La questione sulla verità del cristianesimo è fondamentale e ineludibile. In essa si trova uno dei filoni fondamentali del pensiero di Joseph Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI. In fondo si trovano coinvolti una serie di argomenti che si possono riassumere nel rapporto tra fede e ragione, tra il Dio della fede e il Dio dei filosofi. Nella visione cristiana ambedue non si contrappongono, ma s’incontrano. La “distinzione mosaica” s’incontra con la “distinzione socratica” . La pretesa di verità del cristianesimo conduce a (...) delle conseguenze sia nell’ambito della religione, sia in quello della filosofia e della morale. Per superare la crisi del cristianesimo abbiamo bisogno di recuperare la fiducia nela ragione e tornare alla ricerca della verità. (shrink)

Sumário: 1. El caso del método científico, Alberto Oliva; 2. Un capítulo de la prehistoria de las ciencias humanas: la defensa por Vico de la tópica, Jorge Alberto Molina; 3. La figura de lo cognoscible y los mundos, Pablo Vélez León; 4. Lebenswelt de Husserl y las neurociencias, Vanessa Fontana; 5. El uso estético del concepto de mundos posibles, Jairo Dias Carvalho; 6. Realismo normativo no naturalista y mundos morales imposibles, Alcino Eduardo Bonella; 7. En la lógica de pragmatismo, Hércules (...) de Araujo Feitosa, Luiz Henrique da Cruz Silvestrini; 8 La lógica, el tiempo y el lenguaje natural: un sistema formal para tiempos de portugués, Carlos Luciano Manholi. / Temas em filosofia contemporânea II / Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart, Jaimir Conte, Cezar Augusto Mortari (orgs.) – Florianópolis : NEL/UFSC, 2016. 167 p. : tabs. - (Rumos da epistemologia ; v. 14); ISBN 978-85-87253-27-9 (papel); ISBN 978-85-87253-26-2 (e-book). (shrink)

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word "is", their theories share a common feature: "is" does not have a normative meaning, but a constative meaning. This paper, however, shows (1) that there is a normative meaning of "is" (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word "ought") and (2) that the ambiguity of "is" is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, the paper proposes (3) a performative criterion for making a (...) distinction between constative and normative "is". Thereby, it is possible to attack Searle's famous argument against Hume's law. (shrink)

In the whole Corpus Platonicum, we find in principle only one "direct argument" (Charles Kahn) for the existence of the ideas (Tim.51d3-51e6). The purpose of the article is to analyse this argument and to answer the question of why Plato in the Timaeus again defended the existence of the ideas despite the objections in the Parmenides. He defended it again because the latent presupposition of the apories in the Parmenides, the substantial view of sensibles, is removed through the introduction of (...) space as "substantialized extension". First (I) it is shown that Plato remained in dialogues, like the Sophist and Politicus, faithful to the "theory of ideas" despite his criticism in the Parmenides. The common theme in the trilogy of the Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus is to refute relativism by showing that any relativism presupposes something absolute that is something like the "theory of ideas". The second part of the paper (II) examines closely the logical structure of the argument for the existence of ideas in the Timaeus (51d3-52a7). The third part (III) shows how this argument can avoid the criticism of ideas in the Parmenides. In the Parmenides, sensibles are treated as substantial entities. But, as the Timaeus shows, sensibles are not substantial entities but merely qualities, namely qualities of space, which is the only substance in the sensible world. A shortened English version of the paper appeared in Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum, Granada, Selected papers, ed. by T. Calvo/L. Brisson, Academia Verlag, St. Augustin, 1997, 179-186. -/- But the only "direct argument" (Tim.51d3-51e6) seems to be interestingly flawed. Cf. Ferber, Rafael; Hiltbrunner, Thomas, (2005). (shrink)

The debate over Plato’s “ so called unwritten doctrines”, which he communicated only to a small circle of trusted disciples, has caused a stir among philosophers in recent decades. Rafael Ferber assumes a differentiated position in this controversy. He is convinced that the unwritten doctrines did exist, but that Plato, for reasons inherent in the process of gaining knowledge, was unable to communicate these doctrines even to his closest disciples. In this book, Ferber outlines the discussion and summarizes the (...) standpoints of greatest interest. -/- Ever since Aristotle, we have known that Plato did not put his most important teachings into writing, but instead communicated them only orally to the inner circle of his disciples. While the extant dialogues merely pass down Plato’s “exoteric” doctrines, his most important “esoteric” insights were not meant for the general public. In the meantime, the contents and the significance of Plato’s “unwritten doctrines” have become the subject of debate in philosophical circles. -/- Fifteen years ago, at the height of the controversy over the “unwritten doctrines”, Rafael Ferber entered the fray with a small book. He proposed that Plato was also unable to communicate the “unwritten doctrines” because the highest principles (i.e. the subject of the unwritten doctrines) cannot be known through logical operations due to an epistemological paradox. Ferber’s differentiated position met with great respect and acceptance, although in individual cases it was also rejected. -/- Ferber’s new book again presents the text of 1991, but significantly expands on it through new perspectives and an outline of the discussion it triggered. In this book, the reader learns what is meant by Plato’s unwritten doctrines and what the controversy is all about. (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...) neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

Axiom weakening is a novel technique that allows for fine-grained repair of inconsistent ontologies. In a multi-agent setting, integrating ontologies corresponding to multiple agents may lead to inconsistencies. Such inconsistencies can be resolved after the integrated ontology has been built, or their generation can be prevented during ontology generation. We implement and compare these two approaches. First, we study how to repair an inconsistent ontology resulting from a voting-based aggregation of views of heterogeneous agents. Second, we prevent the generation of (...) inconsistencies by letting the agents engage in a turn-based rational protocol about the axioms to be added to the integrated ontology. We instantiate the two approaches using real-world ontologies and compare them by measuring the levels of satisfaction of the agents w.r.t. the ontology obtained by the two procedures. (shrink)

The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate (...) final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo". (shrink)

The article examines the Socratic principle that (1) virtue is knowledge and its corollary that (2) nobody errs voluntarily (nemo sua sponte peccat). It tries to show (I) that both principles are paradoxa, i.e. from a phenomenological point of view, they seem to be false; (II) that nevertheless the platonic Socrates accepts both principles as true; and finally (III) that these principles are analytical truths a priori which can only be understood if a person (soul) finds them in him- or (...) herself. (shrink)

Reconstruying historically the beginning of development scientific thought in Venezuela, particularly in Physics, allow to account imperative need to preserve academic-scientific formation of Venezuelan society in 21st century. The Venezuelan historians Rafael Balza and Yajaira Freites in their respectively studies "Modern Physics in the Caraqueña Society of the late eighteenth century: between Mathematics and technique and "The problem of knowledge between hacendados and illustrated merchants of the province of Caracas-Venezuela (1793-1810)" allow to account efforts of Agustín de la Torre (...) to insert, in Venezuelan society of 18th century, teaching , research, divulgation and application of modern physical sciences initiated in Europe, marking the beginning of development of eighteenth-century Venezuelan technical and scientific thought. It should be noted that historical study of Agustín de la Torre is a complicated due to scarce documentation and cultural complexity of eighteenth-century Venezuela. The contribution of study is to account for risk of loss of Science in Venezuela in XXI century, through historical reconstruction around of Agustín de la Torre and his countless and tireless efforts to develop the study and application of physics experimental in Venezuela. The scope of this research is framed in the need to show the importance in the preservation of scientific talent. Studying the efforts in eighteenth-century Venezuela allows this. The historical study around Agustín de la Torre gives an account of the origin in the studies of physics and the complex situation within the scientific and social context to develop Science in Venezuela. (shrink)

Ontology engineering is a hard and error-prone task, in which small changes may lead to errors, or even produce an inconsistent ontology. As ontologies grow in size, the need for automated methods for repairing inconsistencies while preserving as much of the original knowledge as possible increases. Most previous approaches to this task are based on removing a few axioms from the ontology to regain consistency. We propose a new method based on weakening these axioms to make them less restrictive, employing (...) the use of refinement operators. We introduce the theoretical framework for weakening DL ontologies, propose algorithms to repair ontologies based on the framework, and provide an analysis of the computational complexity. Through an empirical analysis made over real-life ontologies, we show that our approach preserves significantly more of the original knowledge of the ontology than removing axioms. (shrink)

This is a short overview of Plato’s „greatest thing to be learned“ or the „greatest lesson“ – the Idea of the Good.

¿Llegarán los ordenadores a sustituir a los seres humanos? Lo que hasta hace unas décadas parecía una pregunta de ciencia-ficción, es ahora defendido con seriedad por algunos especialistas en inteligencia artificial. El presente articulo dibuja las más importantes líneas de investigación en este campo y las posiciones más relevantes respecto de la relación hombre-maquina pensante. La conclusión que propone el autor supone una decidida apuesta por un humanismo en el que quepa integrar el desarrollo tecnológico sin perder de vista sus (...) innegables implicaciones éticas. (shrink)

This is a critical discussion of Nick Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory of Art, as he has presented the theory in his book Aesthetic Creation. The discussion focuses on two questions: first, whether the notion of art implied by Zangwill’s theory is at once too wide and too narrow; second, whether Zangwill is right about the persistence conditions of works of art.

At the centre of the monograph (1984, first edition) lies a detailed interpretation and critique of the idea of the Good in the Republic. The main thesis of the interpretation runs as follows: The idea of the Good functions as a third item between thinking and being. The main purpose of the monograph is to introduce the systematic problem of the third item via the historical problem of the idea of the Good. The second, enlarged edition (1989) gives a new (...) reconstruction of an "exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic" (H. Cherniss), that is, of the platonic theory of the ideal numbers and the two principles that were contained in the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Aristotle). The final chapter gives new information on the reception of Plato's idea of the Good in P. Natorp and M. Heidegger. It also includes an updated bibliography. The third edition (2015) is a reprint of the second edition of 1989. Further remarks and an updated bibliography to 2005 are to be found in: - Ferber, Rafael (2005). Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch? Nochmals Platons ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ. In: Barbaric Damir: Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit / Plato on Goodness and Justice / Platone sul Bene e sulla Giustizia. Würzburg, 149-174.:www.zora.uzh.ch/34098/ - Ferber, Rafael / Damschen, Gregor (2015). Is the Idea of the Good Beyond Being? Plato's "epekeinea tês ousias" Revisted (Republic, 6, 509b8-10). In: Nails, Debra; Harold, Tarrant; Kajava, Mika; Salmenkivi, Eero. Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato. Espoo, 197-203: http://www.zora.uzh.ch/116007/. (shrink)

Albert Einstein once made the following remark about "the world of our sense experiences": "the fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle." (1936, p. 351) A few decades later, another physicist, Eugene Wigner, wondered about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, concluding his classic article thus: "the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve" (1960, p. 14). (...) At least three factors are involved in Einstein's and Wigner's miracles: the physical world, mathematics, and human cognition. One way to relate these factors is to ask how the universe could possibly be structured in such a way that mathematics would be applicable to it, and we would be able to understand that application. This is roughly Wigner's question. Alternatively, the way of the mathematical naturalist is to argue that we abstract certain properties from the world, perhaps using our bodies and physical tools, thereby articulating basic mathematical concepts, which we continue building into the complex formal structures of mathematics. John Stuart Mill, Penelope Maddy, and Rafael Nuñez teach this strategy of cognitive abstraction, in very different manners. But what if the very concepts and basic principles of mathematics were built into our cognitive structure itself? Given such a cognitive a priori mathematical endowment, would the miracles of the link between world and cognition (Einstein) and mathematics and world (Wigner) not vanish, or at least significantly diminish? This is the stance of Stanislas Deheane and Elizabeth Brannon's 2011 anthology, following a venerable rationalist tradition including Plato and Immanuel Kant. (shrink)

The article treats again the question of whether «the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?» (Rufus Jones, 1863 1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940 2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (...) (I.) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9 10 and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good. -/- . (shrink)

Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940-2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato‘s Idea of the Good is on the one hand beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article gives first (I.), an introduction into the status questionis. Second (II.), it delivers the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Third (III.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Fourth (IV), it deals with (...) the translation of L. Brisson "Apollon, quelle merveilleuse emphase" of 509c1-2. Fifth (V.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpetation of Plato‘s Republic, 509b9-10. (shrink)

In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...) consistency. (shrink)

The article first gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the "Republic", 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates for whom irrational (...) desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first one. Then it attempts to show that we can elucidate some dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas’s distinction between it actio hominis and actio humana. Finally, the article outlines three substantive answers to the question “What is the Good?” – the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

The article again treats the question of whether ≪the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent?≫. Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being in dignity and power, but, on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and (...) Brisson. Then, it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third, it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9‑10, and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good. (shrink)

What distinguishes the Socrates of the early from the Socrates of the middle dialogues? According to a well-known opinion, the “dividing line” lies in the difference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Socrates of the early dialogues, all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the middle dialogues, there are good-independent desires. The paper argues first that this “dividing line” is blurred in the "Symposium", and second that we have in the "Symposium" (...) a more distinctive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty. This introduction by Diotima/Plato of separate ideas and the lack of understanding of separate ideas – here the idea of beauty – by Socrates may have been the limit not only of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues, but of the historical Socrates as well. (shrink)

The article first (i) gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the Republic, 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good (panta prattei) can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates (...) for whom pure irrational desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first picture. Then it (ii) attempts to show that we can elucidate two dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas. Finally, the article (iii) outlines three substantive answers to the question ``What is the Good?'' - the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist - and shows that these three answers lead into a trilemma. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

The paper puts forward a new interpretation of the image of the Cave, that is the image on human paideia (education) and apaideusia (lack of education). The cause of the apaideusia (R.514a) is identified as a separation from the origin. (1) First, the relation between the Cave, the analogy of the Linie and the Sun is shown not to be a strict parallelism, but a resemblance, which implies sameness and difference between Sun, Line and Cave. (2) Second, the author argues (...) that the idea of the Good is the necessary condition for the possibility of being, truth and thought. It is the highest principle and the ultimate foundation of Plato’s ethics. (3) Third, the author describes Plato’s paideia (education) as holistic, that is: it involves the spiritive and appetitive part of the soul. (shrink)

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms “the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori” in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence (...) and the form of a fact. Both transform the identity of thinking and being first formulated by Parmenides “... to gar auto noein estin te kai einai“ (D/K.B3). (shrink)

The article uses Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s fundamental paradox, as a thought-model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate Zeno’s fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then I construct a mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible to copy the solutions to the fundamental paradox on the (...) mind-body paradox. Three of them fail. But one of them – the Aristotelian one – gives us an interesting hint. Finally, this hint is pursued somewhat further and through comparison with Zeno’s fundamental paradox, the impossibility of a solution to the mind-body problem is shown again. The main new point of this article is the comparison of the mind-body problem with Zeno’s fundamental paradox. The article is a revised english version of an article published in: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 23, 1998, p. 61-75. (shrink)

Under semantic monism I understand the thesis “The Good is said in one way” and under semantic pluralism the antithesis “The Good is said in many ways”. Plato’s Socrates seems to defend a “semantic monism”. As only one sun exists, so the “Good” has for Socrates and Plato only one reference. Nevertheless, Socrates defends in the Philebus a semantic pluralism, more exactly trialism, of “beauty, symmetry and truth” . Therefore, metaphorically speaking, there seem to exist not only one sun, but (...) three suns. If the platonic Socrates defends a semantic monism on the one hand and pluralism on the other, how can we unite his pluralism with his monism? My thesis is that the three references are “qualities” of the one single reference, or again, speaking metaphorically, “side suns” of the single sun. In the following, I propose first an exegesis of Plato’s last written word on the Good in Phil. 65 A 1-5 by dividing it into five sentences. Second, I ask a philosophical question on this monism and the corresponding hierarchy of values. (shrink)

This is a review of lectures given by Eugen Fink at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter term of 1947/48, “Fundamental Questions of Ancient Philosophy,” edited by Franz A. Schwarz.

The first part of the paper (p. 10-21) tries to answer the first question of the title and describes a set of seven "knowledge-claims" made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge.2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody does willingly wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just man is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. 7. (...) The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the "few" (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but "very important" (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. The second part (p. 22-39) tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed "knowledge" of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paper is the comparison of the Socratic "knowledge-claims" with the upper states of the mind symbolised in the Divided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1). (shrink)

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word “is”, their theories share a common feature: “is” does not have a normative meaning. This paper, however, (I) shows (a) that there is a normative meaning of “is” (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word “ought”) and (b) that the ambiguity of “is” is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, it proposes (c) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and (...) normative “is”. Thereby, (II) a new interpretation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument (CPR A 598/B626) makes sense: The difference between being as a real predicate and being as a position depends on the difference between “is” as a descriptive and “is” as a normative predicate. (III) The criterion also makes possible a new answer to Leibniz’s and Schelling’s question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”: The “is” in “there is something” is normative and the question means “Why shall there be something rather than nothing?”. As “there shall be nothing” is self-refuting, the question evokes an ultimate foundation in a practical sense. (shrink)

Nearly a decade ago, Rafael Capurro has gradually shifted his attention towards the ideas of message and of messenger. In lieu of ‘information’, he proposes and develops a new direction of research he calls Angeletics that aims to examine the nature of message and messenger, both of which are inherently social. Coincidently, at about the same time, we witnessed the rise of social epistemology in Angelo-American analytic philosophy. This coincidence is interesting, because both Capurro’s Angeletics and social epistemology indicated (...) a departure from individualistic-orientedness in hermeneutics and traditional epistemology respectively. While social epistemology has earned its place and status in academia, especially in North America and Europe, Capurro’s Angeletics has yet to receive similar attention to which it deserves. Part of the reason for this, I think, is because of its formulation and terminology is relatively unfamiliar to those who do not share the same philosophical tradition. Hence, one remedy to this situation is to attempt to translate Angeletics in terms of social epistemology, and this – is the objective of the current paper. (shrink)

The paper deals with the beginning and the main properties of the science of nature (he peri physeos historiê). According to Themistius (DK 12 A 7), the founder of this kind of Ionic philosophy is Anaximander of Miletus because he was the first who wrote about nature (especially a cosmography and a cosmogony) and developed three main principles of nature: 1. Nature has a mathematical structure (Arist. De coelo I3 295b10-14.32); 2. nature has a physical structure (DK 12 A 10-11); (...) and 3. nature follows natural laws (DK 12 A 9). The origin of this introduction lies in the prolongation of primitive expectations of constancy. It is especially argued that the shift from mythos to logos is characterized by the depersonalization of nature and the introduction of theoretical terms. In fact, the "apeiron" of Anaximander seems to be something similar to a theoretical term, because Anaximander seems to have realized that the explanans of nature cannot be one of its explananda like water (Thales) or air (Anaximenes). (shrink)

In his Vermischte Bemerkungen 43, Wittgenstein notices that he was also influenced by Oswald Spengler. The paper deals with the question of in which way Spengler influenced Wittgenstein’s late works and if it really was influence or only a coincidence of ideas. It is put forward that Spengler’s rather unknown philosophy of language influenced Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, especially the concepts of family resemblance, antiessentialism, and language-game (Sprachspiel). A picture of the famous Neapolitan gesture of “negation” which motivated Wittgenstein to (...) give up the picture theory of language is also shown with an example taken from Andrea de Jorio, La mimica degli antichi investigala nel gestire napoletano, Napoli 1832. (shrink)

This is an obituary notice on Henri Lauener (1933-2002).

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual (...) operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations. (shrink)

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence (...) and the form of a fact. (shrink)

This is an obituary notice in memoriam Martina Stemich.

Continuing the introductory blog to the question: "What is a human being?", that is “What is a zôon logon echôn?“, this blog tries to answer the question by unfolding the meaning of the expression “logos“.

This is an introductory blog to the question: "What is a human being?".

Plato’s “Apology of Socrates” is a masterpiece of the philosophical literature. The question remains as to how much it has been influenced by earlier works, e.g. of Gorgias of Leontinoi and Euripides. Nevertheless, comparative studies on Hippolytus’ defense in Euripides’ tragedy of the same name, on Gorgias’ “Defense of Palamedes” and on Plato’s “Apology” do not exist. The short paper gives an introduction into the status quaestionis.

The first part of the paper (p. 10-21) tries to answer the first question of the title and describes a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. (...) 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but “very important” (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. The second part (p. 22-39) tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paperis the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in theDivided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1). Posted. (shrink)