What does Cyberpunk and AI Ethics have to do with each other? Cyberpunk is a sub-genre of science fiction that explores the post-human relationships between human experience and technology. One similarity between AI Ethics and Cyberpunk literature is that both seek a dialogue in which the reader may inquire about the future and the ethical and social problems that our technological advance may bring upon society. In recent years, an increasing number of ethical matters involving AI have been pointed and (...) debated, and several ethical principles and guides have been suggested as governance policies for the tech industry. However, would this be the role of AI Ethics? To serve as a soft and ambiguous version of the law? I would like to promote in this article a more Cyberpunk way of doing AI Ethics, whit a more anarchic way of governance. In this study, I will seek to expose some of the deficits of the underlying power structures of our society, and suggest that AI governance be subject to public opinion, so that ‘good AI’ can become ‘good AI for all’. (shrink)

O artigo investiga a relação Husserl-Heidegger, para além de suas contribuições à fenomenologia e hermenêutica como novos métodos em filosofia, articulando ontologia e subjetividade, através de um paradigma semânticolingüístico, de forma a delinear qual seria a tarefa hodierna de uma fenomenologia da justiça. The article investigates the Husserl-Heidegger relationship, beyond their historical contributions to both phenomenology and hermeneutics as new methods in philosophy, by articulating ontology and subjectivity through asemantic, linguistic paradigm, so as to delineate the task of a phenomenology (...) of justice. (shrink)

The basic assumption present in these articles is that naturalism is highly compatible with a wide range of relevant philosophical questions and that, regardless of the classical problems faced by the naturalist, the price paid in endorsing naturalism is lower than that paid by essentialist or supernaturalist theories. Yet, the reader will find a variety of approaches, from naturalism in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology to naturalism in the Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind and of the Aesthetics.

Experts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development predict that advances in the dvelopment of intelligent systems and agents will reshape vital areas in our society. Nevertheless, if such an advance isn't done with prudence, it can result in negative outcomes for humanity. For this reason, several researchers in the area are trying to develop a robust, beneficial, and safe concept of artificial intelligence. Currently, several of the open problems in the field of AI research arise from the difficulty of avoiding unwanted (...) behaviors of intelligent agents, and at the same time specifying what we want such systems to do. It is of utmost importance that artificial intelligent agents have their values aligned with human values, given the fact that we cannot expect an AI to develop our moral preferences simply because of its intelligence, as discussed in the Orthogonality Thesis. Perhaps this difficulty comes from the way we are addressing the problem of expressing objectives, values, and ends, using representational cognitive methods. A solution to this problem would be the dynamic cognitive approach proposed by Dreyfus, whose phenomenological philosophy defends that the human experience of being-in-the-world cannot be represented by the symbolic or connectionist cognitive methods. A possible approach to this problem would be to use theoretical models such as SED (situated embodied dynamics) to address the values learning problem in AI. (shrink)

Experts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development predict that advances in the development of intelligent systems and agents will reshape vital areas in our society. Nevertheless, if such an advance is not made prudently and critically-reflexively, it can result in negative outcomes for humanity. For this reason, several researchers in the area have developed a robust, beneficial, and safe concept of AI for the preservation of humanity and the environment. Currently, several of the open problems in the field of AI research (...) arise from the difficulty of avoiding unwanted behaviors of intelligent agents and systems, and at the same time specifying what we really want such systems to do, especially when we look for the possibility of intelligent agents acting in several domains over the long term. It is of utmost importance that artificial intelligent agents have their values aligned with human values, given the fact that we cannot expect an AI to develop human moral values simply because of its intelligence, as discussed in the Orthogonality Thesis. Perhaps this difficulty comes from the way we are addressing the problem of expressing objectives, values, and ends, using representational cognitive methods. A solution to this problem would be the dynamic approach proposed by Dreyfus, whose phenomenological philosophy shows that the human experience of being-in-the-world in several aspects is not well represented by the symbolic or connectionist cognitive method, especially in regards to the question of learning values. A possible approach to this problem would be to use theoretical models such as SED (situated embodied dynamics) to address the values learning problem in AI. (shrink)

How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of (...) the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2nd-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and inter-theoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decision-making problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts. (shrink)

One of the strands of the Transhumanist movement, Singulitarianism, studies the possibility that high-level artificial intelligence may be created in the future, debating ways to ensure that the interaction between human society and advanced artificial intelligence can occur safely and beneficially. But how can we guarantee this safe interaction? Are there any indications that a Singularity may be on the horizon? In trying to answer these questions, We'll make a small introduction to the area of security research in artificial intelligence. (...) We'll review some of the current paradigms in the development of autonomous intelligent systems and evidence that we can use to prospect the coming of a possible technological Singularity. Finally, we will present a reflection using the COVID-19 pandemic, something that showed that our biggest problem in managing existential risks is our lack of coordination skills as a global society. (shrink)

One of the strands of the Transhumanist movement, Singulitarianism, studies the possibility that high-level artificial intelligence may be created in the future, debating ways to ensure that the interaction between human society and advanced artificial intelligence can occur safely and beneficially. But how can we guarantee this safe interaction? Are there any indications that a Singularity may be on the horizon? In trying to answer these questions, We'll make a small introduction to the area of security research in artificial intelligence. (...) We'll review some of the current paradigms in the development of autonomous intelligent systems and evidence that we can use to prospect the coming of a possible technological Singularity. Finally, we will present a reflection using the COVID-19 pandemic, something that showed that our biggest problem in managing existential risks is our lack of coordination skills as a global society. (shrink)

Trata-se de revisitar o debate Rawls-Habermas,em particular, o problema da autonomia política à luz da apropriação que estes autores nos oferecem do procedimentalismo kantiano.Tanto John Rawls quanto Jürgen Habermas, em suas respectivas concepções de "cultura política" e "esfera pública," partem de uma equivocada atribuição de um fundacionalismo moral em Kant de forma a preservar o princípio normativo de universalizabilidade capaz de assegurar a estabilidade de uma "sociedade bem ordenada" e balizar o procedimentalismo democrático enquanto alternativa para os modelos liberais e (...) republicanos. (shrink)

Este artigo procura examinar em que medida a filosofia moral de Kierkegaard se apóia na crítica kantiana da razão dialética. Mostra-se que a rejeição kantiana da prova ontológica da existência de Deus significa um afastamento da incerteza objetiva em direção à certeza prática, enquanto a dialética kierkegaardiana da existência permite que a verdade seja tomada como sendo tanto pessoal quanto objetiva. Se a concepção kierkegaardiana de existência não pode ser separada do Paradoxo Absoluto ou se nem sequer pressupõe a revelação (...) divina parece guiar uma pré-compreensão da oposição luterana entre fé e razão que persiste nas concepções de natureza humana em Kant e Kierkegaard, com relação ao Todo-Outro. (shrink)

O artigo esboça o desenvolvimento da hermenêutica filosófica de Paul Ricoeur a partir de sua fenomenologia da vontade em direção a uma hermenêutica da revelação, mostrando como o projeto radical de destranscendentalizar a subjetividade, subjacente à recepção francesa copntemporânea de uma hermenêutica da suspeita, terma por favorecer um retorno pós-hegeliano a Kant e reformula a filosofia transcendental numa correlação histórica e socialmente mediada entre linguagem e subjetividade, juntamente com uma dialética entre poesis e práxis.

In this paper, I argue that Augustine's conception of God as substance (substantia) has misleadingly been evoked by Martin Heidegger's deconstruction of onto-theological and substantialist variants of metaphysics as they mistook entities (Seienden, entia, beings) f r their very Being (Sein, ens, esse) which cannot be conceptualized or objectified by human thinking, but makes both their thought and reality possible. Even though Augustine sought somehow to reconcile a Neoplatonic, essentialist cosmology with a Judeo-Christian worldview of historical redemption, Heidegger not only (...) failed to properly recognize his indebtedness to Augustinian existential anthropology, but also the latter's contention that the actuality of beings and contingent history ultimately determines ontological concepts in their basic difference from their ontical counterparts, compromising thus Heidegger's intuitive criticisms against the confusion between God and Being (Sein). (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a metaforicidade é inerente à desconstrução de Jacques Derrida e logra articular conceito e metáfora no discurso filosófico, sem reduzir um ao outro, viabilizando uma discursividade sobre a alteridade, como altemativa à dialética hegeliana e sua semiologia de Aufhebung. assim como à própria desconstrução heideggeriana. Mostra-se ainda, à luz da desmitologização empreendida por John Caputo, que a desconstrução derridiana na verdade radicaliza e efetiva a hermenêutica heideggeriana da facticidade.

The article revisits Habermas’s recasting of moral universalism, so as to avoid the aporias of naturalism and cultural relativism, according to a pragmatic-formal perspective that does justice to the complex phenomenon of religion in a postsecular, pluralist world, where believers, atheists, and agnostics can coexist together and actively participate in the construction of a more tolerant, just society.The article revisits Habermas’s recasting of moral universalism, so as to avoid the aporias of naturalism and cultural relativism, according to a pragmatic-formal perspective (...) that does justice to the complex phenomenon of religion in a postsecular, pluralist world, where believers, atheists, and agnostics can coexist together and actively participate in the construction of a more tolerant, just society. (shrink)

The paper seeks to show how Heidegger recasts the problem of reification in Being and Time, so as to address the methodological procedure of formal indication, outlined in his early writings, in order to carry out a deconstruction of ancient ontology. By revisiting Marx's and Lukács's critique of objectification in social relations, especially the former's critique of alienation, in light of Honneth's critical theory of recognition, it is shown how a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of sociality could be reconstructed out of the (...) semantic correlation between reification and formal indication. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta algumas reflexõesacerca da concepção habermasiana demundo da vida, seguindo sua apropriação críticados conceitos de Lebenswelt em Husserl e Lebensformem Wittgenstein, de forma a mostrarem que medida Habermas dá conta da fundamentaçãonormativa de uma teoria crítica da sociedade.

Starting from the sensuous perception of what is seen, an attempt is made at re-casting a Husserlian theory of constitution of the object of intuition, as one leaves the natural attitude through a transcendental method, by positing several theses so as to avoid the aporias of philosophical binary oppositions such as rationalism and empiri-cism, realism and idealism, logicism and psychologism, subjectivism and objectivism, transcendentalism and ontologism, metaphysics and positivism. Throughout fifty-five theses on constitution, the Husserlian proposal of continuously reforming philosophizing (...) by transcendental reduction is revisited, leaving the latter incomplete as new conversions are required by noetic-noematic correlations between world and consciousness. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade. Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivopara responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista dejustificativa epistêmico-moral.The article seeks to show (...) in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood . A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of self-identity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a B-substance y, such that (...) necessarily if y exists x exists). (shrink)

The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.