relation between agents and actions – the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naïve view that ‘ought’ always expresses this relation – on the contrary, adherents of the naïve view are happy to allow that ‘ought’ also has an epistemic sense, on which it means, (...) roughly, that some proposition is likely to be the case, and adherents of the naïve view are also typically happy to allow that ‘ought’ also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case.1 What is important to the naïve view is not that these other senses of ‘ought’ do not exist, but rather that they are not exhaustive – for what they leave out, is the important deliberative sense of ‘ought’, which is the central subject of moral inquiry about what we ought to do and why – and it is this deliberative sense of ‘ought’ which the naïve view understands to express a relation between agents and actions.2 In contrast, logically and linguistically sophisticated philosophers – with a few notable exceptions3 – have rejected this naïve view. According to a dominant perspective in the interpretation of deontic logic and in linguistic semantics, for example, articulated by Roderick Chisholm (1964) and Bernard Williams (1981) in philosophy and in the dominant paradigm in linguistic semantics as articulated in particular by.. (shrink)
You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) (...) fragmentation entails indeterminacy. I support (1) by examining psychological experiments in which most participants behave deplorably (e.g., by maltreating “prisoners” in a simulated prison) or admirably (e.g., by intervening in a simulated theft). I support (2) by arguing that, according to certain plausible conceptions, character evaluations presuppose behavioral consistency (lack of fragmentation). Possible reactions to the paradox include: (a) denying that the experiments are relevant to character; (b) upholding conceptions according to which character evaluations do not presuppose consistency; (c) granting that most people are indeterminate and explaining why it appears otherwise. I defend (c) against (a) and (b). (shrink)
The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the (...) law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. (shrink)
Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)
Le XI.ème Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M..) s’est déroulé à Porto (Portugal), du 26 au 30 août 2002, sous le thème général: Intellect et Imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. A partir des héritages platonicien, aristotélicien, stoïcien, ou néo-platonicien (dans leurs variantes grecques, latines, arabes, juives), la conceptualisation et la problématisation de l’imagination et de l’intellect, ou même des facultés de l’âme en général, apparaissaient comme une ouverture possible pour aborder (...) les principaux points de la pensée médiévale. Les Actes du congrès montrent que « imagination » et « intellect » sont porteurs d’une richesse philosophique extraordinaire dans l’économie de la philosophie médiévale et de la constitution de ses spécificités historiques. Dans sa signification la plus large, la théorisation de ces deux facultés de l’âme permet de dédoubler le débat en au moins six grands domaines: — la relation avec le sensible, où la fantaisie/l’imagination joue le rôle de médiation dans la perception du monde et dans la constitution de la connaissance ; — la réflexion sur l’acte de connaître et la découverte de soi en tant que sujet de pensée ; — la position dans la nature, dans le cosmos, et dans le temps de celui qui pense et qui connaît par les sens externes, internes et par l’intellect ; — la recherche d’un fondement pour la connaissance et l’action, par la possibilité du dépassement de la distante proximité du transcendant, de l’absolu, de la vérité et du bien ; — la réalisation de la félicité en tant qu’objectif ultime, de même que la découverte d’une tendance au dépassement actif ou mystique de toutes les limites naturelles et des facultés de l’âme ; — la constitution de théories de l’image, sensible ou intellectuelle, et de ses fonctions. Les 3 volumes d’Actes incluent les 16 leçons plénières et 112 communications, ainsi que les index correspondants (manuscrits ; noms anciens et médiévaux ; noms modernes ; auteurs). Le volume IV des Actes, contenant 39 communications et des index, est publié par la revue " Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos ", du Gabinete de Filosofia Medieval de l’Universidade do Porto (volume 23, de 2004). Ouvrage publié avec l’appui de l’Universidade do Porto, de la Faculdade de Letras da U.P., du Departamento de Filosofia - F.L.U.P. et de la Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portugal). (shrink)
Why does classical equilibrium statistical mechanics work? Malament and Zabell (1980) noticed that, for ergodic dynamical systems, the unique absolutely continuous invariant probability measure is the microcanonical. Earman and Rédei (1996) replied that systems of interest are very probably not ergodic, so that absolutely continuous invariant probability measures very distant from the microcanonical exist. In response I define the generalized properties of epsilon-ergodicity and epsilon-continuity, I review computational evidence indicating that systems of interest are epsilon-ergodic, I adapt Malament and Zabell’s (...) defense of absolute continuity to support epsilon-continuity, and I prove that, for epsilon-ergodic systems, every epsilon-continuous invariant probability measure is very close to the microcanonical. (shrink)
Over the past fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what theoretical population dynamic models tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift. On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statistical parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical description of population (...) change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is to provide a definitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order effect; 2. Trait fitness is primitive; 3. Modern Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative. (shrink)
Looking at the recent spate of claims about “fake news” which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. Te phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indiference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. Tis indiference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to fourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the “public” epistemology that maintains what (...) is considered “rational” public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse. (shrink)
Imperatives cannot be true, but they can be obeyed or binding: `Surrender!' is obeyed if you surrender and is binding if you have a reason to surrender. A pure declarative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are declaratives — is valid exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is true if the conjunction of its premisses is true; similarly, I suggest, a pure imperative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are imperatives — is obedience-valid (alternatively: bindingness-valid) exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is (...) obeyed (alternatively: binding) if the conjunction of its premisses is. I argue that there are two kinds of bindingness, and that a vacillation between two corresponding variants of bindingness-validity largely explains conflicting intuitions concerning the validity of some pure imperative arguments. I prove that for each of those two variants of bindingness-validity there is an equivalent variant of obedience-validity. Finally, I address alternative accounts of pure imperative inference. (shrink)
The Integrated Information Theory is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main (...) problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem. (shrink)
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. In this paper, I show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but rather derives from a trilemma that confronts almost any theory of consciousness. Given most theories of consciousness, (...) the following three claims are inconsistent. INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems do not overlap with other conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the many). REDUCTIONISM: Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental properties (as per standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). In view of this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is necessarily less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I will also consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best option for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP. (shrink)
Even within religion, the creativity of imagination offers an invaluable defense against the tendencies towards dogma and absolutism. It also provides spaces living and experiencing life in diverse ways. This paper discusses the different facets of creative imagination in religious art and literature forms by comparing Isaac Bashevis Singer’s In My Father’s Court with Wayang shadow theater in Indonesia. I will show that they possess similar features demonstrating a reflection on religious law, creativity and everyday life. In Singer’s work, the (...) synagogue is a theater, and Singer’s father functions in the same way the puppet master, or Dalang. operates in Wayang theater. This allows for the negotiations between religious law and the living community. (shrink)
"Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight" is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, "since surrender" or "it follows that surrender or fight", and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (...) ("surrender or fight" permits you to fight without surrendering, but "surrender" does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one's mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of 'inference', some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one's mind. (shrink)
Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated with stimuli (...) beneficial to survival and reproduction – such as eating and breathing? According to the argument, the fact that we have these particular correlations and not other ones must have an evolutionary explanation. But given epiphenomenalism, differences in phenomenal properties could not cause differences in fitness, so natural selection would not be expected to favor these correlations over any other ones. Epiphenomenalism thus renders these correlations an inexplicable coincidence, and should therefore be rejected. The evolutionary argument has been widely criticized and few have deemed it cogent (Broad 1925; Jackson 1982; Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014). In this paper, I will consider previous and potential criticisms and conclude some of them are indeed fatal to the argument if it is understood, as it traditionally has been, as an argument for any standard version of non-epiphenomenalism such as physicalism and interactionism. I will then offer a new and improved version of the argument, as an argument for a particular non-epiphenomenalist view, which I will call the phenomenal powers view. This is the view that phenomenal properties produce and thereby (metaphysically) necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, or in virtue of their intrinsic, phenomenal character alone – along the lines of C. B. Martin and John Heil’s powerful qualities view (Martin and Heil 1999; Heil 2003). I will argue that the phenomenal powers view explains the correlations given natural selection far better than any other view. It follows that if (and only if) understood as an argument for the phenomenal powers view, the evolutionary argument is far stronger than it is usually thought to be. (shrink)
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