This essay considers how scholarly approaches to the development of molecular biology have too often narrowed the historical aperture to genes, overlooking the ways in which other objects and processes contributed to the molecularization of life. From structural and dynamic studies of biomolecules to cellular membranes and organelles to metabolism and nutrition, new work by historians, philosophers, and STS scholars of the life sciences has revitalized older issues, such as the relationship of life to matter, or of physicochemical inquiries to (...) biology. This scholarship points to a novel molecular vista that opens up a pluralist view of molecularizations in the twentieth century and considers their relevance to current science. (shrink)

Atwater v. Lago Vista is a stand-alone case in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Often basic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence builds off other case law. There is a clear buildup regarding the exclusionary rule from Weeks v. United States (1914) to Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920) to the expansion of “the fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to Mapp v. Ohio (1961) incorporating U.S. Constitution the Fourth Amendment to the states. -/- Likewise, there are cases building up from the incorporation (...) into the states from United States v. Leon (1984) to Arizona v. Evans (1995), expanding Fourth Amendment case law and rights. The cavalcade of these cases somewhat plays a ballet of expanding and contracting the rights in certain circumstances. But the rights build off and limit each other in a cognizable method. -/- Atwater v. Lago Vista is not based on such a cavalcade of cases. It is a stand-alone case at best citing 1600s case law, norms, and rules from before the founding of the United States. Granted, the United States adopted much of the English jurisprudence in the founding of the United States. (shrink)

Resumen: Se trazan las líneas definitorias del derecho humano fundamental al desarrollo sostenible (DHFDS), desde una visión normativa del desarrollo y el constitucionalismo humanista, teniendo en cuenta la dignidad humana, la plena efectividad de los derechos humanos, el Enfoque Basado en los Derechos Humanos y la seguridad humana como pilares normativos de la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible, entendiendo que la plena efectividad de los derechos humanos da lugar al Derecho Humano Fundamental al Nuevo Orden Mundial (DHFNOM) consagrado en (...) el artículo 28 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (DUDH, 1948), aprobada por la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU). Se analiza el entendimiento común para la práctica de las normas y principios de derechos humanos en materia de programación del desarrollo, concibiendo el desarrollo sostenible como un derecho humano fundamental cuyo núcleo esencial son los derechos fundamentales integrados en los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible de la Agenda 2030. Se resalta el deber del Estado de respetar y proteger los derechos humanos de los que las personas y los pueblos son titulares para materializar tangiblemente sus derechos fundamentales inalienables priorizando, en consecuencia, la atención y participación los grupos humanos en situación de debilidad manifiesta, expuestos a mayor vulnerabilidad, marginación, exclusión y discriminación destacando en aras del florecimiento humano, el bien común, el desarrollo sostenible y el desarrollo humano integral de todos. (shrink)

Algunos críticos de la ciencia afirman que es sólo un punto de vista entre otros, sin alguna autoridad epistémica especial. No obstante, en este artículo se defiende que la idea de que la investigación científica involucra una perspectiva o punto de vista no impone una restricción a su ideal de objetividad. Primero se presentan algunas aclaraciones sobre la noción de punto de vista, luego se atiende al concepto de objetividad científica, y por último se enfrentan algunos desafíos (...) que se desprenden de la noción de punto de vista y amenazan rasgos de la objetividad científica vinculados con su autoridad epistémica. -/- Some critics of science claim that it is only a point of view among others, lacking any special epistemic authority. However, this paper contends that conceiving scientific inquiry as something that involves a perspective or a point of view does not pose a constraint on its ideal of objectivity. We first put forward some clarifications on the notion of point of view, followed by some observations on scientific objectivity; finally, we face some of the challenges that rise from the notion of point of view and threaten features of scientific objectivity tied to its epistemic authority.]. (shrink)

Según el realismo científico, el propósito de la ciencia es descubrir la verdad acerca de los aspectos observables e inobservables de la realidad objetiva e independiente de la mente, en la cual habitamos. Putnam y otros han objetado que tal posición realista metafísica presupone un punto de vista del Ojo de Dios, del cual no puede establecerse ningún sentido coherente. En este artículo defenderé dos posiciones: primera, que el realismo científico no requiere la adopción de un punto de (...) class='Hi'>vista del Ojo de Dios; en lugar de esto, plantearé que el realismo científico es una hipótesis acerca de la relación entre la teoría científica y la realidad que puede ser propuesta desde nuestra propia perspectiva humana. Segunda, incluso si el realismo científico requiriera un punto de vista del Ojo de Dios, no necesariamente estaría en detrimento del realismo, pues es posible desarrollar una perspectiva externa inteligible acerca de las relaciones epistémicas humanas que se entretejen con nuestra realidad circundante. (shrink)

Todas las personas creen en la inmortalidad, es decir, no concluyen la existencia de una persona con la muerte, por la sencilla razón de que precisamente una persona ha dejado de existir real y sensualmente, todavía no ha dejado de existir espiritualmente, es decir, no ha dejado de existir en la memoria, en el corazón de los que sobreviven.

Nostalgia is the emotional effect that causes searching between memories the disappeared home, longed for. In itself, while researching in memories, it implies a certain degree of self-absorption and individuation, because the memories are in extremely particular, a return to the self. When this nostalgia is filled with a restorative eagerness, when it has social and political pretensions, this return translates into a marked distancing between one’s point of view and that of any other, until it becomes a threat to (...) the necessary hermeneutics of the other’s point of view that demands all coexistence. / La nostalgia es el efecto emocional que provoca la mirada que busca entre los recuerdos el hogar desaparecido, añorado. En sí misma, en tanto pesquisa en la memoria, implica cierto grado de ensimismamiento e individuación, pues los recuerdos son en extremo particulares, un retorno al yo. Cuando esta nostalgia se reviste de un afán restaurativo, cuando alberga pretensiones sociales y políticas, dicho retorno se traduce en un marcado distanciamiento entre el propio punto de vista y el de cualquier otro, hasta resultar una amenaza para la necesaria hermenéutica del punto de vista ajeno que demanda toda convivencia. (shrink)

Seguendo l’esposizione data in (Orsi 2012), riguardante una comparazione fra alcuni aspetti dell’opera di Carl Schmitt e di Jürgen Habermas in filosofia politica, centrata sulla nozione di ordine ed inquadrata, nelle sue basi, entro la sociologia delle religioni di Max Weber, sarà possibile, oltre l’individuazione in essa di un comune punto di convergenza fra il pensiero dei questi autori nella nozione di ordine, portare avanti, su un piano teoretico di livello superiore, un ulteriore raffronto più orientato verso la metodologia della (...) ricerca filosofica così come intesa da Martin Heidegger, la quale permetterà tra l’altro di vedere sia Schmitt che Habermas da un altro possibile punto di vista prospettico. (shrink)

El objetivo tradicional de la unidad de cuidados intensivos (UCI) es disminuir la mortalidad y morbilidad de los pacientes en estado crítico. A pesar de los avances médicos y tecnológicos, la UCI continúa siendo un lugar común en donde la muerte ocurre, por lo que en la actualidad el equipo de salud de la UCI debe estar familiarizado con los cuidados paliativos y su legislación en México. Preservar la dignidad del paciente, evitar el daño y mantener una comunicación adecuada entre (...) los miembros del equipo de salud y los familiares es fundamental. No existe una técnica única y universal aceptada para la atención de los pacientes en estado terminal en las UCI, por lo que se debe individualizar cada caso y definir objetivos de atención junto con el paciente o sus familiares dentro del marco legal vigente en México. (shrink)

The article analyses the close link between perspectivism, genealogy, and physiology in Nietzsche’s philosophy. The cardinal thesis is that the point of view of value is more fundamental than that of truth. The genealogical method enables the study of the conditions of conservation and growth of points of view and values, following the conductive thread of the body, with the aim of creating new springs of meaning and leaving nihilism behind. Special attention is paid to the tension between dogmatism and (...) relativism. Lastly, I present Nietzsche's notion of “breeding” (Züchtung), which enables a radical questioning of culture and highlights the physiological character of morals. Keywords: perspectivism, value, breeding, moral, point of view, interpretation. (shrink)

L'articolo si propone di accostarsi alla figura di Ernst Mach seguendo la stessa metodologia storico-critica da lui utilizzata. Essa permette di contestualizzarne la figura e l'opera in un momento significativo della storia della filosofia occidentale, ma anche di ridefinire alcuni concetti fondamentali del suo pensiero. Scopo ulteriore della ricerca è di osservare da una diversa prospettiva la questione relativa al valore filosofico del lavoro epistemologico di Mach, mostrando come esso possa essere affermato senza bisogno di uscire dai confini da lui (...) stesso tracciati. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to reflect on the usual and the unusual, based on Friedrich Nietzsche's perspective on the opposition between the pathos of distance or nobility and the ethos from the point of view of utility. In order to do so, an analysis of selected excerpts from Nietzsche's works is carried out, mainly On the genealogy of morality and Beyond Good and Evil. According to Nietzsche, there is no ethos, but only pathos, being the ethos, affirmed by (...) asceticism, only a strategy, a cunning and deceitful invention for the conservation of a precarious way of life. It is this ethos that forges and fixes ascetic values that represent the usual, by inverting values from the point of view of the resentful human's utility. Based on this Nietzschean perspective, we seek to reflect on the unusual as an active impulse that characterizes the noble-type pathos of distance, and the usual as a reactive impulse that characterizes the éthos from the point of view of utility. (shrink)

In the debate about Composition as Identity (CI), a recurring pattern is to ask whether a certain feature of identity is also instantiated by composition. This recurring pattern is followed when, for example, the question is asked whether a whole and its parts are indiscernible. In following this pattern, it is methodologically desirable to assume the most standard account of the philosophical problems at stake. However, when the necessity of identity and the problem whether composition is as necessary as identity (...) are at stake, the literature about CI often violates this methodological principle, and resorts to non-standard views about modality, such as counterpart theory. In this paper, we purport to remedy this anomaly and to assess CI on the background of a standard, broadly Kripkean view of modality, and in particular of the contention that a single entity exists in more than one possible world. Given this contention, the backer of CI is forced to relativize composition and, as a consequence, identity to possible worlds, thereby introducing a non-standard kind of identity. We will discuss the charge of adhocness which might be raised against the resulting variety of CI. (shrink)

This work is about current theories concerning the application of the constitutional rules, on the approach of the efficacy and effectiveness of the fundamental rights. It also suggests an alternative way of logical analysis of the problem, mainly taking in account the phenomena of the application-efficacy-effectiveness of the rules. Therefore, it discusses the dogmatic rules and proposes the logical separation between its applicability and its effectiveness, considering the effectiveness as the potential power to realize the fundamental rights.

Resumen Hegel se aleja de la idea propia de la Ilustración sobre el progreso e introduce una concepción teleológica acerca de la historia a nivel mundial. En ese sentido, el pensamiento ilustrado abogaba por el futuro desde la idea del progreso, mientras que el Romanticismo trataba de comprender el pasado a través de una mirada histórica donde Oriente se consideraba como la niñez de la humanidad. Por lo tanto, se entendía como un pueblo con un elevado despotismo y una ausencia (...) de libertades que, desde la perspectiva occidental moderna, no favorecía la elevación del espíritu. Estos supuestos etnocéntricos son los que denuncia Boaventura de Sousa mediante una teoría Poscolonial de la Historia. (shrink)

Admitiendo, con René Schérer, que la filosofía de Deleuze puede leerse como una teoría de la literatura y la escritura, y dado que tal filosofía constituye un punto cimero del pensamiento dedicado a combatir la representación, este ensayo quisiera aplicar dicha teoría al terreno de la imagen pictórica, articulando la lectura que de Bacon realiza el filósofo en torno a un desarraigo -o desterritorialización- del sentido básico, dominante en pintura: la vista, desplazándose así desde un principio la visión por (...) el tacto, lo visible por lo táctil (aquello que, más que resultar palpable, toca), lo óptico por lo háptico. (shrink)

No presente trabalho, com vistas para uma análise conceitual e crítica acerca do modelo de democracia representativa, bem como uma proposta de mudança sistemática e ordenada, iremos nos debruçar sobre os conceitos e perspectivas elencadas por Arendt e Bobbio no cerne da questão participativa. Hannah Arendt (1941-1975), ilustre teórica política, compreende a sociedade consolidada pós revoluções americana e francesa como fortemente apolitizada, visto o afastamento dos cidadãos dos assuntos públicos na atual democracia indireta. Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004), renomado jusfilósofo, define com (...) rigor analítico a categoria representativa da participação popular nas questões coletivas, indicando suas limitações e possibilidades. Em vista disso, faz-se necessário o estudo conjunto de ambas personalidades para o entendimento da disposição comum no que diz respeito à representatividade política que, segundo a autora alemã, impede a efetiva realização da vida cívica e atomiza os sujeitos, suscitando o desinteresse pela coisa pública e facilitando a oligarquização da mesma. A partir da inferência no que se refere ao foco central deste artigo, e da investigação complementar sobre os próprios riscos da implementação excessiva dos cânones reverberados pela tradição antiga — a qual pressupõe o envolvimento direto dos cidadãos no governo —, perpassaremos pela alternativa proposta por Arendt, a saber: a criação de conselhos deliberativos nos diversos níveis subnacionais a fim de fomentar o maior interesse e atuação popular na tomada de decisões, salvaguardando, assim, parte significativa do espírito revolucionário mas, sem retirar a centralidade de um governo bem estabelecido. Dessa maneira, a relação entre Arendt e Bobbio se designará no exame do sistema democrático representativo com respeito às limitações impostas pelo próprio sistema que impede a plena participação popular qualitativa, juntamente com a orientação arendtiana para rarear essa problemática — embora sem buscar a completa aniquilação do mecanismo de partidos, mas a união deste com o modelo de conselhos. (shrink)

L’epistemologia (detta anche filosofia della conoscenza o gnoseologia) è la disciplina filosofica che studia come gli esseri umani si rapportano da un punto di vista cognitivo alla realtà che li circonda. Le questioni fondamentali che la interessano sono principalmente di natura normativa. Riguardano il modo in cui dovremmo regolare le nostre credenze alla luce dell’informazione in nostro possesso, e la natura della conoscenza umana ed i suoi limiti. Questo capitolo è organizzato in modo corrispondente. La prima sezione tratta della (...) nozione di giustificazione epistemica, la seconda quella di conoscenza, e la terza introduce il problema filosofico dello scetticismo. (shrink)

Trata-se de capítulo de um livro sobre a noção de "substância" na história da filosofia e contém uma discussão sobre a noção ordinária de "corpo" do ponto de vista da filosofia analítica.

En este artículo se sistematiza la perspectiva teórica de Pierre Bourdieu sobre las clases sociales. Se presentan las críticas que realiza a los puntos de vista objetivista y subjetivista en teoría social, los fundamentos de su propia propuesta, el concepto de habitus de clase, y las luchas de clasificaciones mediante las que se constituyen las clases.

Desde un punto de vista postmetafísico y a partir de los argumentos que nos proporciona un autor como Ludwig Wittgenstein, trataremos de defender la tesis de que las normas en general cobran su carácter normativo de la responsabilidad que se atribuye a cada agente cuando, al actuar en sociedad, se liga a los compromisos que sostienen la posibilidad de que esa acción sea común. Esos compromisos, ya que no pueden responder ante una instancia ajena a los agentes sociales , (...) habrán de tener el cariz práctico de todo lo que atañe en exclusiva a los afanes de los humanos entre sí. Una regla no nos pide que respondamos de su cumplimiento o no, pero nosotros sí que podemos pedirnos cuentas unos a otros de ese cumplimiento o vulneración a partir de la responsabilidad compartida en la vida social en que pululan tales reglas; de hecho, a aquellos que las incumplen gravemente, siempre podemos apartarlos definitivamente de nuestra vida en sociedad adjudicándoles «maldad» o «locura» persistente. Al caer así en la cuenta de que las reglas tienen sólo este género de responsabilidad mutua, una nueva regla se nos puede hacer plausible junto a las demás: la de tolerar la posibilidad de otros compromisos con diferentes reglas en otros contextos que hayan generado otras responsabilidades diferentes a las nuestras. (shrink)

Con el fin de discutir las relaciones entre ética, política y educación, el presente artículo analiza la crisis del sistema educativo argentino a partir de una categoría ética: la responsabilidad. Más específicamente, se intenta delinear algunos de los retos a los que una educación para la res- ponsabilidad ciudadana se ve enfrentada en Argentina a comienzos del siglo XXI y en vista de los problemas éticos y políticos por las que atraviesa la educación tanto en el marco de un (...) mundo económicamente globalizado como en contextos de pobreza, exclusión e interculturali- dad, como lo es el latinoamericano. (shrink)

À primeira vista, pode-se pensar que toda restrição à dúvida é contrária à progressão do conhecimento e antidemocrática. Este argumento é utilizado por diferentes sabores de negacionismo. No entanto, um exame do modo como funcionam dúvidas nos mostra que existem exigências epistêmicas para a legitimidade da dúvida que não são satisfeitas pelos negacionismos. Uma consequência deste argumento é que a normatividade epistêmica não é absorvida pela normatividade política. A especificidade da normatividade epistêmica, que explica porque a dúvida de negacionistas (...) não é legítima, desaparece em teorias construtivistas. Teses construtivistas resultam de uma confusão entre o fato de teorias serem construtos sociais e a tese que elas constroem os fatos sobre os quais portam a teoria ela mesma. A legitimidade da dúvida depende de processos sociais de filtragem epistêmica. Os filtros epistêmicos socialmente construídos refletem um fato profundo da evolução da cultura humana: a produção cumulativa, social e assimétrica do conhecimento. (shrink)

Potentialities of attention and distraction with respect to images are critically reprised by Neapolitan artist Domenico Antonio Mancini. In Landscapes (2019), Google Street View addresses painted on canvases take the place of outlying areas of Italian cities, and of canonical oil ‘vedute’ paintings, obliging the viewer to switch from aesthetic absorption to a multitasking, reflexive attention enabled by the tools of mobile devices and the operative agency between the displayed and depicted images. Attracted by the ephemeral, geo-localized vistas displayed on (...) their smartphones, spectator-users must deal with the dynamis of the on-line GSV images: rhetorical and predictable, though, at the same time, and perhaps unintentionally, serendipitous and figural. (shrink)

La democracia en el texto es vista desde una perspectiva integral u onmicomprensiva que complementa la parte instrumental (procedimiento electoral) con la sustancial (goce efectivo de derechos humanos) basado en la concienciación de una real dignidad humana que permita que la persona realice su proyecto de vida, disfrute de sus derechos y funcione efectivamente en la sociedad dentro del Estado democrático constitucional: la interrelación e interdependencia entre democracia, dignidad humana y Estado constitucional de derecho resulta para el autor un (...) norte el cual hay que seguir a cada instante. El libro muestra la importancia de la dogmática actual de la Corte Constitucional colombiana sobre derechos fundamentales, lo cual es un aporte latinoamericano a la estructuración de un constitucionalismo que contribuya con soluciones a favor de la libertad y la justicia en función de la persona humana en un escenario de tensiones evidentes entre la globalización y nacionalismos populistas y patrioteros. En el sentido expresado en el punto anterior la obra del profesor Caldera corrobora la relevancia que dicha dogmática le atribuye a la funcionalidad de los DerechosFundamentales con el logro del contenido normativo de la dignidad humana. Así, para Caldera Ynfante y desde su especial interpretación de la democracia cumple con los requisitos dogmáticos entronizados por la Corte Constitucional para ser considerado como un derecho fundamental generador de todos los efectos instrumentales y sustanciales que le son señalados. El texto nos lleva a establecer conceptualmente con un propósito práctico que la democracia integral, es decir, entendida como derecho fundamental es posible asumirla desde la perspectiva de la denominada teoría de la integralidad de los DDHH a partir de la Declaración y Plan de Acción de Viena sobreDDHH de 1993, instrumento del derecho internacional que resulta apical a partir del cual considera como fundamentales todos los Derechos Humanos. En consecuencia para el autor la democracia integral, como derecho fundamental, es posible asumirla desde la perspectiva del Enfoque Basado enDDHH y así puede ser defendida ante cualquier sistema de protección, ora universal o regional. Por otra parte es necesario para el lector reflexionar en torno al sentido de una democracia integral que para el autor es asumida como una meta garantía de losDDHH; es decir, como el derecho fundamental de los derechos fundamentales. (shrink)

Tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como desde una perspectiva práctica, el fenómeno de la "estetización" no parece ser portador de buenos augurios. En el ámbito teórico, la estetización ha sido vinculada con la crisis de los discursos orientados en términos de verdad, mientras que en el terreno práctico, ella ha sido asociada a ciertos procesos culturales que conducirían a la debacle de los principios normativos. Dejando de lado la problemática teórica, el presente trabajo se concentra en el (...) debate en torno al fenómeno práctico de la estetización de la política. En primer lugar, nos remontamos a la historia de la condena filosófica de la estetización de la esfera política para ocuparnos luego, en un segundo momento, de algunas posiciones esteticistas y antiesteticistas de finales del siglo XX. Posteriormente, procuramos avanzar en una redescripción de esta problemática que nos permita rescatar un sentido productivo de lo estético para el pensamiento político. Para esto último, nuestro trabajo se apoya en las reflexiones de la actual coeditora de la Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Juliane Rebentisch. Tomando como parámetro algunos de los supuestos de sus investigaciones, aquí intentaremos demostrar hasta qué punto la estetización de la vida política puede contribuir al desarrollo de una concepción renovada de esta última. Both from a theoretical and from a practical perspective, the phenomenon of "aestheticization" does not seem to anticipate anything particularly good. On a theoretical level, it has been linked to the crisis of discourse-oriented in terms of truth, while in the practical, has been associated with certain cultural processes that lead to the the collapse of the normative principles. Leaving aside the theoretical issues, this paper focuses on the debate on the phenomenon of the aestheticization of the political culture. First, it goes back to the history of philosophical condemnation of the aestheticization of the political sphere. In a second time, he deals with some conceptions of the late twentieth century. Subsequently, the paper seeks to advance a redescription of this problem that allows rescue a productive sense of aesthetics for political thought. For the latter, our article is based on the reflections of Juliane Rebentisch and attempts to show how the aestheticization of political life can help to develop a new concept of the same. (shrink)

Tendo em vista que “todo sistema de educação é uma maneira política de manter ou de modificar a apropriação dos discursos, com os saberes e os poderes que eles trazem consigo”, nossa pesquisa visa refletir sobre a nova identidade docente materializada no discurso dos PCNs de língua Portuguesa. Trata-se de traduzir a política oficial de formação de professor e/ou desconstruí-la (Derrida, 1998), analisando e discutindo a(s) identidade(s) e competências atribuídas aos professores, abrindo a possibilidade para questionarmos a identidade unificada (...) e transparente que os documentos oficiais desenham para os professores em serviço. Esperamos, com esse trabalho, contribuir para a construção de uma política de formação de professores sensível à subjetividade heterogênea dos professores no Brasil. (shrink)

Según una historia estándar, devenida habitual especialmente por influencia del pensamiento heideggeriano, la filosofía occidental se encuentra atrapada en la trampa de la metafísica. La trampa de la metafísica centra la crítica a la metafísica en torno a la tesis según la cual el esencialismo y una concepción de la verdad condicionada por él determinan qué significa “ser” o “existencia”. Detrás de la realidad se supone un fundamento que bajo la forma de un “trasmundo” (Hinterwelt) produce una manifestación cuasi-causal, a (...) saber: el “mundo” (Welt), el cual se deja con ello concebir como la aparición del ser que se ha retraído en sí mismo. La diferencia entre ser y apariencia mantiene al pensamiento metafísico atrapado, en la medida en que éste no es capaz de reconocer esa diferencia misma como una apariencia. En Siete ensayos sobre la muerte de la metafísica, Héctor Ferreiro ofrece frente a esta historia estándar una convincente contrahistoria. Esta contrahistoria tiene su punto de partida en Hegel, quien intenta, de modo opuesto a la lectura propuesta por Heidegger, superar a la metafísica con sus propios medios y sepultarla a partir de su propia dinámica interna. Precisamente a esta superación está dedicado el debate y discusión de Hegel con el argumento ontológico. Como Kant, Hegel ve en el argumento ontológico uno de los centros operacionales de la metafísica clásica. La cuestión es, pues, cómo abordar el argumento ontológico del modo correcto desde un punto de vista crítico a la metafísica. La estrategia que ofrece Hegel consiste, como lo expone Ferreiro, en desenmascarar la distinción misma entre el ser y la apariencia producida por él como una operación de tipo conceptual. Según Hegel, la metafísica ha sido desde siempre el intento por desarrollar una teoría de la totalidad. Pero una teoría de la totalidad que coloca al ser de un lado y a su aparición del otro lado de un límite no advierte su propia operación, dado que el trazado de un límite pertenece él mismo a la teoría de la totalidad. De lo que se trata, pues, es de examinar los trazados de límite constitutivos de la metafísica para reconocerlos como productos de la reflexión y no como hechos dados que el pensamiento tan sólo debe reflejar. El movimiento de autosuperación de la metafísica que culmina en la discusión de Kant y Hegel con el argumento ontológico pertenece ya, sin embargo, a la tradición de la metafísica. Como lo muestra Ferreiro, la metafísica está a más tardar a partir de la distinción medieval entre esencia y existencia en proceso de superarse a sí misma, pues ya Tomás de Aquino logra reconocer en dicha distinción la verdadera fuente de la producción del mundo. Tomás persiste aún, sin embargo, en una concepción sustancialista, en la medida en que considera a la distinción entre esencia y existencia como un hecho in-dependiente de la teoría y del sujeto. Sin embargo, esa distinción es una operación conceptual y no un objeto que se encuentra en el mundo. En esta medida, la tesis de la distinción de razón entre ambas categorías se presenta como un indicador de la reflexión de la metafísica sobre sí misma. Ferreiro demuestra que el célebre comienzo de la Cien-cia de la Lógica de Hegel significa precisamente una profundización y radicalización de esa autorreflexión. Ahora bien, a ojos de Hegel el ser del comienzo de la Lógica es en sí mismo como tal el resultado del argumento ontológico; en su formulación clásica, sin embargo, el argumento ontológico sólo aspira a probar que hay algo (Dios), pero el argumento mismo no es como tal capaz de determinar ulteriormente ese algo –esto constituye justamente la tarea de la ontología en el sentido de Hegel, es decir, la tarea de la Lógica. Así, lo que podría denominarse en Hegel una “metafísica” es expresamente una crítica a la metafísica tradicional. En efecto, la ontología que Hegel propone en modo alguno significa una recaída en la metafísica anterior a Kant; por el contrario, en la filosofía de Hegel metafísica y crítica a la metafísica se vinculan íntimamente y con ello se cierra un círculo que se había abierto en la metafísica teológica de la Edad Media: precisamente que este movimiento estaba contenido ya programáticamente en la ontología de la distinción entre esencia y existencia es algo que Ferreiro analiza en forma clara y meticulosa. En cuanto disciplina, la ontología está hoy nuevamente en el centro de la atención de la reflexión filosófica a nivel mundial. Siete ensayos sobre la muerte de la metafísica no sólo ofrece en este respecto un análisis de índole histórica; es también una importante contribución teórica al actual retorno a la ontología. (shrink)

El ataque deliberado de Hamás el 7 de octubre contra civiles inocentes es absolutamente inicuo. Por lo tanto, debe ser condenado universalmente. Y, sin embargo, me pregunto cómo un reconocimiento universal de un deber absoluto de respeto por la dignidad humana puede ayudar a resolver el conflicto existencial al que se enfrentan israelíes y palestinos. Idealmente, una solución de dos Estados propuesta por la comunidad internacional puede ser vista como un compromiso razonable y justo. Sin embargo, la realidad sobre (...) el terreno es diferente. Hasta ahora, la existencia de un Estado ha impedido la existencia de otro, sin que se vislumbre el final de su violencia mutuamente destructiva. Su conflicto exige que las personas razonables e imparciales traten de entenderlo de manera holística y de ofrecer una evaluación justa de este conflicto insoluble sin relativizar el sufrimiento humano inmerecido de todos los involucrados y afectados por él. (shrink)

A tradição filosófica das abordagens da moral tem predominantemente como base conceitos e teorias metafísicas e teológicas. Entre os conceitos tradicionais de ética, o mais proeminente é a Teoria do Comando Divino (TCD). De acordo com a TCD, Deus dá fundamentos morais à humanidade desde sua criação e por meio de revelações. Assim, moralidade e divindade seriam inseparáveis desde a civilização mais remota. Esses conceitos submergem em uma estrutura teológica e são principalmente aceitos pela maioria dos seguidores das três tradições (...) Abraâmicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islamismo, abrangendo a parte mais considerável da população humana. Mantendo a fé e a Revelação como seus fundamentos, as Teorias do Comando Divino não estão estritamente sujeitas a qualquer tipo de demonstração. Os oponentes da concepção moral do Comando Divino, fundamentados na impossibilidade de demonstrar suas suposições metafísicas e religiosas, tentam há muitos séculos (embora sem sucesso) desvalorizar sua importância. Eles sustentam o argumento de que a teoria não mostra evidências materiais e coerência lógica e, por esse motivo, não pode ser levada em consideração para fins científicos ou filosóficos. É apenas uma crença e, como tal, deve ser entendida. Além dessas oposições extremas, muitos outros conceitos atacam as teorias do Comando Divino, de uma ou de outra maneira, em parte ou na totalidade. Muitos filósofos e cientistas sociais, da clássica filosofia grega até a presente data, por exemplo, sustentam que a moralidade é apenas uma construção e, portanto, culturalmente relativa e culturalmente determinada. No entanto, isso traz muitas outras discussões e impõe o desafio de determinar qual é o significado da cultura, quais elementos da cultura são moralmente determinantes e, finalmente, quais são os limites dessa relatividade. Os deterministas morais, por sua vez, afirmam que tudo relacionado ao comportamento humano, incluindo a moralidade, é determinado em suas causas, uma vez que o livre-arbítrio não existe. Mais recentemente, os pensadores modernos argumentaram que existe uma rigorosa ciência da moralidade. No entanto, o método científico por si só, apesar de explicar vários fatos e evidências, não pode esclarecer todo o conteúdo e todo o significado da ética. A compreensão moral exige uma percepção mais ampla e um acordo entre os filósofos, que eles nunca alcançaram. Todas essas perguntas têm muitas configurações diferentes, dependendo de cada linha filosófica, e iniciam análises complexas e debates intermináveis, uma vez que muitas delas são reciprocamente conflitantes. O universo e a atmosfera envolvendo esta estudo são os domínios de todos esses conflitos conceptuais, observados de um ponto de vista objetivo e evolutivo. Independentemente dessa circunstância e de sua importância intrínseca, essas questões estão muito distantes da abordagem metodológica de uma discussão analítica sobre a moral objetiva, a qual é, de fato, o objetivo e o escopo deste trabalho. Devemos revisitar brevemente essas importantes teorias tradicionais, porque esta pesquisa abriga um estudo comparativo, e suas suposições pelo menos diferem profundamente de todas as teorias tradicionais. Portanto, torna-se necessário oferecer ao leitor, neste texto, elementos diretos e específicos de comparação para críticas válidas, dispensando pesquisas interruptivas. No entanto, mesmo revisitando as teorias tradicionais, para esse objetivo de exposição comparativa e crítica, elas serão mantidas ao lado de nossas principais preocupações, como " aliena materia ". Independentemente da validade de qualquer um ou de todos os elementos dessa discussão e de seu significado como universo filosófico deste trabalho, o objetivo do nosso estudo é demonstrar e justificar a existência e o significado de arquétipos morais pré-históricos surgidos diretamente dos princípios fundamentais, necessidades sociais e esforços para a sobrevivência. Esses arquétipos são a definição do fundamento essencial da ética, sua agregação ao inconsciente coletivo e organização lógica correspondente e transmissão aos estágios evolutivos do genoma humano e às diferentes relações espaço-tempo, independentemente de qualquer experiência contemporânea dos indivíduos. O sistema definido por esses arquétipos compõe um modelo social humano evolutivo. Esta é uma posição metaética? Sim, ela é. Além disso, como em qualquer raciocínio metaético, devemos procurar cuidadosamente as melhores e coerentes rotas, como a Filosofia Analítica lhes oferece. Desta forma, este trabalho deve demonstrar razoavelmente que a moral não é um produto cultural dos homens civilizados ou das sociedades modernas e que, apesar de estar sujeito a várias agregações e subtrações culturais relativas, seus fundamentos essenciais são arquetípicos e nunca mudaram estruturalmente. Esse raciocínio induz que a moralidade é um atributo primal do "homo sapiens"; não é uma propriedade e nem um acidente: integra a essência humana e pertence ao reino da identidade ontológica humana. -/- O fenômeno humano é um processo contínuo, desempenhando seu papel entre determinação aleatória e livre-arbítrio, e precisamos questionar como a moralidade começou e como chegou a nós no presente. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

Una Según una influyente línea interpretativa sostiene que la mejor ciudad polis ideal de Aristóteles debe ser considerada como un gobierno constitucionaluna politeia (πολιτεία). Son eruditos alemanes quienes adoptan esta lecturaEsta corriente predomina aún hoy entre los eruditos alemanes.. En este grupo hay que incluir a Martha Nussbaum en tanto que aboga por una “socialdemocracia aristotélicaEn tanto paladina de la “social democracia aristotélica”, Martha Nussbaum pertenece también a esta línea exegética ”. En oposición a tales interpretaciones, este ensayo defiende la (...) tesis que Aristóteles pertenece a la tradición de pensamiento político aristocrático. Esta tradición se remonta a Teognis, Heráclito y Platón y se inicia como una crítica dirigida tanto a la decadencia de la virtud aristocrática como cuanto al ascenso de valores democráticos ey egalitariosigualitarios. Este ensayo trabajo demuestra que Aristóteles concibe las diferentes formas de constitución como manifestaciones de distintas concepciones de la justicia distributiva. Aristóteles mantiene una clara preferencia por una concepción aristocrática de la justicia, y , por tantocomo consecuencia, por la aristocracia. La constitución de la mejor polis ideal que detalla en los libros VII y VIII de la Política debe entenderse como una “verdadera aristocracia” en la que los cargos políticos son distribuidos, según el mérito (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν), a los mejores ciudadanos entre los ciudadanos que sean los mejores desde el punto de vista moral e intelectualtanto moral como intelectualmente hablando. Aristóteles, pensamiento político aristocrático, justicia distributiva, aristocracia, mejor poli, sEstado ideal . (shrink)

We undeniably live in an information age—as, indeed, did those who lived before us. After all, as the cultural historian Robert Darnton pointed out: ‘every age was an age of information, each in its own way’ (Darnton 2000: 1). Darnton was referring to the news media, but his insight surely also applies to the sciences. The practices of acquiring, storing, labeling, organizing, retrieving, mobilizing, and integrating data about the natural world has always been an enabling aspect of scientific work. Natural (...) history and its descendant discipline of biological taxonomy are prime examples of sciences dedicated to creating and managing systems of ordering data. In some sense, the idea of biological taxonomy as an information science is commonplace. Perhaps it is because of its self-evidence that the information science perspective on taxonomy has not been a major theme in the history and philosophy of science. The botanist Vernon Heywood once pointed out that historians of biology, in their ‘preoccupation with the development of the sciences of botany and zoology… [have] diverted attention from the role of taxonomy as an information science’ (Heywood 1985: 11). More specifically, he argued that historians had failed to appreciate how principles and practices that can be traced to Linnaeus constituted ‘a change in the nature of taxonomy from a local or limited folk communication system and later a codified folk taxonomy to a formal system of information science [that] marked a watershed in the history of biology’ (ibid.). A similar observation could be made about twentieth-century philosophy of biology, which mostly skipped over practical and epistemic questions about information management in taxonomy. The taxonomic themes that featured in the emerging philosophy of biology literature in the second half of the twentieth century were predominantly metaphysical in orientation. This is illustrated by what has become known as the ‘essentialism story’: an account about the essentialist nature of pre- Darwinian taxonomy that used to be accepted by many historians and philosophers, and which stimulated efforts to document and interpret shifts in the metaphysical understanding of species and (natural) classification (Richards 2010; Winsor 2003; Wilkins 2009). Although contemporary debates in the philosophy of taxonomy have moved on, much discussion continues to focus on conceptual and metaphysical issues surrounding the nature of species and the principles of classification. Discussions centring on whether species are individuals, classes, or kinds have sprung up as predictably as perennials. Raucous debates have arisen even with the aim of accommodating the diversity of views: is monism, pluralism, or eliminativism about the species category the best position to take? In addition to these, our disciplines continue to interrogate what is the nature of these different approaches to classification: are they representational or inferential roles of different approaches to classification (evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics, phylogenetic systematics)? While there is still much to learn from these discussions—in which we both actively participate—our aim with this topical collection has been to seek different entrypoints and address underexposed themes in the history and philosophy of taxonomy. We believe that approaching taxonomy as an information science prompts new questions and can open up new philosophical vistas worth exploring. A twenty-first century information science turn in the history and philosophy of taxonomy is already underway. In scientific practice and in daily life it is hard to escape the imaginaries of Big Data and the constant threats of being ‘flooded with data’. In the life sciences, these developments are often associated with the socalled bioinformatics crisis that can hopefully be contained by a new, interdisciplinary breed of bioinformaticians. These new concepts, narratives, and developments surrounding the centrality of data and information systems in the biological and biomedical sciences have raised important philosophical questions about their challenges and implications. But historical perspectives are just as necessary to judge what makes our information age different from those that preceded us. Indeed, as the British zoologist Charles Godfray has often pointed out, the piles of data that are being generated in contemporary systematic biology have led to a second bioinformatics crisis, the first being the one that confronted Linnaeus in the mid-18th century (Godfray 2007). Although our aim is to clear a path for new discussions of taxonomy from an information science-informed point of view, we continue where others in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science have already trod. We believe that an appreciation of biological taxonomy as an information science raises many questions about the philosophical, theoretical, material, and practical aspects of the use and revision of biological nomenclatures in different local and global communities of scientists and citizen scientists. In particular, conceiving of taxonomy as an information science directs attention to the temporalities of managing an accumulating data about classified entities that are themselves subject to revision, to the means by which revision is accomplished, and to the semantic, material, and collaborative contexts that mediate the execution of revisions. (shrink)

Leyendo algunos textos «marginales» de Jacques Derrida, especialmente en sus últimos trabajos, desde la perspectiva de las relaciones entre la experiencia biográfica y los intereses filosóficos, este ensayo trata, por un lado, de las reflexiones del filósofo acerca del cine como un desarrollo de la tradición contemporánea fundada muy particularmente por Walter Benjamin y Hugo von Hofmannsthal; y por otro, el artículo se centra en el «fantasma» o «espectro»: un concepto básico a la par que clásico tanto del cinematógrafo como (...) del psicoanálisis. De este modo, se quiere mostrar cómo el pensamiento derridiano introduce una variación radical y original en la estética moderna, incluyendo su primera o primitiva acepción: «percepción por los sentidos». -/- Based on the reading of some marginal texts of Jacques Derrida, especially his later works, from the perspective of the relation between biographical experience and philosophical interests, this essay deals, on one hand, with this philosopher´s reflections as to Cinema and its development as a contemporary tradition, as founded very particularly by Walter Benjamin and Hugo von Hofmannsthal. On the other hand, this papers concentrates on another basic and also classical concept of Cinema and psychoanalysis: the concept of phantom or spectre. In this way, the intention is to show how derridian thought introduces a radical and original variation in modern esthetics, including its first or primitive acceptation or perception by the senses. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. (shrink)

We need to give up single visions that are supposed to embrace social and place totalities. We live in overlapping nets rather than single places. We cannot plan unlimited geometrical vistas a la Versailles; but that was always an illusion, and today it would be an oppression. Can we still plan like Sixtus at Rome? Only if we also encourage other modes of organization at the same time. The whole may often end up more like Tokyo, with corners of design (...) and beauty that do not make an overall plan. (shrink)

La época en la que vivimos se caracteriza por una doble y profunda crisis antropológica y educativa lo que hace que la misión educativa sea particularmente vulnerable. Ésta, entendida como el acompañamiento personal de los alumnos en el proceso de crecimiento, en vista del logro de la capacidad de aplicar los conocimientos y la comprensión y una autonomía de juicio de los alumnos, puede aparecer como un terreno accidentado para caminar. Si además, junto a esto, el objetivo de la (...) educación fuera perseguir una formación integral: humana e intelectual, capaz de formar personalidades maduras y equilibradas, capaces de convivir con los demás en el mundo, nos toparíamos con una aporía aparentemente indestructible. El sabio intenta superar la aporía de la necesidad e imposibilidad de una educación integral del hombre en la posmodernidad y posthumanismo y utiliza la investigación filosófico-pedagógica como recurso para superar esta aporía. La valentía de educar para el bien es el resultado de un itinerario de reflexión e investigación realizado en la doble vía de una profunda teoría filosófico-pedagógica y de una percepción empírica, adquirida a lo largo de relaciones educativas prolongadas y, a veces complejas, vividas en primera persona con los sujetos de la formación. En particular, la práctica educativa de los últimos años parece mostrar cada vez más inequívocamente la urgencia de una renovación de la educación que pase por la fundación de una nueva ciencia de los valores, capaz de encarnarse progresivamente en los pliegues de la historia. Es al mismo tiempo un telos y un imprescindible incipit para el replanteamiento de lo educativo y para superar algunas derivas de la vida contemporánea. (shrink)

Las relaciones entre Nietzsche y América Latina están marcadas por el desencuentro. Lo cual no implica que Nietzsche no haya sido leído en Latinoamérica; pero es diferente aludir a Nietzsche, a asumir una perspectiva nietzscheana. Por eso, en vez de usar a Nietzsche para analizar su moral, para desplazar el punto de vista, en América Latina se moraliza a Nietzsche al ponerlo al servicio de esa moral, dejándola indemne. El caso de la filosofía latinoamericana es síntoma de ese desencuentro: (...) en tanto pensamiento de lo uno, no puede servirse del pensamiento nietzscheano, ya que es imposible construir un pensamiento del origen y la unidad desde un pensamiento de lo múltiple, como el de Nietzsche. Explorar y explotar al máximo ese desencuentro, sin intentar subsanarlo, permite construir la relación entre Nietzsche y América Latina en términos nietzscheanos, lo que implicaría deshacerse de la idea misma de América Latina en tanto sujeto, para concentrarse en la disección de sus fuerzas y en la potencia y miseria de sus pasiones. (shrink)

El miedo, originario y transversal, no está repartido de forma uniforme, como tampoco lo está la fuerza que es capaz de dar sentido, o sea dirección y significado, a los vivientes y las cosas. De modo que, desde el punto de vista político – que aquí tendremos que caracterizar – el incremento y la representación de la fuerza multitudinaria es un factor que puede contribuir a la paz. Mientras las mayorías no se vinculen, organicen y expresen sus proyectos comunes (...) serán siempre “masas” que deben ser gobernadas, usualmente con violencia. Hobbes lo dice de modo explícito cuando al ofrecer las razones por las cuales ha escrito De Cive señala que con su proyecto quiere evitar que hombres ambiciosos abusen de la sangre de los muchos para aumentar su poder personal. (shrink)

Hegel ofrece dos formas -en su filosofía en último análisis complementarias- de caracterizar al idealismo: La primera es próxima a la concepción habitual de idealismo previa a Kant, a saber: como una posición que considera que aquello que conocemos es una modificación de la propia conciencia. La segunda descansa en la tesis de la nulidad de lo finito; según esto, ?idealista? es la filosofía que considera que lo finito no tiene en cuanto tal realidad; ?realista?, a la inversa, es la (...) filosofía que toma el ser de las cosas determinadas como algo fijo y definitivo. Hegel denomina a este idealismo ?absoluto?.El idealismo absoluto es el modelo teórico que interrelaciona la tesis del carácter intrínsecamente ideal de los objetos de conocimiento y la tesis de que las cosas singulares que constituyen el mundo real surgen como una autodeterminación del ser. La premisa que permite tal vínculo es la tesis defendida por Hegel de que ser y pensar nunca se han separado y que su separación es el resultado de una concepción posterior errónea de la mente humana sobre la naturaleza de su actividad cognitiva. La hipostasiación de la disociación que la forma cognitiva de la representación introduce en la unidad indiferenciada de ser y pensar de la que parte la actividad de conocimiento en el sentimiento y la intuición sensibles es para Hegel la que provoca la ilusión retroactiva de que ambos -ser y pensar, mundo conocido y mente que conoce- se diferencian y contraponen. Por el contrario, desde el momento que la sensación es también ella misma un modo particular de la actividad continua e ininterrumpida del pensamiento, en el itinerario que va de la percepción sensible a la comprensión del objeto no hay para Hegel un punto en donde pueda introducirse una fractura que disuelva la unidad primigenia entre el ser y el pensar. En esta precisa medida, el momento final de la actividad de conocimiento, es decir, la actividad de comprender el mundo, es a un tiempo la singularización de los contenidos universales que constituyen la teoría del sujeto sobre el mundo y la autodeterminación de la unidad ser-pensar de la que parte y en todo momento permanece el sujeto que elabora esa teoría. Arribados al punto de vista del concepto, la dicotomía realismo-idealismo queda develada como un corolario de la autoconcepción representacionalista de la subjetividad cognoscente. Esta concepción define al paradigma general del realismo, el cual incluye para Hegel como el anverso y reverso de un mismo modelo teórico tanto lo que tradicionalmente ha sido entendido como realismo como al idealismo que resulta de una universalización de la idealidad de la conciencia singular, ya sea en la variante propuesta por Berkeley, ya sea en la del idealismo trascendental de Kant. A ojos de Hegel, por el contrario, el idealismo no puede ser sino absoluto, es decir, debe incluir en sí mismo el momento del ser y, con él, la realidad de las cosas que el sujeto conoce: la tarea esencial de la filosofía no consiste para Hegel más que en tomar conciencia de la co-pertenencia y unidad intrínseca de ambos. (shrink)

Aunque parece una teoría relativamente simple, la teoría de la selección natural ha traído muchas discusiones al respecto de su reconstrucción. En particular, los autores han tenido dificultades a la hora de elucidar el concepto de aptitud (fitness) adecuadamente. El punto de vista de este trabajo consiste en que para entender adecuadamente esta cuestión, y además, para dar cuenta de manera adecuada de las explicaciones seleccionistas, tanto las dadas por Darwin como sus aplicaciones más actuales, es necesario a la (...) hora de reconstruir la teoría utilizar más conceptos de los que habitualmente se utilizan. En este trabajo se explayará sobre este punto y se presentará una reconstrucción de la teoría en cuestión con las herramientas del estructuralismo metateórico. -/- Title: Structuralist Reconstruction of Natural Selection Theory Abstract: Despite seeming relatively simple Natural Selection Theory has brought up many discussions regarding its reconstruction. In particular, many authors have had difficulties in explicating the concept of fitness. The point of view of this paper is that more concepts are needed in order to, on the one hand, understand more adequately this issue, and on the other hand, to account for selectionist explanations, both Darwin’s and current applications, in an adequate way. Having this in mind, I will offer a reconstruction of Natural Selection Theory using the tools of metatheoretical structuralism. (shrink)

Aproximaciones a la escuela francesa de epistemología Los problemas que dominan a la epistemología pueden contextualizarse históricamente como una forma de racionalidad filosófica. La filosofía se ha presentado a lo largo de la historia como un discurso en el que sus diversos componentes (metafísica, ontología, gnoseología, ética, lógica, etc.) se mostraron unidos en el molde de la ?unidad del saber?. En este marco unitario alguna de las formas del saber filosófico detenta usualmente una posición dominante. El énfasis colocado en la (...) unidad del saber filosófico, o en ?la unidad del pensamiento humano?, es una herencia que el pensamiento filosófico recibe de sus raíces mítico-teológicas. Dicha visión se vio sometida, en la historia de la filosofía, a un proceso de secularización por el cual la instancia dominante pasó de la teología a la metafísica y de ésta a la teoría del conocimiento. Entre los siglos XIX y XX, este proceso atestiguó un cambio ulterior, colocando a la epistemología como instancia dominante de la racionalidad filosófica. La sucesión debe verse como una consecuencia de la funcionalización social de los dispositivos de creencias (ideología), lo que provoca que los mismos se conviertan, en determinado momento, en un obstáculo para la producción de nuevos conocimientos. De esta manera, los nuevos conocimientos, para desarrollarse, se ven forzados a provocar reestructuraciones en el campo filosófico, ya sea mediante el reemplazo de la instancia dominante, la incorporación o creación de nuevas formas de saber filosófico -tal el caso de la epistemología-, o de la marginalización relativa de otras. Se trata de en un proceso complejo (que no es ni lineal, ni biunívoco), en el que cabe no obstante discernir un esquema de la sucesión temporal de las formas filosóficas que dominan la pretendida ?unidad del pensamiento humano? (filosofía). El que acabamos de describir es un proceso lento de sustitución y reemplazo en el tipo de garantías que se le exige elaborar a la filosofía. Algunos momentos, como el ocaso de las garantías de la fe, acaecido con el surgimiento de la filosofía moderna, podrían parecer a primera vista contrajemplos para esta concepción de la evolución del saber filosófico. Podría creerse, en efecto, que con la constitución de esferas autónomas de discurso (teología, ciencia, filosofía), del discurso filosófico se desgajó en un discurso de una naturaleza diferente: la ciencia. Sin embargo, una mirada más atenta revela un paisaje diferente, puesto que esta transformación estuvo acompañada, primero, por la aparición de una nueva instancia dominante de la unificación del conocimiento filosófico. Se trata de la búsqueda de una nueva clase de garantías, las del origen y el fundamento del conocimiento, es decir, las de la gnoseología o teoría del conocimiento, en el interior de la cual se verificó finalmente un nuevo desplazamiento, con la constitución, a fines del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, de la ?filosofía de la ciencia? o epistemología. Este modelo para la conceptualización del desarrollo del discurso filosófico tiene la ventaja de permitirnos pensar la relación que la epistemología guarda con la instancia de saber filosófico dominante en el seno de la cual se desarrolla: la de la gnoseología. A partir de las relaciones que la epistemología guarda con la temática de las garantías del conocimiento podemos apresar, en un esquema heurístico que será complejizado de diversos modos en este libro, la diferencia entre las tesis características de la epistemología anglosajona y de la epistemología francesa. De acuerdo con en este esquema heurístico, el rasgo más característico de la epistemología anglosajona es su sujeción, en la mayor parte de su desarrollo, a la teoría del conocimiento, lo que se revela en la persistencia de algunos aspectos de la filosofía de la representación y en la reproducción de la oposición idealista entre sujeto y objeto como dos polos cuya armonía debería establecerse, filosóficamente, en términos de la verdad. En su lugar, la epistemología francesa se propuso el estudio de los mecanismos de producción de los conocimientos. La epistemología, desde esta perspectiva, ya no fue vista primordialmente como el estudio de los fundamentos del conocimiento científico, sino como la teoría de las condiciones y las formas de la práctica científica y la historia de esta práctica, tal como aparece en las distintas ciencias concretas. Expresado de otra manera, el contraste se podría establecer mediante la observación de que mientras los anglosajones hacen filosofía de la ciencia como una extensión de la lógica, los franceses la hacen como una extensión de la historia de la ciencia, es decir, encontrando en la historia el laboratorio del epistemólogo. Ahora bien, según veremos, el campo de la epistemología francesa ha cobijado una buena cantidad de debates que tienen que ver primordialmente con dos tendencias en tensión: la que enfatiza la autonomía de lo epistemológico y aquella que destaca la determinación social del pensamiento. Los trabajos de este libro esperan problematizar este y otros ejes, explorando las perspectivas de los ?clásicos? de la escuela francesa en epistemología (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser, Foucault, etc.), las relaciones entre los mismos y los diálogos que cabe establecer entre estos y otras corrientes de pensamiento. ÍNDICE: La ruptura epistemológica, de Bachelard a Balibar y Pêcheux, Pedro Karczmarczyk La ruptura epistemológica según Bachelard, Althusser y Badiou, Carlos Gassmann Visitaciones Derrideanas, Jazmín Anahí Acosta Epistemología sin sujeto cognoscente. Superación, disolución o sujeción de la subjetividad en Popper, Wittgenstein y Foucault, Silvia Rivera; La torsión política del concepto de verdad en Michel Foucault, Manuel Cuervo Sola Canguilhem y Foucault. De la norma biológica a la norma política, Andrea Torrano Psicología e ideología: Foucault, Canguilhem y Althusser, Matías Abeijón . (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the notions of adequacy and truth functionality in quantum logic from the point of view of a non-deterministic semantics. We give a characterization of the degree of non-functionality which is compatible with the propositional structure of quantum theory, showing that having truth-functional connectives, together with some assumptions regarding the relation of logical consequence, commits us to the adequacy of the interpretation sets of these connectives. An advantage of our proof is that it is independent of (...) the number of truth values involved, generalizing previous works. We also show the failure of the adequacy of every Nmatrix that is a model of the non-distributive lattice of quantum propositions. En este trabajo discutimos las nociones de adecuación y veritativo-funcionalidad en la lógica cuántica, desde el punto de vista de una semántica no determinista. Damos una caracterización del grado de no-funcionalidad compatible con la estructura proposicional de la teoría cuántica, mostrando que tener conectivos veritativo-funcionales, junto con algunos presupuestos relativos a la relación de consecuencia lógica, nos compromete con la adecuación de los conjuntos de interpretación de estos conectivos. Un punto ventajoso de nuestra prueba es que se independiza de la cantidad de valores de verdad involucrados, generalizando trabajos previos. Probamos también que falla la adecuación de cualquier Nmatriz que sirva como modelo para el retículo no distributivo de proposiciones cuánticas. (shrink)

Este trabalho parte da observação de dois modelos de cursos de formação de professores de língua com o objetivo de discutir alguns requisitos essenciais para a concepção de cursos para formação do professor de Português para Falantes de Outras Línguas (PFOL). Nesse sentido, considera que a formação continuada do professor de língua é um momento singular na carreira desse profissional por permitir o desenvolvimento do pensamento reflexivo em torno de proposições teóricas e situações práticas, como propõem Schön (1992), Pimenta (2002), (...) Alarcão (2003) e Zeichner (2008). Como a busca por modelos de formação de professores de PFOL foi pouco satisfatória, selecionamos para este estudo dois cursos organizados a partir de parcerias entre o poder público e pesquisadores universitários, a saber: o GESTAR – Programa Gestão da Aprendizagem Escolar, direcionado aos professores do Ensino Fundamental e o Projeto COGESP – organizado pela PUC/SP em parceria com a Cultura Inglesa. Os objetivos, as metodologias selecionadas para o curso e as atividades propostas constituem a base das discussões que pretendemos propor neste trabalho, pois queremos verificar como o conceito de reflexão tem sido utilizado em programas de formação de professores. Também nos interessa perceber o jogo de posições estabelecido entre os sujeitos envolvidos na formação, especialmente os professores e formadores, em diferentes momentos dos cursos, uma vez que a mobilização de ideias convergentes e divergentes, entre outros elementos, colaboram para a definição de um certo tipo de modalidade formativa. Por sabermos que são muitos os desafios enfrentados pelos formadores em um projeto dessa natureza, pois precisam assumir complexas tarefas quando trabalham alinhados a uma metodologia reflexiva, queremos propor a definição de três requisitos que podem servir de base para a elaboração de cursos e materiais didáticos reflexivos para professores de PFOL, tendo em vista a conscientização pelo professor dos papéis que assume na sociedade. (shrink)

Questo articolo prende in esame il fenomeno della proliferazione di fake news da un punto di vista filosofico—anzi, per meglio dire, prettamente epistemologico—con particolare attenzione a tre questioni fondamentali: cosa sono le fake news e come debbano essere definite; quali meccanismi ne favoriscono la proliferazione sui social media; chi debba essere ritenuto responsabile e degno di biasimo nel processo sotteso alla generazione, pubblicazione e diffusione di fake news. A partire dall'analisi dei principali lavori nella letteratura filosofica sul tema, ci (...) proponiamo di: offrire una definizione di fake news che eviti le obiezioni sollevate contro altre definizioni discusse dalla letteratura (§1); mettere in luce le principali cause della propagazione di fake news, con particolare riferimento ai bias cognitivi e alle strutture comunitarie in cui si organizzano gli utenti dei social media (§2); infine, presentare una analisi originale della responsabilità epistemica dei consumatori di fake news (§3). (shrink)