There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776) is a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological ‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account of (...) human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning. (shrink)

This paper explores one aspect of God’s omniscience, that is, his knowledge of human minds. In §1 I spell out a traditional notion of divine knowledge, and in §2 I argue that our understanding of the thoughts of others is a distinct kind of knowledge from that involved in knowledge of the physical world; it involves empathizing with thinkers. In §3 I show how this is relevant to the question of how, and whether, God understands the thoughts of man. There (...) is, we shall see, some tension between the alleged direct nature of God’s intuition-based knowledge and the empathetic nature of understanding other. (shrink)

Prediction-based decisions, which are often made by utilizing the tools of machine learning, influence nearly all facets of modern life. Ethical concerns about this widespread practice have given rise to the field of fair machine learning and a number of fairness measures, mathematically precise definitions of fairness that purport to determine whether a given prediction-based decision system is fair. Following Reuben Binns (2017), we take ‘fairness’ in this context to be a placeholder for a variety of normative egalitarian considerations. We (...) explore a few fairness measures to suss out their egalitarian roots and evaluate them, both as formalizations of egalitarian ideas and as assertions of what fairness demands of predictive systems. We pay special attention to a recent and popular fairness measure, counterfactual fairness, which holds that a prediction about an individual is fair if it is the same in the actual world and any counterfactual world where the individual belongs to a different demographic group (cf. Kusner et al. (2018)). (shrink)

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya 2015. We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three (...) key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And, three, is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice. (shrink)

In Just Fodder, Milburn argues for a relational account of our duties to animals. Following Clare Palmer, he argues that, though all animals have negative rights that we have a duty not to violate, we only gain positive obligations towards animals in the contexts of our relationships with them, which can be personal or political. He argues that human beings have collective positive duties towards domesticated animals, in virtue of the kind of relationship between us established by domestication. However, when (...) it comes to wild animals, he argues that we have no such morally relevant relationships, and so we have only negative duties towards them. I argue that throughout history and even prehistory human beings have morally entangled themselves with wild animals sufficiently that we may in fact have collective positive duties towards many, if not all, wild animals. (shrink)

While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of the inner (...) structure of intention. In adopting an intention the agent comes to see herself as criticizable depending on whether she executes the intention. This allows us to explain in first-personal terms why the agent becomes disposed to act and deliberate in ways that are characteristic of intention. As intention-formation involves profound changes to reflexive evaluative attitudes, this is the ‘Self-Evaluation’ view of the subjective authority of intention. (shrink)

The charge of hypocrisy is a peculiar kind of accusation: it is damning and ubiquitous; it is used to deny the hypocrite standing to speak; and it is levelled against a great variety of conduct. Much of the philosophical literature on hypocrisy is aimed at explaining why hypocrisy is wrongful and worthy of censure. We focus instead on the use of the accusation of hypocrisy and argue for a revisionary claim. People think that hypocrisy in politics is bad and that (...) calling it out is good. Our novel claim is that even if hypocrisy in politics is bad (and that is a big if), calling it out is worse. We give a feminist case as to why accusations of hypocrisy are problematic. We also go further and claim that hypocrisy is a ubiquitous and perhaps even a necessary and beneficial part of political debate in liberal democracies. We also consider and reject candour as a possible alternative solution to hypocrisy in public debate. We argue that requiring people to be candid is not necessarily a good solution because it will often require one to divulge what is private when there are good reasons not to do so. (shrink)

Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding ‐ understanding of the normative structure of one's action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons (...) explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non‐observational view of practical knowledge are briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non‐observational view is weaker than has been appreciated. (shrink)

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, we (...) should conclude that action explanation is not a species of causal explanation. (shrink)

It has been widely accepted that intentional actions are “the actions to which “a certain sense of the question ‘why?’ is given application” (Anscombe 1957/2000: 9). But there are robust reasons for thinking that this claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which such questions are unsound. We have good reasons for thinking that the questions are not “given application” in these cases. Second, when these questions are “given application” this is best explained, it is argued, not in (...) terms of a necessary link between intentional action and this type of enquiry, but in terms of the fact that this is an enquiry that we pursue when we take an agent to have exercised certain of their rational capacities. (shrink)

This chapter aims to get away from the ‘psychological attitude’ approach framing current philosophical discussion of delusion. We ask not what kind of attitude a delusion is – a belief or an imagination? Something else? – as if it were already clear what the ‘content’ of a delusion could be. We aim instead to shift attention to the question of the ‘object’ of delusions. What is delusion of? What is the object of this form of thinking? This focus on a (...) delusion’s object, over its attitudinal nature, is partly motivated by a desire properly to connect delusory thought with ordinary forms of fantastical thinking that are ubiquitous in the experiences faced by reflective humans in everyday life. We aim at securing a continuity, in a way that much extant discussion of delusion fails to, between delusory thought with more ordinary forms of thinking present in, for example, fantastical or magical thinking. Exploring familiar expressions of such thinking, especially those involved in love and loss, enables us to bring out the way in which such expressions convey forms of affective self-consciousness – that have the subject and her relations as an object – that are not naturally taken as reports liable to investigation as true or false. This raises the question about what how to think about what someone is doing when they give expression to a delusion should we think of them as expressing an attitude towards a truth or false content, or may they be doing something rather different? (shrink)

John Rawls’s political liberalism and its ideal of public reason are tremendously influential in contemporary political philosophy and in constitutional law as well. Many, perhaps even most, liberals are Rawlsians of one stripe or another. This is problematic, because most liberals also support the redefinition of civil marriage to include same-sex unions, and as I show, Rawls’s political liberalism actually prohibits same- sex marriage. Recently in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, however, California’s northern federal district court reinterpreted the traditional rational basis review (...) in terms of liberal neutrality akin to Rawls’s “public reason,” and overturned Proposition 8 and established same-sex marriage. (This reinterpretation was amplified in the 9th Circuit Court’s decision upholding the district court on appeal in Perry v. Brown.) But on its own grounds Perry should have drawn the opposite conclusion. This is because all the available arguments for recognizing same-sex unions as civil marriages stem from controversial comprehensive doctrines about the good, and this violates the ideal of public reason; yet there remains a publicly reasonable argument for traditional marriage, which I sketch here. In the course of my argument I develop Rawls’s politically liberal account of the family by drawing upon work by J. David Velleman and H. L. A. Hart, and discuss the implications of this account for political theory and constitutional law. (shrink)

In this paper, we raise and discuss a puzzle about the relationships among goods, reasons, and deontic status. Suppose you have it within your power to give someone something they would enjoy. The following claims seem platitudinous: you can use this power to reward whatever kind of option you want, thereby making that option better and generating a reason for that person to perform it; this reason is then weighed alongside and against the other reasons at play; and altogether, the (...) reasons determine the deontic statuses of that person’s options. We show, however, that in a certain class of cases at least one of these apparent platitudes must be false. In particular, we show that in a certain kind of case wrongfulness cannot be rewarded. In some cases, if one tries to reward wrongfulness, something surprising must go awry: either what you attempt to give as a reward would not, in fact, be good, or it would not generate a reason, or it would have a surprising effect on the deontic status of the relevant options. The upshot is that the relationships among goods, reasons, and deontic status are complicated in ways that have not previously been remarked. (shrink)

Thông tin là nguyên liệu quan trọng trong đời sống hiện đại. Dường như, đô thị là nơi tập trung nhiều thông tin hơn cả, do hệ thống hạ tầng được đầu tư tốt, và thói quen tiêu dùng thông tin cũng phổ biến. Ngoài ra, tính sẵn sàng chi trả cho thông tin có giá trị cũng làm cho nền kinh tế dựa trên thông tin phát đạt ở đô thị. Tuy nhiên, cũng vì vậy mà nguồn gốc thiên (...) nhiên của một lượng thông tin vô giá trong đời sống con người đã tích tụ cả ngàn năm, đôi khi chưa được nhận thức đúng mức. (shrink)

At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. In these remarks I suggest (...) that Zahavi’s view of what he calls ‘The Experiential Self’ defends precisely the sorts of claims to which a Kantian account of consciousness is fundamentally opposed, and while assessing the overall merits of the two contrasting outlooks is no easy matter, I side with the Kantian view. (shrink)

Augustin est bien connu comme défenseur d’une « théorie privative » du mal. On peut lire, par exemple, dans les Confessions que « le mal n’est que la privation du bien, à la limite du pur néant ». Le problème, cependant, avec les théories privatives du mal est qu’elles ne nous offrent pas, généralement, une explication robuste ni de l’activité du mal, ni de son pouvoir à causer des effets bien réels ; effets desquels l’expérience demande, malgré tout, une explication (...) rationnelle. Or, selon Augustin, la privation seule ne permet pas de rendre compte de toutes les manifestations du mal. L’explication privative du mal est, certes, la plus étudiée par la littérature ; mais elle ne constitue qu’une partie du tableau. Cet article veut souligner quatre moments de l’explication du mal qu’Augustin propose : le mal comme privation ; le mal comme parasite par rapport à l’être ; le mal comme perversion de la volonté ; et finalement, le mal comme conflit d’intérêts. Chacun de ces moments éclaire un type de mal, mais aucun ne permet à lui seul de rendre compte du problème. Pris ensemble, cependant, et gardant leurs différences respectives à l’esprit, la réponse d’Augustin à la question du mal se révèle beaucoup plus sophistiquée et exhaustive qu’on ne voudrait souvent l’admettre lorsqu’on se limite uniquement à la théorie de la privation. | : Augustine is well-known for advocating a ‘privation theory’ of evil. In Confessions, he writes that “evil has no existence except as a privation of good, down to that level which is altogether without being.” The problem with privation theories of evil generally is that they do not provide a robust enough account of the activity and power of evil to cause the very real effects for which experience demands a rational explanation. For Augustine, however, privation alone does not fully account for evil in all of its manifestations. The privation account of evil receives much scholarly treatment, but it is only part of the complete Augustinian picture. This paper outlines four accounts of evil in Augustine : evil as privation, as parasitic on being, as perversion of the will, and as conflict of interest. Each deals with a kind of evil, but none alone provides a complete account. Taken together, however, with their differences in mind, Augustine’s explanation of evil is shown to be much more sophisticated and comprehensive than is often recognised when one limits one’s understanding of Augustine’s conception of evil to the privation theory alone. (shrink)

Responding to an article in a previous issue from Matthew B. O’Brien on the impermissibility of same-sex marriage, this reply corrects a misinterpretation of Rawls’s understanding of political liberalism and a misdirected complaint against the jurisprudence of the U.S. federal courts on civil marriage and other matters. In correcting these interpretations, I seek to demonstrate that a publicly reasonable case for same-sex civil marriage is conceivable in line with political liberalism. I conclude the article by arguing that, although the same-sex (...) civil marriage issue is likely to be a matter of controversy for some time in western societies, a proper understanding of the theoretical issues at stake may contribute to a partial de-escalation of the ‘culture wars’ currently surrounding the issue. (shrink)

Dan O’Brien gives an excellent analysis of testimonial knowledge transmission in his article ‘Communication Between Friends’ (2009) noting that the reliability of the speaker is a concern in both externalist and internalist theories of knowledge. O’Brien focuses on the belief states of Hearers (H) in cases where the reliability of the Speaker (S) is known via ‘intimate trust’, a special case pertaining to friendships with a track record of reliable or unreliable reports. This article considers the notion of ‘intimate trust’, (...) specifically in the context of online fan communities, in which the amount of time as a member of an online fan community and the extent of one’s posting history often results in something like ‘intimate trust’ between fans who are, for all other purposes, strangers. In the last two years, Twitter has provided a number of celebrities with a place to update fans and ‘tweet’ back and forth an innumerable number of times in any given day. This accentuates the intimacy to such a level that it becomes a ‘caricature of intimacy’ – the minute-to-minute updates accentuate the illusion that the fan ‘knows’ the celebrity, but the distance and mediation are still carefully maintained. This is an issue with both ethical and epistemological implications for fan-fan and fan-celebrity relationships online, considering ethics of care and ethics of justice, whether fans ‘owe’ celebrities a certain amount of distance and respect, and whether stars owe the fan something in return, either in the sense of reciprocal Kantian duties or Aristotelian moderation. (shrink)

Hume’s Critique of Religion is a valuable and rewarding contribution to Hume scholarship. The atheistic interpretation that the authors defend is well supported and convincingly argued. Although Gaskin’s Hume’s Philosophy of Religion is (rightly) highly regarded, I believe that Bailey and O’Brien provide a more compelling and convincing interpretation. Their account is, in particular, much stronger in respect of the historical background and contextual considerations that they draw on to support of their interpretation. These historical advances are achieved without weakening (...) the care and attention that is given to Hume’s philosophical arguments. Students and more advanced scholars alike will find this study highly illuminating and instructive. It deserves to be widely read and carefully considered. -/- . (shrink)

Contributors: -/- John Beatty (British Columbia); Kelly James Clark (Ibn Haldun, Istanbul); Angela Coventry (Portland State); Thomas Holden (UC Santa Barbara); Willem Lemmens (Antwerp); Robin Le Poidevin (Leeds); Jennifer Marusic (Edinburgh); Kevin Meeker (South Alabama); Amyas Merivale (Oxford); Peter Millican (Oxford); Dan O’Brien (Oxford Brookes); Graham Oppy (Monash); Paul Russell (Lund); Andre C. Willis (Brown).

Mặc dù từ lâu nhiều nhà nghiên cứu cho rằng, thái độ của con người sẽ ảnh hưởng đến nhận thức và hành vi của họ, nghiên cứu này chỉ ra một số điểm mâu thuẫn và bất nhất trong thái độ của cư dân với tê tê như sau.

Giải quyết biến đổi khí hậu và ô nhiễm môi trường đang và sẽ là thách thức lớn của nhân loại trong thế kỷ 21. Con người không còn nhiều thời gian để sửa chữa, phục hồi đưa hệ sinh thái môi trường (tự nhiên) trở về trạng thái an toàn. Trong khi các nỗ lực trong thời gian qua chưa thực sự hiệu quả thì COP26 mở ra cơ hội lớn để nhân loại tiến gần đến mục tiêu kiềm (...) chế nhiệt độ của trái đất không vượt quá 1.5 độ C. Mặc dù Việt Nam cùng với 146 quốc gia trên thế giới đã có cam kết mạnh mẽ nhất trong việc giảm phát thải vào năm 2050, tuy nhiên việc cụ thể hóa cam kết thông qua các giải pháp sáng tạo là rất quan trọng. Sử dụng (áp dụng, vận dụng) hệ sáng tạo 3D và nguyên lý bán dẫn giá trị, tác giả đề xuất hệ sinh thái “giải pháp trụ cột” cần thực hiện gồm có tăng cường thông tin, truyền thông, nghiên cứu khoa học về môi trường (biến đổi khí hậu, ô nhiễm môi trường...); xây dựng, chuyển đổi và nâng cao văn hóa và môi trường; đẩy mạnh phát triển kinh tế gia tăng phúc lợi; xây dựng (chuyển đổi) lớp doanh nhân có văn hóa, trách nhiệm môi trường; tăng cường mở rộng sự hợp tác quốc tế về mọi mặt đặc biệt là trong lĩnh vực kinh tế, truyền thông và khoa học; và thực thi các giải pháp nêu trên một cách kỷ luật. (shrink)

Pria semut terkenal E.O. Wilson selalu menjadi salah satu pahlawan saya-tidak hanya seorang ahli biologi yang luar biasa, tetapi salah satu yang kecil dan menghilang minoritas intelektual yang setidaknya berani untuk petunjuk pada kebenaran tentang sifat kita bahwa orang lain gagal untuk memahami, atau sejauh yang mereka dO pegang, rajin menghindari untuk expedience politik. Sayangnya, ia mengakhiri karirnya yang panjang dalam mode yang paling mesum sebagai pihak yang bodoh dan arogan serangan terhadap sains termotivasi setidaknya sebagian oleh semangat keagamaan dari (...) rekan Harvard. Ini menunjukkan konsekuensi yang keji ketika Universitas menerima uang dari kelompok agama, jurnal Sains begitu terpesona oleh nama besar bahwa mereka menghindari review peer yang tepat, dan ketika ego diizinkan untuk keluar dari kontrol. Hal ini membawa kita ke dalam sifat evolusi, dasar dari metodologi ilmiah, bagaimana matematika berhubungan dengan ilmu pengetahuan, apa yang merupakan teori, dan bahkan apa sikap untuk agama dan kemurahan hati yang sesuai karena kita tak terelakkan pendekatan runtuhnya peradaban industri. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig Wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) . (shrink)

Nos textos escritos por Foucault durante os anos 60, a problemática antropológica amparava-se, dentre outros fatores, no argumento segundo o qual a modernidade se constitui a partir de uma “finitude constituinte” a substituir um “infinito originário”. A questão do infinito teria, portanto, duas funções: a descrição da epistémê clássica e a própria comparação desta com a epistémê moderna. Entretanto, em As Palavras e as Coisas o capítulo que abre as considerações sobre o período clássico não considera, em suas linhas maiores, (...) a questão do infinito. O argumento gira em torno da “representação”. Nesse contexto, o presente artigo tenta articular as questões do “infinito” e da “representação”, considerando os escritos foucaultianos e a literatura secundária. //////////////////////// -/- En considérant les textes de Foucault écrits pendant les années 60, le problème anthropologique impliquait, parmi d’autres facteurs, l’argument selon lequel la « modernité » serait constituée par une «finitude constituante» qui a remplacée « l’infini originaire » classique. Donc, la question de l’infini aurait au moins deux fonctions: la description de sa propre fonction classique et la comparaison de cette epistémê avec l’epistémê moderne. Par contre, dans l’argumentation de “Les Mots et les Choses”, le chapitre qui ouvre les considérations relatives à la période classique ne tient pas compte, dans ses grosses lignes, de la question de l’infini. L’argument tourne autour de la question de la «représentation». Dans ce contexte, cet article essaie d’articuler les questions de l’infini» et de la «représentation», en considérant les écrits de Foucault et la littérature secondaire. //////////////////////// -/- In the philosophical texts written by Michel Foucault in the decade of 1960, the so called anthropological problem was based, among other subjects, on the argument that the modernity is composed by a “constitutive finitude” that replaced the “originary infinity” of the classical age. Therefore, the question about “infinite” has in this period two functions: the description of the classical episteme itself and its comparison with the modern episteme. However, when one consider The Order of Things (one of the more important texts on this subject), the chapter that opens the argumentation about the classical age does not focuses, in its major lines, the question about the infinite. The argument revolves around the concept of “representation”. In considering this context, this article attempts to articulate the issues of “infinity” and representation”, considering Foucault’s writings and secondary literature. (shrink)

Trong bài viết này chúng tôi trình bày thông tin đại cương về vai trò của nickel trong công nghiệp chế tạo giữa bối cảnh yêu cầu bảo vệ môi sinh trong đại nghị sự mục tiêu phát triển bền vững (SDG) của Liên Hợp Quốc ngày một cấp bách, đối diện với nguy cơ không thể hoàn thành. Các thông tin tóm lược ở đây được dẫn chiếu tới một số nhỏ các tài liệu tham khảo chính và không (...) thể đảm bảo tính trọn vẹn trong khuôn khổ một bài báo nhỏ. Những vấn đề đặt ra có tính tổng quát cho quan hệ môi sinh với việc khai khoáng, tách và tinh chế nickel nói chung trên thế giới. Vì thế, có thể thông tin trong bài không hoàn toàn trùng khớp với tình hình cụ thể của một địa phương trên trái đất, do đặc điểm địa lý, địa chất và kinh tế-công nghệ khác biệt. Bài viết tập trung xoay quanh nguyên lý quan hệ kinh tế-môi trường và ý nghĩa thực tiễn của cụm từ “bền vững” trong bối cảnh cụ thể của công nghiệp nickel. (shrink)

Hiện tượng băng tan ở Nam Cực đang ngày càng nguy hiểm với sức khỏe Trái Đất nói chung, và các cộng đồng cư dân bao gồm cả con người nói riêng. Nghe thì xa xôi vậy, nhưng tác động đang trở nên gần hơn bao giờ hết. Về mặt chu kỳ thời tiết, theo quy luật tự nhiên, giai đoạn hiện nay đáng ra phải là thời kỳ Trái Đất dịu mát đi. Thế nhưng trên thực tế, nhiệt độ (...) lại đang gia tăng. Suốt ba thập niên vừa qua, nhiệt độ Trái Đất liên tục tăng ở các mức kỷ lục chưa từng thấy kể từ khi dữ liệu bắt đầu được thống kê. (shrink)

Este artigo prolonga a análise do argumento apresentado por Descartes em favor da primeira certeza no início da Segunda Meditação, iniciada em um artigo anterior. É examinada a passagem subsequente ao referido argumento com vistas a estabelecer que sua compreensão aponta para um debate velado entre Descartes e seus leitores versa- dos na doutrina escolástica, mais particularmente nas concepções da definição como estruturada pela composição do gênero e da diferença e de específica e de conceito universal abstrato. Procuro mostrar que (...) as razões que Des- cartes dispõe para recusar essas concepções podem ser extraídas de certa interpretação do argumento em favor da certeza da proposição eu existo e que essa recusa é imprescindível para a compreensão adequada do penso, logo existo e, portanto, de seu argumento em favor do dualismo. -/- RESUMÉE: Cet article prolonge l´analyse, publiée dans un article précédent, sur l'argumentation cartésienne qui le conduit à la première certitude au début de la Seconde Méditation. Je propose une interprétation du passage, qui vient juste après cet argument, où Descartes décline la réponse « animal rational » à la question sur sa nature. Ce passage, comme j'essaierai de le montrer, cache un dialogue masqué entre l'auteur et ses lecteurs ayant une formation scolastique. Plus particulièrement, il s'agit de montrer que la critique de Descartes vise de façon plus générale la conception de la définition par genre et différence spécifique, ainsi que la notion de concept en tant qu’universal abstrait. Les raisons qui peuvent justifier cette critique et la rendre plus qu’un simple préjugé de la part de Descartes sont ici puisées dans l'interprétation de l'argumentation cartésienne en faveur de la première certitude, proposée auparavant. On verra alors que la compréhension correcte de ce qui est en question dans ce texte révèle une condition capitale et pour l' acceptation du je pense, donc j'existe et donc pour son raisonnement en faveur du dualisme. (shrink)

Mới đây, trong bài đánh giá tình hình phát triển tổng hợp của Tạp chí Economics and Business Letters, các bài nghiên cứu nhận được nhiều trích dẫn nhất của tạp chí ở cả 3 cơ sở dữ liệu Google Scholar, Web of Science và Scopus đã được vinh danh. Nghiên cứu của TS Vương Quân Hoàng về nguyên lý bán dẫn trong trao đổi giá trị tiền tệ và môi sinh đã đứng đầu ở cả 3 hạng mục. Việc (...) một nghiên cứu lý thuyết được vinh danh bởi tạp chí khoa học được bảo trợ bởi Đại học Oviedo - một trong những trường đại học lâu đời nhất tại châu Âu (450 tuổi), là tín hiệu tích cực về sự lan tỏa và đóng góp của khoa học Việt Nam. (shrink)

The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.

Mới đây, Clarivate Analytics đã đưa ra danh sách loại bỏ 33 tạp chí không được chỉ mục hóa sau khi rà soát một loạt các tạp chí (Ivan, 2020). Kết quả cho thấy hơn 70% các trích dẫn trong một tạp chí là các bài báo khác trong tạp chí đó. Thậm chí, một bài báo khác đã xuất bản trích dẫn gần 200 bài báo khác trên cùng một tạp chí đó.

Her din ve mistik kültürde ortaya çıkan dinî tecrübelerin felsefe, kelam ve fıkıh gibi bilim alanlarında farklı açıklamaları yapılmış, akli olup olmadığı sorgulanmıştır. Vahiy, keramet, vecd, hulul, tecelli gibi kavramlara açıklamalar getirilmiştir. Fakat bu tür tecrübelerin insanın fizyolojik ve psikolojik mekanizmalarıyla ne tür bir bağlantısı olduğu İslam düşünce geleneğinde pek tartışılmamıştır. Bu tür tecrübe yaşayan kişilerin sorunlu olup olmadığı tıbbi açıdan değerlendirilmemiştir. Dini tecrübeleri tıbbî bir sorun olarak ele alıp bu tecrübeleri ‘deney’ konusu yaparak inceleyen ilk düşünür William James’tir (ö.1910). (...) O, The Varieties of Religious Experience adlı kitabında her türlü ‘dini’ olarak ifade edilen tecrübeleri ele alıp açıkladığı gibi, dini olmayan ama dini tecrübelere benzer mistik tecrübeleri de araştırıp, incelemiştir. Fakat James, araştırmasında dini ve mistik tecrübe ayırımı yapmamıştır. İkili bir ayırma tabi tutulmadan bütün tecrübelerin tek bir başlık altında incelenip ‘psikolojik durum’ olarak kabul edilmesi bu bildirinin ele aldığı ana sorundur. Bütün tecrübeler tek bir başlık altında ele alınırsa peygamberlerin tecrübeleri (vahiy) ile bunun dışında yer alan mistik tecrübelerin (vecd, keramet) bir farkı kalmayacaktır. Bu ikisini ayırmak için akli kriterleri ve tecrübelerinin ana iddialarını değerlendirip ele almak gerekir. Vahiy tecrübelerinin temel iddialarıyla mistik tecrübelerin iddialarını karşılaştırdığımızda vahiy tecrübelerinin akli kriterlere uygun olduğu ve tıbbi açıdan hastalıklı bir insanın tecrübesi olmadığı görülecektir. Mistik tecrübeler de ise durum bunun tersi görünmektedir. Mistik tecrübeler geçirenlerin çoğu zaman depresyon, manik ve çoğu zaman da uyuşturucu ile ortaya çıktığı, bunalımlı ve savaş dönemlerinde bu tür tecrübelerin arttığı görülür. Bu şekilde vahiy tecrübesinin doğruluğu ortaya konduğunda toplumu etkileyen dini inançların doğru kaynağına yönelmek mümkün olur. Mistik tecrübelerin ise hastalıklı zihnin ürünü olması nedeniyle insanları saptırıcı, dinden çıkarıcı ve akıl dışı olduğu ortaya çıkar. Bu şekilde dini inançların istikameti doğru bir şekilde çizilmiş olur. (shrink)

Ô nhiễm không khí được coi là “sát thủ vô hình” của cư dân đô thị. Theo ước tính của Tổ chức Y tế Thế giới (WHO), “sát thủ” này gây ra/liên quan đến cái chết của khoảng 60 nghìn người mỗi năm tại Việt Nam. Để góp phần giải quyết bài toán ô nhiễm môi trường không khí tại các đô thị ở Việt Nam, các nhà nghiên cứu tại Trường Đại học Kinh tế - ĐHQGHN cùng các cộng (...) sự trong và ngoài nước đã tập trung tìm hiểu nhận thức và nhu cầu cải thiện ô nhiễm không khí tại Hà Nội - một trong những đô thị năng động nhất thế giới và đang đối diện với tình trạng ô nhiễm không khí nặng nề. (shrink)

Sự ủng hộ và hỗ trợ của cộng đồng dân cư đối với các chính sách bảo tồn hệ sinh thái biển và ven biển là quan trọng và cần thiết. Tuy nhiên, các nghiên cứu đa quốc gia hiện nay về các yếu tố tác động đến vấn đề này vẫn còn nhiều thiếu sót. Hơn nữa, các nghiên cứu liên quan đến biến đổi khí hậu có khả năng làm suy giảm sự ủng hộ hành vi bảo tồn (...) biển và ven biển vẫn còn nhiều hạn chế. Cho nên, nghiên cứu này được thực hiện nhằm tìm hiểu các tác động của nhận thức liên quan đến biến đổi khí hậu của các bên liên quan đối với sự sẵn sàng hỗ trợ bảo vệ biển. Nghiên cứu áp dụng phương pháp Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) cho tập dữ liệu gồm 709 cá nhân liên quan tới hệ sinh thái biển và ven biển ở 42 quốc gia, thuộc dự án MaCoBioS, được tài trợ bởi Ủy ban Châu Âu. Kết quả phân tích chỉ ra rằng cá nhân có suy nghĩ rằng xã hội đang làm nhiều việc để giải quyết tác động của biến đổi khí hậu, phát triển công nghệ có thể giúp giải quyết các vấn đề môi trường, và việc ứng phó với biến đổi khí hậu sẽ gây thiệt hại cho kinh tế đất nước sẽ có xu hướng không sẵn sàng hỗ trợ bảo vệ biển hơn. Dựa trên kết quả này, chúng tôi gợi ý rằng việc nâng cao nhận thức và kiến thức của các cộng đồng dân cư gắn liền với biển có thể giúp tăng cường hành động và cải thiện sự đồng hành, hỗ trợ của chính họ đối với các chương trình bảo tồn đại dương và ven biển. Xa hơn nữa, những nhận thức này sẽ là nền tảng cho việc xây dựng văn hóa thặng dư sinh thái. (shrink)

Millikan and Her Critics offers a unique critical discussion of Ruth Millikan's highly regarded, influential, and systematic contributions to philosophy of mind and language, philosophy of biology, epistemology, and metaphysics. These newly written contributions present discussion from some of the most important philosophers in the field today and include replies from Millikan herself.

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological (...) psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology. (shrink)

Introduction There are some exceptions, which we shall see below, but virtually all theories in psychology and cognitive science make use of the notion of representation. Arguably, folk psychology also traffics in representations, or is at least strongly suggestive of their existence. There are many different types of things discussed in the psychological and philosophical literature that are candidates for representation-hood. First, there are the propositional attitudes – beliefs, judgments, desires, hopes etc. (see Chapters 9 and 17 of this volume). (...) If the propositional attitudes are representations, they are person-level representations – the judgment that the sun is bright pertains to John, not a subpersonal part of John. By contrast, the representations of edges in V1 of the cerebral cortex that neuroscientists talk about and David Marr’s symbolic representations of “zero-crossings” in early vision (Marr 1982) are at the “sub-personal” level – they apply to parts or states of a person (e.g. neural parts or computational states of the visual system). Another important distinction is often made among perceptual, cognitive, and action-oriented representations (e.g. motor commands). Another contrast lies between “stored representations” (e.g. memories) and “active representations” (e.g. a current perceptual state). Related to this is the distinction between “dispositional representations” and “occurrent representations.” Beliefs that are not currently being entertained are dispositional, e.g. your belief that the United States is in North America - no doubt you had this belief two minutes ago, but you were not consciously accessing it until you read this sentence. Occurrent representations, by contrast, are active, conscious thoughts or perceptions. Which leads us to another important distinction: 1 between conscious and non-conscious mental representations, once a bizarre-sounding distinction that has become familiar since Freud (see Chapter 4 of this volume). I mention these distinctions at the outset to give you some idea of the range of phenomena we will be considering, and to set the stage for our central “problem of representation”: what is a mental representation, exactly, and how do we go about deciding whether there are any? We know there are public representations of various kinds: words, maps, and pictures, among others.. (shrink)

Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you emit (...) + offset, the net result is the same as that of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. I argue against both premises. The net result of emitting + offsetting is never equivalent to that of not emitting, and even if it were equivalent, the net result is not the only thing that matters morally. My conclusion is that although we should offset our emissions, avoiding emissions is morally preferable. This conclusion supports a stronger claim: that carbon offsets cannot relieve us of our duty to make significant lifestyle changes so as to reduce emissions and thus lesson our contribution to the harms of climate change. (shrink)

Appeals to nature are ubiquitous in Epicurean ethics and politics. The foundation of Epicurean ethics is its claim that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and pain the sole intrinsic evil, and this is supposedly shown by the behavior of infants who have not yet been corrupted, "when nature's judgement is pure and whole." Central to their recommendations about how to attain pleasure is their division between types of desires: the natural and necessary ones, the natural but non-necessary ones, and (...) the vain and empty ones. Elsewhere, the Epicureans talk about the "natural goods" of political power and fame, and they contrast "natural wealth" with wealth as "defined by empty opinion." Finally, in their politics, Epicurus claims that the "the justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed." This paper explores two questions regarding these various appeals to nature. The first is: what is it for these things to be natural, i.e., what notion of "natural" or "nature" is at play here? (Furthermore, is there a single notion being used across these appeals, and if not, how are they related?) The second is: what normative work does a thing's being natural do? That is, what reason, if any, does a desire's being natural give me for pursuing the object of that desire and trying to fulfill that desire, as opposed to not doing so and trying to eliminate it, and similarly for the other appeals to nature? (shrink)

Célèbre fourmi-homme E.O. Wilson a toujours été l’un de mes héros - non seulement un biologiste exceptionnel, mais l’une des minorités minuscules et en voie de disparition des intellectuels qui ose au moins faire allusion à la vérité sur notre nature que d’autres ne parviennent pas à saisir, ou dans la mesure osant o saisir, soigneusement éviter pour l’opportunisme politique. Malheureusement, il met fin à sa longue carrière d’une manière très sordide en tant que parti à une attaque ignorante et (...) arrogante sur la science motivée au moins en partie par la ferveur religieuse de ses collègues de Harvard. Il montre les conséquences ignobles lorsque les universités acceptent l’argent de groupes religieux, les revues scientifiques sont tellement impressionnés par les grands noms qu’ils évitent l’examen par les pairs appropriés, et quand les egos sont autorisés à devenir hors de contrôle. Il nous entraîne dans la nature de l’évolution, les bases de la méthodologie scientifique, comment les mathématiques se rapportent à la science, ce qui constitue une théorie, et même quelles attitudes à la religion et la générosité sont appropriées que nous approchons inexorablement l’effondrement de la civilisation industrielle. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systemes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2020) et autres. (shrink)

Given the close relatedness of local issues, water scarcity, and sustainability, this research sought to investigate the factors affecting residents’ willingness to reuse direct and indirect potable water in the arid region. Utilizing the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF), an analysis was undertaken with a sample of 1,831 water consumers in the City of Albuquerque, the most populous city in New Mexico, United States. The primary analysis revealed positive associations between local concerns about drought or water scarcity and population growth with (...) residents' willingness to reuse direct and indirect potable water. Conversely, concerns about water quality and water bills were found to be negatively associated with the willingness to utilize directly and indirectly recycled water for drinking. In light of these findings, the study explores the potential of fostering an eco-surplus culture by cultivating a sense of environmental responsibility and acknowledging the relationship between local issues and environmental conditions. Simultaneously, the study proposes collaboration between the government and residents to promote water reuse programs to conserve water resources effectively. (shrink)

Controversially, psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson advises “enforced monogamy” for societies with high percentages of “incels.” As Peterson’s proposal resonates in manosphere circles, this chapter reconstructs and briefly evaluates the argument for it. Premised on the moral importance of civilizational sustainability, advocates argue that both polygamous and socially monogamous but sexually liberal mating patterns result in unsustainable proportions of unattached young men. Given the premises, monogamous societies are probably justified in maintaining their anti-polygamist social and legal norms. The case (...) for imposing stricter sexual norms on socially monogamous but sexually liberal societies is weaker, however, as male involuntary celibacy in those places isn’t as directly caused by male intrasexual competition, and since less intrusive social interventions are more likely to ameliorate “the incel problem.”. (shrink)