The main purpose of the thesis is to identify and fill some gaps that are regularly found in the analysis of the Platonic concept of ἐξαίφνης. The word ἐξαίφνης, which appears 36 times in the Platonic dialogues, has primarily been examined and discussed in relation to what is said in Parmenides and, more rarely, in Symposium, Republic and Seventh Letter. However, as is known, the word is also found in Gorgias, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Statesman and Laws. Moreover, it is worth noting (...) that a history of criticism about the concept of ἐξαίφνης has never been provided, mainly due to the chronological and interpretive difficulties relating to Parmenides. This absence brought on a fragmentation and discontinuity in the study of the concept and it often prompted specialists to see in this notion a secondary or imprecise aspect of the Platonic theory. Regardless of the correctness of interpretations that have been proposed over the centuries, my work clearly shows that all these exegeses share two fundamental limits: the former is a necessarily partial analysis, almost exclusively based on what is written in Parmenides, the latter is the absence of a historical perspective . Cette thèse portant sur le concept d’ἐξαίφνης tel qu’on le trouve dans les textes de Platon se propose de combler les lacunes existantes relatives à l’analyse de ce concept. En effet, le terme d’ἐξαίφνης, dont on trouve trente-six occurrences dans les dialogues de Platon n’a été jusqu’à présent principalement envisagé et examiné qu’à travers ce qui en est dit dans le Parménide et, plus rarement, dans le Banquet, la République et la Lettre VII. Le terme, comme on le sait, se trouve pourtant aussi dans le Gorgias, le Cratyle, le Théétète, le Politique et les Lois. En outre, en raison notamment des difficultés chronologiques et interprétatives liées au dialogue du Parménide, aucune histoire critique du concept d’ἐξαίφνης n’a été entreprise. Cette absence d’histoire critique a pour effet une fragmentation et une discontinuité des études portant sur ce concept, effets qui ont souvent conduit les spécialistes à ne voir dans cette notion qu’un aspect secondaire ou à tout le moins imprécis de la théorie que développe Platon à son sujet. Aussi la thèse s’est-elle attachée à entreprendre une étude préalable de l’histoire de ces interprétations. Quelle que soit la justesse et la valeur des interprétations qui se sont succédées au cours des siècles, cette étude s’emploie à montrer clairement que ces tendances exégétiques se heurtent à deux limites fondamentales que la thèse s’applique à lever : la première est le caractère nécessairement partiel d’une analyse menée presque exclusivement à partir du Parménide, la seconde est l’absence de mise en perspective historique. (shrink)

What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such systems, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. A specific architecture of an artificial system, termed articon, is introduced that by its very design has to claim being conscious. (...) Non-verbal discrimination of the working memory states of the articon gives it the ability to experience different qualities of internal states. Analysis of the flow of inner states of such a system during typical behavioral process shows that qualia are inseparable from perception and action. The role of consciousness in learning of skills — when conscious information processing is replaced by subconscious — is elucidated. Arguments confirming that phenomenal experience is a result of cognitive processes are presented. Possible philosophical objections based on the Chinese room and other arguments are discussed, but they are insufficient to refute articon’s claims that it is conscious. Conditions for genuine understanding that go beyond the Turing test are presented. Articons may fulfill such conditions and in principle the structure of their experiences may be arbitrarily close to human. (shrink)

Hilmi Omar Budda (1894-1952) has played a significant role in the process of institutionalization of History of Religions in Turkey. He, who was the first academician in the field of History of Religions in Turkey, lectured for many years in Dâru’l-Funûn (Ottoman University) Faculty of Divinity, which was found in 1924. Then he worked in department of Institute of Islamic Sciences, which was a branch of Istanbul University Faculty of Arts, by pursuing his same position and career. After that, Budda (...) lectured in Ankara University Faculty of Divinity, which was found in 1949, as the first academic person of the department of History of Religions. Budda, who wrote many scientific studies and trained a large number of students during his academic life roughly thirty years, filled a gap in the field of History of Religions in the early years of republic period. Even though there are some scientific problems in his writings and views on issues, this article deals with Budda’s contributions to the History of Religions and his role in the formation of such a discipline in Turkey. This study, besides, mentions about Budda’s academic sides by analyzing his scientific writings composed of books, articles and columns. (shrink)

I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (δεινότης), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of (...) this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects. (shrink)

In this article, it has been aimed to examine Nietzsche’s main critique towards different understandings of morals in his era. With this criticism, it is aimed to integrally understand the opinions -which are articulated directly or metaphorically- towards morals which have been encountered. In here, while keeping in mind the difference between the concepts of immoralism and amoralism, Nietzsche’s views are interpreted. Being parallel to that aim mentioned above, it has been investigated if there is a thinking in Nietzsche which (...) can be seen as a kind of understanding of morals (maybe as the understanding of morals without morals) or not. And finally, it has been thought that if Nietzsche’s views on morals have any value for the 21st century and upcoming 22nd century human or not, whether there’s something left to learn for this human from his critiques or not. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of acquaintance construes perceptual awareness as at once constitutively independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and other conceptualists object that this is a ‘myth’: perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are already in play therein. Proponents of a relational view of experience, including John Campbell, meanwhile voice sympathy for Russell’s position on this point. This paper seeks to spell out, and defend, a claim that (...) offers the prospects for an attractive, unacknowledged element of common ground in this debate. The claim is that conceptual capacities, at least in a certain minimal sense implicit in McDowell’s recent work, must be operative in perceptual experience, if it is to rationalize judgement. The claim will be supported on the basis of two premises, each of which can be defended drawing, inter alia, on considerations stressed by Campbell. First, that experience rationalizes judgement only if it is attentive. Second, that attention qualifies as a conceptual capacity, in the noted, minimal sense. The conjunction of the two premises might be dubbed ‘attentional conceptualism’. (shrink)

According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition that p. (...) For example, one might respond to a query for directions to the station by saying ‘I believe it is down the first street on your left.' Often, when we reply in this way, it would have been pragmatically preferable simply to assert that p, had we been epistemically warranted in doing so. One's guarded reply thus suggests one is not so warranted. Nevertheless, if one believes what one, at face value, says one believes, one believes p. Contrary to what might seem to be suggested by the Same Norm View, one does not seem to portray oneself as irrational or epistemically beyond the pale in replying in this way. The paper develops this puzzle in detail, and examines a variety of options for a resolving it consistently with the Same Norm view. The most promising of these options, I argue, is to see ‘I believe' guarded affirmations as a form merely approximately correct speech. They would, though, be a form of such speech that interestingly differs from paradigm cases of loose use or conventional hyperbole in that speakers would be comparatively unaware of engaging in approximation. I conclude ‘I believe’—guarded affirmations either show the Same Norm View to be false or must be recognised as such an interestingly distinctive form of merely approximately correct speech. (shrink)

The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, their (...) phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)

Brentano (1874) described intentionality in a number of different ways: as ‘the intentional inexistence of an object’, ‘reference to a content’, ‘direction towards an object’, and ‘immanent objectivity’. All these phrases were intended to mean the same thing, but such elegant variation can give rise to confusion. In my Elements of Mind (2001) I tried to give a simpler description: intentional states all involve directedness upon an object and what I call (following Searle 1992) aspectual shape. My aim in doing (...) this was to introduce an understanding of intentionality that (a) allows theorists of intentionality to agree on the fundamentals of the phenomenon, but disagree about the details; and (b) leaves the question open whether all mental states are intentional. (shrink)

The following article aims to reconstruct the philosophical-political content of Primo Levi's 1976 essays "About Obscure Writing", focusing especially on the anthropological question of inequality.

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This is a short companion piece to my ‘Found in Translation – Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.5 1113b7-8 and its Reception’ in which I examine in close textual analysis the philosophical question whether these two lines from the Nicomachean Ethics provide any evidence that Aristotle discussed free choice – as is not infrequently assumed. The result is that they do not, and that the claim that they do tends to be based on a mistranslation of the Greek. (There is some (...) inevitable overlap with Part 1 of the 'Found in Translation' paper.). (shrink)

Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de 1963 ile 2012 yılları arasında din psikolojisi alanında yapılan ve hala devam eden yüksek lisans ve doktora tezlerine ilişkin analizler yer almaktadır. Bunun yanında din psikolojisinin Türkiye’de akademide yer alışına dair kısa bir tarihçe vardır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, din psikolojisi doktora tezlerine ilişkin bir bibliyografya oluşturarak, araştırmacılara ve lisansüstü öğrencilerine bir katalog sunmaktır. Ayrıca, tezlere ait verilerin analizleriyle, yapılacak yeni çalışmalara yol göstermek amaçlanmıştır. Yöntem olarak literatür taraması yapılmış, farklı kurumların katalogları taranmış ve alandaki akademisyenlerle görüşülmüştür. Elde (...) edilen bilgiler doğrultusunda tezler, yüksek lisans ve doktora tezleri olarak tasnif edilmiş ve yazar referans alınarak alfabetik sıraya göre dizilmiştir. Tez başlıklarının içerdikleri konular tespit edilmiş ve bu veriler analiz edilmiştir. (shrink)

In his _Being Known_ Peacocke sets himself the task of answering how we come to know about metaphysical necessities. He proposes a semantic principle-based conception consisting of, first, his Principles of Possibility which pro­vide necessary and sufficient conditions for a new concept 'admissibility', and second, characterizations of possibility and of necessity in terms of that new con­cept. I focus on one structural feature; viz. the recursive application involved in the specification of 'admissibility'. After sketching Peacocke’s proposal, I intro­duce a fictional (...) protagonist, Cautious Peacocke, whose coherence I claim shows that Peacocke s proposal cannot be made good. I conclude with the conjecture that similar failure will attend any such semantic-based attempts to ground the epistemology of metaphysical necessity. -/- Dans son livre intitulé Being Known, C. Peacocke se propose de repondre à la question de savoir comment nous en venons a connaitre des nécessités métaphysiques. Il développe une conception sémantique reposant sur des principes comprenant, d’une part, ses Principes de Possibilité — qui fournissent les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour un nouveau concept, « l’admissibilité » — et d’autre part des caractérisations de la possibilité et de la nécessité a l’aide de ce nouveau concept. Je me concentre sur une caractéristique structurelle, a savoir l’application récursive a l’œuvre dans la spécification de «l’admissibilité ». Apres avoir esquisse la proposition de Peacocke, j’introduis un personnage fictif, Peacocke-prudent. Je soutiens que la cohérence de ce personnage montre que la proposition de Peacocke ne peut pas être satisfaite. Je conclus en conjecturant qu’un échec similaire se présentera pour toutes les tentatives de fonder l’épistemologie de la nécessité métaphysique sur de telles bases semantiques. (shrink)

For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17– 1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31). In this (...) chapter, I show that a study of this cooperation helps to uncover some distinctive aspects of human cognition and desire. (shrink)

Debata o tzv. „Novém Humovi“ byla v posledních desetiletích dominantním tématem humovské interpretace. James Hill ve svém příspěvku v tomto časopise podporuje hlavní požadavek „novohumovců“, který vymezuje Huma jako epistemologického skeptika a ontologického realistu. Vůči tomuto pojetí máme několik výhrad. Některé se týkají nejasností v definici realismu a celkově i smysluplnosti projektu „Nový Hume“. Některé se týkají konkrétních Hillových argumentů zaměřených na Humovy Dialogy a především jeho tvrzení, že v tomto díle lze nalézt další důkaz Humova realismu.

Né dans le sillage d’un « significant renewal of interest in Bergsonism and a greater recognition of his influence on twentieth-century philosophy » (p. 1), ce livre ne pouvait que poser des questions sur le temps, ramenant également à la philosophie de Heidegger, à qui l’on doit l’une des pensées les plus originales à ce sujet. Aussi Heath Massey s’emploie-t-il lire les textes de Bergson qui tentent de repenser la notion traditionnelle de temps à côté de ceux de Heidegger, mettant (...) plus particulièrement en lumière l’influence de celui-là sur celui-ci, une influence largement passée inaperçue. L’importance de cette œuvre tient dans la façon dont l’A. conteste la philosophie du temps que Heidegger attribue à Bergson. Notre guide considère la lecture bergsonienne de Heidegger comme une « oversimplication » (p. 84) et vise à éclaircir comment, malgré les propos du penseur allemand, le philosophe français a été capable de radicalement repenser le temps d’un point de vue ontologique. Dès lors, l’ouvrage s’achève sur un goût de soupçon, celui-ci faisant dire que Heidegger a essayé de se distinguer de Bergson pour ne pas admettre ce dont il lui est redevable. (shrink)

John Hardwig has championed the thesis (NE) that evidence that an expert EXP has evidence for a proposition P, constituted by EXP’s testimony that P, is not evidence for P itself, where evidence for P is generally characterized as anything that counts towards establishing the truth of P. In this paper, I first show that (NE) yields tensions within Hardwig’s overall view of epistemic reliance on experts and makes it imply unpalatable consequences. Then, I use Shogenji-Roche’s theorem of transitivity of (...) incremental confirmation to show that (NE) is false if a natural Bayesian formalization of the above notion of evidence is implemented. I concede that Hardwig could resist my Bayesian objection if he re-interpreted (NE) as a more precise thesis that only applies to community-focused evidence. I argue, however, that this precisification, while diminishing the philosophical relevance of (NE), wouldn’t settle the tensions internal to Hardwig’s views. (shrink)

Zájem současné sociologie a dalších společenských věd o výzkumy spokojenosti a štěstí zatemňuje skutečnost, že původně právě sociologie chtěla „štěstí" poskytovat a nahrazovat tak náboženské přístupy ke světu. Tento implicitně nábo- ženský charakter je patrný i v rané české sociologii v dílech prvních propagátorů sociologie, jako byl především Emanuel Makovička, a později u některých následovníků a epigonů T. G. Masaryka, v meziválečném období zejména u Ladislava Kunteho, R. I. Malého, Alexandra Sommera-Batěka, Jindřicha Fleischnera a Jana Duška. Z hlediska vývoje české (...) sociologie šlo o zcela okrajové postavy, ačkoli mnohé z nich vynikly v jiných oblastech, jako celek jsou nicméně vyjádřením jednoho z aspektů dobových teoretických úvah o společnosti, jejím uspořádání a vývoji, na který by nemělo být zapomínáno. Zatímco T. G. Masaryka a pozdější akademické sociology „omezoval" vědecký charakter jejich práce, a i pokud směřovali k sociálnímu reformismu, oddělovali jej od teoretické sociologie, „sociologie vedoucí ke štěstí" nalezla plné uplatnění ve vizích a ambiciózních projek- tech těchto amatérských takésociologů - třebaže skončily faktickými nezdary nebo ani nedošly praktického naplnění, ostatně stejně jako v případě jejich pravzoru, Comtova pozitivistického apoštolátu. (shrink)

Cette note devait introduire à un public anglophone la traduction de la « Lettre de Louis Althusser datée du 18 mars 1966 et adressée au Comité central du PCF », elle est ici enrichie dans une version livrée au public français. Elle apporte le contexte historique et théorique nécessaire à la compréhension des interventions « anti-humanistes » de Louis Althusser qui questionne les choix politiques opérés par le PCF au cours des années 1960. Nulle part ailleurs, dans les écrits publiés (...) d’Althusser, nous ne voyons aussi clairement les enjeux politiques imbriqués dans son projet philosophique, ni comment ce projet évolua progressivement d’une entreprise « théoriciste » à la recherche d’une philosophie en lien plus étroit avec la pratique. Cette lettre nous paraît de la plus haute importance pour les spécialistes de l’œuvre d’Althusser, les historiens de la pensée marxiste, mais aussi plus largement à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’importance que peut revêtir le travail d’Althusser dans les débats actuels dans le champ de la philosophie marxiste. (shrink)

The prevailing judgement concerning Merleau-Ponty’s encounter with Saussure’s linguistics is that, although important for the evolution of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language, it was based on a mistaken or at least highly idiosyncratic interpretation of Saussure’s ideas. Significantly, the rendering of Saussure that has been common both in Merleau-Ponty scholarship and in linguistics hinges on the structuralist development of the Genevan linguist’s ideas. This article argues that another reading of Saussure, in the light of certain passages of the Course of General (...) Linguistics forgotten by the structuralists, and of the manuscripts related to the published works, shows to the contrary that Merleau-Ponty’s account was sustainable. An understanding of Saussure’s ideas that does not flinch from their paradoxical features can elucidate the French phenomenologist’s views on language and expression. Moreover, the “linguistic turn” in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical development, identified by James Edie for example, does not seem to have been so clear-cut as has previously been believed; the influence of Saussure’s thought had certainly begun before Merleau-Ponty wrote Phenomenology of Perception -/- En français: « La rencontre de Merleau-Ponty avec la linguistique saussurienne : lecture fautive, réinterpretation ou prolongement ? » Inspirée de la linguistique Saussurienne, la philosophie du langage de Merleau-Ponty a souvent été considérée comme une interprétation erronée des idées de Ferdinand de Saussure ou tout du moins comme une traduction singulière de son œuvre. On remarque cependant que la relecture critique du linguiste genevois, qu’elle soit effectuée à partir de l’œuvre merleau-pontienne ou, plus généralement, dans le champ de la linguistique, repose en grande partie sur les modes d’analyse structuralistes. À la lumière de certains passages du Cours de linguistique générale négligés par les structuralistes, et des manuscrits qui se rapportent aux œuvres publiées, cet article défendra l’idée que l’interprétation de la pensée saussurienne par Merleau-Ponty reste à bien des égards pertinente, pour autant qu’elle ne recule pas devant les traits paradoxaux résultant de la pensée saussurienne. Un questionnement de la pensée de Saussure ne reculant pas devant ses traits paradoxaux peut contribuer à accroître notre compréhension des notions de langage et d’expression chez le phénoménologue français. Dans ce cadre, le « tournant linguistique » merleau-pontien, décrit par James Edie, ne paraît pas aussi net que l’on l’a soutenu auparavant : l’influence de la pensée de Saussure s’est certainement faite sentir avant l’écriture de Phénoménologie de la perception. (shrink)

The paper addresses objections to Aristotle's notion of happiness as inconsistent and confused given the expositions of happiness in Book I and Book X of NE. It argues that such objections are rooted in the erroneous interpretation of Aristotle's description of happiness in Book I as living a "good life", and an unwarranted assumption that when Aristotle identifies happiness with contemplation, he has a professional philosopher in mind and contemplation as an activity one engages in leisurely and as a means (...) of intellectual conditioning. It further shows that happiness as Aristotle understands it is a reward for cultivating virtuous character. And though everyone has the capacity for it, only the few attain happiness since it requires exertion and effort and the many are unwilling to make such acquirement a priority. (shrink)

Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7-8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle or (...) give away a significant portion of their wealth if it did not realize some good end. In this paper, I review the familiar problem raised by Aristotle's discussion of the nature of virtuous actions, propose a solution to this problem by appealing to a distinction between virtuous actions and 'acting virtuously', and sketch the significance of this solution for understanding the relationship between virtue and human happiness. (shrink)

This paper revisits Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in NE VII. 1–10. I try to offer a scientific reading of the book, according to which NE VII. 1–10 closely instantiates the main guidelines of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. I propose that NE VII. 1–2, which aims to establish the fact that akrasia exists, corresponds to the ὅτι-stage of an Aristotelian scientific inquiry, and NE VII. 3–10, which aims to explain both the cause and the object of akrasia, corresponds to the διότι-stage of (...) the inquiry. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one's virtue shines through most clearly. Why then does Aristotle think that a wide range (...) of external goods is required for virtuous activity, and therefore, for happiness? -/- I argue that there is good sense to be made of Aristotle's stance on external goods. Specifically, I explain how, on this view, a range of external goods is required for the full exercise of virtue, and I show that it is only this full exercise that is constitutive of eudaimonia. Drawing on passages in Politics 7.13 and Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, I develop and defend a distinction between the "mere" exercise of virtue, and the full or complete exercise of virtue. I argue that, for Aristotle, the distinguishing feature of this distinction is the value of the virtuous action's ends. An action that fully expresses virtue aims at an end that is unqualifiedly good, while an action that merely exercises virtue does not. I argue that the external goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8 are necessary for performing actions with unqualifiedly good ends, and so necessary for the complete exercise of virtue. In addition to providing a more satisfactory account than existing proposals of the role of external goods in Aristotelian happiness, my interpretation has two additional upshots. First, it brings to light an under-appreciated and independently compelling feature of Aristotle's ethical thought: the value of virtuous actions depends in part on the value of the ends they aim to realize. Second, it finds in Aristotle a distinct and powerful way of thinking about the badness of certain kinds of misfortune and deprivation: they are bad in part because they prevent us from fully realizing our capacity for moral agency, from fully engaging with value in the world. (shrink)

D’après Heidegger, chaque époque/épochè est caractérisé par un certain mode de révélation des étants, qui est à la fois une dissimulation d’une façon de l’Être. Ce mode particulier paraît ne venir de nulle part en ce qu’il se base sur un certain oubli. Dana S. Belu le met en scène pour son livre en faisant valoir la tendance de Heidegger « to treat the history of being (Seinsgeschichte) as a noncausal succession of universal principles of intelligibility that presupposes the forgetting (...) (Seinsvergessenheit) of the clearing (die Lichtung) as their source » (p. 15). L’oubli de notre époque est marqué par une divulgation technologique dans le mode de l’arraisonnement (Gestell) où les étants se révèlent comme partie du fonds (Bestand) d’être calculés, manipulés, exploités, et mis en réserve pour un usage ultérieur. La phénoménologie féministe de l’A. essaie de faire sens à la gestation, la maternité et la procréation médicalement assistée (PMA) qui font aux femmes faire partie de ce fonds et ouvre, parmi les paramètres du Gestell, la porte à une ère « sans mère ». (shrink)

This essay argues that recent evidence in neurobiology and psychology supports Aristotle’s foundational psychology and account of self-control and demonstrates that his account of virtue is still relevant for understanding human agency. There is deep correlation between the psychological foundation of virtue that Aristotle describes in The Nicomachean Ethics (NE)—namely his distinction between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, the way that they interact, and their respective roles in self-controlled action—and dual-process models of moral judgment. Furthermore, Aristotle’s conception (...) of character traits requires emotion regulation, and there is growing evidence in neurobiology and psychology of this ability. Most importantly, individuals can intentionally influence and control their “emotion-generating” system, and furthermore can generate lasting neurological and behavioral changes through deliberate practice. This essay briefly reviews Aristotle’s account of the ψυχή (psyche/soul) and moral virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics, and then reviews contemporary evidence of emotional self-regulation or self-control that correlates with Aristotle’s account of virtue, demonstrating the ongoing relevance of Aristotle for understanding human agency. (shrink)

Although it is well known that Gestalt theory had an important impact on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy throughout his career, there is still no detailed study either of its influence on his ideas or of his own understanding of the notoriously polysemic notion of Gestalt. Yet, this notion is a key to Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental project of overcoming “objective thought” and its inherent dichotomies. By indicating how signification or ideality can be immanent in, rather than opposed to, matter, it compels us to redefine (...) both consciousness and the world it is bound up with. The aim of this article is to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Gestalt against the historical background that he refers to, including Kurt Goldstein’s theory of the organism that was crucial for his interpretation of it. -/- On sait que la théorie de la Gestalt a eu un impact majeur sur la philosophie merleaupontienne. Il n’existe pourtant pas d’étude extensive de l’influence de cette théorie sur les thèses de Merleau-Ponty ou sur sa compréhension propre de la notion fort polysémique de Gestalt. Or cette notion s’avère être l’une des meilleures clés pour comprendre le projet fondamental du dépassement merleau-pontien de la « pensée objective » et de ses dichotomies. En effet, en montrant comment le sens ou l’idéalité sont immanents, plutôt qu’opposés, à la matière, la Gestalt conduit à définir à nouveaux frais la conscience et le monde auquel elle est liée. L’article vise à clarifier la conception de la Gestalt chez Merleau-Ponty à partir de son fond historique. On étudie en particulier la théorie de l’organisme de Kurt Goldstein, qui a été essentielle pour l’interprétation merleaupontienne de la notion de Gestalt. -/- Benché sia noto che la Gestalttheorie abbia avuto un impatto rilevante sull’intero tragitto della filosofia di Merleau-Ponty, non esiste ancora uno studio dettagliato dell’influenza del gestaltismo sulle sue idee né sulla sua comprensione di un concetto notoriamente sfaccettato come quello di Gestalt. Tuttavia proprio questa nozione costituisce una chiave d’accesso fondamentale al grande progetto merleaupontyano di oltrepassare il “pensiero oggettivo” insieme alle dicotomie che lo accompagnano. Indicando come il significato o l’idealità possano essere immanenti, anziché opposti, alla materia, tale nozione ci obbliga a ridefinire tanto la coscienza quanto il mondo a cui essa è legata. L’obiettivo di questo articolo è quello di chiarire la nozione merleaupontyana di Gestalt nel suo contesto storico, con particolare riferimento alla teoria dell’organismo elaborata da Kurt Goldstein, determinante per l’interpretazione merleaupontyana della nozione di Gestalt. (shrink)

RIGHT TO SILENCE-UK, U.S, FRANCE, and GERMANY SALLY RAMAGE (TRADE MARK REGISTERED) WIPO Orchid ID 0000-0002-8854-4293 Pages 2-30 Current Criminal Law, Volume 1, Issue 2, ABSTRACT The privilege of the right to silence can be traced back to the 12th century, becoming more developed in later centuries. -/- Table of cases European Court of Human Rights Deweer v Belgium [1980], Eckle v Germany [1982], DN v The Netherlands [1975], Funke v France [1993] 16 EHRR 297, JP v Austria [1989], Kansal (...) v UK [2003] Application No 21413/02 Khan v UK [2000] 31 EHRR 45, Saunders v UK [1997] 23 EHRR 313, Schenk v Switzerland [1991] 13 EHRR 242, and Tora Tolmos v Spain [1995] Table of Cases United Kingdom Brown v Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline, [2000] , The Times, Feb 14, High Ct Scot.; HM Advocate v Friel [1978] SLT; Lambe v Munster [1882] 10 QBD 110.; Pearse v Pearse [1846] Eng Rep 950 (on truth); Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2003] HL; R v Bryce [1992] 95 Cr App Rep 320; R v Canale [1990] 2 All ER 187; R v Fitzpatrick [1995] 4 SCR 154; R v Herbert [1990] 2 SCR 151; R V Hertfordshire County Council, ex parte Green Environmental Industries and another [2000] 1 All ER 773; R v Keenan [1989] Crim LR 720; R v Maguire [1990] Cr App Rep 115; R v Pound, Green and ors [2004]; R v Sang [1979] Crim LR 655; R v Saunders [1986] unreported; R v Seelig, R v Spens [1991] CA; R v Smith [1992] 95 Cr App. R. 191; R v Steen and ors [2003] unreported; R v Walsh [1981] CrimLR 822; R V Ward 96 Cr App R [1993]; R v Weekes [1993] Crim LR 211; R v White [1999] 2 SCR 417; R v Young [2003] unreported; Thompson Newspaper v Canada [1990] 1 SCR 425; Walsh Automation (Europe) Ltd v Bridgeman and ors [2002] EWHC 1344 QB France-Law France 1789 Declaration des driots de l‟homme et du citoyen 1808 Code d ‟instruction criminelle 1946 Constitution 1958 Code de procedure penale 2000 Penal Code Germany-Law Germany 1871 Criminal Code 1877 Criminal Procedure Code (St PO) 1877 Judicial Organisation Law 1949 Constitution 1975 Criminal Code 1998 Criminal Code Table of Cases Germany Germany BGH Admissibility of secret tape recordings judgement 14 June 1960, in BGHSt 14, 358 BGH Lie detector judgement 16 Feb 1954, in BGHSt 5, 332. BberfG Decision concerning the applicability of ne bis in idem 31 March 1987, in BberfGE 75,1; BGH Sweeping deception of suspect judgement 24 August 1988, in BGHSt 36, 328. BGH Judgement 24 August 1993, in BGHSt 39, 305 Table of Cases United States United States of America California v Byres [1971] 402 U.S. 424; Fisher v United States 475 U.S. 391 [1986]; Griffin v California [1965] 380 US 609 [; Hoffman v United States [1950] 341 U.S. 479; Supreme Court Baldwin v NY, 399 US 143 [1970]; Supreme Court Chavez v Martinez , U.S. 123 [2003]; Supreme Court Doyle v Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 [1976]; Supreme Court Escobedo v Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [1964]; Supreme Court Giglio v US, 405 U.S. 150 [1972] Supreme Court Harris v NY, 401 U.S. 222 [1971]; Supreme Court Kirby v Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 [1972]; Supreme Court Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [1966]; Supreme Court Moore v Illinois, 408 U.S. 768 [1972]; Supreme Court Moran v Burbine, 475 U.S. [1986]; Supreme Court Orzoco v Texas, 324 U.S.24 [1969]; Supreme Court US v Hale [1975] 422 US 17; Supreme Court US v Leon, 468 U.S. 897 [1984]; Supreme Court US v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 [1987]; Twining v New Jersey 211 US 78 113 -/- . (shrink)

RIGHT TO SILENCE-UK, U.S, FRANCE, and GERMANY SALLY RAMAGE (TRADE MARK REGISTERED) WIPO Orchid ID 0000-0002-8854-4293 Pages 2-30 Current Criminal Law, Volume 1, Issue 2, -/- Sally Ramage, BA (Hons), MBA, LLM, MPhil, MCIJ, MCMI, DA., ASLS, BAWP. Orchid ID 0000-0002-8854-4293 Publisher & Managing Editor Criminal Lawyer series [1980-2022](ISSN 2049-8047) Current Criminal Law series [2008-2022] (ISSN 1758-8405) and Criminal Law News series [2008-2022] (ISSN 1758-8421). Sweet & Maxwell (Thomson Reuters) (Licensed Annotator of UK Statutes) in annual law books Current Law (...) Statutes Annotated, (2006, 2009, 2010 editions) (sole and separate S&M contracts) for 7 UK Criminal Justice Statutes: UK Safeguarding Vulnerable Persons Act 2006; UK International Development Act 2006; UK Fraud Act 2006; UK Policing and Crime Act 2009, UK Local Democracy Act 2009; UK Bribery Act 2010; and UK Crime and Security Act 2010. TradeMark SALLY RAMAGE ® (2005-2025) in the UK, 2401827; WIPO TradeMark SALLY RAMAGE® 900614; USA TradeMark 3,440,910) (2008-2028). WARNING: The doing of an unauthorized act in relation to a copyright work may result in both a civil claim for damages and criminal prosecution. -/- ABSTRACT The privilege of the right to silence can be traced back to the 12th century, becoming more developed in later centuries. -/- Table of cases European Court of Human Rights Deweer v Belgium [1980], Eckle v Germany [1982], DN v The Netherlands [1975], Funke v France [1993] 16 EHRR 297, JP v Austria [1989], Kansal v UK [2003] Application No 21413/02 Khan v UK [2000] 31 EHRR 45, Saunders v UK [1997] 23 EHRR 313, Schenk v Switzerland [1991] 13 EHRR 242, and Tora Tolmos v Spain [1995] Table of Cases United Kingdom Brown v Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline, [2000] , The Times, Feb 14, High Ct Scot.; HM Advocate v Friel [1978] SLT; Lambe v Munster [1882] 10 QBD 110.; Pearse v Pearse [1846] Eng Rep 950 (on truth); Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2003] HL; R v Bryce [1992] 95 Cr App Rep 320; R v Canale [1990] 2 All ER 187; R v Fitzpatrick [1995] 4 SCR 154; R v Herbert [1990] 2 SCR 151; R V Hertfordshire County Council, ex parte Green Environmental Industries and another [2000] 1 All ER 773; R v Keenan [1989] Crim LR 720; R v Maguire [1990] Cr App Rep 115; R v Pound, Green and ors [2004]; R v Sang [1979] Crim LR 655; R v Saunders [1986] unreported; R v Seelig, R v Spens [1991] CA; R v Smith [1992] 95 Cr App. R. 191; R v Steen and ors [2003] unreported; R v Walsh [1981] CrimLR 822; R V Ward 96 Cr App R [1993]; R v Weekes [1993] Crim LR 211; R v White [1999] 2 SCR 417; R v Young [2003] unreported; Thompson Newspaper v Canada [1990] 1 SCR 425; Walsh Automation (Europe) Ltd v Bridgeman and ors [2002] EWHC 1344 QB France-Law France 1789 Declaration des driots de l‟homme et du citoyen 1808 Code d ‟instruction criminelle 1946 Constitution 1958 Code de procedure penale 2000 Penal Code Germany-Law Germany 1871 Criminal Code 1877 Criminal Procedure Code (St PO) 1877 Judicial Organisation Law 1949 Constitution 1975 Criminal Code 1998 Criminal Code Table of Cases Germany Germany BGH Admissibility of secret tape recordings judgement 14 June 1960, in BGHSt 14, 358 BGH Lie detector judgement 16 Feb 1954, in BGHSt 5, 332. BberfG Decision concerning the applicability of ne bis in idem 31 March 1987, in BberfGE 75,1; BGH Sweeping deception of suspect judgement 24 August 1988, in BGHSt 36, 328. BGH Judgement 24 August 1993, in BGHSt 39, 305 Table of Cases United States United States of America California v Byres [1971] 402 U.S. 424; Fisher v United States 475 U.S. 391 [1986]; Griffin v California [1965] 380 US 609 [; Hoffman v United States [1950] 341 U.S. 479; Supreme Court Baldwin v NY, 399 US 143 [1970]; Supreme Court Chavez v Martinez , U.S. 123 [2003]; Supreme Court Doyle v Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 [1976]; Supreme Court Escobedo v Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [1964]; Supreme Court Giglio v US, 405 U.S. 150 [1972] Supreme Court Harris v NY, 401 U.S. 222 [1971]; Supreme Court Kirby v Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 [1972]; Supreme Court Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [1966]; Supreme Court Moore v Illinois, 408 U.S. 768 [1972]; Supreme Court Moran v Burbine, 475 U.S. [1986]; Supreme Court Orzoco v Texas, 324 U.S.24 [1969]; Supreme Court US v Hale [1975] 422 US 17; Supreme Court US v Leon, 468 U.S. 897 [1984]; Supreme Court US v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 [1987]; Twining v New Jersey 211 US 78 113 -/- . (shrink)

Felsefe tarihinin hiç şüphesiz en önemli filozoflarından biri olan Aristoteles (M.Ö. 384-322), aynı zamanda bilim tarihinin de en önemli kişilerindendir. Yaşadığı dönemde henüz bilim ve felsefe ayrılmamıştır; bununla birlikte Aristoteles, bilimsel ve sistemli düşünmenin, örnekleme yapmanın, bilim insanının doğaya öğrenmek için yaklaşmasının ilkelerini, ilk kez bu derece düzenli şekilde ortaya koyan kişi olmuştur. Dört neden kuramı söz konusu ilkelerin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmada günümüz biyolojisinin en kapsamlı tartışmalarından biri olan ‘fenotipin ne olduğu ve nasıl oluştuğu’ konusunun, Aristoteles’in dört neden kuramı (...) ile ilişkisi incelenmiştir. Genotip, fenotip ve çevrenin son derece karmaşık yolları içeren etkileşim ağı, araştırılması için birden fazla nedensel sorgulamayı gerektirir ki bu sorgulama bir anlamda Aristoteles’in dört neden kuramının, maddi, formel ve fail nedenlerinin bir arada sorgulanmasına benzerdir. (shrink)

Le cercle herméneutique a été utilisé par tous ceux qui ont défendu la thèse de l’autonomie méthodologique des sciences humaines par rapport aux sciences naturelles. Il est généralement perçu comme un problème ontologique ou logique par les Herméneutistes. Le but de cet article est de montrer que le cercle herméneutique n’est ni l’un ni l’autre. Tout indique, plutôt, qu’il fait référence à un phénomène empirique, qui peut être étudié dans le cadre de la psycholinguistique et d’autres disciplines empiriques. Il ne (...) peut pas, par conséquent, être utilisé comme argument pour légitimer la séparation entre les sciences naturelles et les sciences humaines, et ne peut donc pas contribuer à soutenir la thèse de l’autonomie des sciences humaines. (shrink)

This study attempts to understand whether there were changes over time in Hegel’s opinions on the idea of recognition, which were the basis of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, and how later philosophers writing on recognition and intersubjectivity have comprehended Hegel’s intellectual heritage, together with their criticism of peculiar aspects of Hegel’s point of view. In this regard, in order to be able to understand Honneth’s theory of recognition, it is necessary to inquire into the relation between Honneth’s and Hegel’s (...) theories in a philosophical context. The current inquiry is both related to the aspects of how Honneth was affected by Hegel, and is also particularly focused on Hegel’s Jena period. The point of emphasis in this study is whether or not Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition after his Jena period. Therefore, the discussion focuses on Hegel’s Jena period and the aspects which distinguished this period from others. This study also critically examines the views respecting the abandonment of the recognition on the Phenomenology of Spirit and intersubjectivity after the Jena period, and suggests that recognition and intersubjectivity still retain their dominance on this work known also as Jena Phenomenology, dated as the end of the Jena period. -/- Keywords: Honneth, Hegel, Recognition, Intersubjectivity -/- Türkçe Özet Bu çalışma, Axel Honneth’in tanınma kuramına temel teşkil eden Hegel'in tanınma ve öznelerarasılık üzerine görüşlerinin zaman içinde değişip değişmediğini; tanınma üzerine yazan sonraki kuşak düşünürlerin Hegel’in düşünsel mirasını nasıl algıladıklarını ve görüşlerini hangi açılardan eleştirdiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Honneth’in tanınma kuramını anlayabilmek için onun Hegel ile düşünsel bağlamda ilişkisinin sorgulanması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mevcut sorgulama, Honneth’in Hegel’den ne bağlamda ve ne şekilde etkilendiğiyle ilgili olmakla birlikte özellikle Hegel’in Jena dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, Hegel’in Jena dönemi sonrası felsefesinde öznelerarasılık ve tanınma kuramlarını terk edip etmediği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple ilk önce Hegel’in Jena dönemi ile bu dönemi farklı kılan yönler ele alınmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Jena dönemi sonrasında, Tinin Fenomenolojisi’nde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın terk edildiğine dair görüşlerin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiği; Hegel’in felsefesinde Jena döneminin bitişine tarihlenen ve Jena Fenomenolojisi olarak da bilinen bu eserde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın halen gücünü koruduğu savunulmaktadır. -/- Anahtar Kelimeler: Honneth, Hegel, Tanınma, Öznelerarasılık. (shrink)

Horwich donne une belle analyse de Wittgenstein (W) et est un érudit W de premier plan, mais à mon avis, ils sont tous en deçà d’une pleine appréciation, comme je l’explique longuement dans cet examen et beaucoup d’autres. Si l’on ne comprend pas W (et de préférence Searle aussi) alors je ne vois pas comment on pourrait avoir plus qu’une compréhension superficielle de la philosophie et de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur et donc de tout comportement complexe (psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie, (...) histoire, littérature, société). En un mot, W a démontré que lorsque vous avez montré comment une phrase est utilisée dans le contexte d’intérêt, il n’y a rien de plus à dire. Je vais commencer par quelques citations notables, puis donner ce que je pense sont les considérations minimales nécessaires pour comprendre Wittgenstein, la philosophie et le comportement humain. Tout d’abord, on pourrait noter que mettre "meta" en face de n’importe quel mot devrait être suspect. W a fait remarquer par exemple, que la métamathématique est mathématiques comme les autres. L’idée que nous pouvons sortir de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de haut ordre) est elle-même une profonde confusion. Une autre irritation ici (et tout au long de l’écriture académique pour les 4 dernières décennies) est le sexisme linguistique inverse constant de «elle» et «la sienne» et «elle» ou «il / elle», etc, où «ils» et «leur» et «eux» ferait bien. De même, l’utilisation du mot Français «répertoire» où le «répertoire» anglais se portera plutôt bien. La lacune majeure est l’échec complet (bien que très commun) d’employer ce que je considère comme la vue extrêmement puissante et intuitive de deux systèmes de HOT et Searle cadre que j’ai décrit ci-dessus. C’est particulièrement poignant dans le chapitre sur le sens p111 et seq. (en particulier dans les notes de bas de page 2-7), où nous nageons dans l’eau très boueuse sans le cadre de l’automatisé vrai seul S1, propositionnelle dispositionnelle S2, COS etc. On peut également avoir une meilleure vue de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur en lisant par exemple, Johnston ou Budd (voir mes commentaires). Horwich fait cependant beaucoup de commentaires incisifs. J’ai particulièrement aimé son résumé de l’importation de la position anti-théorique de W sur p65. Il doit mettre davantage l’accent sur 'On Certainty', récemment l’objet de beaucoup d’efforts de Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva et d’autres et résumé dans mes récents articles. Horwich est de premier ordre et son travail vaut bien l’effort. On espère qu’il (et tout le monde) étudiera Searle et une certaine psychologie moderne ainsi que Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker et Baker, etc. pour atteindre une large vision moderne du comportement. La plupart de leurs papiers sont sur academia dot edu et philpapers dot org, mais pour PMS Hacker voir http : info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/ scr / hacker / DownloadPapers dot html. Il donne l’un des plus beaux résumés de l’endroit où une compréhension de Wittgenstein nous laisse que j’ai jamais vu. « Il ne doit y avoir aucune tentative d’expliquer notre activité linguistique/conceptuelle (PI 126) comme dans la réduction de l’arithmétique à la logique de Frege ; aucune tentative de lui donner des fondations épistémologiques (PI 124) comme dans les comptes basés sur le sens d’une connaissance a priori; aucune tentative de caractériser des formes idéalisées de celui-ci (PI 130) comme dans le sens logique; aucune tentative de réforme (PI 124, 132) comme dans la théorie de l’erreur de Mackie ou l’intuitionnisme de Dummett; aucune tentative de rationaliser (PI 133) comme dans le récit de Quine de l’existence; aucune tentative pour le rendre plus cohérent (PI 132) comme dans la réponse de Tarski aux paradoxes menteurs; et aucune tentative pour le rendre plus complet (PI 133) comme dans le règlement des questions d’identité personnelle pour des scénarios hypothétiques bizarres de « téléportation ». Enfin, permettez-moi de suggérer qu’avec la perspective que j’ai encouragée ici, W est au centre de la philosophie et de la psychologie contemporaines et n’est pas obscure, difficile ou non pertinente, mais scintillante, profonde et limpide et que de lui manquer est de manquer l’une des plus grandes aventures intellectuelles possibles. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Etude de l'extension par la negation semi-intuitionniste de la logique positive des propositions appelee logique C, developpee par A. Urquhart afin de definir une semantique relationnelle valable pour la logique des valeurs infinies de Lukasiewicz (Lw). Evitant les axiomes de contraction et de reduction propres a la logique classique de Dummett, l'A. propose une semantique de type Routley-Meyer pour le systeme d'Urquhart (CI) en tant que celle-la ne fournit que des theories consistantes pour la completude de celui-ci.

“İntihar Üzerine” (Ek 1) ve “Ruhun Ölümsüzlüğü Üzerine” (Ek 2) denemeleri, David Hume’un din bağlamında dogmatik inanışları, uslamlamaları en keskin bir biçimde eleştirdiği yazılarıdır. Görgül felsefesinin temel doğruları ve izlediği kuşkucu yöntem uyarınca ortaya koyduğu sonuçlar, bu denemelerin hem yayınlandıkları dönemde hem de sonrasında pek çok olumsuz eleştiriyle karşılaşmasına yol açmıştır. İnsanın doğasına ilişkin her türlü konuyu soruşturma niyetliliği ile yola çıkan Hume, dogmatik dinin ve uygulamalarının köklendiği inanışları ve uslamlamalarını da aynı niyetle irdelemiştir. Özellikle döneminde yaşanan toplumsal sorunların bu (...) dogmalara duyulan kuşkusuz inançlardan köklendiğini göstermeye çalıştığı bu iki denemenin, yine aynı dogmalara dayanarak eleştirilmesi, basımının engellenmesi ve metinlere müdahale edilmesi ise ironiktir. Bu çalışmada, Hume’un her iki denemedeki savlarının bir çözümlemesi değil, denemelerde ele alınan sorunun ne kadar gerçek olduğu, bu iki denemenin yayınlanma süreci örnek gösterilerek incelenecektir. (shrink)

Dans l’œuvre de Platon, l’image du rêve semble d’abord servir à désigner l’état d’ignorance du commun des mortels qui « rêvent » leur vie. Cet usage métaphorique ne saurait correspondre parfaitement à la pensée platoni- cienne du phénomène onirique, particulièrement lorsqu’on l’envisage d’un point de vue éthique (qu’advient-il de la vertu de l’homme dans son sommeil ?), plutôt qu’épistémologique ou ontologique. Dans la République, le sommeil apparaît essentiellement comme l’endormissement d’une partie de l’âme – la rationnelle – au profit d’une (...) autre – la désirante. Platon laisse pourtant entendre que, sous certaines conditions, les visions qui s’y manifestent ne sont pas nécessairement mensongères et pourraient même, pour certaines, avoir une origine divine. Le rêve doit donc être compris non seulement comme un moment de séparation de l’âme et du corps, mais aussi de différenciation des facultés ou parties de l’âme elles-mêmes qui acquièrent là leur autonomie propre et déploient, sans se limiter l’une l’autre, leur plein pouvoir. In Plato’s works the image of a dream at first seems to serve the purpose of indicating the state of ignorance of ordinary humans who « dream » their way through life. This metaphorical usage does not reflect perfectly Plato’s thought on the phenomenon of dreams, especially when it is considered from an ethical point of view (what happens to human virtue during sleep?) rather than an epistemological or ontological one. In the Republic sleep appears to be essen- tially where a part of the soul goes asleep – namely the rational part – to the advantage of the desiring part. However, Plato implies that under certain condi- tions the visions that occur in sleep are not necessarily false and could even, in some cases, have a divine origin. Dreams must therefore be understood not merely as a moment of separation of soul and body, but also of differentiation of the faculties or parts of the soul themselves, which acquire their own autonomy in dreams and deploy their full power without limiting one another (transl. J. Dudley). (shrink)

Bilimin ne olduğunun tespit edilmesi ve bilimi sözde bilimlerden ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlardan ayırt edecek ölçütün ne olması gerektiğine yönelik tartışma, bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme sorunu olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu makalede, öncelikle söz konusu soruna yönelik geleneksel yaklaşımlar incelenmiş ve ardından bu yaklaşımların bilimsel toplulukların doğasına ilişkin özellikleri göz ardı ettiği ortaya konmuştur. Daha önce yapılan çalışmalar bilimi daha çok önermeler, ifadeler ya da salt epistemik bir sistem olarak ele almakta ve bilimsel akıl yürütmenin biçimi ile bilimsel kuramların özelliklerine (...) odaklanmaktadır. Bu tespit çerçevesinde, sunulan çalışmada, bilimsel bir disiplinin asgari olarak iki özellik (yapısal ve kanıta dayalı olması) üzerine kurulması gerektiği vurgulanarak, sınır çizme sorununun çözümüne yönelik önerilen alternatif ölçüt bilimin sosyal yönüne dikkat çekmektedir. Bu bakımdan, makalenin asıl ilgisi, sınır çizme sorununu alternatif bir yolla ele alabilmek amacıyla bilimin ve onun uygulayıcılarının sosyal özelliklerine yönelik tespitleri, sözde bilimin uygulayıcıları ile kıyaslayarak aktarmaktır. Makale, bir disiplinin sözde bilim olarak nitelendirilebilmesi için öncelikle o disiplinin bilimsellik iddiasında bulunması, daha sonra bilimsel topluluk tarafından sürdürülen bir araştırma geleneğine kabul edilmemiş ya da bu araştırma geleneği tarafından terk edilmiş olması gerektiği düşüncesi ile sonuçlandırılmıştır. (shrink)

In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle defines happiness, or eudaimonia, in accordance with an argument he makes regarding the distinctive function of human beings. In this paper, I argue that, despite this argument, there are moments in the NE where Aristotle appeals to elements of happiness that don’t follow from the function argument itself. The place of these elements in Aristotle’s account of happiness should, therefore, be a matter of perplexity. For, how can Aristotle appeal to elements (...) of happiness not entailed by his argument for what happiness involves? I will examine two instances that exemplify the sort of appeal to outside elements that I have in mind. The first deals with Aristotle’s reference, in NE, I, 8, to certain goods—ancestry, children, beauty—goods unrelated to man’s function or his fulfillment of it, but nevertheless required for his happiness. The second instance involves pleasure. Aristotle makes various arguments, both in Books I and X of the NE, that tie pleasure to the activity of the soul, and the function argument in turn. However, none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that pleasure would necessarily follow from this activity. Taken together then, these two examples demonstrate the extent to which Aristotle’s definition of happiness is more inclusive than his function argument permits. (shrink)

Cílem článku je ukázat, že německá raná romantika, která položila filosofické základy romantického hnutí, nebere příklon k subjektivitě prožívání jako odklon od poznání, nýbrž jako jiný způsob poznání. Romantická niternost nachází svůj protějšek ve zkušenosti světa, jemuž umění dokáže propůjčit hlubší význam než racionální filosofie a věda. Tento nový pohled na poznání je romantiky použit jak na výklad přírody, tak duchovní lidské skutečnosti. Článek upozorňuje na to, že vedle dědictví spinozismu měla romantická epistemologie důležitý zdroj v některých úvahách Kantovy Kritiky (...) soudnosti. Tato vazba je sledována zvláště na příkladu filosofie umění F. W. J. Schellinga. Argumentace článku je rozvinuta v kritické konfrontaci se subjektivistickou interpretací romantiky H.-G. Gadamera, čímž se ozřejmuje její širší epistemologický dosah i aktuálnost. Návaznost německých romantiků na Kantovu Kritiku soudnosti se spíše než tendencí k subjektivizaci estetiky projevovala ve snaze o estetizaci poznání. (shrink)

S'étonnant qu'un simple physicien sache traiter des rapports de la physique et de la métaphysique, Edmond Domet de Vorges s'était demandé si Pierre Duhem n'avait pas bénéficié de l'aide de quelque théologien dans l'élaboration de son articulation de ces deux disci­plines. Faisant suite à cette question très perti­nente, cet article liste d'abord les intellectuels catholiques qui étaient en relation avec Duhem avant la publication, en 1893, de son article Physique et métaphysique et qui auraient effec­tivement pu l'aider à concevoir une (...) telle articulation. Se con­sacrant ensuite spécifiquement à l'un d'entre eux, à savoir Maurice Blondel, il étudie les similitudes et divergences existant entre les pensées du physicien bordelais et du philosophe d'Aix pour conclure que Blondel ne peut pas être celui qui aurait inspiré Duhem. À l'appui de cette conclusion, il fait notamment état d'une lettre inédite adressée par Duhem à Ambroise Gar­deil et dans laquelle celui-ci porte un jugement sévère à l'en­droit de son «pauvre ami» Blondel. ––– One might be surprised to find that a simple physician could be able explain with clarity the subtle relationship between physics and metaphysics. It is with this question in mind that Edmond Domet de Vorges asked himself if it might not have been with the aid of theologians that Pierre Duhem was able to find and express his subtle articulation between the two disciplines. Following in the footsteps of this pertinent question, this article begins by listing the catholic intellectuals who were acquain­tances of Pierre Duhem before the publication in 1893 of “Physique et métaphysique”, who may have been able to help him arrive at the relationship between the two sciences expressed in his publication. This line of questioning is followed by a specific study of one of these men, namely Maurice Blondel. The similarities and differences in the opinions of the physician from Bordeaux and the philosopher from Aix are explored with the resulting conclusion that Blondel could not have been he who inspired Duhem. This conclusion can be confirmed by a previously unpublished letter from Duhem to Ambroise Gardeil which contains a very severe judgement with regards to his “poor friend” Blondel. (shrink)

S’inspirant de Memorias. Entre dos mundos, ce texte se veut un témoignage et des commentaires de la perspective pédagogique développée par Mario Bunge dans le cadre de son enseignement de philosophie des sciences à l’Université de Buenos Aires dans les années soixante du siècle dernier. Perspective socratique du métier de philosophe qui ne renvoie cependant pas à une entreprise de dévoilement de la vérité, mais plutôt aux conditions de sa construction.

Il s’agit d’un excellent examen des interactions génétiques / environnement sur le comportement et, en dépit d’être un peu daté, est une lecture facile et utile. Ils commencent par des études jumelles qui montrent l’impact écrasant de la génétique sur le comportement. Ils notent les études de plus en plus connues de Judith Harris qui étendent et résument les faits que l’environnement familial partagé n’a presque aucun effet sur le comportement et que les enfants adoptés grandissent pour être aussi différents (...) de leurs demi-frères et soeurs que les personnes choisies au hasard. Un point fondamental qu’ils (et presque tous ceux qui discutent de la génétique comportementale) ne parviennent pas à noter est que les centaines (des milliers selon votre point de vue) des universels comportementaux humains, y compris toutes les bases de nos personnalités, sont 100% déterminés par nos gènes, sans aucune variation dans les normales. Tout le monde voit un arbre comme un arbre et non une pierre, cherche et mange de la nourriture, se met en colère et jaloux, etc. Donc, ce dont ils parlent surtout ici, c’est de la quantité d’environnement (culture) qui peut influer sur la mesure dans laquelle les divers traits sont montrés, plutôt que leur apparence. Enfin, ils discutent de l’eugénisme de la manière politiquement correcte habituelle, à défaut de noter que nous et tous les organismes sommes les produits de l’eugénisme de la nature et que les tentatives de vaincre la sélection naturelle avec la médecine, l’agriculture, et la civilisation dans son ensemble, sont désastreuses pour toute société qui persiste à le faire. Jusqu’à 50% de toutes les conceptions, soit environ 100 millions par an, se terminent par un avortement spontané précoce, presque tous sans que la mère soit au courant. Cet abattage naturel de gènes défectueux stimule l’évolution, nous maintient relativement génétiquement sains et rend la société possible. Dysgenics est suffisant pour détruire la civilisation, mais la surpopulation sera do ild’abord. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein et John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse au problème de la maintenance, c’est-à-dire au moment où les membres d’un collectif social tentent d’assurer dans le temps l’existence de leur collectif en instituant des règles pour réguler leurs comportements. Ce problème se pose avec acuité lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces règles communes. Pour maintenir la coopération sociale, les membres peuvent décider d’instituer des règles secondaires visant à sanctionner les transgressions des règles primaires déjà établies. La maintenance d’un collectif peut ainsi reposer sur l’émergence (...) de pouvoirs déontiques qui donnent aux membres l’autorité de légitimement punir et expulser les transgresseurs. Mais d’où viennent ces règles ? On peut penser qu’elles émergent des émotions éprouvées par les membres envers les transgresseurs. Je le démontre à l’aide d’une étude de cas qui établit que, dans le collectif Occupy Geneva, l’institutionnalisation de normes pour punir, exclure et réintégrer les déviants s’ancraient respectivement dans l’indignation, le mépris et le pardon. -/- This article focuses on the problem of maintenance; that is the moment when the members of a social collective attempt to ensure the existence of their collective over time by instituting rules to regulate their behavior. This problem becomes critical when certain members do not respect the common rules. To maintain social cooperation, members can decide to institute secondary rules aimed at sanctioning the transgressions of the already established primary rules. The maintenance of a collective can thus rely on the emergence of deontic powers that give members the authority to legitimately punish and expel transgressors. But where do these rules come from? The hypothesis is that they emerge from the emotions felt by the members towards the transgressors. I show this with the help of a case study, which establishes that the institutionalization of norms allowing the punishment, the exclusion, and the reintegration of deviants within the “Occupy Geneva” collective, was grounded in indignation, contempt, and forgiveness respectively. (shrink)

According to Arthur Danto, it is illegitimate to seek a neutral, or pre-interpretative, description of an artwork, since such descriptions necessarily fail to respect the artwork as such. Instead, we must begin by interpreting, so as to constitute the work : interpretation is what distinguishes artworks from mere physical objects. In this paper, I argue that, while Danto is right to distance artworks from mere things, this can be done without suggesting that artworks are constituted by interpretation. Moreover, Danto’s view (...) leaves us unable to account for the fact that interpretations are constrained to be responsive to the work’s features. I demonstrate that, by appealing to conventions of description that are specific to art, it is possible to offer a neutral description that respects the work as an artwork. This view accords with our common sense understanding of the relation between description and interpretation, and avoids the unfortunate consequences of Danto’s theory. // Selon Arthur Danto, il est illégitime de chercher une description « neutre » ou préinterprétative d’une oeuvre d’art, parce qu’une telle description ne peut respecter l’oeuvre d’art en tant que telle. Nous ne pouvons aborder une oeuvre sans l’interpréter, puisque l’interprétation constitue l’oeuvre d’art et distingue celle-ci d’un simple objet physique. Dans cet article je soutiens que, bien que Danto ait raison de vouloir distinguer les oeuvres d’art des simples choses, on peut effectuer cette distinction sans conclure que les oeuvres d’art sont constituées par l’interprétation. Je soutiens en outre que le point de vue de Danto ne nous permet pas de tenir compte du fait que les interprétations doivent respecter les caractéristiques de l’oeuvre. Je montre qu’en faisant appel aux conventions de description spécifiques à l’art, on peut proposer une description neutre qui respecte l’oeuvre d’art en tant qu’oeuvre. Mon point de vue est conforme à la relation généralement admise entre la description et l’interprétation des oeuvres d’art, et évite les conséquences négatives de la théorie de Danto. (shrink)

Krize spojená s příchodem pandemie koronaviru ukázala, že užitečné expertní vědění sice podle všeho existuje, ale ne každému, kdo se představí jako expert, bychom měli věřit. Slovy doktora House: „Všichni lžou.“ Lžou i odborníci. Kapitola se zaměřuje na situace, kdy odborník lže takříkajíc „s dobrým úmyslem,“ neboť se domnívá, že pravda by veřejnost vedla k chování, které není společensky žádoucí. V takovém případě se jedná o lhaní paternalistické, protože má ochránit veřejnost před ní samotnou. Ukážeme příklady, kdy k němu dochází, (...) a pokusíme se i odhadnout, jak dobře takový pokus o manipulaci veřejnosti funguje krátkodobě i dlouhodobě. Protože výsledky našeho rozboru nenaznačují, že by dobročinné lhaní odborníků bylo skutečně společensky prospěšné, pobavíme se také o tom, proč by se mu člověk v roli experta měl raději vyhnout. (shrink)

Quoique l'on ne trouve qu'un nombre limité de références à Nicod dans les manuscrits de la période dite « intermédiaire » de Wittgenstein, une lecture attentive de La Géométrie dans le monde sensible s'avère pourtant décisive pour comprendre la nature du projet phénoménologique de Wittgenstein de la fin des années vingt. Nous nous proposons de montrer que la prise en compte ainsi que la reformulation du problème posé par Nicod en 1924, celui de la nature de la relation d'inclusion spatiale, (...) conduit Wittgenstein à remplacer dès 1929 l'ancien critère logique du simple et du complexe (celui du Tractatus logico-philosophicus) par un critère phénoménologico-grammatical inédit et désabsolutisé applicable à toute donnée visuelle quelle qu'elle soit. Plus généralement, la priorité donnée par Wittgenstein au visuel dans son « investigation phénoménologique des impressions sensorielles » trouve sa meilleure justification dans l'esquisse par Nicod d'une géométrie de la vision à la fois complète et indépendante. Nous montrons en particulier que les propriétés structurales du champ visuel mises au jour par Nicod dans sa construction (diversité et simultanéité des places sensibles, coloréité) sont tacitement utilisées par Wittgenstein pour justifier la possibilité d'une description phénoménologique conçue, précisément, comme description des places ou « localités » constitutives de cet espace perceptif. (shrink)

Jeff Paris proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams I showed that Joyce’s accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that both results are easy corollaries of the core result that Paris appeals to in proving his dutch book theorem. We see that every point of accuracy-domination defines a (...) dutch book, but we only have a partial converse. (shrink)

Ce livre propose, à partir du constat de difficultés importantes et de paradoxes dans la conception heideggérienne de la vérité comme décèlement (aletheia), une nouvelle interprétation du fameux « tournant » qui sera compris comme la nécessité d’une structure d’inversion réciproque des rapports fondatifs. Contre tous les replis subjectifs ou les fixations sur des subsistances illusoires, cette structure « tournante » (à la racine du cercle herméneutique) montre comment aucune vérité ne s’établit sans sortie hors de soi, sans être provoquée (...) par ce qui la met en question et qu’ainsi, contrairement à ce que croyait Levinas, la pensée de Heidegger ne consacre pas un enfermement dans le même, mais constitue une invitation à la différence. Le philosophe de Messkirch élabore une « logique » du questionnement et l’exigence d’un étonnement impliquant une attention sans cesse renouvelée qui visent à réveiller la vocation du savoir ─ compris comme une des plus hautes formes de respect ─ bien plus qu’à s’étourdir de vaines mises en abîmes. Cet ouvrage, bien qu’il témoigne d’une attention scolaire, ne veut pas être un commentaire destiné aux seuls spécialistes, mais constitue l’effort, à partir d’une certaine autonomie philosophique, de présenter la pensée heideggérienne à ceux qu’elle devrait intéresser, de l’arracher aux préjugés dans lesquels elle est souvent emprisonnée et d’en défendre le meilleur. (shrink)

La philosophie de Platon s'inscrit dans la lignée des présocratiques, des sophistes et des traditions artistiques qui sous-tendent l'éducation grecque, dans un cadre nouveau, défini par la dialectique et la théorie des Idées. Pour Platon, la connaissance est une activité de l'âme, affectée par des objets sensibles, et par des processus internes. Le platonisme a ses origines dans la philosophie de Platon, bien qu'il ne doive pas être confondu avec elle. Selon le platonisme, il existe des objets abstraits (une notion (...) différente de celle de la philosophie moderne qui existe dans un autre domaine distinct à la fois du monde sensible externe et du monde interne de la conscience, et est à l'opposé du nominalisme). Une distinction essentielle pour Platon dans sa philosophie est la théorie des Formes, la distinction entre la réalité perceptible mais inintelligible (science) et la réalité imperceptible mais intelligible (mathématiques). La géométrie était la principale motivation de Platon, ce qui montre l'influence de Pythagore. Les formes sont des archétypes parfaits dont les objets réels sont des copies imparfaites. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12629.70883. (shrink)