Results for 'Wissenschaftstheorie'

48 found
Order:
  1. Zwischen Klassischer Und Moderner Wissenschaftstheorie: Hermann von Helmholtz Und Karl R. Popper, Erkenntnistheoretisch Verglichen.Gregor Schiemann - 1995 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43 (5):845—859.
    Mit seinem Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der Physiologie, Physik und Geometrie ist Hermann von Helmholtz wie kaum ein anderer Wissenschaftler der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts repräsentativ für die Naturforschung in Deutschland. Nicht weniger repräsentativ nimmt sich die Entwicklung seiner Wissenschaftsauffassung aus. Während er bis in die späten 60er Jahre einen emphatischen Wahrheitsanspruch der Wissenschaft vertrat, begann er in der nachfolgenden Zeit, die Geltungsbedingungen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis einer Relativierung zu unterwerfen, die zusammenfassend als Hypothetisierung bezeichnet werden kann. Helmholtz entwickelte damit (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  79
    Kurt Lewin, Wissenschaftstheorie I. [REVIEW]Barry Smith - 1983 - History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (2):235-238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  95
    Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie.Wiltsche Harald - 2013 - Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht/UTB.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Between Classical and Modern Theory of Science. Hermann von Helmholtz Und Karl R. Popper, Compared Epistemologically.Gregor Schiemann - 1995 - In Heinz Lübbig (ed.), The Inverse Problem. Akademie Verlag und VCH Weinheim.
    With his influence on the development of physiology, physics and geometry, Hermann von Helmholtz – like few scientists of the second half of the 19th century – is representative of the research in natural science in Germany. The development of his understanding of science is not less representative. Until the late sixties, he emphatically claimed the truth of science; later on, he began to see the conditions for the validity of scientific knowledge in relative terms, and this can, in summary, (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  47
    Physikalistische Graphologie Als Avantgarde der Psychologie Oder Physikalismus Auf Abwegen.Thomas Mormann - forthcoming - In Christian Damböck & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Young Carnap in Context 1918 - 1935. Wien, Austria: Springer.
    Die Physikalisierung der Psychologie war für Carnap Teil eines Programms, das die Sonderstellung der Psychologie als Wissenschaft des menschlichen Denkens und Fühlens als Illusion entlarven und zeigen sollte, die Psychologie sei ein Teil der Physik wie alle anderen Wissenschaften auch. In etwas anderer Motivation zielte Carnaps Physikalismus ausserdem auf eine Überwindung der Trennung von Geistes–wissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften: Erwiese sich die Psychologie sich als physikalisierbar, wäre das ein wesentlicher Schritt für die Vereinheitlichung der Wissenschaften in Gestalt einer enzyklopädischen „Einheitswissenschaft“ überhaupt. Carnaps (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  93
    Wertlogik für Anfänger.Werner | G. | Petschko - 2013 - GrundRiss-Verlag.
    Wer sich vom Wesen der Dinge irgendeine wichtige Erkenntnis verspricht, geht von der Annahme aus, daß die Dinge über Eigenschaften verfügen, die sie unabhängig vom Betrachter, also objektiv haben. Die ganze Rationalität dieser Leute besteht im Grund aus nichts anderem. Sie sind der Ansicht, daß man diese Eigenschaften nur gründlich genug erforschen muß, um daraus eine zwingende Logik und entsprechende Rechte ableiten zu können.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction.Seungbae Park - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):75-84.
    The pessimistic induction holds that successful past scientific theories are completely false, so successful current ones are completely false too. I object that past science did not perform as poorly as the pessimistic induction depicts. A close study of the history of science entitles us to construct an optimistic induction that would neutralize the pessimistic induction. Also, even if past theories were completely false, it does not even inductively follow that the current theories will also turn out to be completely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  8. Medizin als Wissenschaft - eine wissenschaftstheoretische Analyse.Holger Lyre - 2018 - In Daniela Ringkamp & Héctor Wittwer (eds.), Was ist Medizin? Der Begriff der Medizin und seine ethischen Implikationen. Alber.
    Gegenstand dieses Beitrags ist eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Medizin. Den Leitfaden der Analyse bildet dabei ein jüngerer Ansatz in der analytischen Wissenschaftstheorie, wonach Systematizität als zentrales Kriterium von Wissenschaft anzusehen ist (Hoyningen-Huene 2013). Ich werde im Detail zeigen, dass die Medizin dieses mehrdimensionale Kriterium insgesamt erfüllt, dass aus der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Medizin aber gleichwohl normative Konsequenzen folgen, die beispielsweise zur Abgrenzung von der Homöopathie und einer kritischen Bewertung des biopsychosozialen Modells führen. Zudem resultieren der Anwendungscharakter der Medizin (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science.Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):381-408.
    There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  10. Understanding and Trusting Science.Matthew H. Slater, Joanna K. Huxster & Julia E. Bresticker - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (2):247-261.
    Science communication via testimony requires a certain level of trust. But in the context of ideologically-entangled scientific issues, trust is in short supply—particularly when the issues are politically ‘entangled’. In such cases, cultural values are better predictors than scientific literacy for whether agents trust the publicly-directed claims of the scientific community. In this paper, we argue that a common way of thinking about scientific literacy—as knowledge of particular scientific facts or concepts—ought to give way to a second-order understanding of science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11.  62
    Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:00-00.
    The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):569-579.
    Bird argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  13. Non-Factive Understanding: A Statement and Defense.Yannick Doyle, Spencer Egan, Noah Graham & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (3):345-365.
    In epistemology and philosophy of science, there has been substantial debate about truth’s relation to understanding. “Non-factivists” hold that radical departures from the truth are not always barriers to understanding; “quasi-factivists” demur. The most discussed example concerns scientists’ use of idealizations in certain derivations of the ideal gas law from statistical mechanics. Yet, these discussions have suffered from confusions about the relevant science, as well as conceptual confusions. Addressing this example, we shall argue that the ideal gas law is best (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):451-459.
    Dellsén has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s ; epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15. Explicating Objectual Understanding: Taking Degrees Seriously.Christoph Baumberger - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1:1-22.
    The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: An epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  16.  58
    How to Formulate Scientific Realism and Antirealism.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (4):477–488.
    The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific realists and antirealists should choose the former over the latter as the framework of their debate.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
    Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way in which scientists (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  18. Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):59-68.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denying a key (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  19. Making Sense of Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms From a Metaphysical Perspective.Beate Krickel - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):453-468.
    According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than another acting entity if and only if the former is a component in the mechanism for the latter. Craver and Bechtel :547–563, 2007. doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8) argue that a consequence of this view is that there cannot be causal interactions between acting entities at different mechanistic levels. Their main reason seems to be what I will call the Metaphysical Argument: things at different levels of a mechanism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science.Seungbae Park - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):115–124.
    What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  21.  40
    Copernican Reasoning About Intelligent Extraterrestrials: A Reply to Simpson.Samuel Ruhmkorff & Tingao Jiang - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (4):561-571.
    Copernican reasoning involves considering ourselves, in the absence of other information, to be randomly selected members of a reference class. Consider the reference class intelligent observers. If there are extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs), taking ourselves to be randomly selected intelligent observers leads to the conclusion that it is likely the Earth has a larger population size than the typical planet inhabited by intelligent life, for the same reason that a randomly selected human is likely to come from a more populous country. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Unification and Revolution: A Paradigm for Paradigms.Nicholas Maxwell - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):133-149.
    Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Technology and Epistemic Possibility.Isaac Record - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (2):1-18.
    My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical entity like Laplace’s Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I’ll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24. The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):461–466.
    In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Re-Enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):201-224.
    In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  26. Interdisciplinarity in Philosophy of Science.Marie I. Kaiser, Maria Kronfeldner & Robert Meunier - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):59-70.
    This paper examines various ways in which philosophy of science can be interdisciplinary. It aims to provide a map of relations between philosophy and sciences, some of which are interdisciplinary. Such a map should also inform discussions concerning the question “How much philosophy is there in the philosophy of science?” In Sect. 1, we distinguish between synoptic and collaborative interdisciplinarity. With respect to the latter, we furthermore distinguish between two kinds of reflective forms of collaborative interdisciplinarity. We also briefly explicate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27. There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):377-384.
    There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths.Timothy D. Lyons - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):317-338.
    According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?Antonio Diéguez-Lucena - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):393 - 403.
    In his paper "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan's criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon's statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):581-590.
    We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Wien Und München: Zwei Stationen der Deutschsprachigen Wissenschaftsphilosophie Im 20. Jahrhundert.Thomas Mormann - 2010 - In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Vertreibung, Transformation und Rückkehr der Wissenschaftstheorie. Am Beispiel von Rudolf Carnap und Wolfgang Stegmüller. Lit Verlag.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Don’T Blame the Idealizations.Nicholaos Jones - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):85-100.
    Idealizing conditions are scapegoats for scientific hypotheses, too often blamed for falsehood better attributed to less obvious sources. But while the tendency to blame idealizations is common among both philosophers of science and scientists themselves, the blame is misplaced. Attention to the nature of idealizing conditions, the content of idealized hypotheses, and scientists’ attitudes toward those hypotheses shows that idealizing conditions are blameless when hypotheses misrepresent. These conditions help to determine the content of idealized hypotheses, and they do so in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Bohr as a Phenomenological Realist.Towfic Shomar - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (2):321-349.
    There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism, which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist, because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Photographic Evidence and the Problem of Theory-Ladenness.Nicola Mößner - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):111–125.
    Scientists use visualisations of different kinds in a variety of ways in their scientific work. In the following article, we will take a closer look at the use of photographic pictures as scientific evidence. In accordance with Patrick Maynard’s thesis, photography will be regarded as a family of technologies serving different purposes in divergent contexts. One of these is its ability to detect certain phenomena. Nonetheless, with regard to the philosophical thesis of theory-ladenness of observation, we encounter certain reservations concerning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Relativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium.Howard Sankey - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):281-292.
    In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Science and Fiction: Analysing the Concept of Fiction in Science and its Limits.Ann-Sophie Barwich - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):357-373.
    A recent and growing discussion in philosophy addresses the construction of models and their use in scientific reasoning by comparison with fiction. This comparison helps to explore the problem of mediated observation and, hence, the lack of an unambiguous reference of representations. Examining the usefulness of the concept of fiction for a comparison with non-denoting elements in science, the aim of this paper is to present reasonable grounds for drawing a distinction between these two kinds of representation. In particular, my (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Is Really Something Wrong with Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann, “What’s Wrong with Microphysicalism?”.Holger Lyre - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1):167-171.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Handeln und Verursachen.Geert Keil - 2000 - Klostermann.
    Wenn wir handeln, greifen wir in den Lauf der Welt ein und führen Veränderungen herbei, von denen wir zu Recht denken, daß sie nicht eingetreten wären, hätten wir nicht eingegriffen. Durch menschliche Eingriffe herbeigeführte Veränderungen machen aber nur einen kleinen Teil dessen aus, was in der Welt geschieht. Der größere Teil geschieht ohne unser Zutun. Beide Arten von Geschehnissen werden sowohl alltagssprachlich wie philosophisch in kausalem Vokabular beschrieben. Handelnde werden als kausale Urheber eines Geschehens verstanden; zugleich sind die mit Handlungen (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Muller’s Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):103-114.
    For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40.  67
    Popper Als Ethiker.Christoph Lutge - 2001 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 26 (2):149-162.
    Karl Popper hat eine Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie, eine Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften, eine Sozialphilosophie, eine Philosophie des Geistes und sogar Beiträge zur Ästhetik geliefert. Lediglich eine Ethik fehlt, was bei Popper, der sich immer als Philosoph der Aufklärung bezeichnete, doch etwas erstaunt. Ich werde versuchen, Elemente einer solchen Ethik zu rekonstruieren. Karl Poppers Beiträge zur Ethik sind relativ wenig bekannt. Dies dürfte vor allem daran liegen, dass sich keine seiner Arbeiten ausschließlich mit Ethik beschäftigt. Stattdessen findet man Bemerkungen zu diesem (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  67
    Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Normativität und Bayesianismus.Stephan Hartmann & Ludwig Fahrbach - 2005 - In B. Gesang (ed.), Deskriptive oder normative Wissenschaftstheorie. ontos-Verlag. pp. 177-204.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  79
    Scientific Images as Circulating Ideas: An Application of Ludwik Fleck’s Theory of Thought Styles.Nicola Mößner - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):307-329.
    Without doubt, there is a great diversity of scientific images both with regard to their appearances and their functions. Diagrams, photographs, drawings, etc. serve as evidence in publications, as eye-catchers in presentations, as surrogates for the research object in scientific reasoning. This fact has been highlighted by Stephen M. Downes who takes this diversity as a reason to argue against a unifying representation-based account of how visualisations play their epistemic role in science. In the following paper, I will suggest an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  78
    Review of WILLARD QUINE, Philosophy of Logic, Harvard, 1970/1986. [REVIEW]John Corcoran - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39:37-39.
    This book is best regarded as a concise essay developing the personal views of a major philosopher of logic and as such it is to be welcomed by scholars in the field. It is not (and does not purport to be) a treatment of a significant portion of those philosophical problems generally thought to be germane to logic. It would be easy to list many popular topics in philosophy of logic which it does not mention. Even its "definition" of logic-"the (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  96
    Science and Politics: Dangerous Liaisons.Neven Sesardić - 1992 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 23 (1):129-151.
    In contrast to the opinion of numerous authors (e.g. R. Rudner, P. Kitcher, L. R. Graham, M. Dummett, N. Chomsky, R. Lewontin, etc.) it is argued here that the formation of opinion in science should be greatly insulated from political considerations. Special attention is devoted to the view that methodological standards for evaluation of scientific theories ought to vary according to the envisaged political uses of these theories.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  28
    Reconstruction of Scientific Theory Change.Rinat M. Nugayev & Christian Suhm - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):206-210.
    In his book “Reconstruction of Scientific Change” R.M. Nugayev proposes a new model of theory change by analyzing the reasons for theory change in science. Nugayev’s theoretical concept is based on a realist’s philosophical attitude. The most important notions of Nugayev’ s conception of theory change are “theories’ cross” and “crossbred objects”, which he takes from the terminology of other Russian philosophers of science (Bransky, Podgoretzky, Smorodinsky). His investigations often refer to several famous Western philosophers. Yet his study is not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  31
    Die Berliner Gruppe: Texte zum Logischen Empirismus.Nikolay Milkov (ed.) - 2015 - Felix Meiner.
    Die Berliner Gruppe um Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Lewin, Walter Dubislav, Alexander Herzberg, Kurt Grelling und Carl Gustav Hempel, die die »Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Philosophie« in Berlin leitete, verstand sich als gleichberechtigter Partner der Wiener Kollegen und schlug durchaus einen eigenständigen Weg zu »einer an der exakten Wissenschaft geschulten Philosophie« (Reichenbach) ein. Im öffentlichen und geistigen Leben der deutschen Hauptstadt spielte sie eine bedeutende Rolle, bevor ihre Mitglieder durch den Nationalsozialismus ins Exil gezwungen wurden. Nach ihrer Emigration haben Reichenbach, Hempel und (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Natur Im Labor. Themenschwerpunkt in Philosophia Naturalis Bd. 43, Heft 1-2.Gregor Schiemann & Kristian Köchy (eds.) - 2006 - Klostermann..
    Seit Beginn der frühen Neuzeit ist das naturwissenschaftliche Verfahren maßgeblich durch ein neues Konzept geprägt: das Konzept des experimentellen, gestalterischen Eingriffs in die Natur. Es geht nun nicht mehr darum, eine Geschichte der "freien und ungebundenen Natur" (Bacon) zu erzählen, die in ihrem eigenen Lauf belassen und als vollkommene Bildung betrachtet wird. Es geht vielmehr darum, der "gebundenen und bezwungenen Natur" (Bacon) vermittels der experimentellen Tätigkeit des Menschen die Geheimnisse zu entreißen. Diese technisch-praktische Konzeption grenzt sich explizit von den klassischen (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark