Results for 'armchair philosophizing'

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  1. The Aporetic Structure of Philosophical Problems.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Journal of Didactics of Philosophy 3 ((1)):5-18.
    The central idea of this essay is that philosophical thinking revolves around aporetic clusters, i.e., sets of individually plausible, but collectively inconsistent propositions. The task of philosophy is to dissolve such clusters, either by showing that the propositions in question, contrary to first impression, are compatible with each other, or by showing that it is permissible to abandon at least one of the propositions involved. This view of philosophical problems not only provides a very good description of well-understood philosophizing, (...)
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  2. Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy.Jennifer Nagel & Kaija Mortensen - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 53-70.
    Once symbolized by a burning armchair, experimental philosophy has in recent years shifted away from its original hostility to traditional methods. Starting with a brief historical review of the experimentalist challenge to traditional philosophical practice, this chapter looks at research undercutting that challenge, and at ways in which experimental work has evolved to complement and strengthen traditional approaches to philosophical questions.
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  3. Armchair Access and Imagination.Giada Fratantonio - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):525-547.
    In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins (2005), and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The (...)
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  4. From Armchair to Wheelchair: How Patients with a Locked-in Syndrome Integrate Bodily Changes in Experienced Identity.Marie-Christine Nizzi, Athena Demertzi, Olivia Gosseries, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, François Jouen & Steven Laureys - 2012 - Consciouness and Cognition 21 (1):431-437.
    Different sort of people are interested in personal identity. Philosophers frequently ask what it takes to remain oneself. Caregivers imagine their patients’ experience. But both philosophers and caregivers think from the armchair: they can only make assumptions about what it would be like to wake up with massive bodily changes. Patients with a locked-in syndrome (LIS) suffer a full body paralysis without cognitive impairment. They can tell us what it is like. Forty-four chronic LIS patients and 20 age-matched healthy (...)
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  5.  90
    Armchair Knowledge and Modal Skepticism: A Rapprochement.Felipe Leon - 2009 - Dissertation, University of California, Riverside
    The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge (...)
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  6. In Defence of Armchair Expertise.Theodore Bach - 2019 - Theoria 85 (5):350-382.
    In domains like stock brokerage, clinical psychiatry, and long‐term political forecasting, experts generally fail to outperform novices. Empirical researchers agree on why this is: experts must receive direct or environmental learning feedback during training to develop reliable expertise, and these domains are deficient in this type of feedback. A growing number of philosophers resource this consensus view to argue that, given the absence of direct or environmental philosophical feedback, we should not give the philosophical intuitions or theories of expert philosophers (...)
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  7. Evidence and Armchair Access.Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):479-500.
    In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of the (...)
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  8. Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):58-70.
    Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which (...)
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  9. The Real Trouble for Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism.Adam Pautz - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 153-181.
    I criticize some armchair arguments against phenomenal externalism due to Block, Hawthorne, Kriegel, Levine, Shoemaker and others. I conclude by discussing an overlooked armchair argument: the argument from phenomenal localism.
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  10. The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye.Ned Block - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue that first (...)
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  11. Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):595-612.
    The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...)
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  12.  89
    Epistemic Luck and Logical Necessities: Armchair Luck Revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Smiljana Gartner Bojan Borstner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.
    Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, therefore, qualifies as (...)
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  13. The Reliability of Memory: An Argument From the Armchair.Ali Hasan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.
    The “problem of memory” in epistemology is concerned with whether and how we could have knowledge, or at least justification, for trusting our apparent memories. I defend an inductive solution—more precisely, an abductive solution—to the problem. A natural worry is that any such solution would be circular, for it would have to depend on memory. I argue that belief in the reliability of memory can be justified from the armchair, without relying on memory. The justification is, roughly, that my (...)
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  14. The Counterexample Method and Armchair Philosophy.Peyman Pourghannad & Davood Hosseini - manuscript
    According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, we may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real situation does not fit with what the theory implies. In this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is at most either untenable or otherwise useless in bringing about what is commonly expected from it.
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  15.  64
    (Philosophizing About) Gender-Open Children.Saray Ayala-López - 2020 - Feminism and Philosophy Newsletter, American Philosophical Association.
    I’m at the playground with my baby, and a smiling adult inquires, “Is it a boy or a girl?” Scientific studies show that if I say X, they will see my baby as doing A, being A, feeling A—versus if I say Y.1 They’ll likely make different assumptions about whether my baby is able to climb up the playground structures and sit without support, and they’ll encourage my baby to engage in different activities.2 And of course, they’ll respond to them (...)
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  16. Philosophizing About the Mind.Massimo Pigliucci - 2002 - Philosophy Now 36:11-13.
    A brief inquiry into philosophy of mind, its history, and its current schools of thought.
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  17. No need to get up from the armchair.Dan Baras - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):575-590.
    Several authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be (...)
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  18. Experimental Philosophy, Williamson’s Expertise Defense of Armchair Philosophy and the Value of the History of Philosophy.Lucas Thorpe - 2016 - In Philosophy at Yeditepe: Special Issue on Philosophical Methodology. Istanbul: pp. 169-184.
    This paper examines Timothy Williamson's recent 'expertise defense' of armchair philosophy mounted by skeptical experimental philosophers. The skeptical experimental philosophers argue that the methodology of traditional 'armchair' philosophers rests up trusting their own intuitions about particular problem cases. Empirical studies suggest that these intuitions are not generally shared and that such intuitions are strongly influenced factors that are not truth conducive such as cultural background or whether or not the question is asked in a messy or tidy office. (...)
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  19. Filozofowanie a prawda o człowieku / Philosophizing and the True Knowledge of Human Being, 2014.Marek Pepliński - 2014 - Filo-Sofija 26 (3):85-98.
    Philosophizing and the True Knowledge of Human Being -/- The article presents the principles and method of classical philosophy. This kind of philosophy, developed mainly in ancient and medieval times, is still viable and interesting today. What is more important, it can be used as grounds for academic philosophy. Doing so provides a philosopher with resources for autonomy in her philosophical inquiry as well as the usefulness and application of its results for various cultural, social, and political tasks. The (...)
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  20.  57
    The Beneficial Relationship Between Theorizing, Philosophizing, and Practicing.Deborah A. Fox - manuscript
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  21. Emotional A.I. Research: The Importance of Data-Philosophizing to Account for Cultural Differences.Ho Manh Tung - unknown
    The discourse on emotional A.I., i.e., technologies that read, classify, identify human emotions, is currently dominated by Western ideas1. Yet, even A.I. researchers in the West acknowledge there are cultural differences if neglected could magnify and affect A.I.'s accuracy.
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  22. Superimposed Mental Imagery: On the Uses of Make-Perceive.Robert Briscoe - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. pp. 161-185.
    Human beings have the ability to ‘augment’ reality by superimposing mental imagery on the visually perceived scene. For example, when deciding how to arrange furniture in a new home, one might project the image of an armchair into an empty corner or the image of a painting onto a wall. The experience of noticing a constellation in the sky at night is also perceptual-imaginative amalgam: it involves both seeing the stars in the constellation and imagining the lines that connect (...)
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  23. The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2015 - Discipline Filosofiche 25 (1):23-42.
    Must philosophers incorporate tools of experimental science into their methodological toolbox? I argue here that they must. Tallying up all the resources that are now part of standard practice in analytic philosophy, we see the problem that they do not include adequate resources for detecting and correcting for their own biases and proclivities towards error. Methodologically sufficient resources for error- detection and error-correction can only come, in part, from the deployment of specific methods from the sciences. However, we need not (...)
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  24. Empirically Investigating Imaginative Resistance.Shen-yi Liao, Nina Strohminger & Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2014 - British Journal of Aesthetics 54 (3):339-355.
    Imaginative resistance refers to a phenomenon in which people resist engaging in particular prompted imaginative activities. Philosophers have primarily theorized about this phenomenon from the armchair. In this paper, we demonstrate the utility of empirical methods for investigating imaginative resistance. We present two studies that help to establish the psychological reality of imaginative resistance, and to uncover one factor that is significant for explaining this phenomenon but low in psychological salience: genre. Furthermore, our studies have the methodological upshot of (...)
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  25. Third‐Person Knowledge Ascriptions: A Crucial Experiment for Contextualism.Jumbly Grindrod, James Andow & Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind and Language:1-25.
    In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the results of these experiments have not supported the original motivation for epistemic contextualism. That is partly because experiments have only uncovered effects of changing context on knowledge ascriptions in limited experimental circumstances (when contrast is present, for example), and partly because existing experiments have not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one (...)
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  26. Color Adjectives, Standards, and Thresholds: An Experimental Investigation.Nat Hansen & Emmanuel Chemla - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (3):1--40.
    Are color adjectives ("red", "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives attempt to answer that question using informal ("armchair") judgments. The informal judgments of theorists conflict: it has been proposed that color adjectives are absolute with standards anchored at the minimum degree on the scale, that they are absolute but have near-midpoint standards, and that they are relative. In this paper we report two experiments, one based on entailment patterns and one (...)
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  27. Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256.
    A number of philosophers have recently suggested that the role of intuitions in the epistemology of armchair philosophy has been exaggerated. This suggestion is rehearsed and endorsed. What bearing does the rejection of the centrality of intuition in armchair philosophy have on experimentalist critiques of the latter? I distinguish two very different kinds of experimentalist critique: one critique requires the centrality of intuition; the other does not.
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  28.  56
    High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is the correct procedure for determining the contents of perception? Philosophers tackling this question increasingly rely on empirically-oriented procedures in order to reach an answer. I argue that this constitutes an improvement over the armchair methodology constitutive of phenomenal contrast cases, but that there is a crucial respect in which current empirical procedures remain limited: they are unimodal in nature, wrongly treating the senses as isolatable faculties. I thus have two aims: first, to motivate a reorientation of the (...)
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  29. Ultra-Liberal Attitude Reports.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2043-2062.
    Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain ‘ultra-liberal’ uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call ‘descriptivism’; and (...)
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  30. Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place Under the Sun.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In D. Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 7-46.
    What is the rationale for the methodological innovations of experimental philosophy? This paper starts from the contention that common answers to this question are implausible. It then develops a framework within which experimental philosophy fulfills a specific function in an otherwise traditionalist picture of philosophical inquiry. The framework rests on two principal ideas. The first is Frank Jackson’s claim that conceptual analysis is unavoidable in ‘serious metaphysics’. The second is that the psychological structure of concepts is extremely intricate, much more (...)
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  31. From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:349-377.
    I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming (...)
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  32. Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential (...)
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  33. Speaker’s Reference, Stipulation, and a Dilemma for Conceptual Engineers.Max Deutsch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3935-3957.
    Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is trivial to implement but of very little value, representing no new or especially fruitful method of philosophizing. Two key distinctions frame this dilemma and explain its two horns. First, the distinction between speaker’s meaning and reference and semantic meaning and reference reveals a severe implementation problem for one construal of conceptual engineering. Second, (...)
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  34. Le paradoxe du progrès : Cournot, Stent et Ruyer.Philippe Gagnon - 2014 - In Michel Weber Vincent Berne (ed.), Chromatikon X : Annales de la Philosophie En Procès – Yearbook of Philosophy in Process. pp. 71-90.
    This text reconsiders the philosophizing into the future of mankind and futurology done by molecular biologist Gunther Stent in *The Coming of the Golden Age* in the light of Raymond Ruyer's critical notice published in the aftermath of the publication of Stent's book in French translation. For Ruyer, it is an occasion to revisit his own take on what he called in his last work a "theology of the opposition between the organic and the rational," and to restate in (...)
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  35. What Anti-Individualists Cannot Know a Priori.Susana Nuccetelli - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):48-51.
    Note first that knowledge of one's own thought-contents would not count as a priori according to the usual criteria for knowledge of this kind. Surely, then, incompatibilists are using this term to refer to some other, stipulatively defined, epistemic property. But could this be, as suggested by McKinsey { 1 99 1: 9), the property of being knowable 'just by thinking' or 'from the armchair'? Certainly not if these were metaphors for knowledge attainable on the basis of reason alone, (...)
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  36. Human Rights: Moral or Political?Adam Etinson - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Human rights have a rich life in the world around us. Political rhetoric pays tribute to them, or scorns them. Citizens and activists strive for them. The law enshrines them. And they live inside us too. For many of us, human rights form part of how we understand the world and what must (or must not) be done within it. -/- The ubiquity of human rights raises questions for the philosopher. If we want to understand these rights, where do we (...)
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  37. Intuitive Evidence and Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - In Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology. Bloomsbury. pp. 155–73.
    In recent years, some defenders of traditional philosophical methodology have argued that certain critiques of armchair methods are mistaken in assuming that intuitions play central evidential roles in traditional philosophical methods. According to this kind of response, experimental philosophers attack a straw man; it doesn’t matter whether intuitions are reliable, because philosophers don’t use intuitions in the way assumed. Deutsch (2010), Williamson (2007), and Cappelen (2012) all defend traditional methods in something like this way. I also endorsed something like (...)
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  38.  96
    Attention to Mental Paint and Change Detection.Assaf Weksler - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1991-2007.
    According to the influential thesis of attentional transparency, in having or reflecting on an ordinary visual experience, we can attend only outwards, to qualities the experience represents, never to intrinsic qualities of the experience itself, i.e., to “mental paint.” According to the competing view, attentional semitransparency, although we usually attend outwards, to qualities the experience represents, we can also attend inwards, to mental paint. So far, philosophers have debated this topic in strictly armchair means, especially phenomenological reflection. My aim (...)
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  39. Melting Musics, Fusing Sounds. Stumpf, Hornbostel and Comparative Musicology in Berlin.R. Martinelli - 2014 - In R. Bod, J. Maat & T. Weststeijn (eds.), The Making of the Humanities. Vol. III: The Modern Humanities. Amsterdam University Press. pp. 391-401.
    The ancient Greeks already used to give ethnic names to their different scales, and observations on differences in music of the various nations always raised the interest of musicians and philosophers. Yet, it was only in the late nineteenth century that “comparative musicology” became an institutional science. An important role in this process was played by Carl Stumpf, a former pupil of Brentano’s who pioneered these researches in Berlin. Stumpf founded the Phonogrammarchiv to collect recordings of folk and extra-European music (...)
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  40. Evidence and Intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
    Many philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with (...)
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  41. Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason.Colin Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
    Spinoza claims we can control any passion by forming a more clear and distinct idea of it. The interpretive consensus is that Spinoza is either wrong or over-stating his view. I argue that Spinoza’s view is plausible and insightful. After breaking down Spinoza’s characterization of the relevant act, I consider four existing interpretations and conclude that each is unsatisfactory. I then consider a further problem for Spinoza: how his definitions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ make room for passions becoming action. I (...)
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  42. First Philosophy and Natural Philosophy in Descartes.Gary Hatfield - 1985 - In A. J. Holland (ed.), Philosophy, Its History and Historiography. Reidel. pp. 149-164.
    Descartes was both metaphysician and natural philosopher. He used his metaphysics to ground portions of his physics. However, as should be a commonplace but is not, he did not think he could spin all of his physics out of his metaphysics a priori, and in fact he both emphasized the need for appeals to experience in his methodological remarks on philosophizing about nature and constantly appealed to experience in describing his own philosophy of nature. During the 1630s, he offered (...)
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  43. Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2008 - Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):39-58.
    First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of “experimental philosophy,” in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons’ intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy—independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage with (...)
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  44. African Sage Philosophy and Socrates: Midwifery and Method.Gail M. Presbey - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):177-192.
    The paper explores the methodology and goals of H. Odera Oruka’s sage philosophy project. Oruka interviewed wise persons who were mostly illiterate and from the rural areas of Kenya to show that a long tradition of critical thinking and philosophizing exists in Africa, even if there is no written record. His descriptions of the role of the academic philosopher turned interviewer varied, emphasizing their refraining from imposition of their own views, their adding their own ideas, or their midwifery in (...)
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  45. Filozofowanie a prawda o człowieku.Marek Pepliński - 2014 - Filo-Sofija 14 (26):85-98.
    Philosophizing and the True Knowledge of Human Being -/- Abstract -/- The article presents the principles and method of classical philosophy. This kind of philosophy, developed mainly in ancient and medieval times, is still viable and interesting today. What is more important, it can be used as grounds for academic philosophy. Doing so provides a philosopher with resources for autonomy in her philosophical inquiry as well as the usefulness and application of its results for various cultural, social, and political (...)
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  46.  76
    The Risks of (Doing) Philosophy.Ruel F. Pepa - manuscript
    Philosophizing is at risk in the face of dogmatism, either political or religious. In political and/or religious circumstances where freedom of expression is curtailed, the risk of critical and discursive philosophizing (pursued both analytically and synthetically) is extremely far above the ground. As a case in point, getting into a balanced critical and appreciative philosophical deliberation (reflection and discourse) on the Israeli-Palestinian political conflicts and controversies right inside Israel with politically fired-up Israelis both intellectual and non-intellectual alike is (...)
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  47. Philosophy Versus Literature? Against the Discontinuity Thesis.Bence Nanay - 2013 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71 (4):349-360.
    According to what I call the ‘Discontinuity Thesis’, literature can never count as genuine philosophizing: there is an impermeable barrier separating it from philosophy. While philosophy presents logically valid arguments in favor of or against precisely formulated statements, literature gives neither precisely formulated theses nor arguments in favor of or against them. Hence, philosophers don’t lose out on anything if they don’t read literature. There are two obvious ways of questioning the Discontinuity Thesis. First, arguing that literature can indeed (...)
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  48.  95
    Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein by Edward Kanterian (2007).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life and thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (ie, like everyone else) it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets some critical points wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and that W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise from this book that he laid out the (...)
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  49.  89
    “A Small, Shabby Crystal, yet a Crystal”: A Life of Music in Wittgenstein’s Denkbewegungen.Eran Guter - 2019 - In B. Sieradzka-Baziur, I. Somavilla & C. Hamphries (eds.), Wittgenstein's Denkbewegungen. Diaries 1930-1932/1936-1937: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Innsbruck, Austria: StudienVerlag. pp. 83-112.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein's life and writings attest the extraordinary importance that the art of music had for him. It would be fair to say even that among the great philosophers of the twentieth century he was one of the most musically sensitive. Wittgenstein’s Denkbewegungen contains some of his most unique remarks on music, which bear witness not only to the level of his engagement in thinking about music, but also to the intimate connection in his mind between musical acculturation, the perils (...)
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  50. Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.
    I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey argues that incompatibilist (...)
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