What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.

Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product–process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product.

Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. (...) This has mistakenly encouraged the view that the only way to think of process is as the stuff of events, and has obscured the possibility of thinking of processes as individual continuants. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an explosion of philosophical work on blame. Much of this work has focused on explicating the nature of blame or on examining the norms that govern it, and the primary motivation for theorizing about blame seems to derive from blame’s tight connection to responsibility. However, very little philosophical attention has been given to praise and its attendant practices. In this paper, I identify three possible explanations for this lack of attention. My goal is to (...) show that each of these lines of thought is mistaken and to argue that praise is deserving of careful, independent analysis by philosophers interested in theorizing about responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a novel challenge to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness theory of moral responsibility. According to their view, agents possess the control necessary for moral responsibility if their actions proceed from a mechanism that is moderately reasons-responsive. I argue that their account of moderate reasons-responsiveness fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility since it cannot give an adequate account of the responsibility of individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Empirical evidence suggests that (...) autistic individuals demonstrate impairments in counterfactual thinking, and these impairments, I argue, are such that they cast doubt on Fischer and Ravizza’s construal of moderate reasons-responsiveness. I then argue that modifying the view in order to accommodate individuals with ASD forces them to defend a strong reasons-responsive account despite the fact that they explicitly deny that such an account can adequately characterize what it is to be morally responsible for one’s actions. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out (...) but who are nevertheless not responsible agents. Attending to the moral psychology of such individuals will, I think, help shed light on an important gap in the conversational theory. (shrink)

The Substituted Judgment Standard for surrogate decision-making dictates that a surrogate, when making medical decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient, ought to make the decision that the patient would have made if the patient had decisional capacity. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, SJS has been the target of a variety of criticisms. Most objections to SJS appeal to epistemic difficulties involved in determining what a patient would have decided in a given case. In this article, I offer an alternative (...) standard for surrogate decision-making that avoids these difficulties. I then offer an account of its theoretical underpinnings which shows that it preserves the central moral justification for SJS, namely, respect for patient autonomy. (shrink)

An influential philosophical conception of our mind’s place in the world is as a site for the states and events that causally mediate the world we perceive and the world we affect. According to this conception, states and events in the world cause mental states and events in us through the process of perception. These mental states and events then go on to produce new states and events in the world through the process of action. Our role is as hosts (...) for these states and events that causally mediate the states and events on the input side and those on the output side. (shrink)

I argue that while every betrayal is a breach of trust, not every breach of trust is a betrayal. I defend a conception of trust as primarily a feature of behaviour (i.e. trusting behaviour) and only secondarily a feature of a mental attitude. So it is possible to have the attitude of distrust towards someone while still trusting them in the way you behave. This makes sense of the possibility of Judas Iscariot breaching Jesus’ trust, and so betraying him, even (...) though Jesus presumably knew that Judas would do just that. This conception of trust may be spelt out in terms of making oneself reliant on somebody in a collaboration with them. Such collaborations include relationships like friendships and love affairs, as well as political activities or defending one’s country against aggression. I argue that only when these collaborations involve a commitment to loyalty is a breach of trust a betrayal. And loyalty is a feature of those collaborations or relationships that exclude others – us/them collaborations. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a (...) normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance. (shrink)

This paper presents a challenge for exemplar theories of moral concepts. Some have proposed that we acquire moral concepts by way of exemplars of actions that are prohibited as well as of actions that are required, and we classify newly encountered actions based on their similarity to these exemplars. Judgments of permissibility then follow from these exemplar-based classifications. However, if this were true, then we would expect that individuals who lacked, or were deficient in, the capacity to form or access (...) exemplars of this kind would be similarly deficient in the ability to classify new actions according to them, and this relative inability would be manifested in the moral judgments made by such individuals. However, there is reason to suspect, I think, that a number of individuals who have been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder actually have the deficiencies I have described here but are nevertheless fully able to make sound moral judgments. If this is so, then it must be th... (shrink)

A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it (...) are rebutted, and the possibility of rejecting the second rather than the first of these assumptions is explored briefly. (shrink)

Generosity is not the same thing as kindness or self-sacrifice. Presumptuousness is incompatible with generosity, but not with kindness or self-sacrifice. I consider a kind but interfering neighbour who inappropriately takes over the role of mother to my daughter; her behaviour is not generous. Presumptuousness is the improper exercise of a disposition to adopt a role that one does not have. With this in mind I explore the idea that generosity is the proper exercise of the disposition to adopt a (...) role that one does not have. It is a mean between meanness on the one hand (where that disposition is not exercised when it should be) and presumptuousness on the other hand (where that disposition is exercised when it should not be). Adopting a role is being motivated by the considerations that should motivate someone who actually has that role. The disposition to adopt roles you do not have is important in social situations where there is a need for a role that nobody is filling. It is also the basis of developing relationships like friendship; you have to act as if you are a friend before you become a friend. This model fits the parable of the Good Samaritan in an obvious way. It also explains charity and forgiveness. I suggest that forgiveness is demanded by a certain relationship – call it love. What makes forgiveness optional after someone has wronged you is that love itself may be optional after someone has wronged you. There is nothing generous about forgiving someone you love, though loving them may be generous. Forgiveness only counts as generous when you don’t love the person, and even then it can fail to be generous if it is presumptuous. (shrink)

One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based (...) objection. I then offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible explanation of our differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant features of the action in question. (shrink)

Despite being somewhat long in the tooth at the time, Aristotle, Hume and Kant were still dominating twentieth century moral philosophy. Much of the progress made in that century came from a detailed working through of each of their approaches by the expanding and increasingly professionalized corps of academic philosophers. And this progress can be measured not just by the quality and sophistication of moral philosophy at the end of that century, but also by the narrowing of some of the (...) gaps between Aristotelian, Humean and Kantian philosophers. (shrink)

Arguing against the claim that beliefs are reasons for action.

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In doing (...) so, I present and defend a principle of ‘just assembly’ and argue that satisfying this principle is an essential part of any deliberation regarding the justice of a particular conflict. (shrink)

I argue against the claim that the fundamental form of trust is a 2-place relation of A trusting B and in favour of the fundamental form being a 4-place relation of A, by ψ-ing, trusting B to φ. I characterize trusting behaviour as behaviour that knowingly makes one reliant on someone doing what they are supposed to do in the collaborative enterprise that the trusting behaviour belongs to. I explain how trust is involved in the following collaborative enterprises: knowledge transfer (...) – i.e. telling someone something; maintaining a relationship; and passing responsibility for an action on to someone else. And I finish by showing how our talk of trust in non-collaborative contexts – e.g. trusting a branch to support one’s weight – may be explained by reference to the central sort of collaborative trust. (shrink)

In chapter 14 of Zahavi’s recent book, Self and Other, the notion of shame is discussed. In feeling shame one experiences oneself as experienced by others. For Sartre, that experience in itself is sufficient for shame, as one experiences oneself as determined in the experience of others and hence as shamefully not self-determining. But Zahavi introduces an extra condition for shame, which is a ‘global decrease in self-esteem’. This paper questions the need for this condition and argues that seeing oneself (...) as shameful in the eyes of others needs to be spelt out in a pragmatist way in terms of certain shame-involving practices rather than in a purely phenomenological way. (shrink)

in O’Rourke, F. (ed.), Human Destinies (Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).

Arguing against the claim that beliefs are reasons for action.

The study investigated the management of students’ academic failure among secondary school students for high productivity in Obingwa Local Government Area of Abia State. The study was guided by two research questions and two hypotheses. Descriptive survey research design was used while the population of the study comprised thirty public secondary schools. A sample size of 10 secondary schools was selected from the 30 public secondary schools using stratified random sampling technique. Self-designed instrument entitled “Management Students’ Academic Failure Questionnaire” (MSAFQ) (...) was utilized. The validity of the instrument was ensured. Test retest method was used and reliability co-efficient of 0.80 and 0.83 was obtained through Cronbach Alpha Statistics. Mean was used to answer the research questions while Z-test statistics was used to test the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significant. The findings include but not limited to: lack of instructional material and inability of the teachers to stimulate students are causes of academic failures among students. It is therefore recommended that the government or appropriate agency should ensure adequate supply of functional instructional resources and teachers’ should do well to motivate students to learn thereby save students from incessant failures that could mar their future and life expectations. (shrink)

Love, S. (2007). Using somatic awareness as a guide for making healthy life choices. Somatics Magazine- Journal Of The Mind/Body Arts and Sciences, Volume XV, Number 2, pages 40-43. (Silver Love is same person as author Martha C. Love).

This is a Belarusian translation of an essay interpreting the much-neglected Second Part of Kant's book, Conflict of the Faculties, entitled “An old question raised again: Is the human race constantly progressing?”, by showing the close relationship between the themes it deals with and those Kant addresses in the Supplements and Appendices of Perpetual Peace. In both works, Kant portrays the philosopher as having the duty to promote a “secret article”, without which his vision of a lasting international peace through (...) the agency of a federation of states is bound to fail. Both works identify this article as involving the necessity of publicity as a transcendental condition for peace, and call for philosophers to engage politicians and lawyers in a creative attitude towards lawmaking. Kant’s visionary program has failed to reach its goal up to now, not because it is too idealistic, but because philosophers have failed to take up the challenge. (shrink)

Tradução do artigo "Mill between Aristotle and Bentham".

There is a paucity of research on how psychopathy relates to decision-making. In this study, we assessed the relationship between affective decision-making and psychopathic personality. A sample of prisoners (n D 49) was characterized in terms of psychopathic traits using the Psychopathic Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV). Decision-making was assessed using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Higher levels of psychopathy related to more advantageous choices (p D .003). Also counter-intuitively, higher levels of antisocial traits (facet 4) predicted advantageous choices during the (...) learning phase of the task (p D .004). Our findings suggest that some psychopathic facets may be more relevant to decisionmaking under risk, and highlight the importance of further investigations considering facet and trait-level relationships with decision-making. (shrink)

For the full text of this article see "Download Options PhiPapers Archive and click Download from Archive" at the bottom of this page. First 500 words of article: To my surprise last spring, an article titled “Gut Almighty”, which briefly explained the latest emotion theories on how intuition comes from the gut, was featured in Psychology Today (Flora, 2007) at the same time that my article on gut instinctual somatic responses and healthy life choices was published in Somatics Spring 07 (...) issue (Love, 2007). I wondered if two articles published on the gut in one month might surely be a record, as the gut has not seemed to have so much attention in the media since Gershon’s (1998) book acclaiming it through his neurological research to have a mind of its own. -/- In the months I awaited the publication of my article, I reread Gershon’s (1998) book and it was again delightful to me to read that a scientific investigation actually uncovered evidence that the gut has a separate capacity to generate and record vital responses and functions as what he calls our second brain. Gershon outlines the biological functions of the gut as being its own intelligent brain and having its own vitality that is in communication with, but not dependent upon, the head brain. As I combed through his book and shared emails with my colleague, Robert Sterling, it became quite clear to us that Gershon’s work was supportive of the clinical findings in the work we did as guidance counselors in the 70s. Our work centered around assisting people to assess the meaning of their experiences through an awareness on the empty-full instinctual feeling responses that they identified in the gut region of the body. We found with the people that we counseled that these gut responses were linked to the dynamic struggles of balancing the two needs of the person for acceptance and for feeling in control of one’s own responses (the freedom to respond naturally), and that these two needs were instinctual and necessary to fulfill on a moment to moment basis for continued vitality of the person. Similar to Gershon’s findings, it was also our conclusion that the gut area of the body contains a feeling response center that holds a relationship to the thinking processes of the person, but is a separate response center from the thinking head responses and certainly not dependent upon it. -/- Feeling inspired by Gershon’s (1998) work and the attention recently given to the gut in the literature and media, I decided to write a second article for Somatics that further explains the specific technique of the Somatic Reflection Process (SRP). The intention of this article is to answer the questions about the process that I have been asked in the past year by many friends and colleagues who read my first article last Spring on the findings of Robert Sterling’s and my somatic work as guidance counselors. I am including both the method and a protocol for facilitating the SRP, as well as a brief summary of a recent research study using the SRP protocol presented (Love, 2005). (shrink)

This collection brings together fourteen contributions by authors from around the globe. Each of the contributions engages with questions about how local and global bioethical issues are made to be comparable, in the hope of redressing basic needs and demands for justice. These works demonstrate the significant conceptual contributions that can be made through feminists' attention to debates in a range of interrelated fields, especially as they formulate appropriate responses to developments in medical technology, global economics, population shifts, and poverty.

Sabemos que la conformación de la música tradicional en México, así como en la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos, se debe a la aportación musical europea y africana principalmente. El danzón tradicional, género musical cubano y adoptado en México como propio, es una forma que resultó de la síntesis de patrones rítmicos africanos y formas musicales europeas. Nuestro interés por la obra musical sinfónica Danzón 2 de Arturo Márquez se debe al hecho de que, al mismo tiempo que es una (...) expresión artística, es portadora de elementos tradicionales, los cuales nos permiten apreciar una carga identitaria representativa de nuestro país. Una de las formas que nos permite determinar la expresión de identidad en la música contemporánea es la presencia de elementos musicales tradicionales. En este trabajo se pretende demostrar que el Danzón 2 se constituye, entre otros elementos, por formas musicales y células rítmicas de nuestra tradición. Creemos que una manera de enfrentar los retos que surgen en el siglo XXI, respecto a los temas del universalismo y la cuestión de la identidad, es a través de una actitud abierta y reflexiva en la que se replanteen los patrones tradicionales musicales creativamente. Nuestra visión es que el Danzón 2 –obra creada en 1994– del compositor mexicano Arturo Márquez, lejos de ser una de las manifestaciones político-nacionalistas (que sólo tratan de difundir ciertos patrones " convenientes " para los intereses del Estado o de sus instituciones, anunciándose dentro de la vena de la globalización como multiculturalismo), es una pieza sinfónica que se nos muestra como una obra de arte... (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for her thought-experiment. I also argue (...) that each of her sources of authority presents further difficulties for her project. Finally, I argue that it is not clear that her thought-experiment is one that actually involves identity in any crucial way. As a result, the case she offers does not offer any satisfactory support for her view on the relation between identity, morality and thought-experiments, but we do gain some insights into what that relation really is along the way. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum’s new book Political Emotions is a contribution to political philosophy and, simultaneously, a moral-psychological study of the emotions. In it, she revisits some of the most prominent themes in her 2004 book Hiding from Humanity and her 2001 treatise, Upheavals of Thought. As Nussbaum points out in the opening pages of Political Emotions, one of her goals in this work is to answer a call issued by John Rawls for a “reasonable moral psychology” that would be conceptually (...) refined and empirically grounded, since a complete theoretical account of the just society must be informed by a suitably complex, accurate conception of human emotions. On the whole, Political Emotions is a remarkably successful book that combines several areas of philosophical research in which the author’s proficiency is well known. It shows how problems that lie on the more intimate side of ethics, pertaining for instance to friendship and family life, have relevance for social justice and publi .. (shrink)

Processes are occurrents that were, are, or will be happening. They endure or they perdure, i.e. they are either “fully” present at every time they happen, or they rather have temporal parts. According to Stout (2016), they endure. His argument assumes that processes may change. Then, Stout argues that, if something changes, it endures. As I show, Stout’s Argument misses its target. In particular, it makes use of a notion of change that is either intuitive but illegitimate (...) or technical but question-begging. (shrink)

The paper examines Martha Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian Social Democracy», and in particular her appropriation of Aristotle’s political philosophy. The paper questions Nussbaum’s claim that Aristotle’s account of human nature and her capabilities approach are not metaphysical. It critically analyses Nussbaum’s egalitarian interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of distributive justice, laying out the primary reasons supporting the thesis that Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian Social Democracy» is incompatible with Aristotle’s non-egalitarian political philosophy.

In 1907–8, Russell and Stout presented an objection against James and Schiller, to which both James and Schiller replied. In this paper, I shall revisit their transatlantic exchange. Doing so will yield a better understanding of Schiller’s relationship to a worryingly solipsistic brand of phenomenalism. It will also allow us to appreciate a crucial difference between Schiller and James; a difference which James explicitly downplayed.

Martha Nussbaum, filosofa e accademica statunitense, maestra del nostro tempo, attualmente docente di diritto ed etica all’Università di Chicago, è una pensatrice molto amata e dibattuta e autrice, insieme ad Amartya Sen, della celebre ‘teoria delle capacità’. Studiosa del mondo classico, esordisce con un’opera dal titolo ‘La fragilità del bene’, che la fa conoscere in tutto il mondo. Eppure, di questa docente e conferenziera di caratura mondiale, nel nostro Paese ancora non esistono opere che la riguardino, se non alcune (...) tesi di dottorato reperibili nel catalogo Opac online, comunque non destinate al vasto pubblico. […] Allora ho pensato che vi sia la necessità di spiegare in sintesi i concetti fondamentali della sua filosofia, racchiusa per lo più in volumi di grosso spessore, che, come tali, possono forse scoraggiare la lettura di chi non ha pazienza per addentrarsi in un pensiero tanto ricco, complesso e affascinante. Dalla lettura che ho fatto di quattro sue opere in versione integrale, “La fragilità del bene”, “Coltivare l’umanità”, “Non per profitto”, “Emozioni politiche”, è nato questo mio lavoro. (shrink)

The practical aspect of ancient philosophy has been recently made a focus of renewed metaphilosophical investigation. After a brief presentation of three accounts of this kind developed by Martha Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot, and Michel Foucault, the model of the therapeutic argument developed by Nussbaum is called into question from the perspectives offered by her French colleagues, who emphasize spiritual exercise (Hadot) or the care of the self (Foucault). The ways in which the account of Nussbaum can be defended are (...) then discussed, including both a ‘negative’ defense, i.e. the indication of the weaknesses of Hadot and Foucault’s proposals, and a ‘positive’ one focused on the points in which Nussbaum can convincingly address doubts about her metaphilosophical account. In response to these analyses, some further remarks made by Hadot and Foucault are discussed in order to demonstrate that their accounts are not as distant from Nussbaum after all. Finally, a recent metaphilosophical study by John Sellars together with a therapeutic (medical) model developed by the author of the present article are suggested as providing a framework for potential reconciliation between all three accounts discussed and a resource for further metaphilosophical studies. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo realiza un diálogo marxista latinoamericano con la pedagogía socrática de la filósofa norteamericana, Martha Nussbaum, expuesto en su manifiesto Sin fines de lucro: por qué la democracia necesita de las humanidades (2010). En un primer momento, se dilucida la tesis de la autora y sus argumentos filosóficos, de diagnóstico de crisis y de parentesco. Posteriormente, se controvierte su argumentación y matriz liberal a través de indagaciones marxiano-socráticas y refutaciones. Finalmente, se arriba a una sentencia filosófica sobre (...) el régimen educativo del capital y las apuestas recuperadoras de la tradición griega desde la pedagogía socialista. (shrink)

Dieses Buch stellt mit Alasdair MacIntyres After virtue und Jeffrey Stouts Ethics after Babel zwei grundlegende Werke der anglo-amerikanischen Moralphilosophie vor. Beide Autoren behaupten, dass wir moralische Konflikte nicht lösen können, weil unsere liberale Gesellschaft von einem Ethikmodell ausgeht, das auf falschen erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen fußt. Der Fehler eines liberalen Ethikansatzes liegt ihrer Ansicht nach darin, dass er versucht, diese Konflikte durch eine Letztbegründung ethischer Prinzipien zu lösen. Im Gegensatz zu einem solchen „fundamentalistischen“ Modell der Ethikbegründung argumen-tieren Stout und MacIntyre, (...) dass die Rechtfertigung von Normen vom jeweiligen sozialen und kul-turellen Kontext abhängig ist. Sie weisen nach, dass dies aber nicht zu einem umfassenden Rela-tivismus führen muss. Während MacIntyre davon ausgeht, dass eine derartige „nicht-fundamentalistische“ Ethikbegründung einen gleichzeitigen Bruch mit dem Liberalismus erfordert, zeigt Stout hingegen, dass eine kontextualistische Neubegründung der Moral gelingen kann, wenn man den Liberalismus selbst als moralische Tradition reinterpretiert. Nach einer Kritik an den „nicht-fundamentalistischen“ Ansätzen MacIntyres und Stouts wird am Ende des Buches dargestellt, dass sich ihre Schwächen durch eine Kombination korrigieren las-sen. (shrink)

Se situant au confluent du libéralisme politique rawlsien et de l’anthropologie néoaristotélicienne, l’approche des capabilités de Martha Nussbaum offre un cadre théorique permettant de répondre aux tensions multiculturelles. Cet article constitue une analyse détaillée de la réponse de Nussbaum à ces enjeux, qui prétend unir un pluralisme axiologique à un universalisme moral fort. Nous avancerons que la démarche entreprise par la philosophe porte une tension entre le libéralisme politique rawlsien et le cadre conceptuel apporté par la liste des capabilités. (...) Cette liste pose une difficulté par le déficit démocratique de ses fondements, n’intégrant pas suffisamment des normes d’inclusion et de représentation. Dans un dernier temps, nous tenterons de pallier ces problèmes en intégrant à l’approche de Nussbaum des exigences délibératives. (shrink)

Neste artigo, tivemos o objetivo de analisar como o racionalismo ético limita a ética. Frente a este propósito, expomos a fonte trágica da ética de Aristóteles, para quem a ética não é ciência e não tem uma fonte metafísica. A revelação de Aristóteles mostrou como o seu pensamento ético, por ultrapassar o racionalismo filosófico, inaugura uma corrente de pensamento moral cuja modéstia é mais adequada à fragilidade da condição humana.

Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the (...) anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering. (shrink)

Summary of Nussbaum's book. Raises worries about the political neutrality of her psychoanalytic assumptions and about whether her compassion promoting policies can adequately mitigate problems like racism, selfishness, and partiality.

review of two similar collections on well-being.