One of the central problems in Anne Conway’s metaphysical philosophy is answering the question: what is the identity and nature of the creature than endures through time? There are two basic ways of interpreting Conway’s answer to this question. One interpretation is that the identity is that of a soul, and its nature is material. This is the interpretation taken by Emily Thomas. Another interpretation is that a created spirit is the identity, and its nature is also material. This is (...) the interpretation taken by Rozemond and Simmons. In this paper, I present an interpretation that is a version of Thomas’ thesis. It claims that the identity of Conway’s creature that endures through time is the soul. However, my interpretation goes beyond Thomas’ thesis and against Rozemond and Simmons in that the nature of the soul cannot be strictly material, thus possibly immaterial. This thesis relies on what I call “the contrary thesis,” as applied to Conway’s metaphysical philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that finding Dionysus' counterpart in India is a futile task unless the relation focuses on Dionysus as a divine force of nature variously manifest following the meaning of the Rig Veda verse mentioned above. As Nietzsche saw the Dionysian as a force of nature inherent in the human, it becomes a much more plausible thesis to ascertain a relation of Dionysus to India through Indo-European comparative mythology and philology. This is so because many scholars have (...) given objective status to assertions about Dionysus' relation to India that can at best be only subjectively attested. The fields of Indo-European comparative mythology and philology, because of their very nature of dealing with a body of literature that is yet unattested, provide space for an objectively plausible, though still subjectively arguable, thesis for a relation of Dionysus to India. All this will become evident as we travel from Germany in the early twentieth century to the culture of the Indo-Europeans through Rome, Greece, Persia, Iran, and India. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that none of Socrates’ four arguments for the immortality of the soul can prove it to be immortal. All that the four arguments amount to is an inference to the best explanation. However, this inference to Socrates’ best explanation builds up on a series of informal fallacies and ambiguities, leading to inconsistencies in his overall four-fold argument. The fallacies, ambiguities, and inconsistencies will become clear as we navigate Socrates’ four arguments for the immortality of the (...) soul in the Phaedo. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Callicles has plausible reasons to accuse Socrates of playing word tricks around the notions of nature and convention. Whether Callicles is right or wrong to accuse Socrates of doing so is not the question here but how Plato makes us see by what Socrates and Callicles say the plausible reasons Callicles thinks he has to think he is right. At first, Socrates conventionally regards Callicles as an opponent worthy of engaging in dialectic. As his (...) way of doing philosophy fails to engage Callicles, however, it naturally reveals that Socrates thinks otherwise of Callicles than what he conventionally said. To substantiate this thesis, I will focus extensively on Callicles' Great Speech and Socrates' short speeches before and after it. (shrink)

Certain German scholars’ secular approach to studying Sanskrit in late 18th and earlyand middle 19th century Europe infuenced the establishment of the Wales Professorship of Sanskrit at Harvard. This infuence contrasted it with some English scholars’ religious concerns. While these English scholars were attempting to aid in the Christian conversion of the Hindus, those German scholars were leading the academy into comparative philology. The establishing of the Boden Professorship of Sanskrit at Oxford, the German dominion of theSanskrit teaching professoriate in (...) the Continent, and the German mentorship of early American scholars interested in the study of India attested to this interplay between a German secular approach and an English religious concern with and to the study of Sanskrit. (shrink)

In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Heidegger claims that there are still possibilities for thinking beyond metaphysical philosophy. In his own words, “perhaps there is a thinking that is more sober minded than the incessant frenzy of rationalization… outside of the distinction of rational and irrational.” In Heideggerian fashion, this paper has no thesis. However, it explores Heidegger’s quest for new ways of thinking while shedding light on the antipathy “philosophy” still holds against non-Western, precisely, Indic (...) thinking. This exploration consists of Andrea Nightingale’s argument for Plato’s construction of the discipline of philosophy, Steven Burik’s relation of early and later Heidegger’s claim on the end of philosophy to comparative philosophical thinking, and Mehta’s exploration of Heideggerian Being alongside Vedantic Brahman. (shrink)

Throughout Herman Hesse’s Demian, the use of verbal irony illuminates Sinclair’s struggle to deal appropriately with his callow behavior and thereby evolve. As he tentatively begins to experiment with his sense of self through interactions with friends and family, Sinclair often speaks in indirect ways and skirts direct encounters with the implications of his callowness. As Sinclair comes of age, he awkwardly straddles the dichotomy between the protective world of his family and the threatening outside world. If he says what (...) he really thinks and faces direct implications, he fears he risks losing the comfort of his closest relationships which guide him along his path; yet while he knows the world beyond those relationships is full of existential alienation and solitude, he nevertheless desires to mature, even if that maturity means isolation and pain. The use of verbal irony functions to illuminate the gradual development he undergoes from callousness to a budding acceptance of his existentialism thereby coming to terms with himself. This is evidenced when Demian reprimands him for offering money to Kromer, when he resents having hurt Pistorius, and when his father confronts him in the boarding school. (shrink)

In this paper, I have constructed one likely relation between Schiller’s views on sexual desire and his general aesthetic value theory. I argue that beauty ennobles sexual desire when one rationally realizes that one did not choose to live in a state solely dominated by sexual desire. By allowing oneself to be in this state of aesthetic freedom, sexual desire grows into affection, and one experiences individual freedom. This thesis results from integrating Matherne and Riggle’s reconstruction of Schiller’s theory of (...) aesthetic value in “Schiller on Freedom and Aesthetic Value” with my construction of Schiller’s relation of sexual desire to his theory of aesthetic value. In what follows, I will (1) present Matherne and Riggle’s reconstruction of Schiller’s theory, (2) extract the main arguments about sexual desire from letters three and twenty-seven, (3) combine both main arguments into Schiller’s unstated but likely argument for how one should ennoble sexual desire not only in kind but by beauty, (4) relate this major argument of Schiller’s views on sexual desire to his theory of aesthetic value, and then (5) conclude with final remarks. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Svetambaras fail to persuade the Digambaras because they rely on oppositional inferences instead of straight-up attacks on the Digambara points. For example, unlike the Yapaniyas who claim a piece of clothes should not dictate deliberations on moksha for women, the Svetambaras prefer only to oppose, say, the Digambara position that there is no valid evidence to justify moksha for women by inferring that there is no valid evidence of the opposite either. It would be (...) better to deduce that there is no such evidence than to infer the opposite likelihood. This is further problematic because the nature of inference is not validity but only likelihood. This will become clear as I analyze some of the first arguments and objections both sides pose. (shrink)

Short Papers on Al-bayunniyah's "Principles of Sufism," Hafiz's "Faces of Love," Ibn Tufayl's "Hayy Ibn Yaqzan," and Watt's "Islamic Creeds.".

“Is Zoroastrianism Dualist or Monotheistic?” is an article in which Boyd and Crosby present two dualist and four monotheist responses to that question. The authors submit these six versions to philosophical scrutiny according to the way they manage the problem of evil. Ultimately, the authors opt for a seventh response – their response, which they find more plausible than the previous six other options and meets their criterion of philosophical scrutiny to a better extent. In this paper, I will present (...) the seven versions the authors describe and ask which one responds better to Epicurus’ formulation of the abovementioned problem of evil. I am subjecting the seven versions to Epicurus’ formulation because it is formulated as questions that demand answers. Thus, Epicurus’ formulation provokes an active engagement with its questions. I argue that although Boyd and Crosby’s version does have a philosophical advantage over the others, it cannot guarantee the salvation of humankind given that their view makes it possible to think of the world as an increasingly better place, which humankind might not want to let go of altogether. (shrink)

In "Against Interpretation," published in 1966, Susan Sontag argues against specific approaches to interpreting an artwork that reduces it to an exploration of its content. Sontag claims that an interpretation tries to squeeze more meaning into the content than is already there in the form of the artwork. Hence, Sontag claims, an interpretation of content devalues the sense of form. Sontag asserts that the content consists of the "prescriptive" (12) ideas of an artwork that enable a viewer to arrive at (...) an artist's "picture of reality" or "statement" (4) through an interpretation of its form. In turn, form is the "descriptive" (12) elements of the painting - such as figures, colors, and lines - that should be, in and of themselves, enough to evoke a response in the viewer. Sontag considers this response to the form of the artwork the evocation of its "thing" - the experience of the artwork as it is. It is this individual and unmediated experience of art she considers the stuff of magic, claiming that an interpretation transforms a possibly "incantatory, magical" (3) experience of the artwork into a "portentous" interpretive one. Therefore, Sontag urges viewers to curtail the inclination to interpret the "content" of an artwork so that they can experience its magic - such that it provokes a magical experience (14). (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how Otto Schrader, Krishna Belvalkar, Franklin Edgerton, and Vishwa Adluri justify the plausibility of a Kashmir recension of the Gita by employing the lectio principle. Lectio difficilior means that the more difficult reading is probably the better and older one since scribes may often simplify the difficult reading into a simple one, the lectio facilior, for the later versions of a text. The employment of the lectio principle then pervades these scholars' discussions about the plausibility (...) of a Kashmiri recension of the Bhagavad Gita. However, the problem with the lectio principle is that scholars may employ it to justify their interpretations of a text, although some other interpretations of the exact text may be more plausible. While Adluri calls attention to the employment of the lectio principle by the other scholars regarding the plausibility of a Kashmir Recension of the Bhagavad Gita, he employs the lectio principle himself to justify his opinions which are mainly against Schrader. The use of the lectio principle is thus problematic because of its subjective nature that leaves open the question of what interpretation is definitely, and objectively, more plausible. (shrink)

In his book, "The Religion of the Future," Unger groups distinct philosophies under the term "Overcoming the World." This is problematic because Unger makes several metaphysical and epistemological claims about OW without clearly identifying which of these distinct philosophies supports his allegations. Specifically, Unger groups Vedanta under OW without distinguishing between Advaita and Dvaita Vedantas- two similar but distinct traditions within Vedanta. Thus, while he mainly criticizes the views of Advaita Vedanta, which are similar but not equal to those of (...) Buddhism, Dvaita Vedanta contradicts many of Unger's assumptions on Vedanta. Thus, Unger misleads students who read his book into thinking that Advaita and Dvaita Vedantas are the same. While I will not deal in this paper with the reasons why Unger might have decided to do so, I will introduce and clarify some of the distinctive features within the Dvaita Vedanta tradition that render his criticism of Vedanta in favor of his concept for a future religion problematic and biased. (shrink)