Academic excellence and intelligence are commonly lauded as commendable attributes synonymous with success. However, a disconcerting trend has surfaced within educational institutions, challenging the prevailing narrative of scholastic accomplishment—smart shaming. This research delves into the increasing concern of smart shaming within educational settings, particularly at Immaculate Conception College of Balayan, Inc., questioning the predominant emphasis on academic excellence and intelligence. A qualitative case study design, along with judgmental sampling, was employed to examine fifteen (15) student leaders who had experienced smart (...) shaming on campus. Thematic analysis revealed that sarcastic remarks including "edi wow," "Okay ikaw na matalino," "bidabida," and "sipsip" were a prevalent manifestation of smart shaming, adversely affecting emotional well-being, academic and leadership prowess, mental health, and self-perception. Coping mechanisms, predominantly centered around ignoring and focusing on goals, were identified. The findings underscore the imperative for educators to remain vigilant regarding instances of smart shaming in classrooms, promoting open communication to ensure student well-being. Additionally, guidance counselors play a pivotal role in aiding students in effectively navigating the repercussions of smart shaming. This study advocates for proactive programs and interventions to address and alleviate the deleterious effects of smart shaming on students. (shrink)

I argue that fitting envy plays a special role in safeguarding our happiness and flourishing. After presenting my theory of envy and its fittingness conditions, I contrast Kant’s view that envy is always unfitting with D’Arms and Jacobson’s defense of fitting envy as an evolutionarily-shaped response to a deep and wide human concern, that is, relative positioning. However, D’Arms and Jacobson don’t go far enough. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, distinguishing between an epistemic claim, according to (...) which we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what position we occupy in a continuum of goodness, and thus to form judgments of goodness, and a metaphysical one, according to which much human goodness depends on implicit or explicit rankings and positionality. Second, I argue that fitting envy is not only intrinsically valuable qua fitting response to authentic goodness, but can be epistemically, morally and prudentially valuable. (shrink)

Cette étude montre comment le météorologue Edward Lorenz, dans deux articles de 1963 et 1964, explore les propriétés des systèmes chaotiques par des allers-retours entre une déduction mathématique (basée sur la théorie des systèmes dynamiques) et une étude des solutions numériques du système dit « de Lorenz » dans un régime d’instabilité. This study aims at showing how the metereologist Edward Lorenz, in two papers of 1963 and 1964, explores the properties of chaotic systems thanks to the interplay between a (...) mathematical deduction (based on dynamical systems theory) and a study of the mathematical solutions of the Lorenz system in an instability regime. (shrink)

Kant scholars have rarely addressed the centuries-old tradition of casuistry and the concept of conscience in Kant’s writings. This book offers a detailed exploration of the period from Pascal’s Provincial Letters to Kant’s critique of probabilism and discusses his proposal of a (new) casuistry as part of an moral education. *** -/- Die Debatte um Kasuistik und Probabilismus zählt zu den wichtigsten Themen der Moraltheologie und Moralphilosophie der frühen Neuzeit. In der enormen Verbreitung der Literatur über die Gewissensfälle (casus conscientiae) (...) und in der großen Resonanz der Lehre von den wahrscheinlichen Meinungen (opiniones probabiles) in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts findet sich ein wirkungsmächtiges Modell für die Analyse des moralischen Handelns, in welchem Universalität des Gebots und Kontingenz der Handlung, Notwendigkeit der Norm und individuelle Freiheit miteinander versöhnt werden. Dennoch erregt dieses Modell heftige Kritik, die in Pascals berühmtem Angriff in den Briefen in die Provinz (1656–1657) gipfelt. So beginnt für die Kasuistik und den Probabilismus eine lange Krise, welche die Entstehung der modernen Moralphilosophie und den Siegeszug des kantischen Paradigmas ankündigt. Die Krise von Kasuistik und Probabilismus fällt zusammen mit einer einsetzenden rigoristischen Reaktion der christlichen Moraltheologie sowohl katholischer als auch protestantischer Prägung,welche die moralischen und spekulativen Folgen eines Rückgriffs auf Gewissensfälle und wahrscheinliche Meinungen als inakzeptabel ablehnt. Die Ablehnung geht aber weiter und dringt bis in den Kern der philosophischen Reflexion vor: Die rigoristische Reaktion gegen Kasuistik und Probabilismus entzündet sich im moralphilosophischen Denken Kants als Folge seiner umfassenden kritischen Revision der Grundbegriffe der Moralphilosophie sowie insbesondere seiner Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von Gewissen und praktischem Urteil. Dem Grundsatz des Probabilismus setzt Kant das Kriterium der moralischen Gewißheit („quod dubitas, ne feceris!“) entgegen, das er als „Postulat des Gewissens“ bezeichnet (RGV 6:185.23–186.9).Und die Kasuistik wird als eine „Critic der Handlungen nach Sophistic“ abgestempelt, als eine „Uebung, um nach der Sophistic das Gewissen zu hintergehen oder es zu chicaniren, insofern man es in Irrthum zu setzen denkt“ (V-MS/Vigil 27:620.2–5). Dennoch weist Kant den kasuistischen Fragen eine herausragende Stellung in der Tugendlehre zu und legt der Kasuistik im Rahmen der ethischen Methodenlehre, also im Hinblick auf pädagogische Anwendungen, letztlich eine positive Funktion bei. Vermutlich ist Kants Angriff auf Kasuistik und Probabilismus durch den Einfluss Pascals philosophisch vermittelt. Kants Verhältnis zu Pascal und, allgemeiner, zu dem historischen Hintergrund, welchem dieser angehört, sind gleichwohl noch erstaunlich wenig erforscht: Trotz der wiederholten (stillschweigenden oder sogar ausdrücklichen) Hinweise an wichtigen Stellen in Kants Schriften richtet die Kant-Forschung ihre Aufmerksamkeit nur selten auf die Jahrhunderte währende Tradition der Kasuistik und den Begriff des Gewissens, der in ihrem Rahmen ausgearbeitet wird. Aus dieser langen Geschichte wird in diesem Band insbesondere der Zeitraum „von Pascal bis Kant“ eingehend untersucht, d.h. der noch wenig erkundete Zeitabschnitt von der beißenden Polemik von Pascals Briefe in die Provinz bis zu Kants eigener Kritik des Probabilismus und seinem Entwurf einer (neuen) Kasuistik als Teil der ethischen Methodenlehre. (shrink)

Nel primo paragrafo sarà esaminato l’impianto normativo che regola le pubbliche amministrazioni, riformato dalle l. n. 142 e n. 241 del 1990, dal D.Lgs. 29/1993, dalle “leggi Bassanini” e dalla legge-quadro 150/2000, sia riguardo al diritto di accesso nei confronti dell’attività dell’amministrazione, sia in merito al radicamento di criteri di efficacia, efficienza ed economicità delle policies sia agli strumenti con cui gli Enti locali e cittadini possono comunicare. Gli anni ‘90 segnano l’inizio di un processo volto alla riorganizzazione delle PA (...) a partire dalla centralità della comunicazione istituzionale ma anche della concezione del “diritto all’informazione” nelle tre accezioni di diritto “di informare, “di informarsi” e “essere informati”. La Levi ha ben sottolineato “la rapidità inusuale nella storia nazionale” di tale riforma e la centralità assunta in essa dalle dimensioni dell’informazione, della comunicazione e della partecipazione: "In sintesi, si può ritenere legittimo concludere che le riforme del decennio 1990-2000 abbiano segnato il passaggio dal segreto alla trasparenza e dall’unilateralità alla partecipazione. Le politiche di modernizzazione in tema di comunicazione pubblica e di maggiore trasparenza dell’attività dell’amministrazione si sono mosse verso una più marcata tutela dei diritti dei cittadini e verso l’accentuazione del risultato dell’azione amministrativa" (2004, p. 16). Grandi ha ribadito che tale evoluzione costituisce nella cultura politica dello stato di diritto una «sorta di pre-condizione dell’emergere dei nuovi diritti di cittadinanza, intesi quale partecipazione consapevole e informata al processo decisionale pubblico» (Grandi 20022, 13). Nel secondo paragrafo verranno descritte gli ambiti di applicazione, le finalità, gli obiettivi e le strutture della comunicazione istituzionale disciplinate dalla legge n. 150/2000 e dai conseguenti regolamenti attuativi: il Portavoce, l’Ufficio stampa, l’Ufficio per le relazioni al pubblico. Come vedremo, si tratta di una normativa che rappresenta un punto di arrivo e un punto di partenza, in quanto, da un lato, se chiude il decennio delle riforme amministrative, d’altro lato, problematizza compiutamente per la prima volta il rapporto di comunicazione tra PA e cittadini e pone in evidenza tutte le difficoltà nell’implementare le norme nella realtà. Agli elementi critici della comunicazione istituzionale sono riservate le considerazioni conclusive: dal reclutamento e formazione del personale, al coordinamento delle strutture, dal persistere di mentalità burocratiche e autoreferenziale alla carenza di risorse. Il problema delle dotazioni organiche e finanziarie, in particolare, è molto sentito dalle amministrazioni di dimensioni più piccole, le quali spesso ricorrono alla “esternalizzazione” di attività degli uffici di comunicazione, non solo per la produzione editoriale, le campagne pubblicitarie e i servizi di gestione degli eventi, ma anche per il sito internet e i compiti di informazione più tradizionali. In tale situazione, la comunicazione istituzionale, pur dichiarata come strategica, rischia di rimanere un momento residuale dell’azione pubblica sia in termini di processo sia in termini di contenuto, slegata dagli obiettivi dell’organizzazione. (shrink)

"Sofò e Fefilìa" attinge dal mondo antico - dalla sua potenza -, ma possiede come sfondo del lucido meditare la contemporaneità. Un'analisi estrema, tragica, della vasta gamma dei sentimenti umani, che coniuga - in modo personale e innovativo - diverse anime: la poetica di d'Annunzio; la filosofia di Cioran, Weil, Heidegger, Schopenhauer, Leopardi, Pascal; la psicologia del profondo di Jung. Un tema, tanti temi: la vita-morte con le sue molteplici declinazioni in chiave gnostica. Sofò, perché Sofia è sapienza, lucetempo delle (...) menti, seme di salvezza. Il mito gnostico insegna, infatti, che l'uomo spirituale ritornerà alla luce e sarà la redenzione. Fefilìa, in quanto Fede e Amore costituiscono le cifre dell'e-sistenza. Prefazione: prof. Alberto Giovanni Biuso - Disponibile sul sito: BookSprint Edizioni -. (shrink)

Amaç: Kanserle yaşayan bireylerin (KYB) bakımında, resmiyette görünür olmayan ve çoğunlukla herhangi bir profesyonel donanıma sahip olmayan, ama sürecin başından sonuna, hasta bireye eşlik eden bakım verenler kritik öneme sahiptir. Baş etmesi zor bir hastalık olan kanserle mücadele eden bireylerin bakımında, bakım verenler fiziksel, zihinsel ve sosyal birtakım zorluklarla karşılaşmaktadır. Bu araştırma, KYB’lere bakım veren, yakınlarının karşılaştıkları zorlukları gündeme getirmeyi ve ihtimam etiği perspektifinden, bakım verenlerin bakımına yönelik öneriler sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Gereç ve Yöntem: Bu araştırma tanımlayıcı ve kesitsel olup araştırmanın (...) evreni Marmara Üniversitesi Pendik Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi (MÜPEAH) Onkoloji kliniğinde takip edilen, 15 Mart-5 Nisan tarihleri arasında kemoterapi ünitesine ve servis hizmetlerine başvuran KYB’lerin bakım veren yakınlarıdır. KYB’lere bakım verenlerin umutsuzluk derecelerini tespit etmek ve bunu etkileyen faktörleri ölçmek için, veri toplama aracı olarak; sosyodemografik sorular, bakım alan bireyin hastalık derecesine yönelik sorular ve Beck Umutsuzluk Ölçeği sorularından oluşan bir anket elden dağıtılmıştır. Anket bakım verene yönelik sosyodemografik sorular 8, KYB’nin hastalığının durumu ile ilgili sorular 7, Beck Umutsuzluk Ölçeği 20 olmak üzere 35 sorudan oluşmaktadır ve yaklaşık 10 dakikada tamamlanmaktadır. Elde edilen veriler önce Microsoft Excel aracılığıyla dijitalleştirilmiş, ardından IBM SPSS 27.0.1 sürümüyle analiz edilmiştir. Verilerin analizinde Ki-kare, Fisher’s Exact testi ve Pearson Korelasyon analizi kullanılmış, istatistiksel anlamlılık değeri için p<0.05 kabul edilmiştir. Bulgular: Ankete katılan 151 bakım verenin 83’ü (%55,3) kadın, 67’si (%44,7) erkektir. Katılımcıların yaş ortalaması 40,09’dur. Bakım verenlerin %41,1’i umutsuzluk düzeyi ölçeğinde “minimal ya da yok”, %39,7'si "hafif düzeyde", %13.2'si orta düzeyde ve %6’sı “aşırı düzeyde” skorunu almıştır. KYB’lere bakım verenlerin demografik özellikleri ile umutsuzluk düzeyi arasında anlamlı bir ilişki bulunmamıştır. Bakım verenlerin yaşı, cinsiyeti, medeni durumu, gelir durumu ve bakım verme süresi ile umutsuzluk skorları arasında anlamlı bir ilişki bulunmazken, eğitim seviyesi ile umutsuzluk skorları arasında anlamlı bir ilişki bulunmuştur. (p=0,019). Sonuç: Bakım verenlerin, umutsuzluk düzeyleri göz önüne alındığında, önemli psikolojik yükler taşıdığına ve bu yükün, özellikle bakım verenin eğitim seviyesi ile hastanın sağlık durumu arasında belirgin ilişkiler gösterdiğine ulaşılmıştır. Bu bilgiler ışığında, sosyodemografik özelliklerin bakım verenleri önemli ölçüde etkilediği görülmüştür. Bakım verenlerin duygusal yükleri, bakım alıcılarla olan ilişkileri ve bu sürecin hem bireysel hem toplumsal düzeyde getirdiği zorluklar ve sorumluluklar, ihtimam etiği kapsamında ele alınmıştır. Araştırma neticesinde bakım verenlerin karşılaştığı zorluklar ve ihtiyaçlarının daha geniş bir toplumsal ve etik perspektiften ele alınmasının gerekliliği ortaya konmuştur. Bakım verenlerin bakımına yönelik öneriler, duygusal destek; teorik eğitim ve bilgilendirme desteği; pratik ve uygulamalı destek; kaynak erişimi ve tahsisi; tanıma ve doğrulama başlıkları altında sunulmuştur. (shrink)

Se leggiamo tra le righe del suo lavoro, possiamo scoprire che Varzi prende i mostri molto sul serio. Troviamo, per esempio, mostri mereologici frutto della composizione non ristretta, come l’entità costituita dalla metà sinistra di questa mela e dal bracciolo di quella poltrona.10 Oppure mostri topologici dai quali una teoria mereotopologica delle nicche deve rifuggire, come le curve riempispazio di Peano e Hilbert.11 O, ancora, mostri ontologici come l’antimateria;12 le entità “inesistenti” che, come si sa, non possono esistere, dato che (...) non ci sono cose che non esistono; e le entità “negative”: buchi, mancanze e omissioni, conferenze non date.13 In questo contributo, seguendo il suggerimento di Varzi, parlerò, appunto, di mostri, prendendo l’avvio da alcune creature che popolano il regno della finzione, per poi passare a trattare dei mostri che popolano il nostro mondo. Essendo poco lo spazio e molti i mostri, procederò dapprima proponendone una tassonomia – punto di partenza per ogni generalizzazione che si rispetti – e in seguito cercando di illustrare perché i mostri vadano presi sul serio in metafisica. È d’obbligo precisare che si tratterà di una tassonomia parziale e provvisoria, ma lo è altrettanto ricordare che le tassonomie, quelle biologiche in particolare, lo sono sempre, per due ragioni. In parte, perché la vita è in costante evoluzione, in parte perché le nostre conoscenze e decisioni condizionano la struttura e i contenuti dei nostri sistemi di categorie: basti pensare che la prima edizione del Systema naturae di Linneo contava undici pagine, mentre la tredicesima ben tremila, ripartite in sei volumi. Quando un tassonomo scopre un organismo che ritiene – dopo accurati esami comparativi – essere appartenente a una specie fino ad allora sconosciuta, ne deposita nella letteratura scientifica, insieme al nome binomiale (cioè il nome specifico, composto dall’indicazione del genere e della specie, come Homo sapiens), una descrizione in termini di caratteri fenetici. Quel token è chiamato tipo nomenclaturale, o esemplare-tipo, ed è il portatore del nome della specie di cui viene considerato tipo. Sulla falsariga della procedura appena descritta, riporterò la descrizione di alcuni tipi nomenclaturali per una tassonomia mostruosa che si baserà su tre criteri principali: (1) l’origine, (2) la costituzione genetica, (3) l’aspetto fenotipico. Prima di procedere, vorrei però sottolineare tre rispetti sotto i quali classificare mostri mitologici differisce dal classificare individui “ordinari”. Innanzitutto, nel caso dei mostri mitologici non è possibile, a causa del frequente intervento divino, ricorrere al criterio dell’interfecondità per stabilire se due mostri appartengono alla medesima specie. Ma d’altro canto, tale criterio, benché sia abbastanza affidabile per gli animali, non lo è affatto, per ragioni diverse dai mostri, per molte piante, alghe e funghi. Un’altra peculiarità da segnalare – di cui però non avremo modo di occuparci oltre – è che le entità mitologiche sono frequentemente soggette a trasformazioni sostanziali, mentre la nostra biologia sembra, aristotelicamente, escluderne la possibilità: una tigre non può trasformarsi in un canguro, pena la sua uscita dall’esistenza. Meno paradossalmente, una larva di mosca e la mosca adulta saranno considerate appartenenti alla medesima sorta – la mosca, appunto – benché dall’una all’altra non vi sia praticamente alcuna continuità materiale (nella metamorfosi la larva viene distrutta quasi completamente e l’adulto si genera a partire da pochi aggregati cellulari indifferenziati). Infine, nel caso dei mostri mitologici, parlerò più genericamente di “gruppo tassonomico” anziché di “specie” (e dunque il nome dei tipi nomenclaturali non sarà un nome binomiale) dal momento che, come diverrà chiaro nel corso della lettura, è proprio il concetto di “specie” come diverrà chiaro nel corso della lettura, è proprio il concetto di “specie” come articolazione naturale non oltrepassabile che i mostri che andiamo a classificare ci chiedono di mettere in discussione. (shrink)

Dans un texte désormais célèbre, Ferdinand de Saussure insiste sur l’arbitraire du signe dont il vante les qualités. Toutefois il s’avère que le symbole, signe non arbitraire, dans la mesure où il existe un rapport entre ce qui représente et ce qui est représenté, joue un rôle fondamental dans la plupart des activités humaines, qu’elles soient scientifiques, artistiques ou religieuses. C’est cette dimension symbolique, sa portée, son fonctionnement et sa signification dans des domaines aussi variés que la chimie, la théologie, (...) les mathématiques, le code de la route et bien d’autres qui est l’objet du livre La Pointure du symbole. -/- Jean-Yves Béziau, franco-suisse, est docteur en logique mathématique et docteur en philosophie. Il a poursuivi des recherches en France, au Brésil, en Suisse, aux États-Unis (UCLA et Stanford), en Pologne et développé la logique universelle. Éditeur-en-chef de la revue Logica Universalis et de la collection Studies in Universal Logic (Springer), il est actuellement professeur à l’Université Fédérale de Rio de Janeiro et membre de l’Académie brésilienne de Philosophie. SOMMAIRE -/- PRÉFACE L’arbitraire du signe face à la puissance du symbole Jean-Yves BÉZIAU La logique et la théorie de la notation (sémiotique) de Peirce (Traduit de l’anglais par Jean-Marie Chevalier) Irving H. ANELLIS Langage symbolique de Genèse 2-3 Lytta BASSET -/- Mécanique quantique : quelle réalité derrière les symboles ? Hans BECK -/- Quels langages et images pour représenter le corps humain ? Sarah CARVALLO Des jeux symboliques aux rituels collectifs. Quelques apports de la psychologie du développement à l’étude du symbolisme Fabrice CLÉMENT Les panneaux de signalisation (Traduit de l’anglais par Fabien Shang) Robert DEWAR Remarques sur l’émergence des activités symboliques Jean LASSÈGUE Les illustrations du "Songe de Poliphile" (1499). Notule sur les hiéroglyphes de Francesca Colonna Pierre-Alain MARIAUX Signes de vie Jeremy NARBY Visualising relations in society and economics. Otto Neuraths Isotype-method against the background of his economic thought Elisabeth NEMETH Algèbre et logique symboliques : arbitraire du signe et langage formel Marie-José DURAND – Amirouche MOKTEFI Les symboles mathématiques, signes du Ciel Jean-Claude PONT La mathématique : un langage mathématique ? Alain M. ROBERT. (shrink)

Dalle decisioni algoritmiche alle raccomandazioni sugli acquisti, dai sex robot alla sorveglianza sociale, dalla cybersicurezza all’autonomia operativa dei veicoli e delle armi, l’impatto dell’intelligenza artificiale e della robotica sulla vita delle persone è sempre più ramificato e pervasivo. Il volume offre un quadro d’insieme delle questioni etiche sollevate dall’incontro tra automi e individui nella società contemporanea: la protezione dell’autonomia a fronte della raccolta minuziosa di dati personali, le forme di benessere collettivo da promuovere attraverso l’automazione, la trasparenza e l’equità delle (...) decisioni prese con il supporto di un algoritmo, il ruolo dei sistemi intelligenti nella crisi ambientale. L’automazione non è segno incontrovertibile di sventura, ma nemmeno indizio sicuro di progresso. Cosa sarà delle persone, delle società e della vita sul nostro pianeta dipende in modo cruciale da come sapremo affrontare le sfide etiche dell’età degli automi. (shrink)

This thirteenth volume of Collected Papers is an eclectic tome of 88 papers in various fields of sciences, such as astronomy, biology, calculus, economics, education and administration, game theory, geometry, graph theory, information fusion, decision making, instantaneous physics, quantum physics, neutrosophic logic and set, non-Euclidean geometry, number theory, paradoxes, philosophy of science, scientific research methods, statistics, and others, structured in 17 chapters (Neutrosophic Theory and Applications; Neutrosophic Algebra; Fuzzy Soft Sets; Neutrosophic Sets; Hypersoft Sets; Neutrosophic Semigroups; Neutrosophic Graphs; Superhypergraphs; Plithogeny; (...) Information Fusion; Statistics; Decision Making; Extenics; Instantaneous Physics; Paradoxism; Mathematica; Miscellanea), comprising 965 pages, published between 2005-2022 in different scientific journals, by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 110 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 26 countries: Abduallah Gamal, Sania Afzal, Firoz Ahmad, Muhammad Akram, Sheriful Alam, Ali Hamza, Ali H. M. Al-Obaidi, Madeleine Al-Tahan, Assia Bakali, Atiqe Ur Rahman, Sukanto Bhattacharya, Bilal Hadjadji, Robert N. Boyd, Willem K.M. Brauers, Umit Cali, Youcef Chibani, Victor Christianto, Chunxin Bo, Shyamal Dalapati, Mario Dalcín, Arup Kumar Das, Elham Davneshvar, Bijan Davvaz, Irfan Deli, Muhammet Deveci, Mamouni Dhar, R. Dhavaseelan, Balasubramanian Elavarasan, Sara Farooq, Haipeng Wang, Ugur Halden, Le Hoang Son, Hongnian Yu, Qays Hatem Imran, Mayas Ismail, Saeid Jafari, Jun Ye, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Abdullah Kargın, Vasilios N. Katsikis, Nour Eldeen M. Khalifa, Madad Khan, M. Khoshnevisan, Tapan Kumar Roy, Pinaki Majumdar, Sreepurna Malakar, Masoud Ghods, Minghao Hu, Mingming Chen, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Loey, Mihnea Alexandru Moisescu, Muhammad Ihsan, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Shabir, Mumtaz Ali, Muzzamal Sitara, Nassim Abbas, Munazza Naz, Giorgio Nordo, Mani Parimala, Ion Pătrașcu, Gabrijela Popović, K. Porselvi, Surapati Pramanik, D. Preethi, Qiang Guo, Riad K. Al-Hamido, Zahra Rostami, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Muzafer Saračević, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Selvaraj Ganesan, Shammya Shananda Saha, Marayanagaraj Shanmugapriya, Songtao Shao, Sori Tjandrah Simbolon, Florentin Smarandache, Predrag S. Stanimirović, Dragiša Stanujkić, Raman Sundareswaran, Mehmet Șahin, Ovidiu-Ilie Șandru, Abdulkadir Șengür, Mohamed Talea, Ferhat Taș, Selçuk Topal, Alptekin Ulutaș, Ramalingam Udhayakumar, Yunita Umniyati, J. Vimala, Luige Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Yaman Akbulut, Yanhui Guo, Yong Deng, You He, Young Bae Jun, Wangtao Yuan, Rong Xia, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Zayen Azzouz Omar, Xiaohong Zhang, Zhirou Ma.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬. (shrink)

L’Exercitium academicum circa praescientiam daemonum (1666), pubblicato nella riformata Jena, tematizza una questione dibattuta nella Scolastica fra XIII e XIV secolo ma le cui radici risalgono ad Agostino d'Ippona, cui si deve il primo testo sull'argomento: la prescienza dei demoni. L'analisi segue la traccia del De divinatione daemonum agostiniano, mentre appare critica nei confronti delle posizioni di Tommaso d'Aquino e dei tomisti. Ad esse, in particolare riguardo alla natura delle facoltà intellettive demoniche, egli contrappone Giovanni Duns Scoto, Durando di san (...) Porziano e non meglio specificati nominales, accomunati in un indistinto riferimento alla teoria delle species. Ciò non toglie che il testo segua poi Tommaso nell'articolazione delle forme di prescienza dei demoni e nella definizione di questa come conoscenza congetturale. Scopo del nostro intervento sarà infatti mostrare, attraverso l'analisi che per la prima volta sarà condotta sul testo, lo spaccato di una comunità conversazionale nella quale le linee di forza e le distinzioni che animano il dibattito si mostrano autonome rispetto alle posizioni storiche di cattolici e riformati. Nell’Exercitium, Duns Scoto è contrapposto ai tomisti e, con Agostino e Durando di san Porziano – che costituisce una fonte comune del dibattito secentesco insieme a Bonaventura, Aureolo, Suarez, Vazquez, Gregorio di Valencia, e in tale veste sarà ripreso di lì a poco da Leibniz -, è cooptato tra gli autori a sostegno della sua tesi. Lungi dall'essere un esercizio di eclettismo o la stanca ripetizione di formule scolastiche, lo scritto getta luce su un dibattito universitario nel quale le fonti sono usate non come auctoritates ma quale repertorio di teorie da smontare e rimontare; ad esse l’Exercitium attinge per soluzioni che si definiscono in relazione a finalità filosofiche o dottrinali, ma non politiche né confessionali. (shrink)

There are two areas of particular importance in Heathen ethics. One is the growth and maintenance of ethical personal power or 'might and main': the inner strength and drive that is necessary to develop and sustain a good character and reputation, and to achieve worthy deeds during our life. The second is the pursuit of relationships and community life that promote individual, group, and community well-being and effective functionality. Any thoughtful reading of Heathen history, old texts, tales, poems and sagas (...) will show how important these two factors were in ancient Heathen life. This was generally illustrated by showing the painful, cascading disruptions that were caused by failures of, and transgressions against, these ethical values and aspirations. Modern Heathens can benefit from a fuller understanding of ancient Heathen ethical views: both their strengths and their weaknesses, their pros and cons. Only by a thoughtful grasp of these concepts can we make the best use of the elder ways as Heathens living in today’s world. This book offers philosophical discussions of certain Heathen ethical concepts, as well as guidelines for using these concepts to live ethically strong and spiritually healthy lives as modern Heathens. Fulfilled OATHS build Heathen might and main, increasing our personal power. Unpaid SHILD (moral obligation) weakens our might and main; taking responsibility for shild heals personal power. FRITH is a fabric of interwoven might and main, created and shared by many: the roots of relationship and community. LUCK and WYRD can be expressed through flows of might and main, discovered along the complex, hidden paths that lead to Heathen wisdom. Understanding, increasing, maintaining, and sharing ethical might and main is a foundation of Heathen ethics. “In Oaths, Shild, Frith, Luck & Wyrd, Winifred Hodge Rose draws on her extensive scholarship and experience to explore what the lore has to tell us about how the Old Heathens viewed certain ethical questions, and to offer suggestions on how these perspectives can help us deal with the challenges that we face today.” Diana L. Paxson, author of Essential Asatru: A Modern Guide to Norse Paganism. “Oaths, Shild, Frith, Luck & Wyrd provides tools for individual and collective healing, and articulates important questions and challenges that we must consider as we adapt the knowledge and life ways of our ancestors to our contemporary context.” Sara Axtell, Ph.D. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Marxist Buddhism may provide a novel approach to envy in society. It has been argued that envy arises in response to socio-political inequality, which is considered a problem given the social and moral harms associated with envy. Thus, achieving equality is expected to solve the problem of envy. However, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that is not the case, and that, in particular, societies inspired by Marxist ideals are not envy-free—if anything, the opposite seems (...) true. Buddhism has traditionally condemned envy. It shares with Marxism the idea that individual wellbeing can be obtained, paradoxically, only through lessening emphasis on individuality—Marxism by means of economic collectivism, Buddhism by means of a spiritual transformation. Both aim at shrinking the self and are keenly aware of how quickly an emphasis on one’s own desires leads to greed and exploitation of others. However, Marxist ideals have failed to yield successful large-scale flourishing communities, while Buddhism is a religion practiced by millions of people but has not advanced a politically progressive agenda in particular. Marxist Buddhism—argue—may perhaps bring together the best of the respective traditions to solve the problem of envy. However, I end by cautioning against such a radical reshaping of our psychological makeup, especially given the evidence that shows that there are morally and prudentially good types of envy, and sketch the profile of a Buddhist-friendly type of envy as an alternative to total eradication. (shrink)

The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians (Markosian 1998, 2004; Simons 2004; Parsons (2000) also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons (2004) goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples (henceforth just extended simples) are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these (...) views lies in explaining why it is that the various sub-volumes of space occupied by such simples, are not occupied by proper parts of those simples. Intuitively at least, many of us find compelling the idea that spatially extended objects have proper parts at every sub-volume of the region they occupy. It seems that the defender of extended simples must reject a seemingly plausible claim, what Simons calls the geometric correspondence principle (GCP): that any (spatially) extended object has parts that correspond to the parts of the region that it occupies (Simons 2004: 371). We disagree. We think that GCP is a plausible principle. We also think it is plausible that our world is composed of extended simples. We reconcile these two notions by two means. On the one hand we pay closer attention to the physics of our world. On the other hand, we consider what happens when our concept of something—in this case space—contains elements not all of which are realized in anything, but instead key components are realized in different features of the world. (shrink)

Confronted with the great variety one can find today in the work of those often labelled (either by themselves or by others) as “relationalists”, “naïve realists” or “disjunctivists”, one could be excused for thinking that relationalism has no common core, but is instead a constellation of views, which at best bear a kind of family resemblance to each other. We believe that this impression would be inaccurate. Relationalism is best thought of not as a constellation of loosely interrelated views, but (...) as a single wellspring of views, which has both a common core, and a variety of versions which differ from each other along two central axes of variation. In the first half of this introduction, we articulate this structure of relationalist views by constructing a common logical space for them. In the introduction’s second part, we use this logical space to introduce the various contributions this volume collects. (shrink)

As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...) maintain or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of belief in free will? In this chapter we consider the practical implications of free will skepticism and argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. We argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for example, would not be threatened. On treatment of criminals, we argue that although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation programs would still be justified. While we will touch on all these issues below, our focus will be primarily on this last issue. -/- We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an often destructive form of moral anger. In section III we argue that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy. We present and defend our own preferred model for dealing with dangerous criminals, an incapacitation account built on the right to self-protection analogous to the justification for quarantine (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014a; Caruso 2016a), and we respond to recent objections to it by Michael Corrado and John Lemos. (shrink)

Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...) and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this article, I critically reassess Iris Marion Young's late works, which centre on the distinction between liability and social connection responsibility. I concur with Young's diagnosis that structural injustices call for a new conception of responsibility, but I reject several core assumptions that underpin her distinction between two models and argue for a different way of conceptualising responsibility to address structural injustices. I show that Young's categorical separation of guilt and responsibility is not supported by the writings of Hannah (...) Arendt, which Young draws on, and that it is also untenable on independent systematic grounds. Furthermore, I argue that several of Young's other criteria fail to clearly demarcate two distinct phenomena. I therefore propose to transcend Young's distinction between two models in favour of a related, but conceptually different distinction between two forms of responsibility: interactional and structural. Embracing this terminology facilitates the conceptualisation of the general features of responsibility that are shared by both forms, including their retrospective and prospective time-direction and their applicability to individual, joint and group agency. The distinction between interactional and structural responsibility also yields a more compelling general account of the role of background structures, and of blame within ascriptions of political responsibility. (shrink)

The notion of function is indispensable to our understanding of distinctions such as that between being broken and being in working order (for artifacts) and between being diseased and being healthy (for organisms). A clear account of the ontology of functions and functioning is thus an important desideratum for any top-level ontology intended for application to domains such as engineering or medicine. The benefit of using top-level ontologies in applied ontology can only be realized when each of the categories identified (...) and defined by a top-level ontology is integrated with the others in a coherent fashion. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) has from the beginning included function as one of its categories, exploiting a version of the etiological account of function that is framed at a level of generality sufficient to accommodate both biological and artifactual functions. This account has been subjected to a series of criticisms and refinements. We here articulate BFO’s account of function, provide some reasons for favoring it over competing views, and defend it against objections. (shrink)

Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual contentand my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that theperception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magni-tudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second—that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents.

Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating (...) cognitive activity. It also argues that giving proper attention to the way the folk use their psychological concepts requires questioning the legitimacy of commonsense functionalism. In place of extended functionalism—empirical or commonsensical—we promote the fortunes of extensive enactivism, clarifying in which ways it is distinct from notions of extended mind and distributed cognition. (shrink)

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism (...) about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative. (shrink)

In The Border between Seeing and Thinking, Ned Block argues that the distinction between perception and cognition should be grounded in representational format. I object that cognition is multifaceted, and includes representations with the same format as some perceptual representations. We can save Block’s view by interpreting it as concerning the border between one elite species of cognition—namely, propositional thought—and everything below it, including perception. But that leaves the border between perception and cognition in general unexplained. To fill this gap, (...) I recommend my stimulus-dependence account of the border and reply to objections Block raises against it. This brings into relief a category of mind that is crucial to understanding human infants and nonhuman animals—namely, nonpropositional cognition, which sits between perception and propositional thought. (shrink)

Context: The majority of contemporary enactivist work is influenced by the philosophical biology of Hans Jonas. Jonas credits all living organisms with experience that involves particular “existential” structures: nascent forms of concern for self-preservation and desire for objects and outcomes that promote well-being. We argue that Jonas’s attitude towards living systems involves a problematic anthropomorphism that threatens to place enactivism at odds with cognitive science, and undermine its legitimate aims to become a new paradigm for scientific investigation and understanding of (...) the mind. Problem: Enactivism needs to address the tension between its Jonasian influences and its aspirations to become a new paradigm for cognitive science. By relying on Jonasian phenomenology, contemporary enactivism obscures alternative ways in which phenomenology can be more smoothly integrated with cognitive science. Method: We outline the historical relationship between enactivism and phenomenology, and explain why anthropomorphism is problematic for a research program that aspires to become a new paradigm for cognitive science. We examine the roots of Jonas’s existential interpretation of biological facts, and describe how and why Jonas himself understood his project as founded on an anthropomorphic assumption that is incompatible with a crucial methodological assumption of scientific enquiry: the prohibition of unexplained natural purposes. We describe the way in which phenomenology can be integrated into Maturana’s autopoietic theory, and use this as an example of how an alternative, non-anthropomorphic science of the biological roots of cognition might proceed. Results: Our analysis reveals a crucial tension between Jonas’s influence on enactivism and enactivism’s paradigmatic aspirations. This suggests the possibility of, and need to investigate, other ways of integrating phenomenology with cognitive science that do not succumb to this tension. Implications: In light of this, enactivists should either eliminate the Jonasian inference from properties of our human experience to properties of the experience of all living organisms, or articulate an alternative conception of scientific enquiry that can tolerate the anthropomorphism this inference entails. The Maturanian view we present in the article’s final section constitutes a possible framework within which enactivist tools and concepts can be used to understand cognition and phenomenology, and that does not involve a problematic anthropomorphism. Constructivist content: Any constructivist approach that aims for integration with current scientific practice must either avoid the type of anthropomorphic inference on which Jonas bases his work, or specify a new conception of scientific enquiry that renders anthropomorphism unproblematic. (shrink)

The axiological tenet of scientific realism, “science seeks true theories,” is generally taken to rest on a corollary epistemological tenet, “we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve (or approximate) that aim.” While important debates have centered on, and have led to the refinement of, the epistemological tenet, the axiological tenet has suffered from neglect. I offer what I consider to be needed refinements to the axiological postulate. After showing an intimate relation between the refined postulate and ten theoretical (...) desiderata, I argue that the axiological postulate does not depend on its epistemological counterpart; epistemic humility can accompany us in the quest for truth. Upon contrasting my axiological postulate against the two dominant non-realist alternatives and the standard realist postulate, I contend that its explanatory and justificatory virtues render it, among the axiologies considered, the richest account of the scientific enterprise. (shrink)

Davis called for “extreme caution” in the use of non-invasive brain stimulation to treat neurological disorders in children, due to gaps in scientific knowledge. We are sympathetic to his position. However, we must also address the ethical implications of applying this technology to minors. Compensatory trade-offs associated with NIBS present a challenge to its use in children, insofar as these trade-offs have the effect of limiting the child’s future options. The distinction between treatment and enhancement has some normative force here. (...) As the intervention moves away from being a treatment toward being an enhancement—and thus toward a more uncertain weighing of the benefits, risks, and costs—considerations of the child’s best interests diminish, and the need to protect the child’s autonomy looms larger. NIBS for enhancement involving trade-offs should therefore be delayed, if possible, until the child reaches a state of maturity and can make an informed, personal decision. NIBS for treatment, by contrast, is permissible insofar as it can be shown to be at least as safe and effective as currently approved treatments, which are themselves justified on a best interests standard. (shrink)

The scientific realism debate has now reached an entirely new level of sophistication. Faced with increasingly focused challenges, epistemic scientific realists have appropriately revised their basic meta-hypothesis that successful scientific theories are approximately true: they have emphasized criteria that render realism far more selective and, so, plausible. As a framework for discussion, I use what I take to be the most influential current variant of selective epistemic realism, deployment realism. Toward the identification of new case studies that challenge this form (...) of realism, I break away from the standard list and look to the history of celestial mechanics, with an emphasis on twentieth century advances. I then articulate two purely deductive arguments that, I argue, properly capture the historical threat to realism. I contend that both the content and form of these novel challenges seriously threaten selective epistemic realism. I conclude on a positive note, however, arguing for selective realism at a higher level. Even in the face of threats to its epistemic tenet, scientific realism need not be rejected outright: concern with belief can be bracketed while nonetheless advocating core realist tenets. I show that, in contrast with epistemic deployment realism, a purely axiological scientific realism can account for key scientific practices made salient in my twentieth century case studies. And embracing the realists favored account of inference, inference to the best explanation, while pointing to a set of the most promising alternative selective realist meta-hypothesis, I show how testing the latter can be immensely valuable to our understanding of science. (shrink)

In attempting to form rational personal probabilities by direct inference, it is usually assumed that one should prefer frequency information concerning more specific reference classes. While the preceding assumption is intuitively plausible, little energy has been expended in explaining why it should be accepted. In the present article, I address this omission by showing that, among the principled policies that may be used in setting one’s personal probabilities, the policy of making direct inferences with a preference for frequency information for (...) more specific reference classes yields personal probabilities whose accuracy is optimal, according to all proper scoring rules, in situations where all of the relevant frequency information is point-valued. Assuming that frequency information for narrower reference classes is preferred, when the relevant frequency statements are point-valued, a dilemma arises when choosing whether to make a direct inference based upon relatively precise-valued frequency information for a broad reference class, R, or upon relatively imprecise-valued frequency information for a more specific reference class, R*. I address such cases, by showing that it is often possible to make a precise-valued frequency judgment regarding R* based on precise-valued frequency information for R, using standard principles of direct inference. Having made such a frequency judgment, the dilemma of choosing between and is removed, and one may proceed by using the precise-valued frequency estimate for the more specific reference class as a premise for direct inference. (shrink)

In our target article, we argued that the number sense represents natural and rational numbers. Here, we respond to the 26 commentaries we received, highlighting new directions for empirical and theoretical research. We discuss two background assumptions, arguments against the number sense, whether the approximate number system represents numbers or numerosities, and why the ANS represents rational numbers.

Attributions of omnipresence, most familiar within the philosophy of religion, typically take the omnipresence of an entity to either consist in that entity's occupation of certain regions or be dependent upon other of that entity's attributes, such as omnipotence or omniscience. This paper defends an alternative conception of omnipresence that is independent of other purported divine attributes and dispenses with occupation. The resulting view repurposes the metaphysics of necessitism and permanentism, taking omnipresent entities to be those entities that exist at (...) all regions. This view is then shown to best accommodate attributions of omnipresence to a diverse range of metaphysical posits, like abstract entities, and a more diverse class of religious posits. (shrink)

This paper gives a characterization of distributed cognition (d-cog) and explores ways that the framework might be applied in studies of science. I argue that a system can only be given a d-cog description if it is thought of as performing a task. Turning our attention to science, we can try to give a global d-cog account of science or local d-cog accounts of particular scientific projects. Several accounts of science can be seen as global d-cog accounts: Robert Merton's sociology (...) of scientific norms, Philip Kitcher's 20th-century account of cognitive labor, and Kitcher's 21st-century notion of well-ordered science. Problems that arise for them arise just because of the way that they attribute a function to science. The paper concludes by considering local d-cog accounts. Here, too, the task is the crux of the matter. (shrink)

I present and develop the view that omissions are de re possibilities of actual events. Omissions do not literally fail to occur; rather, they possibly occur. An omission is a tripartite metaphysical entity composed of an actual event, a possible event, and a contextually specified counterpart relation between them. This view resolves ontological, causal, and semantic puzzles about omissions, and also accounts for important data about moral responsibility for outcomes resulting from omissions.

According to the standard narrative, natural kind is a technical notion that was introduced by John Stuart Mill in the 1840s and the recent craze for natural kinds, launched by Putnam and Kripke, is a continuation of that tradition. I argue that the standard narrative is mistaken. The Millian tradition of kinds was not particularly influential in the 20th-century, and the Putnam-Kripke revolution did not clearly engage with even the remnants that were left of it. The presently active tradition of (...) natural kinds is less than half a century old. Recognizing this might help us better appreciate both Mill and natural kinds. (shrink)

Unconscious perceptions have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer (...) a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay defends a qualified version of Quine's thesis of universal revisability against Chalmers's recent conditionalization-based criticisms of it. It is argued that an embodied view of cognitive processing undermines Chalmers's account of nonrevisable a priori justification, which presupposes that concepts prefigure the confirmation-relations into which they enter, so as to make such relations rationally accessible to anyone who possesses those concepts. On the view developed here, bodily interaction with the world and the accompanying subconscious processing can change subjects' (...) dispositions to apply their concepts, in ways that are not rationally accessible to them, even given a complete description of that interaction, and do not constitute a change in the content of the concepts involved. Thus a subject who treats a proposition as indefeasibly justified a priori might nevertheless significantly lower her credence in that proposition, in ways that are not accessible to the subject on the basis of her grasp of the content of the relevant concepts. This discussion has further implications concerning the role of the a priori in the philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

The phenomenal particularity thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception’s phenomenology. Martin, Campbell, Gomes and French and others defend this thesis. Against them are Mehta, Montague, Schellenberg and others, who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate between them is now at an impasse. This paper aims to (...) break through this impasse. It argues that we have reached the impasse because two distinct conceptions of phenomenology—a “narrow” conception and a “broad” conception—are compatible with our what-it-is-like characterizations of phenomenology. It also suggests that each of these two conceptions has its own theoretical value and use. Therefore, the paper recommends a pluralistic position, on which we acknowledge that there are two kinds of phenomenology: narrow phenomenology and broad phenomenology. The phenomenal particularity thesis is true only with respect to the latter. (shrink)

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism (...) as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration. (shrink)

Debates over what is fundamental assume that what is most fundamental must be either a “top” level (roughly, the biggest or highest-level thing), or a “bottom” level (roughly, the smallest or lowest-level things). Here I sketch an alternative to top-ism and bottom-ism, the view that a middle level could be the most fundamental, and argue for its plausibility. I then suggest that the view satisfies the desiderata of asymmetry, irreflexivity, transitivity, and well-foundedness of fundamentality, that the view has explanatory power (...) on par with that of top-ism and bottom-ism, and that it satisfies the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (shrink)

When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into groups (...) capable of so doing. In this paper I argue that several questionable assumptions have shaped the character and scope of inquiry to this point, precluding us from grappling with a range of important questions concerning the epistemic dimensions of collective inaction. I offer an overview of recent conversation concerning collective inaction, advance a critique of the picture of responsibility that has emerged from this conversation, and propose an alternative approach to th... (shrink)

This paper develops and articulates a metaphysics of intersectionality, the idea that multiple axes of social oppression cross-cut each other. Though intersectionality is often described through metaphor, theories of intersectionality can be formulated using the tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics. A central tenet of intersectionality theory, that intersectional identities are inseparable, can be framed in terms of explanatory unity. Further, intersectionality is best understood as metaphysical and explanatory priority of the intersectional category over its constituents, akin to metaphysical priority of (...) the whole over its parts. (shrink)

Free will skepticism maintains that what we do, and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of praise and blame. In recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers have advanced and defended versions of free will skepticism, including Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014), Galen Strawson (2010), Neil Levy (2011), Bruce Waller (2011, (...) 2015), and myself (Caruso 2012, 2013, forthcoming). Critics, however, often complain that adopting such views would have dire consequences for ourselves, society, morality, meaning, and the law. They fear, for instance, that relinquishing belief in free will and basic desert moral responsibility would leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior, increase anti-social conduct, and undermine meaning in life. -/- In response, free will skeptics argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014; Waller 2011, 2015; Caruso 2016, forthcoming). According to optimistic skeptics, prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened. And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, incapacitation and rehabilitation programs would still be justified (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014; Levy 2012; Caruso 2016; Pereboom and Caruso, forthcoming). In this paper, I attempt to extend this general optimism about the practical implications of free will skepticism to the question of creativity. -/- In Section I, I spell out the question of creativity and explain why it’s relevant to the problem of free will. In Section II, I identify three different conceptions of creativity and explain the practical concerns critics have with free will skepticism. In Section III, I distinguish between three different conceptions of moral responsibility and argue that at least two of them are consistent with free will skepticism. I further contend that forward-looking accounts of moral responsibility, which are perfectly consistent with free will skepticism, can justify calling agents to account for immoral behavior as well as providing encouragement for creative activities since these are important for moral and creative formation and development. I conclude in Section IV by arguing that relinquishing belief in free will and basic desert would not mean the death of creativity or our sense of achievement since important and realistic conceptions of both remain in place. (shrink)

Proponents of grounding often describe the notion as "metaphysical causation" involving determination and production relations similar to causation. This paper argues that the similarities between grounding and causation are merely superficial. I show that there are several sorts of causation that have no analogue in grounding; that the type of "bringing into existence" that both involve is extremely different; and that the synchronicity of ground and the diachronicity of causation make them too different to be explanatorily intertwined.

The increasing use of opioid treatment agreements has prompted debate within the medical community about ethical challenges with respect to their implementation. The focus of debate is usually on the efficacy of OTAs at reducing opioid misuse, how OTAs may undermine trust between physicians and patients and the potential coercive nature of requiring patients to sign such agreements as a condition for receiving pain care. An important consideration missing from these conversations is the potential for racial bias in the current (...) way that OTAs are incorporated into clinical practice and in the amount of physician discretion that current opioid guidelines support. While the use of OTAs has become mandatory in some states for certain classes of patients, physicians are still afforded great leeway in how these OTAs are implemented in clinical practice and how their terms should be enforced. This paper uses the guidelines provided for OTA implementation by the states of Indiana and Pennsylvania as case studies in order to argue that giving physicians certain kinds of discretion may exacerbate racial health disparities. This problem cannot simply be addressed by minimising physician discretion in general, but rather by providing mechanisms to hold physicians accountable for how they treat patients on long-term opioid therapy to ensure that such treatment is equitable. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences.

The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from (...) different property theorists in the love literature. However, even this more sophisticated property view falls short in accounting for unrequited love's reasons. In response, I develop a new version of the property view that I call the experiential view. On this view, we love a person not only in virtue of properties shaped by and experienced in a reciprocal loving relationship, but also in virtue of perspectival properties, whose value can be properly assessed also outside of a reciprocal loving relationship. The experiential view is the only view that can account not only for reciprocated love's reasons, but also for unrequited love's reasons. (shrink)

This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, counterfactuals imbued with causal content whose antecedents appeal to metaphysically impossible worlds. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events, such as “If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2+2=5, the math textbooks would not have remained intact.” After providing an account of impossible omissions, the paper argues for three claims: (i) impossible omissions play a causal role in the actual world, (ii) causal (...) counterpossibles have broad applications in philosophy, and (iii) the truth of causal counterpossibles provides evidence for the nonvacuity of counterpossibles more generally. (shrink)