Results for 'Substance Dualism'

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  1. There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism.José Gusmão Rodrigues - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (2):199-222.
    This article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that will either fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance dualism are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this (...)
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  2. Descartes’s Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is (...)
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  3. Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn’T Established Substance Dualism.Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to (...)
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  4. A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35.
    This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...)
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  5. Pure or Compound Dualism? Considering Afresh the Prospects of Pure Substance Dualism.Joshua Ryan Farris - 2013 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):151-160.
    Substance dualism has received much attention from philosophers and theologians in contemporary literature. Whilst it may have been fashionable in the recent past to dismiss substance dualism as an unviable and academically absurd position to hold, this is no longer the case. My contention is not so much the merits of substance dualism in general, but a more specified variation of substance dualism. My specific contribution to the literature in this article is (...)
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  6. Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his (...)
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  7. Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism’.Christina Van Dyke - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.
    Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. In so doing, he takes himself to be rejecting a Platonic version of substance dualism; his criticisms, however, apply equally to a traditional understanding of Cartesian dualism. Aquinas’s own peculiar brand of dualism is receiving increased attention from contemporary philosophers—especially those attracted to positions that fall between Cartesian substance dualism and reductive materialism. What Aquinas’s own view amounts (...)
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  8. Swinburne on Substance Dualism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):5--15.
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  9. Objections to Dualism.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this essay, I discuss the standard objections to substance dualism and conclude that they are far less formidable than is usually supposed.
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  10. Against Emergent Dualism.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 73-86.
    Emergent substance dualism is explained in detail and several criticisms are raised against the view.
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  11.  41
    An Argument for Dualism From the Lived Experience of Being in Space.Steven Duncan - manuscript
    This is a companion to an earlier essay, "An Argument for Dualism from the Lived Experience of Time," in which I argue that our lived experience of being in space is best accounted for on a substance dualist ontology of the experiencing subject and a 3-dimensionalist account of time. Such an account excludes the metaphysical possibility of 4-dimensionalism as a literal, descriptive account of noumenal time inasmuch as it is incompatible with facts we know with greater certainty than (...)
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  12.  25
    An Argument for Dualism From the Lived Experience of Being in Space.Steven Merle Duncan - manuscript
    In a sequel to the author's argument for dualism from the lived experience of time, this paper continues the line of though initiated by in that study a bit further by considering the implications of our experience of being in space for dualism. I conclude that four-dimensionalism cannot accommodate the facts of our experience of ourselves as being in time - localized in space but not located there after the manner of a material thing. Substance dualism, (...)
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  13. Dismantling Bodily Resurrection Arguments Against Mind-Body Dualism.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 295-317.
    According to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, human persons will have an embodied existence in eternity. Many Christian materialists, especially Lynne Rudder Baker, Trenton Merricks, and Kevin Corcoran, argue that the doctrine of bodily resurrection creates serious problems for substance dualism (dualism). These critiques argued that bodily resurrection is made trivial by dualism, that dualism makes it difficult if not impossible to explain why we need to be embodied, or that dualism should be (...)
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  14. Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - Heythrop Journal 59 (2):201-220.
    At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments (...)
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  15. Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology.Andrew Brenner - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).
    Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, (...)
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  16.  87
    Leibniz's Lost Argument Against Causal Interaction.Tobias Flattery - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
    Leibniz accepts causal independence, the claim that no created substance can causally interact with any other. And Leibniz needs causal independence to be true, since his well-known pre-established harmony is premised upon it. So, what is Leibniz’s argument for causal independence? Sometimes he claims that causal interaction between substances is superfluous. Sometimes he claims that it would require the transfer of accidents, and that this is impossible. But when Leibniz finds himself under sustained pressure to defend causal independence, those (...)
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  17. By Ye Divine Arm: God and Substance in De Gravitatione.Hylarie Kochiras - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (3):327-356.
    This article interprets Newton's De gravitatione as presenting a reductive account of substance, on which divine and created substances are identified with their characteristic attributes, which are present in space. God is identical to the divine power to create, and mind to its characteristic power. Even bodies lack parts outside parts, for they are not constructed from regions of actual space, as some commentators suppose, but rather consist in powers alone, maintained in certain configurations by the divine will. This (...)
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  18. Substance, Reality, and Distinctness.Boris Hennig - 2008 - Prolegomena 7 (1):2008.
    Descartes claims that God is a substance, and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible. For Descartes, that something is real means it can exist in separation, and something is a substance if it does not depend on other substances for its existence. Further, separable objects are correlates of distinct ideas, for an idea is distinct (in an objective sense) if its object may be easily (...)
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  19. Elisabeth of Bohemia as a Naturalistic Dualist.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2018 - In Emily Thomas (ed.), Early Modern Women on Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 171-187.
    Elisabeth was the first of Descartes' interlocutors to press concerns about mind-body union and interaction, and the only one to receive a detailed reply, unsatisfactory though she found it. Descartes took her tentative proposal `to concede matter and extension to the soul' for a confused version of his own view: `that is nothing but to conceive it united to the body. Contemporary commentators take Elisabeth for a materialist or at least a critic of dualism. I read her instead as (...)
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  20. Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism.Brandon Rickabaugh & C. Stephen Evans - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington. pp. 231-256.
    The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, (...)
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  21.  37
    Motions in the Body, Sensations in the Mind: Malebranche's Mechanics of Sensory Perception and Taste.Katharine Julia Hamerton - forthcoming - Arts Et Savoirs.
    This article, which seeks to connect philosophy, polite culture, and the Enlightenment, shows how Malebranche’s Cartesian science presented a full-frontal attack on the worldly notion of a good taste aligned with reason. It did this by arguing that the aesthetic tastes that people experience were the result of mechanically-transmitted sensations that, like all physical sensations, were inaccurate, erroneous and relativistic. The mechanics of this process is explored in detail to show how Malebranche was challenging honnête thinking. The article suggests that (...)
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  22. Do Souls Exist?David Kyle Johnson - 2013 - Think 12 (35):61-75.
    ‘The soul hypothesis’ enjoys near unanimous support in the general population. Among philosophers and scientists, however, belief in the soul is far less common. The purpose of this essay to explain why many philosophers and scientists reject the soul hypothesis and to consider what the non-existence of the soul would entail.
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  23. Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  24.  87
    Revisiting the Mind-Brain Reductionisms: Contra Dualism and Eliminativism.Nythamar de Oliveira - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (2):363-385.
    In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a B- (...) y, such that necessarily if y exists x exists). (shrink)
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  25. Dualismus von Eigenschaften und Substanzen. Eine Bestandsaufnahme aktueller Überlegungen.Patricia Wallusch - 2015 - In Patricia Wallusch & Heinrich Watzka (eds.), Verkörpert existieren. Ein Beitrag zur Metaphysik menschlicher Personen aus dualistischer Perspektive. Aschendorff Verlag. pp. 59-70.
    Zu den Anliegen dieses Beitrags zählt zum einen die Diskussion einiger aktuellerer Argumente gegen die Vereinbarkeit eines Dualismus von Eigenschaften mit einem (Substanz-)Physikalismus und zum anderen in einer Präsentation und Verteidigung des von E. J. Lowe (1950-2014) vertretenen (Nicht-Cartesianischen) Substanzendualismus. -/- Erschienen in: Patricia Wallusch/ Heinrich Watzka (Hrsg.): Verkörpert existieren. Ein Beitrag zur Metaphysik menschlicher Personen, Münster: Aschendorff 2015, pp. 59-70. ISBN 978-3-402-11892-4 .
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  26. Physicalism and the Privacy of Conscious Experience.Miklós Márton & János Tőzsér - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 4 (1):73-88.
    The aim of the paper is to show that the privacy of conscious experience is inconsistent with any kind of physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same kind of conscious experience in (...)
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  27.  53
    Breaking the Grip of Materialism (Review of Unsnarling the World-Knot). [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1998 - New Scientist (2137).
    David Ray Griffin does not fully come to terms with the fact that science has already abandoned the narrow materialist view of bits of matter pushing each other around. Even as early as Newton's law of gravitation, and most obviously with quantum physics, science has embraced the view that the world consists of relationships (often described as laws) between different types of processes and states.
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  28.  50
    Soul Substance (Jīva Dravya) – As Expounded In Dravyasamgraha.Vijay K. Jain - manuscript
    Soul substance (jīva dravya) is ubiquitous but unseen. Driving force within each one of us, it has been, since time immemorial, a subject matter of research by philosophers, religious leaders and laity. Still, ambiguity and misconceptions prevail as regard its real nature. Some negate the existence of soul and attribute consciousness to the union of four basic substances – earth (prthvī), water (jala), fire (agni), and air (vāyu); death leads to its annihilation. Some believe it to be momentary, devoid (...)
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  29. The Mind-Body Problem.Tim Crane - 1999 - In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how our mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, actions and thinking—are related to the physical states, events and processes in our bodies. A question of the form, ‘how is A related to B?’ does not by itself pose a philosophical problem. To pose such a problem, there has to be something about A and B which makes the relation between them seem problematic. Many features of mind and body have been cited as (...)
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  30. Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiological Perspective.Jakob Korf - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):39-44.
    Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including (...)
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  31. The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body.Stephen Yablo - 1990 - In David Copp (ed.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. pp. 149--201.
    Descartes's "conceivability argument" for substance-dualism is defended against Arnauld's criticism that, for all he knows, Descartes can conceive himself without a body only because he underestimates his true essence; one could suggest with equal plausibility that it is only for ignorance of his essential hairiness that Descartes can conceive himself as bald. Conceivability intuitions are defeasible but special reasons are required; a model for such defeat is offered, and various potential defeaters of Descartes's intuition are considered and rejected. (...)
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  32. Why a Bodily Resurrection?: The Bodily Resurrection and the Mind/Body Relation.Mugg Joshua & James T. Turner Jr - 2017 - Journal of Analytic Theology 5:121-144.
    The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that (...)
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  33. A Feminist Voice in the Enlightenment Salon: Madame de Lambert on Taste, Sensibility, and the Feminine Mind*: Katharine J. Hamerton.Katharine J. Hamerton - 2010 - Modern Intellectual History 7 (2):209-238.
    This essay demonstrates how the early Enlightenment salonnière madame de Lambert advanced a novel feminist intellectual synthesis favoring women's taste and cognition, which hybridized Cartesian and honnête thought. Disputing recent interpretations of Enlightenment salonnières that emphasize the constraints of honnêteté on their thought, and those that see Lambert's feminism as misguided in emphasizing gendered sensibility, I analyze Lambert's approach as best serving her needs as an aristocratic woman within elite salon society, and show through contextualized analysis how she deployed honnêteté (...)
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  34. A Conceptualist Argument for a Spiritual Substantial Soul.J. P. Moreland - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):35-43.
    I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism – minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter (...)
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  35.  83
    Sellars' Argument for an Ontology of Absolute Processes.David Landy - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (1):1-25.
    Scholars have rejected Wilfrid Sellars’ argument for an ontology of absolute processes on the grounds that it relies on a dubious and dogmatic appeal to the homogeneity of color. Borrowing from Rosenthal’s recent defense, but ultimate rejection of homogeneity, I defend this claim of on Sellarsian/Kantian transcendental grounds, and reconstruct the remainder of his argument. I argue that Sellars has good reason to suppose that homogeneity is a necessary condition of any possible experience, including indirect experience of theoretical-explanatory posits, and (...)
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  36. Naturalistic Theories of Life After Death.Eric Steinhart - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):145-158.
    After rejecting substance dualism, some naturalists embrace patternism. It states that persons are bodies and that bodies are material machines running abstract person programs. Following Aristotle, these person programs are souls. Patternists adopt four-dimensionalist theories of persistence: Bodies are 3D stages of 4D lives. Patternism permits at least six types of life after death. It permits quantum immortality, teleportation, salvation through advanced technology, promotion out of a simulated reality, computational monadology, and the revision theory of resurrection.
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  37. Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 2012 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 3 (3):281-292.
    Materialism is nearly universally assumed by cognitive scientists. Intuitively, materialism says that a person’s mental states are nothing over and above his or her material states, while dualism denies this. Philosophers have introduced concepts (e.g., realization, supervenience) to assist in formulating the theses of materialism and dualism with more precision, and distinguished among importantly different versions of each view (e.g., eliminative materialism, substance dualism, emergentism). They have also clarified the logic of arguments that use empirical findings (...)
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  38. Mind, Body, Space, and Time.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
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  39. Malebranche, Taste, and Sensibility: The Origins of Sensitive Taste and a Reconsideration of Cartesianism’s Feminist Potential.Katharine J. Hamerton - 2008 - Journal of the History of Ideas 69 (4):533-558.
    This essay argues that Malebranche originated the model of sensitive taste in French thought, several decades before Du Bos. It examines the highly gendered, negative physiological model of taste and of the female mind which Malebranche developed within the Cartesian framework and as a witness to Parisian salon society in which women’s taste had great cultural influence, and strongly questions the common assumption that Cartesian substance dualism necessarily contained feminist potential. The essay argues for Malebranche’s great influence in (...)
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  40.  86
    Uma defesa do dualismo de substâncias.Richard Swinburne & Jaimir Conte - 2008 - Princípios 15 (23):291-313.
    Argumento neste artigo que embora existam muitas maneiras diferentes de descrever o mundo ou algum segmento dele, qualquer maneira que deixe de acarretar logicamente uma separabilidade do corpo e da alma como os dois componentes de cada ser humano conhecido (o corpo sendo uma parte contingente e a alma a parte essencial do homem) deixará de fornecer uma descriçáo completa do mundo. T ítulo original do artigo: “ What makes me me? A Defense os Substance Dualism ”. Apresentado (...)
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  41. What is Functionalism?Ned Block - 1996 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), [Book Chapter]. MacMillan.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  42. Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - In T. Stoneham & P. Lodge (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge.
    In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident (...)
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  43.  76
    A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2014 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
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  44. Leibniz’s Theory of Substance and His Metaphysics of the Incarnation.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2015 - In Paul Lodge & T. W. C. Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge. pp. 231-252.
    This paper explores the development of Leibniz’s metaphysics of the Incarnation in the context of his philosophy. In particular it asks to what extent Leibniz’s repeated endorsement of the traditional analogy between the union in humankind of soul (mind) and body, and the union in Christ of divine and human natures, could be accommodated by his more general metaphysical doctrines. Such an investigation highlights some of the deepest commitments in Leibniz’s theory of substance as well as detect in it (...)
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  45. How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.
    Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I (...)
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  46. Formulating Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Searle’s and Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness.John Moses Chua - 2017 - Talisik Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):43-58.
    This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism (...)
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  47. Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Yitzhak Melamed here offers a new and systematic interpretation of the core of Spinoza's metaphysics. In the first part of the book, he proposes a new reading of the metaphysics of substance in Spinoza: he argues that for Spinoza modes both inhere in and are predicated of God. Using extensive textual evidence, he shows that Spinoza considered modes to be God's propria. He goes on to clarify Spinoza's understanding of infinity, mereological relations, infinite modes, and the flow of finite (...)
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  48. An Incomplete Definition of Reality.Boris DeWiel - 2013 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):50-72.
    A reality may be defined incompletely as a perpetuating pattern of relations. This definition denies the name of reality to an utter and totalistic patternlessness, like a primal patternless stuff, because a patternless all-ness would be indistinguishable from a patternless nothingness. If reality began from a chaos or patternless stuff, it became a reality only when it became patterned. If there are orders of reality with perpetuating relations between them, as in Cartesian interactive substance dualism, the definition allows (...)
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  49. Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.David Bourget - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
    In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), (...)
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  50. Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?Daniel Stoljar & Christian List - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):96-108.
    The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ as it occurs in the argument: if 'distinctness' is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument is founded can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument (...)
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