This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Steven Lukes, one the most eminent critics of methodological individualism. The focus is on Lukes’ interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of linguistic exclusivism (i.e., naive reductionism), the multiple-realization problem, Boudon’s and Elster’s micro-foundationalist approach, ontological individualism, and the rationality of human action.

Significant associations have been found between specific human leukocyte antigen (HLA) alleles and organ transplant rejection, autoimmune disease development, and the response to infection. Traditional searches for disease associations have conventionally measured risk associated with the presence of individual HLA alleles. However, given the high level of HLA polymorphism, the pattern of amino acid variability, and the fact that most of the HLA variation occurs at functionally important sites, it may be that a combination of variable amino acid sites shared (...) by several alleles (shared epitopes) are better descriptors of the actual causative genetic variants. Here we describe a novel approach to genetic association analysis in which genes/proteins are broken down into smaller sequence features and then variant types defined for each feature, allowing for independent analysis of disease association with each sequence feature variant type. We have used this approach to analyze a cohort of systemic sclerosis patients and show that a sequence feature composed of specific amino acid residues in peptide binding pockets 4 and 7 of HLA-DRB1 explains much of the molecular determinant of risk for systemic sclerosis. (shrink)

Four studies explore the role of perceptual fluency in attenuating bullshit receptivity, or the tendency for individuals to rate otherwise meaningless statements as “profound”. Across four studies, we presented participants with a sample of pseudoprofound bullshit statements in either a fluent or disfluent font and found that overall, disfluency attenuated bullshit receptivity while also finding little evidence that this effect was moderated by cognitive thinking style. In all studies, we measured participants’ cognitive reflection, need for cognition, faith in intuition, and (...) superstitious beliefs. Superstition strongly predicted bullshit receptivity regardless of fluency. Inconclusive results were found for the remaining scales. Potential links for the role of perceptual disfluency in promoting analytic thinking are discussed. (shrink)

In the United States, prohibitionist policies are used as the primary approach to combat the negative effect of substance use on society. An extensive academic literature spanning the disciplines of economics, political science, and multiculturalism documents the great social costs of the United States’ “War on Drugs” both nationally and internationally. These costs come with at best marginal effect on substance abuse and other crimes linked to the drug trade. In many cases, there is a reason to believe that these (...) policies exacerbate the problems they aim to address. This article explores psychologists’ ethical commitments to social change concerning such drug policy, given the field of psychology’s expanding commitment to social justice. We examine arguments regarding the boundaries between psychologists’ personal and professional ethics with regard to political participation. Using drug prohibition as an exemplar, we suggest that many psychologists’ political actions and professional ethics may be misaligned. Ultimately, we conclude that the endorsement of prohibitionist drug policies is in direct conflict with the guiding ethical principles put forth by the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. (shrink)

Worsening energy crises and the growing effects of climate change have spurred, among other things, concerted efforts to tackle global problems through what the United Nations calls Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These are in turn argued to be best achieved via the adoption of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) as the vehicle for guiding our efforts. However, though these things are often presented as the solution to global issues, they are increasingly being used as a means to centralize power (...) and exacerbate growing authoritarian trends. This article aims to demonstrate how the narratives surrounding ESG mask this reality, taking as a solution one of the foundational causes of global wealth and power disparity. (shrink)

In this study, screening positive for probable depression was common among undergraduate students at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and associated with sociodemographic and selected behavioral factors. These findings call for strengthening the awareness and use of counselling services among undergraduate students.

The potential for vaccines to prevent the spread of infectious diseases is crucial for vaccination policy and ethics. In this paper, I discuss recent evidence that the current COVID-19 vaccines have only a modest and short-lived effect on reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission and argue that this has at least four important ethical implications. First, getting vaccinated against COVID-19 should be seen primarily as a self-protective choice for individuals. Second, moral condemnation of unvaccinated people for causing direct harm to others is unjustified. (...) Third, the case for a harm-based moral obligation to get vaccinated against COVID-19 is weak. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, coercive COVID-19 vaccination policies (e.g., measures that exclude unvaccinated people from society) cannot be directly justified by the harm principle. (shrink)

Actual causes - e.g. Suzy's being exposed to asbestos - often bring about their effects - e.g. Suzy's suffering mesothelioma - probabilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to tackle one of the thornier difficulties for traditional accounts of probabilistic actual causation: namely probabilistic preemption.

One of the important challenges in the philosophy of mathematics is to account for the semantics of sentences that express mathematical propositions while simultaneously explaining our access to their contents. This is Benacerraf’s Dilemma. In this dissertation, I argue that cognitive science furnishes new tools by means of which we can make progress on this problem. The foundation of the solution, I argue, must be an ontologically realist, albeit non-platonist, conception of mathematical reality. The semantic portion of the problem can (...) be addressed by accepting a Chomskyan conception of natural languages and a matching internalist, mentalist and nativist view of semantics. A helpful perspective on the epistemic aspect of the puzzle can be gained by translating Kurt G ̈odel’s neo-Kantian conception of the nature of mathematics and its objects into modern, cognitive terms. (shrink)

This review article provides a brief descriptive overview of past efforts to use self-referential argumentation, distinguishing pragmatical from metalogical self-referential approaches. The reviewer claims that the pragmatical self-referential argument proposed in this book is itself metalogically self-referentially inconsistent, and directs the reader to other relevant published works by the reviewer.

The rapid expansion of Big Tech companies into various societal domains (e.g., health, education, and agriculture) over the past decade has led to increasing concerns among governments, regulators, scholars, and civil society. While existing theoretical frameworks—often revolving around privacy and data protection, or market and platform power—have shed light on important aspects of Big Tech expansionism, there are other risks that these frameworks cannot fully capture. In response, this editorial proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on the notion of sphere (...) transgressions, which draws on political philosopher Michael Walzer's theory of justice. The editorial not only introduces the sphere transgressions framework, but it also highlights its potential to generate novel research questions. Furthermore, this editorial introduces eight articles and one commentary from a group of interdisciplinary scholars that critically examine Big Tech expansionism by reflecting on this expansionism from the perspective of different societal spheres or by engaging with the sphere transgressions framework itself. (shrink)

An Address delivered to the Seattle G. K. Chesterton Society at the University of Washington Newman Center, May 2, 2013.

The repugnant conclusion poses a conundrum in population ethics that has evaded satisfactory solution for four decades. In this article, I show that the repugnant conclusion can be avoided without sacrificing any moral intuitions. The resulting framework satisfies Parfit's requirements for `theory X'. This is achieved using non-Archimedean orders, which admit the possibility of pairs of goods for which no amount of one is better than a single unit of the other. I show that with minimal assumptions, not only are (...) such goods sensible, they are compulsory. I show that utilitarianism and expected utility theory in their canonical forms are not in general suitable in this setting, and using these tools naively can lead to ethical errors that are arbitrarily serious. Multi-dimensional lexicographic expected utility representations may be required. I use fuzzy sets to show that there needn't be a clear boundary separating goods that are not Archimedean equivalent. This may be unavoidable due to intrinsic physical limits on the ability to discriminate between different goods arising from e.g. quantum mechanics. Limited discriminatory power causes preferences to be non-transitive, which can resolve problems related to so-called `fanaticism' and `recklessness' wherein `rational' decision-makers counterintuitively prefer arbitrary long shot bets to a guaranteed lesser outcome. (shrink)

A book review of _Free Choice: A Self-referential Argument_ by J. M. Boyle, Jr., G. Grisez, and O. Tollefsen. The review concerns the pragmatical self-referential argument employed in the book, and points to the fact that the argument is itself self-referentially inconsistent, but on the level of metalogical self-reference.

A new book by Batya Friedman and David G. Hendry, Value Sensitive Design: Shaping Technology with Moral Imagination, is reviewed. Value Sensitive Design is a project into the ethical and design issues that emerge during the engineering programs of new technologies. This book is intended to build on the over two decades of value sensitive design research, however with a greater emphasis on the developments of the theoretical underpinnings of the approach as well as initial steps that designers can employ (...) to put the method into practice. (shrink)

Arguably the biggest challenge in analyzing English tense is to account for the double access interpretation, which arises when a present tensed verb is embedded under a past attitude—e.g., "John said that Mary is pregnant". Present-under-past does not always result in a felicitous utterance, however—cf. "John believed that Mary is pregnant". While such oddity has been noted, the contrast has never been explained. In fact, English grammars and manuals generally prohibit present-under-past. Work on double access, on the other hand, has (...) either disregarded the oddity (e.g., Abusch 1997: 39) or treated it as a reflex of a particular dialect (e.g., Kratzer 1998: 14). The goal of the paper is to argue—based on a corpus study—that a present-under-past sentence is grammatical, but modulated by two, interacting pragmatic phenomena: cessation and parentheticality. (shrink)

Εκτενής Βιβλιοκριτική της έκδοσης: Plotinus Ennead VI.4 and VI.5: On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole («The Enneads of Plotinus with Philosophical Commentaries»). Εισαγωγή, αγγλική μετάφραση, υπόμνημα Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson & Steven Keith Strange. Las Vegas/Zurich/Athens: Parmenides Publishing 2015, 305 σ., 36 €.

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

Contemporary discussions about operational definition often hark back to Stanley Smith Stevens’ classic papers on psychological operationism (1935ab). Still, he was far from the only psychologist to call for conceptual hygiene. Some of Stevens’ direct colleagues at Harvard---most notably B. F. Skinner and E. G. Boring---were also actively applying Bridgman’s conceptual strictures to the study of mind and behavior. In this paper, I shed new light on the history of operationism by reconstructing the Harvard debates about operational definition in the (...) years before Stevens published his seminal articles. Building on a large set of archival evidence from the Harvard University Archives, I argue that we can get a more complete understanding of Stevens’ contributions if we better grasp the operationisms of his former teachers and direct colleagues at Harvard’s Department of Philosophy and Psychology. (shrink)

I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most (...) unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant and original analysts of language. -/- In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. -/- Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to context. -/- Nevertheless this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

A short review of the collection of Anscombe's ethical essays edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally.

This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power (...) to influence the will and not just the behavior of other agents. In the last part of this paper we briefly discuss Steven Lukes’ alternative view of a “third dimension” of power and end with a sketch of a more promising way to account for this neglected form of power. (shrink)

_La Peste_, originally published in 1947 by the Nobel Prize-winning writer Albert Camus, chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague as it spreads through the quarantined Algerian city of Oran. While most discussions of fictional examples within aesthetics are either historical or hypothetical, Camus offers an example of "pestilence fiction." Camus chose fiction to convey facts--about plagues in the past, his own bout with tuberculosis at age seventeen, living under quarantine away from home for several years, and forced separation from (...) his wife who remained in Algiers while he was abroad in Nazi-occupied France. His own lived experiences undergird an imaginative account of shared human realities with which we can identify: vulnerability to the disease, isolation, fear, and finally humanitarianism. _The Plague_ teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted. This collection of original essays on philosophical themes in _The Plague_ is of special relevance during and in the aftermath of Covid-19 but also provides reflections that will be of lasting value to those interested in this classic work of literature. The novel explores questions of enduring importance. Do we collectively meet the threshold of ethical behavior posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"? Or does the absurd undermine the compassionate? Do "heroes" dutifully fight a plague with "common decency," or does human nature resign itself to the normalization of uncontrollable suffering and death? There are myriad ways to approach the novel and this volume encourages readers to ponder human dilemmas in fictional Oran informed by our current pandemic. Series editor forward by Richard Eldridge. List of Contributors includes Steven G. Kellman, Jane E. Schultz, Andrew Edgar, Kathleen Higgins, Edward B. Weiser, Cynthia A. Freeland, and Margaret E. Gray; see "Introduction" by Peg Brand Weiser below. (shrink)

● Any given placement (e.g. Sun in Taurus; Mars in Capricorn; Mercury in the third house) is necessarily common to tens of thousands of people. Saturn in the ninth house, for example, will not behave the same or produce the same effects in the twenty or one hundred charts in which we find it there. In each case Saturn will behave in accordance with the rest of the astrographic/chart composition (as if we stayed in the same hotel in different epochs (...) or different people contracted the same disease; our stay will be different each time, according to the epoch, and each person’s symptoms will too, be different, according to their individual biochemistry; not to mention that each chart or astrography, like each genetic code or sequence, is unrepeatable). Certainly, “no planet can produce, on its own, what only the combined or concerted action of all can” (BUSTAMANTE, 2023, SPICA magazine, pp. 93-111). Hence the synergistic nature of the interpretative exercise (i.e., the whole is greater than all its parts). The fundamental component of the mathematical expression of the interpretive exercise is: astrological triangulation, the functional denomination for what we know as synthesis (WEISS, 1946; LEO, 1983, HAND, 1981). In order to demonstrate its usefulness, as well as the convenience of its mathematical expression, we have chosen two individuals (JEFFREY DAHMER, STEVEN SPIELBERG) whose astrographies do not—according to the community—explain their lives. The rest of the astrographies correspond to those of serial killers JOHN WAYNE GACY, DAVID CARPENTER, and TED BUNDY. ● We explain, by means of algebraic notations, the synthesis and the functional values that make up the synthesis. ● We take the Moon and Neptune as relevant bodies for the purpose of diagnosing or studying endocrine or neurohormonal issues, and Mars, Pluto, and Saturn as relevant planets for the purpose of inferring violence or sinister behaviour, upon the case, and quadratures or oppositions—and conjunctions—between Venus and the Moon, the Moon and Neptune, and the Sun or Venus and Neptune or Uranus as indicators of neurohormonal disorders and/or sexual deviance (APA definition) . ● We consider quadratures (90º) or oppositions (180º)—and conjunctions—between Mercury or the Moon and Saturn, or between Mars or the Moon and Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and/or Pluto as powerful indications of violence or mental disorders, upon the case. ● We have also regarded Sagittarius as a sign as expansive and abundant as its ruler, Jupiter, according to the best of its characterisations (or as an exceptionally swift and wild sign, according to other characterisations), and the fifth region of a natal chart as one closely related to fortune in a broad sense (material and immaterial). ● Because we advocate the idea that orbs should be predicated of the planet (size, speed), not the aspect itself, the gas giants (Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune) and the Sun have been granted up to 10º of orb (or 12º, in the case of broad influence ). We understand aspectual relationships as angular relationships held between two or more celestial bodies placed in signs with at least one property in common (according to our molecular theory of the ecliptic, compatible with the optical theory of the aspects from the Hellenistic tradition). (shrink)

This is a reply to Luke Roelof's comments (2017) on my paper "A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness" (2015). On both Russellian monism and dualism, experiences are distinct from neural-functional states and they are correlated with some neural-functional states and not others. The only difference between them concerns the status of the extra-logical principles linking experiences with their neural-functional correlates (e. g. increasing S1 firing rates results in increasing pain): Russellian monists hold that they are a priori and (...) necessary, while dualists say that they are a posteriori and contingent. How are we to decide between them? Roelofs suggests that Russellian monism is simpler than dualism. I argue against this. Both face the "T-shirt problem": both require a swarm of extra-logical principles linking brain states with experiences. The Russellian monist might engage in some unbridled speculation: they are somehow derivable from small set of more basic extra-logical principles ("principles of combination"), even if we cannot supply the details. But the dualist can do the same. The only difference is that the dualist will speculate that those more basic principles are contingent rather than necessary a priori. Given our limited evidence, there is no reason (and in particular no simplicity-based reason) to prefer the Russellian monist's speculations to the dualist's parallel speculations. (shrink)

Though the concepts of diversity and inclusion are still widely used in the contexts of management, policy-making, and academic research, the notion of superdiversity is becoming increasingly popular. First articulated by social anthropologist Steven Vertovec (see Vertovec, 2006; 2007; 2012), superdiversity has been described as a concept and theoretical tool that enables us to study our ever-evolving, globalising social reality in great detail by taking the enormous amount of diversity that exists within different groups in societies around the world (...) into account as well, in addition to differences between different groups. Superdiversity is mainly linked to the growing ethnic and cultural complexity of Western European societies, and is therefore often associated with the rise of so-called majority-minority- cities, such as Amsterdam, Brussels, and London, to name a few – all cities in which ethnic minority groups are about to replace (or have already replaced) the ethnic majority group (see, e.g., Crul, Schneider, & Lelie, 2013; Crul, 2016; Geldof, 2015). (shrink)

With An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784) and What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? (1786), Kant presents the concept of public use of reason and defines its requirements, scope, and function. In outline, the public use of reason consists in sharing one’s thoughts with “the entire public of the world of readers” (8:37). As for its requirements, to the extent that someone communicates in their own person, i.e. not in the exercise of their function (...) as a public official, and bases their reasoning on universalizable grounds, their use of reason qualifies as public and shall be free from state censorship. Therefore, Kant’s concept of public use reason aims to establish a public debate that is free and includes in its scope, both as subjects and recipients, potentially all adult men. The ultimate function of the public use of reason is to foster moral progress and, with it, the reform of the political community according to the republican ideal. However, it is commonly held that Kant, with his 1798 essay The Conflict of the Faculties, deprives his notion of public use of reason of its progressive core and adjusts it to the absolutist conception of speech and civil service. Characterizations of state officials as “not free to make public use of their learning” (7:18) and “bound to uphold whatever […] the crown sanctions for them to expound publicly” (7:8), as well as the depiction of laypeople as “incompetent” (7:18) and “resigned to understanding nothing about [the sciences]” (7:34), have led influential interpreters to read Kant as redefining his notion of public use of reason by restricting its subjects to university professors and its recipients to government members (e.g. John Christian Laursen 1986, rpt. 1992 and 1996; Kevin Davis 1992; Steven Lestition 1993; Jay Franzel 2013). On my reading, with The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant does indeed redefine the concept of public use of reason making concessions to the absolutist notion of speech and civil service. However, a close reading of the text reveals that the public use of reason ends up being reaffirmed in its progressive core and extended in its scope. To substantiate my interpretation, I will systematically analyse and classify each of the 68 occurrences of the adjective ‘public’ in The Conflict of the Faculties and show how Kant employs the absolutist vocabulary to convey the progressive project of his previous writings. Accordingly, I argue that Kant holds on to the free public use of reason as a means to reform politics according to the republican ideal and that the employment of the absolutist vocabulary is motivated by a pragmatic attitude and a provocative stance. (shrink)

Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014) He has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades and covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual people to murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million years or so). -/- Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains as to why these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own research into normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young females, in prehistoric times. -/- After surveying Buss’s comments, I present a very brief summary of intentional psychology (the logical structure of rationality), which is covered extensively in my many other articles and books. -/- Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined’(2012), and my review of it easily available on the net and in two of my recent ebooks. Briefly, Pinker notes that murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our planet, coupled with increased police presence, with communication and surveillance and legal systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is even a brief and local absence of the police. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in more of my writings on psychology may see Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century--Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 392p (2017). For all my writings in their most recent versions, please consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed. 686p (2017). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some main philosophical positions taken in the admittedly multifarious discussion concerning the possibility of rational evaluation in comparing different forms of life. Most importantly, I will outline a view of rational evaluation that would be as sensitive as possible to the diversity and offerings of various cultural viewpoints.

NUTRIÇÃO SOBRE A AZOOSPERMIA EM BOVINOS -/- -/- E. I. C. da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE sede -/- AZOOSPERMIA EM BOVINOS -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- A falta completa de esperma no ejaculado pode ser devido a uma falha no processo de espermatogênese ou relacionada a causas no transporte do esperma. Com relação ao transporte, o esperma pode ser impedido de ser ejaculado mediante bloqueios ou oclusões no sistema do ducto extragonadal, ou (...) por causa de uma disfunção ejaculatória. Nos cães, por exemplo, a possibilidade de oclusão ser a causa pode ser determinada por medições de fosfatase alcalina (ALP) no plasma seminal, já que a ALP se origina do epidídimo e seminífero epitélio tubular. Se a concentração de ALP no fluido seminal for superior a 5000 UI/l, a amostra ejaculada contém fluido desses tecidos e a oclusão pode ser descartada. -/- As causas testiculares da azoospermia incluem a falha da espermatogênese, que pode ser causada por uma série de fatores; estes incluem fatores hormonais, imunológicos, congênitos, tóxicos, patogênicos, traumáticos e nutricionais. Aqui, as supressões na região do AZF (que contém sub-regiões AZFa, AZFb e AZFc) no cromossoma Y desempenham um papel importante, representando 10-15% dos casos de azoo- e oligospermia. Na região AFZc, o gene DAZ, que é suprimido na azoospermia, é considerado importante no controle espermatogênico, uma vez que a sua eliminação é frequentemente detectada em homens e/ou animais inférteis. -/- A perda total da capacidade de formação de espermatozoides pelo epitélio testicular e, portanto, a ausência de espermatozoides viáveis ou não no volume ejaculado pelo animal é denominado como azoospermia (VARNER et al., 2000), um macho nessas condições deve ser imediatamente retirado dos processos produtivos e não é, de forma alguma, viável para fins reprodutivos. A origem da causa pode ter caráter nutricional, ou outras, sendo multifatoriais; em processos crônicos severos pode-se chegar à azoospermia reversível, que é diagnosticada e corrigida de forma oportuna. Entre os principais fatores de caráter nutricional temos: -/- 18.1 Nitratos (NO3-) e nitritos (NO2-) -/- Quando os ruminantes consomem uma alimentação com elevadas concentrações de nitratos (presente principalmente nas forrageiras) parte do nitrato não pode ser imediatamente convertido em nitrito e, por fim, em amoníaco (todas essas transformações acontecem no rúmen mediante a flora microbiana); isso faz com que nitrato e nitrito se acumulem no rúmen. A adição do nitrato no rúmen intensifica o problema. O envenenamento por nitrato ocorre quando o nível de nitrito presente no rúmen excede a capacidade do microbiota para convertê-lo em amoníaco. Quando isto acontece, o nitrato e o nitrito são absorvidos através da parede do rúmen e entram na circulação sanguínea. É o nitrito que causa a toxicidade. -/- Estudou-se o equilíbrio ácido-básico e sua relação com a reprodução e produção, postulando a hipótese de que esse equilíbrio afeta os mecanismos endócrinos e metabólicos, além dos reprodutivos. -/- 18.2 Relação energia:proteína -/- Quando a alimentação apresenta deficiências de energia aumenta-se a degradação das gorduras (provenientes do tecido adiposo), acompanhada pela redução da liberação de insulina (hipoinsulinemia) afetando-se a lipogênese, mobilizando-se mais gordura corporal do que se sintetiza. -/- Situações como a acidose ruminal (excesso de grão e deficiência em fibras) ou alcalose ruminal (excesso de ureia com baixa energia digerível) resultam em perturbações sobre a fertilidade; além disso, deficiências energéticas graves que levam à cetose causam estresse com a liberação de catecolaminas, ACTH e TSH que afetam a secreção de GnRH, afetando por fim, a espermiogênese. -/- -/- Uma diminuição de energia na alimentação gera hipoglicemia que, ao mesmo tempo, produz hipoinsulinemia incrementando assim a lipólise em tecidos, gerando como produtos as cetonas. -/- A hipoinsulinemia juntamente com a cetonemia e a geração de beta-endorfinas, por problemas na alimentação, reduzem notavelmente a síntese de GnRH. A GnRH reduz a liberação do LH e FSH. A diminuição da liberação do LH provoca azoospermia hipogonadotrópica com efeitos de estimulação hormonal anormais segundo a avaliação endócrina, bem como a obstrução testicular inexplicada. -/- Se houver um aumento significativo na liberação de FSH, a azoospermia hipogonadotrópica é refletida em diagnóstico como disfunção testicular. -/- 18.3 Minerais (Selênio Se) -/- Quando os níveis de Se na dieta são deficientes, ocorrem falhas na formação e maturação espermática. O Se mostra uma grande influência na fertilidade do macho afetando a qualidade do sêmen, o plasma seminal contém elevadas quantidades de GSH-Px, cuja função é proteger a membrana do espermatozoide do ataque peroxidativo; além disso, na cauda do gameta masculino há um selenopeptídeo que faz com que, em uma deficiência de Se, produza-se uma fratura no meio da cauda do espermatozoide. -/- O esperma dos animais com deficiência de Se apresentam pobre motilidade com características de desenvolvimento anormal na cauda do esperma. Demonstrou-se que a deficiência de Se, não somente precipita o problema em reprodutores, mas que o esperma deformado, foi menos efetivo na subsequente fertilização do ovócito ovulado (HAWKES et al., 2001), ou seja, animais que possuem deficiência desse mineral podem ter esperma inapropriado para a destinação de inseminação artificial ou mesmo a monta natural, uma vez que a taxa de concepção estará bastante baixa. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BARRENHO, Gonçalo José Pinheiro. Nutrição e fertilidade em bovinos de leite. 2016. Dissertação de Mestrado. Universidade de Évora. -/- BINDARI, Yugal Raj et al. Effects of nutrition on reproduction-A review. Adv. Appl. Sci. Res, v. 4, n. 1, p. 421-429, 2013. -/- BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. -/- CHENOWETH, Peter J.; LORTON, Steven (Ed.). Animal Andrology: Theories and Applications. Boston: Cabi, 2014. -/- -/- DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. -/- DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. -/- DIAS, Juliano Cesar et al. Alguns aspectos da interação nutrição-reprodução em bovinos: energia, proteína, minerais e vitaminas. PUBVET, v. 4, p. Art. 738-743, 2010. -/- FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. -/- FRENEAU, G. E.; GUIMARÃES, J. D. Curso Teórico-Prático de Andrologia Bovina. Goiânia: Laboratório de andrologia e Tecnologia de Sêmen da Escola de Veterinária da Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2000. -/- GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. -/- HAWKES, WAYNE CHRIS; TUREK, PAUL J. Effects of dietary selenium on sperm motility in healthy men. Journal of Andrology, v. 22, n. 5, p. 764-772, 2001. -/- MAAS, John. Relationship between nutrition and reproduction in beef cattle. The Veterinary Clinics of North America. Food Animal Practice, v. 3, n. 3, p. 633-646, 1987. -/- SHORT, Robert E.; ADAMS, D. C. Nutritional and hormonal interrelationships in beef cattle reproduction. Canadian Journal of Animal Science, v. 68, n. 1, p. 29-39, 1988. -/- THATCHER, W. W. et al. Strategies for improving fertility in the modern dairy cow. Theriogenology, v. 65, n. 1, p. 30-44, 2006. -/- TEIXEIRA, J. C.; TEIXEIRA, LFAC. Alimentação de bovinos leiteiros. FAEPE, Lavras, 1997. -/- VARNER, D. D. et al. Techniques for evaluating selected reproductive disorders of stallions. Animal reproduction science, v. 60, p. 493-509, 2000. (shrink)

This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...) does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind. (shrink)

I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to (...) land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances. (shrink)

Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this article we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends on not only a difference in the natures of the standing to (...) blame and forgive but also a difference in the natures of blame and forgiveness themselves. (shrink)

In 2019, several US states passed “heartbeat” bills. Should such bills go into effect, they would outlaw abortion once an embryonic heartbeat can be detected, thereby severely limiting an individual’s access to abortion. Many states allow health care professionals to refuse to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. Yet heartbeat bills do not include a positive conscience clause that would allow health care professionals to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. I argue that this asymmetry is unjustified. The (...) same criteria that justify protecting conscientious refusals to provide abortion also justify protecting positive conscientious appeals regarding abortion. Thus, if the law provides legal exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, refuse to provide abortions where it is legal, it should also provide exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, feel obligated to provide abortions where it is illegal. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. (...) She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer. (shrink)

The predominant view is that a study using health data is observational research and should require individual consent unless it can be shown that gaining consent is impractical. But recent arguments have been made that citizens have an ethical obligation to share their health information for research purposes. In our view, this obligation is sufficient ground to expand the circumstances where secondary use research with identifiable health information is permitted without explicit subject consent. As such, for some studies the Institutional (...) Review Board/Research Ethics Committee review process should not assess the practicality of gaining consent for data use. Instead the review process should focus on assessing the public good of the research, public engagement and transparency. (shrink)

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, the risks that such communication creates must be weighed against against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. This conclusion however, gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit analysis to rationalize excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional design principles (...) and normative frameworks from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy. (shrink)

As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell’s Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differ...

A new formulation of the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) for the existence of God is offered, which avoids a number of commonly raised objections. I argue that we can and should focus on the fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe, and show how physics itself provides the probabilities that are needed by the argument. I explain how this formulation avoids a number of common objections, specifically the possibility of deeper physical laws, the multiverse, normalisability, whether God would fine-tune at (...) all, whether the universe is too fine-tuned, and whether the likelihood of God creating a life-permitting universe is inscrutable. (shrink)

An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. (...) She takes this to imply that causation is not fundamentally a matter of difference-making. In this paper, I defend the difference-making approach against Ney’s argument. I also offer some positive reasons for thinking, pace Ney, that causation is fundamentally a matter of difference-making. (shrink)

J. M. E. McTaggart’s anti-passage argument (the argument that time is “unreal) has misled philosophers of time for almost a century. The present paper shows that the clearest formulation of this argument, that of D. H. Mellor in Real Time II, is unsound when its premises are interpreted so that it is valid and invalid when it so interpreted that it is sound). This argument need mislead us no longer. -/- The crucial item in the interpretation of the premises is (...) the copula ‘is’, as in ‘E is past’. The copula may be either tensed or tenseless. While this ambiguity of the copula has been noted before, its implications for McTaggart’s argument had not been adequately exploited. This paper does that job. (shrink)

Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; (...) that the word true, in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism. (shrink)

The future of health research will be characterised by three continuing trends: rising demand for health data; increasing impracticability of obtaining specific consent for secondary research; and decreasing capacity to effectively anonymise data. In this context, governments, clinicians and the research community must demonstrate that they can be responsible stewards of health data. IRBs and RECs sit at heart of this process because in many jurisdictions they have the capacity to grant consent waivers when research is judged to be of (...) particular value. However, several different terms are used to refer to this value, indicating a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the appropriate test for access to health data for research without consent. In this paper we do three things. First we describe the current confusion and instability in terminology relating to public interest in the context of consent waivers. Second we argue for harmonisation of terminology on the grounds of clarity, transparency and consistency. Third we argue that the term ‘public interest’ best reflects the normative work required to justify consent waivers because it is the broadest of the competing terms. ‘Public interest’ contains within its scope positive and negative implications of a study, as well as welfare, justice and rights considerations. In making this argument, we explain the normative basis for consent waivers, and provide a starting place for further discussion about the precise conditions in which a given study can be said to advance the public interest. Ipsos MORI study found that: … the public would be broadly happy with administrative data linking for research projects provided Those projects have social value, broadly defined. Data are de-identified. Data are kept secure. Businesses are not able to access the data for profit. (shrink)

In the human sciences, experimental research is used to establish causal relationships. However, the extrapolation of these results to the target population can be problematic. To facilitate extrapolation, we propose to use the statistical technique Latent Class Regression Analysis in combination with the analogical reasoning theory for extrapolation. This statistical technique can identify latent classes that differ in the effect of X on Y. In order to extrapolate by means of analogical reasoning, one can characterize the latent classes by a (...) combination of features, and then compare these features to features of the target. (shrink)

Two options are ‘incommensurate’ when neither is better than the other, but they are not equally good. Typically, we will say that one option is better in some ways, and the other in others, but neither is better ‘all things considered’. It is tempting to think that incommensurability is vagueness—that it is (perhaps) indeterminate which is better—but this ‘vagueness view’ of incommensurability has not proven popular. I set out the vagueness view and its implications in more detail, and argue that (...) it can explain most of the puzzling features of incommensurability. This argument proceeds without appeal to John Broome’s ‘collapsing principle’. (shrink)

Effects of perceived control and close alternative outcomes were examined. Subjects played a computer-simulated "wheel-of-fortune" game with another player in which two wheels spun simultaneously. Subjects had either control over spinning the wheel or control over which wheel would determine their outcome and which would determine the other player's outcome. Results showed that (a) subjects generated counterfactuals about the aspect of the game that they controlled, (b) the direction of these counterfactuals corresponded to the close outcome associated with the aspect (...) they controlled, and (c) close counterfactuals predicted affective responses to the outcome of the wheel spin. Cognitive and motivational implications of the influence of perceived control on counterfactual generation are discussed. (shrink)

A recent controversy over the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's recommendation to censor two publications on genetically modified H5N1 avian influenza has generated concern over the threat to scientific freedom such censorship presents. In this paper, I argue that in the case of these studies, appeals to scientific freedom are not sufficient to motivate a rejection of censorship. I then use this conclusion to draw broader concerns about the ethics of dual-use research.

Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, (...) in addition to hypocrites, there may be hypercrites, who blame themselves more severely than others. Leading accounts for why hypocrites lack standing to blame others would also seem to imply that hypercrites lack the standing to blame others, but some may find this counterintuitive. We argue that neither of these problems from self-blame poses a unique threat to leading accounts of standing. (shrink)