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Paweł Gładziejewski
Polish Academy of Sciences
  1. Predictive Coding and Representationalism.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2).
    According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...)
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    Just How Conservative is Conservative Predictive Processing?Paweł Gładziejewski - 2017 - Hybris. Revista de Filosofía 38:98-122.
    Predictive Processing (PP) framework construes perception and action (and perhaps other cognitive phenomena) as a matter of minimizing prediction error, i.e. the mismatch between the sensory input and sensory predictions generated by a hierarchically organized statistical model. There is a question of how PP fits into the debate between traditional, neurocentric and representation-heavy approaches in cognitive science and those approaches that see cognition as embodied, environmentally embedded, extended and (largely) representation-free. In the present paper, I aim to investigate and clarify (...)
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  3. Action Guidance is Not Enough, Representations Need Correspondence Too: A Plea for a Two-Factor Theory of Representation.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2015 - New Ideas in Psychology:doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015..
    The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive (...)
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  4. Neurophenomenology: An Invitation to Discussion.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2010 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1):179–189.
    No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...)
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  5. Shared Representations, Perceptual Symbols, and the Vehicles of Mental Concepts.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):102-124.
    The main aim of this article is to present and defend a thesis according to which conceptual representations of some types of mental states are encoded in the same neural structures that underlie the first-personal experience of those states. To support this proposal here, I will put forth a novel account of the cognitive function played by ‘shared representations’ of emotions and bodily sensations, i.e. neural structures that are active when one experiences a mental state of a certain type as (...)
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  6. Embodied Cognitive Science: Gibbs in Search of Synthesis.Paweł Gładziejewski, Anna Karczmarczyk & Przemysław Nowakowski - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):215 – 225.
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