La questione sulla verità del cristianesimo è fondamentale e ineludibile. In essa si trova uno dei filoni fondamentali del pensiero di Joseph Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI. In fondo si trovano coinvolti una serie di argomenti che si possono riassumere nel rapporto tra fede e ragione, tra il Dio della fede e il Dio dei filosofi. Nella visione cristiana ambedue non si contrappongono, ma s’incontrano. La “distinzione mosaica” s’incontra con la “distinzione socratica” . La pretesa di verità del cristianesimo conduce a (...) delle conseguenze sia nell’ambito della religione, sia in quello della filosofia e della morale. Per superare la crisi del cristianesimo abbiamo bisogno di recuperare la fiducia nela ragione e tornare alla ricerca della verità. (shrink)
In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...) consistency. (shrink)
The debate over Plato’s “ so called unwritten doctrines”, which he communicated only to a small circle of trusted disciples, has caused a stir among philosophers in recent decades. Rafael Ferber assumes a differentiated position in this controversy. He is convinced that the unwritten doctrines did exist, but that Plato, for reasons inherent in the process of gaining knowledge, was unable to communicate these doctrines even to his closest disciples. In this book, Ferber outlines the discussion and summarizes the (...) standpoints of greatest interest. -/- Ever since Aristotle, we have known that Plato did not put his most important teachings into writing, but instead communicated them only orally to the inner circle of his disciples. While the extant dialogues merely pass down Plato’s “exoteric” doctrines, his most important “esoteric” insights were not meant for the general public. In the meantime, the contents and the significance of Plato’s “unwritten doctrines” have become the subject of debate in philosophical circles. -/- Fifteen years ago, at the height of the controversy over the “unwritten doctrines”, Rafael Ferber entered the fray with a small book. He proposed that Plato was also unable to communicate the “unwritten doctrines” because the highest principles (i.e. the subject of the unwritten doctrines) cannot be known through logical operations due to an epistemological paradox. Ferber’s differentiated position met with great respect and acceptance, although in individual cases it was also rejected. -/- Ferber’s new book again presents the text of 1991, but significantly expands on it through new perspectives and an outline of the discussion it triggered. In this book, the reader learns what is meant by Plato’s unwritten doctrines and what the controversy is all about. (shrink)
The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate (...) final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo". (shrink)
In the whole Corpus Platonicum, we find in principle only one "direct argument" (Charles Kahn) for the existence of the ideas (Tim.51d3-51e6). The purpose of the article is to analyse this argument and to answer the question of why Plato in the Timaeus again defended the existence of the ideas despite the objections in the Parmenides. He defended it again because the latent presupposition of the apories in the Parmenides, the substantial view of sensibles, is removed through the introduction of (...) space as "substantialized extension". First (I) it is shown that Plato remained in dialogues, like the Sophist and Politicus, faithful to the "theory of ideas" despite his criticism in the Parmenides. The common theme in the trilogy of the Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus is to refute relativism by showing that any relativism presupposes something absolute that is something like the "theory of ideas". The second part of the paper (II) examines closely the logical structure of the argument for the existence of ideas in the Timaeus (51d3-52a7). The third part (III) shows how this argument can avoid the criticism of ideas in the Parmenides. In the Parmenides, sensibles are treated as substantial entities. But, as the Timaeus shows, sensibles are not substantial entities but merely qualities, namely qualities of space, which is the only substance in the sensible world. A shortened English version of the paper appeared in Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum, Granada, Selected papers, ed. by T. Calvo/L. Brisson, Academia Verlag, St. Augustin, 1997, 179-186. -/- But the only "direct argument" (Tim.51d3-51e6) seems to be interestingly flawed. Cf. Ferber, Rafael; Hiltbrunner, Thomas, (2005). (shrink)
The article first gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the "Republic", 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates for whom irrational (...) desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first one. Then it attempts to show that we can elucidate some dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas’s distinction between it actio hominis and actio humana. Finally, the article outlines three substantive answers to the question “What is the Good?” – the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)
The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)
Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940-2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato‘s Idea of the Good is on the one hand beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article gives first (I.), an introduction into the status questionis. Second (II.), it delivers the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Third (III.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Fourth (IV), it deals with (...) the translation of L. Brisson "Apollon, quelle merveilleuse emphase" of 509c1-2. Fifth (V.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpetation of Plato‘s Republic, 509b9-10. (shrink)
The first part of the paper (p. 10-21) tries to answer the first question of the title and describes a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. (...) 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but “very important” (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. The second part (p. 22-39) tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paperis the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in theDivided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1). Posted. (shrink)
In his Vermischte Bemerkungen 43, Wittgenstein notices that he was also influenced by Oswald Spengler. The paper deals with the question of in which way Spengler influenced Wittgenstein’s late works and if it really was influence or only a coincidence of ideas. It is put forward that Spengler’s rather unknown philosophy of language influenced Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, especially the concepts of family resemblance, antiessentialism, and language-game (Sprachspiel). A picture of the famous Neapolitan gesture of “negation” which motivated Wittgenstein to (...) give up the picture theory of language is also shown with an example taken from Andrea de Jorio, La mimica degli antichi investigala nel gestire napoletano, Napoli 1832. (shrink)
The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence (...) and the form of a fact. (shrink)
The article examines the Socratic principle that (1) virtue is knowledge and its corollary that (2) nobody errs voluntarily (nemo sua sponte peccat). It tries to show (I) that both principles are paradoxa, i.e. from a phenomenological point of view, they seem to be false; (II) that nevertheless the platonic Socrates accepts both principles as true; and finally (III) that these principles are analytical truths a priori which can only be understood if a person (soul) finds them in him- or (...) herself. (shrink)
No audiovisual, a violência normalmente é vista como apenas uma ação, um sensacionalismo, especialmente as cenas de luta. No entanto, além do mero grau percebido, o anime é um gênero fílmico onde tais cenas apresentam um grau concebido,uma outra ressignificação de tais atitudes. Assim, o presente artigo busca analisar tal situação, dentro do domínio das Ciências da Linguagem, no anime Cavaleiros do Zodíaco. O objetivo aqui é descrever tais efeitos de sentido provenientes das cenas de lutas e como eles operam (...) não só na construção poética, mas também no reforço da lógica do fantasma, o mecanismo de interação psíquica da obra audiovisual. (shrink)
The first part of the paper (p. 10-21) tries to answer the first question of the title and describes a set of seven "knowledge-claims" made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge.2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody does willingly wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just man is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. 7. (...) The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the "few" (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but "very important" (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. The second part (p. 22-39) tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed "knowledge" of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paper is the comparison of the Socratic "knowledge-claims" with the upper states of the mind symbolised in the Divided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1). (shrink)
Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word “is”, their theories share a common feature: “is” does not have a normative meaning. This paper, however, (I) shows (a) that there is a normative meaning of “is” (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word “ought”) and (b) that the ambiguity of “is” is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, it proposes (c) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and (...) normative “is”. Thereby, (II) a new interpretation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument (CPR A 598/B626) makes sense: The difference between being as a real predicate and being as a position depends on the difference between “is” as a descriptive and “is” as a normative predicate. (III) The criterion also makes possible a new answer to Leibniz’s and Schelling’s question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”: The “is” in “there is something” is normative and the question means “Why shall there be something rather than nothing?”. As “there shall be nothing” is self-refuting, the question evokes an ultimate foundation in a practical sense. (shrink)
Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: (...) If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):. (shrink)
This is the abbreviated and slightly revised English version of my paper “Moralische Urteile als Beschreibungen institutioneller Tatsachen. Unterwegs zu einer Theorie moralischer Urteile“, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 79, 1993, 372-392. It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character (...) of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: if moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, whereas Y means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: it is stating a fact in descriptive language and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized, although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The metaethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a byproduct, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counter-example against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under an obligation to do the thing promised”. (shrink)
Tras analizar sucintamente las consecuencias científicas y filosóficas de la identidad mente-cerebro, se señalan argumentos a favor y en contra de mantener el debate mente-cerebro. En particular se consideran las nuevas técnicas de exploración del cerebro como argumento en contra de tal debate. Las deficiencias e insuficiencias de tales técnicas aconsejan mantener el debate mente-cerebro y no asumir el materialismo.
¿Llegarán los ordenadores a sustituir a los seres humanos? Lo que hasta hace unas décadas parecía una pregunta de ciencia-ficción, es ahora defendido con seriedad por algunos especialistas en inteligencia artificial. El presente articulo dibuja las más importantes líneas de investigación en este campo y las posiciones más relevantes respecto de la relación hombre-maquina pensante. La conclusión que propone el autor supone una decidida apuesta por un humanismo en el que quepa integrar el desarrollo tecnológico sin perder de vista sus (...) innegables implicaciones éticas. (shrink)
El presente artículo tiene como objetivo determinar el fundamento teológico del concepto de soberanía propuesto por el jurista alemán Carl Schmitt. Según nuestra hipótesis, tal fundamento teológico se encuentra en la filosofía del pensador danés Søren Kierkegaard, quien, en diferentes obras, desarrolló los importantes conceptos de excepción, decisión y suspensión teleológica de la ética en relación a la experiencia religiosa de la repetición. Como veremos, tales conceptos forman parte del fundamento teológico de la famosa definición schmittiana de la soberanía: “soberano (...) es quien decide sobre el estado de excepción”, la cual define el decisionismo del jurista alemán. Así, por medio del concepto de decisión, extraído de la obra kierkegaardiana e introducido en la doctrina de la soberanía, Schmitt logra tres objetivos. Por un lado, no solo inicia la crítica al parlamentarismo liberal y al Estado burgués de Derecho, sino que revela el fundamento teológico-existencial de la unidad política del Estado moderno. En segundo lugar, en el marco jurídico-político, actualiza la teología fideísta desarrollada por Kierkegaard en su obra. Finalmente, en el marco teológico-metafísico, introduce el papel de la decisión como actualizador del rol público de la trascendencia en la modernidad secularizada frente a la reserva escatológica de la teología. Para lograr nuestro objetivo, utilizaremos el método de la analogía conceptual teológico-política creado y aplicado por el mismo Carl Schmitt a la historia de la soberanía europea. (shrink)
La finalidad del presente artículo es descubrir la presencia del concepto de persona en la doctrina de la soberanía de Carl Schmitt. A pesar de que este concepto tuvo un amplio desarrollo metafísico en el seno del pensamiento cristiano durante la antigüedad tardía, jamás pudo desembarazarse de la impronta jurídica de sus creadores los juristas romanos. Por tal razón, sirvió como soporte conceptual para el posterior despliegue de la noción de persona jurídica, sistematizada a lo largo de la modernidad. Para (...) lograr nuestro objetivo, intentaremos rastrear la transformación del concepto de persona a lo largo de la edad media y la modernidad, así como revisar el concepto de soberanía en la teoría política moderna. Por otro lado, estudiaremos la noción de decisión en la obra de Carl Schmitt, noción que el gran jurista alemán utilizó para definir su propia concepción de la soberanía. A partir de estas precisiones, intentaremos establecer la relación existente entre la noción de persona y la de decisión en el seno de la concepción schmittiana de la soberanía tomando como hilo conductor los presupuestos teológicos implícitos en ella. Como veremos, tales presupuestos nos remitirán a la obra del pensador danés Søren Kierkegaard, cuyas doctrinas nos mostrarán todo el alcance del planteamiento schmittiano. De esta manera, podemos concluir que el concepto de persona subyacente al decisionismo schmittiano ha sido transformado, en primer término, en el de existencia política, noción determinada por la relación de enemistad; y, en segundo lugar, en el de unidad de la personalidad, concepto determinado por la actualización de la dimensión espiritual al interior de la condición humana. (shrink)
Apresentamos neste artigo explicitações histórico-conceituais sobre o surgimento da predicação lógica contemporânea. Quando se trata de predicação, remete-se de imediato à obra de Aristóteles, mas, com as transformações trazidas pela Lógica Contemporânea, o estudo da predicação deixa o plano do estudo lógico-gramatical para o estudo do plano da análise lógicomatemática. Veremos, nesse sentido, a importância dos trabalhos de Peirce, Frege e Russell para o surgimento da predicação lógica contemporânea. Embora Peirce tenha sido o precursor da introdução do conceito de função (...) proposicional na História da Lógica, ganha destaque, contemporaneamente, o modelo de interpretação da predicação inicialmente proposto por Frege. (shrink)
Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not aligned with his (...) best evaluative judgement. Yet, if the agent’s best evaluative judgement provides him a reason for action, this reason should also be his strongest reason, and therefore, the strongest cause. How then can it be possible that an agent incontinently acts according to a reason of inferior causal strength? In this paper, I analyze how Davidson’s argument for the possibility of incontinent actions interacts with his causal theory of actions. I argue that Davidson’s proposal does not fully respect the two principles of intentional rationality, that he himself claims to be compelling. Lastly, I sketch some initial steps that might be helpful to drawing more precise conceptual distinctions in terms of the rationality of incontinent actions. (shrink)
Das Coisas que nos fazem pensar: O debate sobre a Nova Teoria da Comunicação é o livro que descreve os primeiros momentos de debate e divulgação, por Ciro Marcondes Filho, da Nova Teoria da Comunicação e do metáporo. O objetivo da presente resenha é demonstrar como o livro se caracteriza enquanto um percurso feito pelo autor de disseminação e defesa de sua construção ontológica, epistemológica e metodológica da Comunicação em sua busca para transformá-la de ciência aplicada para ciência pura.
O presente artigo busca caracterizar a querela interna do Movimento Jovem-Hegeliano através da descrição e caracterização do conceito de massa/massificação dentro do pensamento de seus membros primeiros, a saber: Ludwig Feuerbach, David Strauss e Bruno Bauer.
O presente artigo apresenta um retrospecto teórico das temáticas da Cultura e Identidade – essa tomada também como identificação e individualização – dentro das principais obras de Herbert Marcuse, em especial Razão e Revolução e A Ideologia da Sociedade Industrial. Após traçar esse arcabouço, pretendemos ilustrar os conceitos filosóficos utilizando exemplos midiáticos presentes nas práticas midiáticas atuais, buscando demonstrar a pregnância que um pensamento da época da contracultura pode ter no século XXI.
O presente artigo busca definir o movimento literário cyberpunk a partir da sua influência teórica vinda do campo da matemática. Utilizando a teorização interna ao movimento, centrada em Rudy Rucker, o objetivo aqui é entender como os campos da análise e dos fundamentos da matemática criam uma importante distinção entre os cyberpunks e as demais distopias literárias. Com isso, há a pressuposição de um movimento de uma crítica sociomatemática feita pelos cyberpunks cujos conceitos matemáticos tornam possível criticar o tempo presente, (...) bem como servir de divulgação científica. (shrink)
The beginning for C. S. Peirce was the reduction of the traditional categories in a list composed of a fundamental triad: quality, respect and representation. Thus, these three would be named as Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, as well given the ability to degeneration. Here we show how this degeneration categorical is related to mathematical revolution which Peirce family, especially his father Benjamin Peirce, took part: the advent of quaternions by William Rowan Hamilton, a number system that extends the complex numbers, (...) i.e. those numbers which consists of an imaginary unit built by the square root of minus one. This is a debate that can, and should, have contributions that take into account the role that mathematical analysis and linear algebra had in C. S. Peirce’s past. (shrink)
This article aims to show that the contribution of Charles Sanders Peirce to communicology is much earlier than the advent of epistemological integration of semiotics in communication studies, being phaneroscopy as a early form of communicology. This reflection is based on the study of the categorical degeneration theorized by Peirce, his influence on communicational thinking (especially on Gilles Deleuze’s cinema theory), as well as the conceptual link between degeneration and phenomenon from the philosophical point of view of quaternions.
O presente trabalho visa entender como o rádio esportivo se estrutura dentro da linguagem do rádio. Partindo dos pressupostos que o rádio é uma linguagem regida por uma lógica (o jogo de linguagem) e uma pragmática (os gêneros do discurso), há o estudo detalhado do rádio esportivo enquanto modelo operacional em intersecção temática com o mundo radiofônico.
O presente artigo deseja estudar a questão da música enquanto linguagem e como seria a sua ação linguística dentro do campo da comunicabilidade e das mediações. Para isso, utilizando as ideias da Filosofia Analítica da Linguagem (especialmente Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin e John Searle), serão analisados dois elementos da linguagem musical de épocas distintas e antagônicas: o leitmotiv (com enfoque em O Anel do Nibelungo, de Richard Wagner) e a fórmula (com enfoque em Licht, de Karlheinz Stockhausen). A ideia (...) aqui é verificar a autonomia da linguagem musical bem como as suas possibilidades de lógica ilocucionária. Palavras-chaves: Linguagem musical; Pragmática; Ação linguística. (shrink)
Dentro da produção da UPA, estúdio que buscou rivalizar esteticamente com os preceitos da Disney no cinema de animação nos anos 1950, Gerald McBoing-Boing é a personagem mais emblemática, estrelando quatro curtas de animação que representam os preceitos do estúdio. No entanto, o mote narrativo de McBoing-Boing é que ele não se comunica com sons, mas sim por efeitos sonoros, e se fazendo entender. Para entender quais são as possibilidades linguísticas desse uso sonoro e como ele não nos aparece enquanto (...) algo surreal, analisaremos tal representação à luz da segunda filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, cuja obra-chave são as Investigações Filosóficas. Concentrando no §528, o objetivo é mostrar como McBoing-Boing se encaixa em um fenômeno language-like, representando um ponto central na crítica estética da UPA. (shrink)
O presente artigo busca analisar como o conceito de massas é analisado na filosofia dita pós-moderna. Usando a intersecção entre Filosofia da Linguagem e Filosofia Política, o conceito se metamorfoseia em diversos autores (Jean-François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze) para desembocar naqueles que trabalham o conceito atualmente em filosofia: Michael Hardt e Antonio Negri.
O presente artigo busca analisar, no aspecto da imagem fílmica, os documentários de arquivo sobre a Fórmula 1 em seus primórdios garagistas (pré-1950 ao fim da década de 1970). Para isso, serão analisados três documentários recentes sobre grandes pilotos da categoria, a saber: Jack Brabham, Graham Hill e Juan Manuel Fangio. Utilizando a teorização de Gilles Deleuze acerca da imagem-movimento e seus aspectos semióticos, o objetivo aqui é ver que a cadeia de significação provocada pela reedição de imagens de arquivo (...) provoca a construção de um argumento que ressalta mais o lado humano dos pilotos do que os seus feitos enquanto esportistas consagrados. (shrink)
O objetivo desse paper é mostrar como que se opera a temática da exclusão social dentro da esfera espectacularizadora da mídia. Usando o conceito, retirado do Direito Romano por Giorgio Agamben, de Homo sacer, mostraremos como esses indíviduos que estão às margens dos direitos estatais aparecem em temáticas que “esquecem” do seu problema fundamental. Relembrando os jornais romanos conhecidos como acta populi e o termo, difundido filosoficamente por Roland Barthes, de fait divers, podemos ver como que os excluídos (cuja existência, (...) segundo Herbert Marcuse, é perigosa para o status quo) se tornam figuras dóceis na esfera pública. (shrink)
Neste artigo, analisa-se como as histórias em quadrinhos sobre automo-bilismo, notadamente a do personagem Michel Vaillant, conseguem en- gendrar, em sua narrativa, mundos possíveis, que, mesmo com atributos ficcionais, se vinculam à referencialidade dos fatos ocorridos no esporte. Utilizando o arcabouço teórico de Umberto Eco e de David Lewis, o objetivo aqui é refletir acerca desse exercício de isomorfismo linguístico, bem como desvelar as estratégias altermundistas utilizadas.
This article wants to analyze how Man Rayin his photographs, engages a poetry of silenceusing this medium as a poetic communication technology. To understand the functioning of this poetic language, we will adopt the Groupe μ analysis method (both the General Rhetoricand the Treatise on the Visual Sign). Whereas the language is manifold as the forms of representation, and it present in all media, whatever the lack of speech -silence -would find its richest form in both directions through the metaphors (...) and metonymy engaged in metasememes of the photos studied. (shrink)
The French theorist A. J. Greimas, inspired by such studies, is considered one of the founders of Narratology through the construction of models of analysis where these invariables would be centered in the subject of the narrative and based on the action and the transformation of them. The objective of the present essay is to analyze the ideas of Greimas, as well as to look for the logical mechanism that resides in each model.
This essay wants to rescue the concept of phaneroscopy, created by Charles Sanders Peirce, to adapt it in a phenomenological condition of multiple realities. Therefore, in addition to review the reflection of Peirce, we visited the approach of phenomenology of multiple realities proposed by Alfred Schutz in his reading of William James. The idea is to seek a phenomenology that goes beyond the human consciousness to other research subjects.
Esse artigo pode ser dividido em duas partes. A primeira consiste na reconstrução do importante caminho heideggeriano em Ser e Tempo que vai do impessoal (das Man) à cura (Sorge) através de um ponto em comum: o entretenimento. A segunda consiste em apontar brevemente a possibilidade ou não do uso do caminho descrito pela primeira parte e do pensamento de Martin Heidegger nos estudos midiáticos, onde o entretenimento está inserido. Essa construção dupla proporciona não apenas um estudo undimensional seja do (...) pensamento heideggeriano ou da questão do entretenimento. O objetivo é iluminar tanto o percurso da busca do ser através do “entreter” quanto perceber a possibilidade de um estudo direto da mídia através dos conceitos presentes em Heidegger que, de certa forma, influenciou pensadores de grande uso atual nas pesquisas midiáticas como Michel Foucault e Jacques Lacan. (shrink)
O presente artigo deseja entender como a lógica diegética de Salò, último filme de Pier Paolo Pasolini, engendra um fascismo pulsional. Isso é demonstrado a partir da lógica lacaniana do desejo centrado na figura conceitual do fantasma. Com a leitura sexual do conceito feita por Contardo Calligaris, o artigo mostra que o fascismo que Pasolini critica não precisa ser apenas o político, mas também pode ser posto em uma situação econômica tal como aquela que o capitalismo midiatizado coloca em movimento. (...) -/- . (shrink)
O presente artigo deseja observar como a crônica esportiva de futebol (especialmente a produção textual de Nelson Rodrigues e José Lins do Rego) consegue engendrar, em sua narrativa, mundos possíveis que, mesmo com atributos ficcionais, se vinculam à referencialidade dos fatos ocorridos no esporte. Utilizando-se o arcabouço teórico de Umberto Eco e de David Lewis, o objetivo aqui é refletir acerca desse exercício de isomorfismo linguístico, bem como desvelar as estratégias altermundistas utilizadas.
This article is an effort to understand how the Peirce's Arrow (Logical NOR), as a logical operation, can act within the concept of Ludwig Wittgenstein's language-game, considering that the language game is a satzsystem, i.e., a system of propositions. To accomplish this task, we will cover four steps: (1) understand the possible relationship of the thought of C. S. Peirce with the founding trio of analytic philosophy, namely Frege-RussellWittgenstein, looking for similarities between the logic of Peirce and his students (notably (...) Christine Ladd and O.H. Mitchell) with a New Wittgenstein’s approach, which sees Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus),Middle Wittgenstein and Last Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations) while a coherent way of thinking and not a theoretical break; (2) describe the operation of the Peirce’s Arrow (Logical NOR) as a logical connective; (3)understand the notion of satzsystem (Middle Wittgenstein) and the possibility of applying the concept of language-game (Last Wittgenstein) on it; and (4) understand how the Logical NOR can operate within a satzsystem. The goal here is a search for the logic of the language-game and how the logical ideas of C. S. Peirce can help in this construction. And this construction might be interesting for a better understanding of the analytic philosophy of language. (shrink)
O presente artigo busca debater a posição de Charles Sanders Peirce e dos primeiros estudantes peirceanos de Lógica (Christine Ladd e O. H. Mitchell nos Studies in Logic, 1883) dentro do debate inspirador da visão da linguagem dentro da Filosofia Analítica, conhecido como “Lingua Universalis contra Calculus Ratiocinator”, cujos primórdios podem ser traçados desde a filosofia de Gottfried Leibniz. Para isso, comparamos esse campo do pensamento peirceano com o debate crucial entre a conceitografia de Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879) e a (...) lógica algébrica de George Boole (An investigation of the Laws of Thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of Logic and Probabilities, 1854). O nosso objetivo principal é observar que esse momento da filosofia peirceana pode ser comparado com o pensamento wittgensteiniano, especialmente em sua nova vertente, chamada New Wittgenstein, que tenta superar a tradicional divisão entre Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e Investigações Filosóficas. Pela comparação entre pensadores influenciados por C. S. Peirce e a filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, pretendemos abrir caminhos na compreensão do conceito de jogo de linguagem, especialmente em sua gramática e em seus operadores simbólicos, através da observação das funções de verdade [truth functions] e as tabelas de verdade [truth tables] enquanto lógica algébrica. (shrink)
The objective of this research essay is to understand the episteme of phenomenology using the recent construction of Mark D. Vagle which understands phenomenological knowledge as a conceptual tripod between encounters, way of living and crafting. There is here a preliminary view on the subject where it seeks to understand the phenomenology beyond its big names such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, among others. It is a phenomenology of vision for the twenty-first century, focusing on the epistemological and methodological construction (...) of phenomenological research. -/- . (shrink)
O presente artigo busca investigar como certas produções midiáticas que, apesar da pretensa polêmica e campanha de (contra)estigmatização, não causaram o eco social pretendido. Usando o arcabouço teórico de Jean-François Lyotard, de inspiração wittgensteniana, iremos analisar três produções audiovisuais que entram nas características de nosso objeto: Torre de Babel, Garapa e Capitalismo: uma História de Amor. Observando como tais obras se relacionam com as questões de (re)presentações, saberes e apostas linguísticos, veremos como se operou o silenciamento da polêmica resultando em (...) um processo de normalização e normatização no escopo social. (shrink)
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