In recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction (MFPR) has increasingly been the subject of debate in Norway, and the intensity reached a tentative maximum when Legislation Department delivered the interpretative statement § 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act in 2016 in response to the Ministry of Health (2014) requesting the Legislation Department to consider whether the Law on abortion allows for MFPR of healthy fetuses in multiple pregnancies. The Legislation Department concluded that current abortion laws allow MFPR within the framework (...) the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and during autumn 2018, it was further intensified in connection with the Christian Democrat "crossroads" and signals from the Conservatives to consider removing §2.3c and to forbid MFPR. -/- Many of the arguments in the MFPR debate appear seemingly similar to arguments pending in the general abortion debate, and an analysis of what sets MFPR apart from other abortions is wanting. The aim of this article is, therefore, to examine whether there is a moral distinction between abortion and MFPR of healthy fetuses. We will cover the typical arguments of the Norwegian debate, and highlight them with scholarly articles from the literature. The most important arguments against MFPR that we have identified we have dubbed the harm argument, slippery-slope argument, intent argument, grief argument, psychological long-term effects for the woman and sorting argument. We conclude that counter-arguments do not measure up in terms of detecting a morally relevant difference between MFPR of healthy fetuses and abortions. Our conclusion is therefore that—despite what several debaters seem to think—there is no morally relevant difference between the two. Therefore, when we allow abortion, we should also allow MFPR. (shrink)

The article offers a reconstruction of John Rawls views on political legitimacy, from A Theory of Justice to his late writings on political liberalism. It argues that Rawls had three conceptions of legitimacy, not two as one might expect based on the distinction between his two major works. Its argument is that the most radical change in Rawls’ thinking about legitimacy occurs in ‘Introduction to the Paperback Edition’ and ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’. Here Rawls assumes that there can (...) be a reasonable pluralism not only of comprehensive doctrines, but also of political liberal conceptions of justice. As a consequence, the standard of political legitimacy is no longer specified as sufficient justice relative to justice as fairness, but instead as sufficient justice relative to a family of political conceptions of justice – a family which in turn is animated by an ideal of public reasoning about constitutional matters and matters of basic justice. The article also shows how Rawls’ late ideal of public reason is grounded in the need for legitimate constitutional government. (shrink)

In its recent statement 'Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis', the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine concluded that preimplantation genetic diagnosis for sex selection for non-medical reasons should be discouraged because it poses a risk of unwarranted gender bias, social harm, and results in the diversion of medical resources from genuine medical need. We critically examine the arguments presented against sex selection using preimplantation genetic diagnosis. We argue that sex selection should be available, at least within (...) privately funded health care. (shrink)

In her paper, The case for physician assisted suicide: not proven, Bonnie Steinbock argues that the experience with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act fails to demonstrate that the benefits of legalising physician assisted suicide outweigh its risks. Given that her verdict is based on a small number of highly controversial cases that will most likely occur under any regime of legally implemented safeguards, she renders it virtually impossible to prove the case for physician assisted suicide. In this brief paper, we (...) suggest some ways that may enable us to weigh the risks and benefits of legalisation more fairly and, hopefully, allow us to close the case for physician assisted suicide. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: -/- Preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons raises serious moral, legal and social issues. The main concern is based on the assumption that a freely available service for sex selection will distort the natural sex ratio and lead to a severe gender imbalance. However, for a severe gender imbalance to happen, at least two conditions have to be met. First, there must be a significant preference for children of a particular sex, and second, there must be a considerable demand (...) for preconception sex selection. To ascertain whether or not these two conditions are met, we have conducted a survey in Germany. METHODS: -/- As a representative sample of the German population, 1094 men and women aged 18-45 years were asked about their gender preferences and whether or not they could imagine selecting the sex of their children through flow cytometric separation of X- and Y-bearing sperm followed by intrauterine insemination. RESULTS: -/- 58% of respondents stated that they do not care about the sex of their offspring. 30% wish to have a family with an equal number of boys and girls. 4% would like to have more boys than girls, 3% more girls than boys, 1% only boys and 1% only girls. For first-borns, however, there is still a preference for boys over girls. While 75.6% claimed to have no gender preference, 14.2% would like their first child to be a boy and 10.1% would like their first child to be a girl. Whereas 6% could imagine taking advantage of preconception sex selection, 92% found this to be out of the question. Even in the hypothetical case that a medication for sex selection were ever to become available, 90% stated that they would not want to use it. CONCLUSION: -/- Given that a majority does not seem to care about the sex of their offspring and only a minority seem to be willing to select the sex of their children, a freely available service for preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons is rather unlikely to cause a severe gender imbalance in Germany. (shrink)

Preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons raises serious moral, legal and social issues. The main concerns include the threat of a sex ratio distortion due to a common preference for boys over girls, the charge of sexism, the danger of reinforcing gender stereotypical behaviour in sex selected children, and the fear of a slippery slope towards creating designer babies. This paper endeavours to show that none of the objections to preconception sex selection is conclusive and that there is no justification (...) for denying parents the right to choose the sex of their prospective children. (shrink)

This brief paper summarizes a series of postal investigations on the acceptance of selection for X or Y spermatozoa. These were conducted mainly in Germany but also in the UK, the Netherlands and the US. Selected families were approached with a series of questions about their wish to use sperm selection, and their choice of boys or girls. In general, large majorities opposed this approach for family balancing or sex selection on the basis of cost and inconvenience of the treatment. (...) The view was expressed that its use in medicine was more acceptable. Care was taken to compose a series of open questions to particular sections of the population, e.g.men versus women, differing ages, and families with imbalanced sex ratios. More favourable responses arose, for example in pregnant women. Overall, all four nations had large majorities against the use of sex selection. (shrink)

Preconception sex selection for nonmedical reasons raises important moral, legal, and social issues. The main concern is based upon the assumption that a widely available service for sex selection will lead to a socially disruptive imbalance of the sexes. For a severe sex ratio distortion to occur, however, at least two conditions have to be met. First, there must be a significant preference for children of a particular sex, and second, there must be a considerable interest in employing sex selection (...) technology. Our objective was to ascertain such demand and preferences among the United States general population. (shrink)

Many people look to religion to help resolve the serious moral and legal issues associated with assisted reproductive technologies. Doing so presupposes that religion is the cornerstone of ethics, but this assumption is not well founded. While various faiths are entitled to articulate their views on matters of human reproduction, the contradictions involved in doing so make it unwise to rely on religion in the formulation of law and policy. These contradictions – such as the indeterminacy about what revealed truths (...) means – make moral secular philosophy a better guide for the protection of human welfare. (shrink)

Within the next parliamentary term, the German government is expected to replace the current Embryo Protection Act with a new Human Reproductive Technology Act. Before introducing new legislation, policy makers may want to survey public attitudes towards novel applications of reproductive technology. In order to assess opinions and concerns about preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons, a social survey has been conducted in Germany. As a representative sample of the German population, 1005 men and women 18 years and older were (...) asked whether or not preconception sex selection should be made available. Of the respondents, 32% held that sex selection should be strictly prohibited, be it for medical or non-medical reasons, and 54% accepted the use of preconception sex selection for medical purposes. Only a minority of 11% approved of the use of preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons. The widespread opposition to a freely available service for non-medical sex selection is based on several claims: 87% of respondents hold that 'children are a gift and deserve to be loved regardless of any characteristics such as beauty, intelligence or sex'; 79% argue that choosing the sex of children is 'playing God'; 76% are opposed because it is seen as 'unnatural'; 49% are afraid that it is 'skewing the natural sex ratio'; and 40% consider it to be 'sexist'. (shrink)

In its recent report Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, the House of Commons’ Select Committee on Science and Technology insisted that the United Kingdom ‘does not take a purely insular view’ on sex selection but to carefully consider the impact on other countries before allowing changes to current legislation. True, no country is an island, not even the British Isles. Still, outlawing a harmless practice in Great Britain because of its alleged harmful effects in other countries is bad public (...) policy. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: -/- In its recent report 'Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law', the House of Commons' Select Committee on Science and Technology called for greater efforts to establish the potential demographic impact of sex selection across all sectors of UK society. Given the well-known preference for boys over girls among some communities, there is concern that a readily available service for social sex selection may upset the balance of the sexes. Of particular interest are the gender preferences and the demand (...) for sex selection among Pakistanis. METHODS: -/- We conducted a social survey on gender preferences and potential demand for preconception sex selection among 301 pregnant women in Karachi, Pakistan, using a self-report questionnaire consisting of 14 questions. RESULTS: -/- About 41.5% wish to have a family with an equal number of boys and girls; 3.3% would like to have only boys, 1.0% only girls, 27.6% more boys than girls and 4.3% more girls than boys, and 22.3% stated that they do not care about the sex composition of their family. Whereas 6.3% could imagine employing cytometric sperm separation for social sex selection, 76.1% could not and 17.6% were undecided. About 27.2% felt that social sex selection ought to be legal, 48.8% thought it ought to be illegal and 23.9% were undecided. CONCLUSIONS: -/- Although Pakistani women do show a statistically significant preference for boys over girls, the number of women willing to subject themselves to cytometric sperm separation appears to be too small to cause a severe imbalance of the sexes. However, further research among British citizens of Pakistani origin is needed to establish whether sex selection poses a serious threat to the sex ratio of UK communities. (shrink)

Extending the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to screen embryos for non-medical traits such as gender, height and intelligence, raises serious moral, legal, and social issues. In this paper I consider the possibility of using PGD to select the sexual orientation of offspring. After considering ®ve potential objections, I conclude that parents should be permitted to use PGD to choose the sexual orientation of their children.

The aim of this survey was to explore the attitudes towards gender selection, focusing on people who were affected by infertility and also familiar with advanced technologies such as the internet. Although this survey is based almost exclusively on answers from women, it seems reasonable to conclude that a widely available service for preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons would not cause a severe gender imbalance in Germany.

Much has been written about the ethics of sex selection. This article thoroughly explores the ethical arguments put forth in the literature both for and against non-medical sex selection using sperm sorting. While most of these arguments come from philosophers, feminist scholars, social scientists and members of the healthcare community, they are often echoed in empirical studies that have explored community values. This review is timely because the first efficacious method for sex selection via sperm sorting, MicroSort, is currently in (...) clinical trials and moving closer to FDA approval for marketing in the USA. While the clinical trials are currently focused on the use of MicroSort to avoid X-linked genetic diseases, MicroSort can also be used to satisfy parental preferences. (shrink)

The majority of German specialists in reproductive medicine opposes preimplantation sex selection for nonmedical reasons while recommending preimplantation sex selection for medical reasons, e.g. X-linked diseases like haemophilia.

BACKGROUND Preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons is a controversial issue in bioethics. Little research has described preferences for preconception sex selection among Arab populations. This study describes the sex preference and interest in employing sex selection techniques among pregnant women in northern Jordan. -/- METHODS A self-reported questionnaire was administered to 600 pregnant women in Irbid, Jordan. χ2 test and binary logistic regression were used to examine the factors associated with interest in preconception sex selection. -/- RESULTS In general, (...) the interest in using sex selection was low. Women who preferred boys were more likely to be interested in sex selection, if paid for by the couple [odds ratio (OR) = 4.40, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.75–11.11] or by health insurance (OR = 3.42, 95% CI: 1.94–6.06), or, if feasible, administered through oral medication (OR = 8.84, 95% CI: 5.05–15.63). Women with lower education were more likely to be interested in sex selection, if paid by health insurance (OR = 1.96, 95% CI: 1.10–3.45) and were more likely to believe that sex selection is legal (OR = 1.79, 95% CI: 1.06–2.86). Women who had no boys were more likely to be interested in sex selection, if paid by health insurance (OR = 1.94, 95% CI: 1.10–3.42) or, if feasible, through medication (OR = 3.03, 95% CI: 1.82–5.00). -/- CONCLUSIONS The majority of participants were not in favor of using preconception sex selection. Those with a preference to have boys, with lower education, and those with an imbalanced family were more likely to be interested in using sex selection technology. (shrink)

Given that sex selection does not harm anyone, there is no moral justification for a legal ban.

The Sorting Society: The Ethics of Genetic Screening and Therapy. Edited by Loane Skene & Janna Thompson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008.

After its review of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990, the Department of Health concluded that the British Parliament ought to outlaw sex selection for any but the most serious of medical reasons. This paper reviews the most frequently expressed objections to social sex selection and concludes that there is simply no moral justification for prohibiting parents from using sex selection technology to balance their families.

One of the most basic questions facing democratic theory is who ought to be included in political participation. Most recent discussions of this question have focused on the wrongful exclusion of those who ought to be included. Less attention has been paid to the question of whether political participation can be objectionably over-inclusive. Robert Dahl insists that it can; a claim to inclusion, he writes, “cannot be justified if it is advanced by persons whose interests are not significantly affected (...) by the decisions of that unit.” This essay is a moral defense of what Dahl would consider political over-inclusion, of empowering those entirely unaffected by a given political decision to participate in the making of that decision. My argument is not that the unaffected have a right to participate or that they are somehow wronged by political exclusion in a manner analogous to how the affected may be wronged when excluded. What matters morally is not what a proper resolution to a specific political conflict will do for the unaffected—by definition, it can do nothing for them. What matters is what the inclusion of the unaffected can do to improve the quality of the decision being made, and hence to benefit those affected by this decision. My focus will be on one particular manner in which the inclusion of the unaffected can improve political decision-making: namely, by increasing impartiality. As I argue in the first section of this essay, whereas the affected can only possess what I call “artificial impartiality,” the unaffected possess what I call “natural impartiality.” . (shrink)

Covaluation is the generalization of coreference introduced by Tanya Reinhart. Covaluation distributes in patterns that are very similar yet not entirely identical to those of binding. On a widespread view, covaluation and binding distribute similarly because binding is defined in terms of covaluation. Yet on Reinhart's view, binding and covaluation are not related that way: binding pertains to syntax, covaluation does not. Naturally, the widespread view can easily explain the similarities between binding and covaluation, whereas Reinhart can easily explain the (...) dissimilarities. Reciprocally, the widespread view finds it harder to explain the dissimilarities, whereas Reinhart finds it harder to explain the similarities. Reinhart and others have proposed more than one explanation of the similarities, but as I argue, these explanations do not work. Hence although I adopt Reinhart's view, I propose a new explanation of the similarities and dissimilarities between binding and covaluation: While Reinhart has invoked semantic structure only to explain dissimilarities, I do so to explain both similarities and dissimilarities at once. Finally, I examine in light of this approach the topics of language acquisition, only-constructions, the identity predicate, the Partee/Bach/Higginbotham problem, the Dahl puzzle and its recent versions by Roelofsen. (shrink)

A partir do século XIX, a teoria democrática foi desenvolvida com base no confronto entre duas doutrinas políticas: o liberalismo e o socialismo. O liberalismo é um projeto que defende as limitações dos poderes governamentais, buscando a proteção dos direitos econômicos, políticos, religiosos e intelectuais dos membros da sociedade. Ou seja, para os liberais o poder do Estado deve ser limitado, pois eles acreditam que a verdadeira liberdade depende da menor interferência possível do Estado e das leis nesses direitos. A (...) defesa do liberalismo tem como principal representante Benjamin Constant. Membro da Assembleia Nacional Francesa, escreveu a obra A liberdade dos antigos comparada com a dos modernos, na qual afirma que a liberdade dos modernos, que deve ser promovida e desenvolvida, é a liberdade individual na relação com o Estado (ou seja, as liberdades civis e políticas), enquanto a liberdade dos antigos, que se tornou impraticável, é a liberdade de participação direta na formação das leis.1 Outros autores como, como o francês Alexis de Tocqueville2 e o inglês John Stuart Mill3 , defenderam a ideia de que a única estrutura democrática compatível com o Estado liberal seria a democracia representativa. Uma passagem interessante para o nosso debate sobre a democracia é o princípio do dano, de Stuart Mill. Por esse princípio, cada indivíduo tem o direito de agir como quiser desde que suas ações não prejudiquem outras pessoas. Se a ação afeta diretamente apenas a pessoa que a está realizando, a sociedade em tese não tem o direito de intervir, mesmo que o indivíduo esteja prejudicando a si próprio. Contudo, se os indivíduos fizerem algo ruim para si mesmos ou para sua propriedade podem indiretamente prejudicar a coletividade, já que ninguém vive isolado, devendo por isso ser impedidos de fazê-lo. Stuart Mill isenta desse princípio aqueles que são incapazes de se governar. Em síntese, todo o processo de democratização, como se deu nos Estados liberais democráticos, consiste numa transformação mais quantitativa do que qualitativa do regime representativo. Ou seja, o avanço da democracia nesses regimes ocorre em duas direções: no alargamento gradual do direito do voto e na multiplicação dos órgãos representativos. Para a doutrina socialista, o sufrágio universal é apenas o ponto inicial do processo de democratização do Estado, enquanto para o liberalismo é o ponto de chegada. Alguns dos principais teóricos do socialismo, como Antonio Gramsci4 e Rosa Luxemburgo5 , afirmam que o aprofundamento do processo de democratização na perspectiva das doutrinas socialistas ocorre de dois modos: por meio da crítica à democracia representativa (e da retomada de alguns temas da democracia direta) e pela ampliação da da participação popular e do controle do poder por meio dos chamados “conselhos operários”. Em outras palavras, a diferença crucial entre a democracia dos conselhos e a democracia parlamentar é que a primeira reconhece ter havido um deslocamento dos centros de poder dos órgãos tradicionais do Estado para a grande empresa, na sociedade capitalista. Por isso, o controle que o cidadão pode exercer por meio dos canais tradicionais da democracia política não é suficiente para impedir os abusos de poder. Logo, o controle deve acontecer nos próprios lugares de produção, e seu protagonista é o trabalhador real, não o cidadão abstrato da democracia formal. Mais recentemente, na metade do século XX, surgiu a corrente pluralista. Os pluralistas, em particular Robert Dahl6 , cientista político estadunidense, não procuravam estabelecer uma definição abstrata e teórica acerca da democracia, mas, por meio da observação das experiências de sistemas políticos, estipularam alguns requisitos mínimos: funcionários eleitos, eleições livres justas e frequentes, liberdade de expressão, fontes de informação diversificadas, autonomia para associações e cidadania inclusiva. Com base nesses critérios são caracterizadas quatro estruturas de governo: hegemonias fechadas, que são regimes em que não há disputa de poder e a participação política é limitada; hegemonias inclusivas, regimes em que não há disputa de poder, mas ocorre participação política; oligarquias competitivas, regimes nos quais há disputa de poder, mas com limitada participação política; e poliarquias, regimes em que não há disputa de poder e participação política ampliada. Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), economista austríaco, criticou as teorias clássicas de democracia, especialmente na relação estabelecida entre a democracia e a soberania popular7 . Para o autor, a definição clássica de democracia supõe duas ficções incapazes de resistir a uma análise realista: a existência do bem comum e a universalidade da racionalidade dos indivíduos. Para Schumpeter, a unidade da vontade geral, que constituiria o bem comum, e a racionalidade dos indivíduos seriam mitos, porque, para ele, esses elementos se tornaram irracionais por não conseguirem definir coerentemente suas preferências diante da influência da propaganda e de outros métodos de persuasão. Dessa forma, Schumpeter rompe com a ideia de democracia como soberania popular para propô-la como método, um tipo de arranjo institucional (de governos) para alcançar decisões políticas. Assim, sugere a superação do impedimento provocado pela irracionalidade das massas, reduzindo sua participação na política ao ato da produção de governos (ato de votar). As atribuições político-administrativas ficariam a cargo das elites eleitas. Essa é uma postura polêmica, na medida em que propõe uma redução da participação popular. Contrário a essa visão, o cientista político canadense C. B. Macpherson8 , sustenta que a liberdade e o desenvolvimento individual só podem ser alcançados plenamente com a participação direta e contínua dos cidadãos na regulação da sociedade e do Estado. Macpherson defende uma transformação estruturada em um sistema que combine partidos competitivos e organizações de democracia direta, que criam uma base real para a existência da democracia participativa. Mas, para que esse modelo pudesse se desenvolver, seria necessário que os partidos políticos se democratizassem, com princípios e procedimentos de democracia direta, complementada e controlada por organizações geridas por pessoas comuns, em seus locais de trabalho e nas comunidades locais. Na teoria das elites, o poder político pertence ao restrito círculo de pessoas que toma e impõem decisões a todos os membros que tenha de recorrer, como ação radical, à força. Ainda na doutrina liberal, mas opondo-se ao pluralismo, existem os elitistas, que utilizam o termo “elite” como referência a grupos sociais superiores de vários tipos. O termo seria empregado no pensamento social e político somente no final do século XIX. Essas teorias sociológicas, propostas pelos pensadores Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), sociólogo e economista francês; Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), cientista político italiano, e Robert Michels (1876-1936), sociólogo alemão radicado na Itália, defendem que em toda sociedade existe apenas uma minoria, que, por diversos motivos, vem a se tornar detentora do poder. Pareto afirmava que existe uma “circulação das elites”, ou seja, uma minoria de pessoas que se alternam no poder. Mosca justifica o poder das elites governamentais pelo fato de serem uma minoria articulada e organizada, enquanto os governos seriam uma classe numerosa, mas dividida e desorganizada. Ao estudar as formações partidárias, Michels destacou como a própria estrutura das organizações favorecia o surgimento das elites e sua longa permanência no poder. Nas palavras de Michels, essa estabilidade das elites no poder é a “lei de ferro das oligarquias”. Ao longo dos últimos séculos foram construídas diversas interpretações e teorias acerca dos objetivos e conteúdos da democracia. Na prática, a democracia pode ser um modelo de governo que amplia as capacidades de desenvolvimento social, político e econômico, com base em princípios de igualdade e cidadania, ou se tornar uma simples “regra” para formar governos que não priorizem necessariamente o atendimento das demandas sociais. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS CONSTANT, B. A liberdade dos antigos comparada à dos modernos. 1. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2015. DAHL, R. Poliarquia: participação e oposição. São Paulo: Edusp, 1987. ________. Um prefácio à teoria democrática. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1989. LUXEMBURGO, R. Têxteis. Paris: Editions Socieles, 1982. MACPHERSON, C. B. A teoria política do individualismo possessivo, de Hobbes e Locke. Tradução de Nelson Dantas. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979. MICHELS, R. Sociologia dos partidos políticos. Brasília: Ed. da UnB, 1982. MILL, J. S. Sobre a liberdade. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1991. SCHUMPETER, J. A. Capitalismo, socialismo e democracia. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1984. SILVA, A. et. al. Sociologia em movimento. 2. ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. TOCQUEVILLE, A. A democracia na América: leis e costumes. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Øyvind Dahl’s argument for the conclusion that Malagasy people conceive of the future as coming from behind them and not as being before them as most worldviews do. I argue that we have good reason not to attribute this view to Malagasy people. First, it would mark an inefficient and anomalous way of keeping track of the past and future. Second, the linguistic and testimonial evidence presented by Dahl doesn’t support the conclusion. Even (...) though this specific argument fails, Dahl has many enlightening things to say about Malagasy time conceptions, such as the various time-conceptions that figure more predominantly in their worldview as opposed to the general modern Western worldview. Dahl is right that successful communication for Westerners in Madagascar requires understanding that the Malagasy worldview is structured more by an event-related conception of time than the general modern Western worldview. I also show in this paper that the three time conceptions Dahl outlines are relevant to living a good life. (shrink)