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Natalie Alana Ashton
University of Stirling
  1.  42
    The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2019 - Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):153-163.
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  2.  17
    Rethinking Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy.
    ‘Relativism’ is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy. Showing that a view entails relativism is almost always considered tantamount to showing that it is nonsensical. However, relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing – they have features which might be tempting if they weren’t thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. In this paper I argue that it’s possible to secure the intuitively appealing features of at least one kind of relativism – epistemic relativism – without having to accept (...)
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  3. Situating Feminist Epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions (...)
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  4.  14
    Appropriate Belief Without Evidence.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2):7-28.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy.
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  5.  16
    Scientific Perspectives, Feminist Standpoints, and Non-Silly Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - forthcoming - In Michela Massimi & Ana-Maria Cretu (eds.), Knowledge from a Human Point of View.
    Defences of perspectival realism are motivated, in part, by an attempt to find a middle ground between the realist intuition that science seems to tell us a true story about the world, and the Kuhnian intuition that scientific knowledge is historically and culturally situated. The first intuition pulls us towards a traditional, absolutist scientific picture, and the second towards a relativist one. Thus, perspectival realism can be seen as an attempt to secure situated knowledge without entailing epistemic relativism. A very (...)
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  6.  9
    Relativising Epistemic Advantage.Natalie Alana Ashton - forthcoming - In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Relativism.
    In this paper I explore the relationship between social epistemology and relativism in the context of feminist epistemology. I do this by focusing on one particular branch of feminist epistemology - a branch known as standpoint theory - and investigating the connection between this view and epistemic relativism. I begin by defining both epistemic relativism and standpoint theory, and by briefly recounting the standard way that the connection between these two views is understood. The literature at the moment focuses on (...)
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