Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

The aptly called “simulation hypothesis” is the latest version of the historical skeptical philosophical speculation. The simulation hypothesis in its contemporary form is tied to sense inputs from sources (typically technologically based) other than external objects in the immediate environment. Let’s explore this: so why might some people take the modern-day philosophical simulation hypothesis seriously, and others think it is a bunch of covfefe? A wide-ranging consideration of the belief that we are living in a simulated world. Considers both philosophical (...) and psychological aspects of such belief. An annotated reference list is provided for those interested in pursuing the topic in more detail. (shrink)