Results for 'assertoric responsibility'

990 found
Order:
  1. Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics.Andrew Peet - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):914-932.
    I argue that assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities undertaken by communicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitments are distinguished by being generated directly in virtue of the words the speaker uses. This raises two questions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the content thus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distinguish between commitments in terms of their manner of generation? I answer the first question by developing a novel (...) based metasemantics. I answer the second by reference to the conflicting pressures governing the resources we have available for appraising speech. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  2. The Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters: Towards an Assertion-Based Account.Michele Giavazzi - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):111-131.
    It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. (1 other version)Schiffer's Puzzle: A Kind of Fregean Response.Ray Buchanan - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 128-148.
    In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’, Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature. A proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition ‘the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of [the relevant object] in different ways’ (129). But as no Fregean or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.
    Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5. Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
    Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts that can be lies and speech acts that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  6. Negative Epistemic Exemplars.Mark Alfano & Emily Sullivan - 2019 - In Benjamin R. Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
    In this chapter, we address the roles that exemplars might play in a comprehensive response to epistemic injustice. Fricker defines epistemic injustices as harms people suffer specifically in their capacity as (potential) knowers. We focus on testimonial epistemic injustice, which occurs when someone’s assertoric speech acts are systematically met with either too little or too much credence by a biased audience. Fricker recommends a virtue­theoretic response: people who do not suffer from biases should try to maintain their disposition towards (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. The poet affirmeth.Emanuel Viebahn - manuscript
    This paper is concerned with fictive utterances, the authorial utterances that make up works of fiction. It is widely held that fictive utterances cannot be constative speech acts, such as assertions. Instead, fictive utterances are construed as pretended speech acts, as invitations to make-believe or as declarations. My aim is to challenge the non-constative consensus and to defend a view on which fictive utterances are constative speech acts after all, namely constatives that have a story as their target. I motivate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Counterevidentials.Laura Caponetto & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Moorean constructions are famously odd: it is infelicitous to deny that you believe what you claim to be true. But what about claiming that p, only to immediately put into question your evidence in support of p? In this paper, we identify and analyse a class of quasi-Moorean constructions, which we label counterevidentials. Although odd, counterevidentials can be accommodated as felicitous attempts to mitigate one’s claim right after making it. We explore how counterevidentials differ from lexicalised mitigation operators, parentheticals, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Warrant and Objectivity.Jon Barton - 2008 - Dissertation, Kings College London
    Wright's _Truth and Objectivity_ seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. -/- Dummett introduced 'anti-realism' as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. _Truth and Objectivity_ proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Petition to Include Cephalopods as “Animals” Deserving of Humane Treatment under the Public Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.New England Anti-Vivisection Society, American Anti-Vivisection Society, The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, The Humane Society of the United States, Humane Society Legislative Fund, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Judit Pungor, Jennifer Mather, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Lori Marino, Greg Barord, Carl Safina, Heather Browning & Walter Veit - forthcoming - Harvard Law School Animal Law and Policy Clinic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. Does Global Business Have a Responsibility to Promote Just Institutions?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2009 - Business Ethics Quarterly 19 (2):251-273.
    ABSTRACT:Drawing upon John Rawls's framework inThe Law of Peoples,this paper argues that MNEs have a responsibility to promote well-ordered social and political institutions in host countries that lack them. This responsibility is grounded in a negative duty not to cause harm. In addition to addressing the objection that promoting well-ordered institutions represents unjustified interference by MNEs, the paper provides guidance for managers of MNEs operating in host countries that lack just institutions. The paper argues for understanding corporate (...) in relation to the specific institutional environment in which MNEs operate. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  12. Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.
    Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  13. Borderline Personality Disorder and Moral Responsibility.Agnès Baehni - forthcoming - Medicine Health Care and Philosophy.
    This paper seeks to determine the extent to which individuals with borderline personality disorders can be held morally responsible for a particular subset of their actions: disproportionate anger, aggressions and displays of temper. The rationale for focusing on these aspects lies in their widespread acknowledgment in the literature and their plausible primary association with blame directed at BPD patients. BPD individuals are indeed typically perceived as “difficult patients” (Sulzer 2015, Bodner et al. 2011), significantly more so than schizophrenic or depressive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.
    In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4, I contrast the absence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  15. A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.
    In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. Can ChatGPT be an author? Generative AI creative writing assistance and perceptions of authorship, creatorship, responsibility, and disclosure.Paul Formosa, Sarah Bankins, Rita Matulionyte & Omid Ghasemi - forthcoming - AI and Society.
    The increasing use of Generative AI raises many ethical, philosophical, and legal issues. A key issue here is uncertainties about how different degrees of Generative AI assistance in the production of text impacts assessments of the human authorship of that text. To explore this issue, we developed an experimental mixed methods survey study (N = 602) asking participants to reflect on a scenario of a human author receiving assistance to write a short novel as part of a 3 (high, medium, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. The Missing Link Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Consumer Trust: The Case of Fair Trade Products.Sandro Castaldo, Francesco Perrini, Nicola Misani & Antonio Tencati - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 84 (1):1-15.
    This paper investigates the link between the consumer perception that a company is socially oriented and the consumer intention to buy products marketed by that company. We suggest that this link exists when at least two conditions prevail: (1) the products sold by that company comply with ethical and social requirements; (2) the company has an acknowledged commitment to protect consumer rights and interests. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a survey among the clients of retail chains offering Fair Trade (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  18. Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.
    My initial work, with collaborators Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner (2005, 2006), on surveying folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility was designed primarily to test a common claim in the philosophical debates: that ordinary people see an obvious conflict between determinism and both free will and moral responsibility, and hence, the burden is on compatibilists to motivate their theory in a way that explains away or overcomes this intuitive support for incompatibilism. The evidence, if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  19. With all Due Caution: Global Anti-Obesity Campaigns and the Individualization of Responsibility.Alison Reiheld - 2015 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 8 (2):226-249.
    Obesity is one of several targets of public health efforts related to availability of and access to healthy foods. The tension between individual food decisions and social contexts of food production, preparation, and consumption makes targeting individuals deeply problematic and yet tempting. Such individualization of responsibility for obesity and nutrition is unethical and impractical. This article warns public health campaigns against giving into the temptation to individualize responsibility, and presents an argument for why they should proceed with all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  20. Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.Alix Cohen - 2013 - Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.
    This paper sets out to show that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. To support this claim, I argue that whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility: first, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Examining distinctions and relationships between Creating Shared Value (CSV) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Eight Asia-based Firms.Hamid Khurshid & Robin Stanley Snell - 2022 - Asian Journal of Business Ethics 11 (2):327-357.
    Corporate activities conducted under the banner of creating shared value (CSV) have gained popularity over the last decade, and some MNCs have espoused that CSV has entered the heart of their practices. There has, however, been criticism about the lack of a standard definition of CSV. The purpose of the current study was to develop a working definition of CSV by identifying distinctions between CSV and various conceptions of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with managers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. Doubt, Despair, and Doxastic Agency: Kierkegaard on Responsibility for Belief.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    Although doubt (Tvivl) and despair (Fortvivlelse) are widely recognized as two central and closely associated concepts in Kierkegaard’s authorship, their precise relationship remains opaque in the extant interpretive literature. To shed light on their relationship, this paper develops a novel interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the connection between despair and our agency over our beliefs, and its significance for Kierkegaard’s ethics of belief. First, I show that an important yet largely overlooked form of Kierkegaardian despair involves either failing to take (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Hume’s Passion-Based Account of Moral Responsibility.Taro Okamura - 2023 - Hume Studies 48 (2):195-216.
    Many scholars have claimed that the psychology of the indirect passions in the Treatise is meant to capture how we come to regard persons as morally responsible agents. My question is exactly how the indirect passions relate to responsibility. In elucidating Hume’s account of responsibility, scholars have often focused not on the passionate responses themselves, but on their structural features. In this paper, I argue that locating responsibility in the structural features is insufficient to make sense of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. The Soldier’s Share: Considering Narrow Responsibility for Lethal Autonomous Weapons.Kevin Schieman - 2022 - Journal of Military Ethics (3):228-245.
    Robert Sparrow (among others) claims that if an autonomous weapon were to commit a war crime, it would cause harm for which no one could reasonably be blamed. Since no one would bear responsibility for the soldier’s share of killing in such cases, he argues that they would necessarily violate the requirements of jus in bello, and should be prohibited by international law. I argue this view is mistaken and that our moral understanding of war is sufficient to determine (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. What Time Travel Teaches Us about Moral Responsibility.Taylor Cyr & Neal Tognazzini - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (3).
    This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral responsibility into sharper focus, helping (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Philosophic Communities of Inquiry: The Search for and Finding of Meaning as the Basis for Developing a Sense of Responsibility.Arie Kizel - 2017 - Childhood and Philosophy 13 (26):87 - 103.
    The attempt to define meaning arouses numerous questions, such as whether life can be meaningful without actions devoted to a central purpose or whether the latter guarantee a meaningful life. Communities of inquiry are relevant in this context because they create relationships within and between people and the environment. The more they address relations—social, cognitive, emotional, etc.—that tie-in with the children’s world even if not in a concrete fashion, the more they enable young people to search for and find meaning. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27.  66
    Resolving a puzzle about moral responsibility and logical truth.Alexander Geddes - 2025 - Synthese 205 (1):1-19.
    Lampert and Waldrop have recently presented a puzzle about moral responsibility and logical truth, in which they derive a contradiction from three apparently plausible principles: (A) no one is responsible for any logical truth; (B) if no one is responsible for something, then no one is responsible for what it strictly implies; and (C) someone is responsible for something. They argue that, in response, we must give up (B)—a principle that plays a key role in arguments for incompatibilism. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. A Pluralist Approach to Joint Responsibility.Nicolai K. Knudsen - 2023 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 51 (2):140-165.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 2, Page 140-165, Spring 2023.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Hegel on legal and moral responsibility.Mark Alznauer - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):365 – 389.
    When Hegel first addresses moral responsibility in the Philosophy of Right, he presupposes that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do, but appears to offer little, if any, justification for this assumption. In this essay, I claim that the first part of the Philosophy of Right, “Abstract Right”, contains an implicit argument that legal or external responsibility (blame for what we have done) is conceptually dependent on moral responsibility proper (blame for what we have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30.  27
    Self-induced Moral Incapacity, Collective Responsibility, and Collective Attributability.Felix Lambrecht - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
    Niels de Haan (2023) defends the possibility of holding collectives morally responsible against a challenge posed by the problem of self-induced moral incapacity. Self-induced moral incapacity seems to introduce a responsibility gap that corporate agents might exploit to avoid responsibility. De Haan argues that the problem does not introduce responsibility gaps because collective moral agents become responsible for actions they committed while they were incapacitated once they reacquire moral capacity. I argue that de Haan’s argument is incomplete. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic.Philipp Steinkrüger - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1413-1444.
    This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. Global Climate Change and Catholic Responsibility.Gerald Braun, Monika K. Hellwig & W. Malcolm Byrnes - 2007 - Journal of Catholic Social Thought 4 (2):373-401.
    Citation: Braun G, Hellwig MK, Byrnes WM (2007) Global Climate Change and Catholic Responsibility: Facts and Faith Response. Journal of Catholic Social Thought 4(2): 373-401. Abstract: The scientific evidence is now overwhelming that human activity is causing the Earth’s atmosphere to grow hotter, which is leading to global climate change. If current rates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue, it is predicted that there will be dramatic changes, including flooding, more intense heat waves and storms, and an increase in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Parole and the moral self: Moral change mitigates responsibility.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Jesse J. Prinz - 2019 - Journal of Moral Education 48 (1):63-85.
    Recent studies demonstrate a moral self effect: continuity in moral values is crucial to ascriptions of identity in and over time. Since Locke, personal identity has been referred to as a ‘forensic’ concept, meaning that it plays a role in attributions of moral responsibility. If moral values are crucial to identity over time, then perceived changes in a person’s set of values may reduce responsibility for past deeds. To test this, we examined the moral self effect in parole (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity.Alon Chasid & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):731-751.
    A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  35. The Symbolism of Evil: The Full Shape of Our Capacity for Moral Responsibility.Marius Daniel Ban - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (4):139-160.
    In this article, I examine the discourse around evil from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. Through an analysis of the religious symbolism of evil and an associated quest for a complete study of being, I intend in this article to explore fresh ways of establishing the relation between our rhetorical practices of evil and moral responsibility. I draw on Ricoeur’s work on the primary symbols of evil, which can be seen as a means for clarifying and extending our understanding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. AI and Structural Injustice: Foundations for Equity, Values, and Responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich & Désirée Lim - 2023 - In Justin B. Bullock, Yu-Che Chen, Johannes Himmelreich, Valerie M. Hudson, Anton Korinek, Matthew M. Young & Baobao Zhang (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter argues for a structural injustice approach to the governance of AI. Structural injustice has an analytical and an evaluative component. The analytical component consists of structural explanations that are well-known in the social sciences. The evaluative component is a theory of justice. Structural injustice is a powerful conceptual tool that allows researchers and practitioners to identify, articulate, and perhaps even anticipate, AI biases. The chapter begins with an example of racial bias in AI that arises from structural injustice. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Justice and the Grey Box of Responsibility.Carl Knight - 2010 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 57 (124):86-112.
    Even where an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions for responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. This paper argues that those who want to place considerations of responsibility at the centre of distributive and criminal justice ought to take this concern seriously. The common strategy of relying on what Susan Hurley describes as a 'black box of (...)' has the advantage of not taking responsibility considerations to be irrelevant merely because some specific account of responsibility is mistaken. It can, furthermore, cope perfectly well with an absence of responsibility, even of the global sort implied by hard determinism and other strongly sceptical accounts. Problems for the black box view come in where responsibility is present, but in a form that is curtailed in one significant regard or another. The trick, then, is to open the box of responsibility just enough that its contents can be the basis for judgements of justice. I identify three 'moderately sceptical' forms of compatibilism that cannot ground judgements of justice, and are therefore expunged by the strongest 'grey box' view. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Avoiding unnecessary suffering: Towards a moral minimum standard for humans' responsibility for animal welfare.Thomas Köllen & Doris Schneeberger - 2023 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility (4):1-11.
    Animals are an important part of our social, economic and corporate world. Their wellbeing is significantly affected by the ways in which humans treat them. However, animals have long remained (and, indeed, continue to remain) effectively invisible in the business ethics and corporate responsibility discourse. This article argues in favor of the moral necessity of according animal welfare a higher priority in business. In line with most streams in both recent and traditional animal ethics, this article derives the avoidance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Law, Decision, Necessity: Shifting the Burden of Responsibility.Johanna Jacques - 2015 - In Matilda Arvidsson, Leila Brännström & Panu Minkkinen (eds.), The Contemporary Relevance of Carl Schmitt: Law, Politics, Theology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 107-119.
    What does it mean to act politically? This paper contributes an answer to this question by looking at the role that necessity plays in the political theory of Carl Schmitt. It argues that necessity, whether in the form of existential danger or absolute values, does not affect the sovereign decision, which must be free from normative determinations if it is to be a decision in Schmitt’s sense at all. The paper then provides a reading of Schmitt in line with Weber’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. The Educational Implications of Otherness and Responsibility in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in Work with People with Special Needs.Arie Kizel - 2010 - Ma’Agalei Nefesh: Journal for Psychology, Psychotherapy, Emotional Development and Creative Education 3:3-11.
    Otherness was at the center of the Levinese project, and in his ethics theory. In doing so, Levinas moved his project away from ontology, epistemology, and reason, to a point where the others are confronted in all its "nudes," to the point where it is recognizable that it cannot be reduced. In this article, I will examine the concepts of responsibility and the connection of the other person's humanism from his major books.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. What’s the Relationship Between the Theory and Practice of Moral Responsibility?Argetsinger Henry & Manuel Vargas - 2022 - Humana Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (42):29-62.
    This article identifies a novel challenge to standard understandings of responsibility practices, animated by experimental studies of biases and heuristics. It goes on to argue that this challenge illustrates a general methodological challenge for theorizing about responsibility. That is, it is difficult for a theory to give us both guidance in real world contexts and an account of the metaphysical and normative foundations of responsibility without treating wide swaths of ordinary practice as defective. The general upshot is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. ‘Black Intellectuals in the Age of Crack’: Organic Responsibility, the Race-Class-Gender Nexus, and Action Paralysis in the Boston Review Roundtables, 1992–1993.Lukas Slothuus - 2022 - Global Intellectual History 1 (00):00.
    The existing research on the role of intellectuals in alleviating suffering has overlooked contributions by prominent Black intellectuals from the United States in the early 1990s. Two roundtable debates co-organised under the auspices of the Boston Review at Harvard and MIT in 1992 and 1993 in response to Eugene Rivers’ essay “On the Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Age of Crack” were central to these contributions, counting a star-studded line-up of Black intellectuals including bell hooks, Cornel West, and Glenn (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility.Matthias Rolffs - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2355-2376.
    Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Nietzsche’s Social Account of Responsibility.Daniel Harris - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):103-110.
    I have two aims in this paper. The first is to add to a growing case against reading the sovereign individual, discussed by Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morality, as Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. I suggest that the conception of responsibility active in the sovereign individual passage is directly at odds with what, as a second aim, I argue Nietzsche’s positive account of responsibility to be. Thinking that the sovereign individual, a sort of distant and composed individual who (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Integrating medical ethics with normative theory: Patient advocacy and social responsibility.Nancy S. Jecker - 1990 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 11 (2).
    It is often assumed that the chief responsibility medical professionals bear is patient care and advocacy. The meeting of other duties, such as ensuring a more just distribution of medical resources and promoting the public good, is not considered a legitimate basis for curtailing or slackening beneficial patient services. It is argued that this assumption is often made without sufficient attention to foundational principles of professional ethics; that once core principles are laid bare this assumption is revealed as largely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. From aesthetics to vitality semiotics - From l´art pour l´art to responsibility. Historical change of perspective exemplified on Josef Albers.Martina Sauer - 2020 - In Grabbe, Lars Christian ; Rupert-Kruse, Patrick ; Schmitz, Norbert M. (Hrsgg.): Bildgestalten : Topographien medialer Visualität. Marburg: Büchner. Büchner Verlag. pp. 194-213.
    The paper follows the thesis, that the perception of real or virtual media shares the anthropological state of "Ausdruckswahrnehmung" or perception of expression (Ernst Cassirer). This kind of perception does not represent a distant, neutral point of view, but one that is guided by feelings or "vitality affects" (Daniel N. Stern). The prerequisites, however, for triggering these feelings/"vitality affects" are not recognizable objects or motifs, but rather their sensually evaluable “abstract representations” or their formal logical structures. In contrast to aesthetic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.
    Suppose that there is no real distinction between 'mad' and 'bad' because every truly bad-acting agent, proves to be a morally incompetent one. If this is the case: should we not change our ordinary interpersonal relationships in which we blame people for the things they do? After all, if people literally always act to 'the best of their abilities' nobody is ever to blame for the wrong they commit, whether these wrong actions are 'horrible monster'-like crimes or trivial ones, such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. An Interpersonal-Epistemic Account of Intellectual Autonomy: Questioning, Responsibility, and Vulnerability.Kunimasa Sato - 2018 - Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan 2:65-82.
    The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility.Rik Peels - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.
    William Alston has provided a by now well-known objection to the deontological conception of epistemic justification by arguing that since we lack control over our beliefs, we are not responsible for them. It is widely acknowledged that if Alston’s argument is convincing, then it seems that the very idea of doxastic responsibility is in trouble. In this article, I attempt to refute one line of response to Alston’s argument. On this approach, we are responsible for our beliefs in virtue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. DOES KUTZ's THEORY OF JOINT ACTION ATTRIBUTE RESPONSIBILITY TO SHAREOWNERS?Magdalena Smith - manuscript
    In this paper I argue that Christopher Kutz misapplies his theory of joint action when he attributes shareowners responsibilities on the basis of their intentional participation in the corporations in which they invest. Instead I propose that his theory of joint action should be used to attribute shareowners responsibilities on the basis of their intentional participation in the stock market. If shareholders’ accountability is grounded in their intentional participation in the stock market, then shareholders cannot take responsibility for corporation’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 990