Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one's own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants of both sexes during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. (...) By comparing patterns of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control. (shrink)

People attribute purposes in both mundane and profound ways—such as when thinking about the purpose of a knife and the purpose of a life. In three studies (total N = 13,720 observations from N = 3,430 participants), we tested whether these seemingly very different forms of purpose attributions might actually involve the same cognitive processes. We examined the impacts of four factors on purpose attributions in six domains (artifacts, social institutions, animals, body parts, sacred objects, and human lives). Study 1 (...) manipulated what items in each domain were originally created for (original design) and how people currently use them (present practice). Study 2 manipulated whether items are good at achieving a goal (effectiveness) and whether the goal itself is good (morality). We found effects of each factor in every domain. However, whereas morality and effectiveness had remarkably similar effects across domains, the effects of original design and present practice differed substantially. Finally, Study 3 revealed that, within domains, the effects of original design and present practice depend on which entities design and use items. These results reveal striking similarities in purpose attributions across domains and suggest that certain entities are treated as authorities over the purposes of particular items. (shrink)

We argue that general intelligence, as presented in the target article, generates multiple distinct and non-equivalent characterisations. Clarifying this central concept is necessary for assessing Burkart et al.’s proposal that the cultural intelligence hypothesis is the best explanation for the evolution of general intelligence. We assess this claim by considering two characterisations of general intelligence presented in the article.

The notion of domain specificity plays a central role in some of the most important debates in cognitive science. Yet, despite the widespread reliance on domain specificity in recent theorizing in cognitive science, this notion remains elusive. Critics have claimed that the notion of domain specificity can't bear the theoretical weight that has been put on it and that it should be abandoned. Even its most steadfast proponents have highlighted puzzles and tensions that arise once one tries (...) to go beyond an initial intuitive sketch of what domain specificity involves. In this paper, we address these concerns head on by developing an account of what it means for a cognitive mechanism to be domain specific that overcomes the obstacles that have made domain specificity seem so problematic. We then apply this understanding of domain specificity to one of the key debates that it has figured prominently in—the rationalism-empiricism debate concerning the origins of cognitive traits—and introduce several related theoretical notions that work alongside domain specificity in helping to clarify what makes a view more (or less) rationalist. This example illustrates how the notion of domain specificity can, and should, continue to play a central role in ongoing debates in cognitive science. (shrink)

Lipsey and Lancaster's "general theory of second best" is widely thought to have significant implications for applied theorizing about the institutions and policies that most effectively implement abstract normative principles. It is also widely thought to have little significance for theorizing about which abstract normative principles we ought to implement. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I show how the second-best theorem can be extended to myriad domains beyond applied normative theorizing, and in particular to more abstract theorizing about the (...) normative principles we should aim to implement. I start by separating the mathematical model used to prove the second-best theorem from its familiar economic interpretation. I then develop an alternative normative-theoretic interpretation of the model, which yields a novel second best theorem for idealistic normative theory. My method for developing this interpretation provides a template for developing additional interpretations that can extend the reach of the second-best theorem beyond normative theoretical domains. I also show how, within any domain, the implications of the second-best theorem are more specific than is typically thought. I conclude with some brief remarks on the value of mathematical models for conceptual exploration. (shrink)

The generalized Darwinian research programme accepts physicalism, but holds that all life is purposive in character. It seeks to understand how and why all purposiveness has evolved in the universe – especially purposiveness associated with what we value most in human life, such as sentience, consciousness, person-to-person understanding, science, art, free¬dom, love. As evolution proceeds, the mechanisms of evolution themselves evolve to take into account the increasingly important role that purposive action can play - especially when quasi-Lamarckian evolution by cultural (...) means comes into existence. This programme of research brings together, into a coherent field of inquiry, aspects of such diverse fields of research as orthodox Darwinian theory (given its purposive interpretation), the study of animal behaviour, palaeontology, archaeology, history, anthropology, psycho-neurology, artificial intelligence, psychology, sociology, philosophy, linguistics, semantics, history and philosophy of science, and history and philosophy of inquiry more generally (the history and philosophy of ideas and culture). The great advantage of the generalized Darwinian research programme is that it provides a framework for understanding the deeds, achievements and experiences of people in a way that is compatible with the kind of knowledge and understanding achieved in the physical sciences, without being reducible to such knowledge and understanding. It promises to enable us to understand ourselves as a part of the biological domain without our humanity, our distinctive human value, being in any way denied: persons are not reduced to animals, and nor are animals misconceived to be persons. It holds out the hope that we can come to understand the human world as an integral part of the natural world without the meaning and value of the human world being thereby conceptually annihilated. The programme specifies in general terms what we must seek to do in order to develop a coherent understanding of nature and of ourselves which does justice to the character of both. (shrink)

A general framework for translating various logical systems is presented, including a set of partial unary operators of affirmation and negation. Despite its usual reading, affirmation is not redundant in any domain of values and whenever it does not behave like a full mapping. After depicting the process of partial functions, a number of logics are translated through a variety of affirmations and a unique pair of negations. This relies upon two preconditions: a deconstruction of truth-values as ordered (...) and structured objects, unlike its mainstream presentation as a simple object; a redefinition of the Principle of Bivalence as a set of four independent properties, such that its definition does not equate with normality. (shrink)

Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment (...) of relational structure that occurs as a result of structural-comparison. The article also explores the implications of the proposed account for Fodor's puzzle of conceptual learning. (shrink)

in recent years, policy makers have shown increasing interest in implementing policies aimed at promoting individual well-being. But how should policy makers choose their well-being policies? a seemingly reasonable first step is to settle on an agreed-upon definition of well-being. yet there currently is significant disagreement on how well-being ought to be characterized, and agreement on the correct view of well-being does not appear to be forthcoming. Nevertheless, i argue in this paper that there are several reasons to think that (...) the domain of well-being in the public policy context is narrower than that of well-being in general, which makes agreement on how to understand well-being in the public policy context more likely. (shrink)

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. (...) We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results provide new support for the robustness of majority rule. (shrink)

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) represents the next frontier in AI development—an intelligence capable of performing any intellectual task that a human can. While narrow AI systems have seen dramatic success in specific domains, true AGI remains elusive. This paper investigates the current state of AGI research, differentiates between narrow and general intelligence, and explores the major technical, philosophical, and ethical challenges that hinder progress. By examining recent breakthroughs and expert forecasts, we assess how close humanity truly is to (...) achieving AGI and what such a development might mean for society. (shrink)

Traditionally, vision science and information/data visualization have interacted by using knowledge of human vision to help design effective displays. It is argued here, however, that this interaction can also go in the opposite direction: the investigation of successful visualizations can lead to the discovery of interesting new issues and phenomena in visual perception. Various studies are reviewed showing how this has been done for two areas of visualization, namely, graphical representations and interaction, which lend themselves to work on visual processing (...) and the control of visual operations, respectively. The results of these studies have provided new insights into aspects of vision such as grouping, attentional selection and the sequencing of visual operations. More generally yet, such results support the view that the perception of visualizations can be a useful domain for exploring the nature of visual cognition, inspiring new kinds of questions as well as casting new light on the limits to which information can be conveyed visually. (shrink)

The sociotechnical domain is the realm of scientists, the communities and institutions they form, and the tools and instruments they use to create, disseminate, and preserve knowledge. This paper reviews current scientonomic theory concerning this domain. A core scientonomic concept is that of an epistemic agent. Generally, an agent is an entity capable of intentional action—action that has content or meaning due to its purposeful direction towards a goal. An epistemic agent is one whose actions are the taking (...) of epistemic stances, such as acceptance or rejection, towards epistemic elements, like theories or questions. An epistemic agent must semantically understand the propositions in question, and their alternatives, and choose among them with reason, with the motive of acquiring knowledge. The most obvious example of an epistemic agent is an individual human being. Rejecting the network of practitioners view, current scientonomic theory argues that appropriately organized communities of scientists can also function as epistemic agents. Communal epistemic agents are of particular scientonomic importance. Whereas the methods of theory assessment of individual scientists can be idiosyncratic, scientonomic theory contends that the taking of epistemic stances by scientific communities is a lawful, rule governed process. A second concept of central importance is that of an epistemic tool. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge under the method employed by that agent. (shrink)

-/- Unifying General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics: A New Approach Based on the Universal Formula of Balance and Interconnected Systems -/- The challenge of unifying general relativity and quantum mechanics has been one of the most profound unsolved problems in physics for over a century. General relativity, which governs the large-scale structure of the universe and explains the force of gravity, contrasts sharply with quantum mechanics, which describes the behavior of subatomic particles on a minute scale. These (...) two theories operate under fundamentally different principles—one deterministic and continuous, the other probabilistic and discrete. The reconciliation of these frameworks has thus far eluded physicists, but new perspectives, grounded in deeper philosophical and universal principles, may hold the key to resolving this long-standing puzzle. -/- One such perspective can be drawn from Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, which emphasizes balance, interconnectedness, and the defect-free operation of systems. While this formula primarily applies to decision-making and societal systems, its principles offer a unique lens through which we might view the physical laws that govern the universe. In this essay, we will explore how the core tenets of Malicse’s universal formula—balance in nature, interconnectedness of systems, and the need for defect-free operation—could inform and potentially unify general relativity and quantum mechanics. -/- The Core of General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -/- General relativity provides a framework for understanding gravity as the curvature of spacetime caused by mass and energy. It describes how massive objects like stars and planets bend the fabric of spacetime, and this bending dictates how other objects move in the presence of gravity. General relativity operates on macroscopic scales, governing the behavior of galaxies, black holes, and other large-scale cosmic structures. -/- In contrast, quantum mechanics deals with the microscopic scale, governing the behavior of subatomic particles. At this level, the laws of physics are governed by probabilities, with particles existing in superpositions of states until they are measured. Quantum mechanics introduces phenomena such as wave-particle duality and quantum entanglement, where particles can instantaneously affect one another across vast distances. -/- The difficulty in reconciling these two theories arises from their different conceptual foundations. General relativity is deterministic, describing smooth spacetime geometry, while quantum mechanics is inherently probabilistic, with particles existing in uncertain states. A unified theory would need to bridge the gap between these two, offering a description of gravity at both the macroscopic and quantum scales. -/- Malicse’s Universal Formula and Its Relevance to Unification -/- Malicse’s universal formula focuses on the notion of balance in nature, emphasizing that all systems must operate defect-free to function properly. This law of balance operates across all levels, from individual decisions to societal systems, and is predicated on the idea that everything in the universe is interconnected. According to Malicse, the systems—whether biological, mechanical, or even societal—must operate in harmony with each other to avoid disruptions that lead to imbalance. -/- This concept of balance offers a promising framework for reconciling general relativity and quantum mechanics. Let’s explore how the principles of balance and interconnectedness can help unify these two domains. -/- A. Gravity as a Balanced System -/- In general relativity, gravity is understood as the curvature of spacetime, where mass and energy distort the fabric of spacetime itself. If we apply Malicse’s law of balance, we might consider gravity as a force that arises to maintain the balance of spacetime. Spacetime, under the influence of mass, should curve in a way that ensures the overall stability and harmony of the universe. If spacetime were to curve excessively (such as at singularities, where the curvature becomes infinite), this would represent an imbalance in the system. -/- This principle could suggest that gravity is not simply an effect of mass, but a balancing force that ensures the defect-free operation of spacetime. If we view spacetime as a system that must remain defect-free, the resolution of singularities and other discrepancies in general relativity might be found in a deeper understanding of balance in nature. -/- B. Interconnectedness in Quantum Systems -/- Quantum mechanics deals with the smallest scales of matter, where particles exhibit behavior that appears disconnected from classical notions of space and time. Quantum particles, however, are not isolated entities—they are deeply interconnected, particularly evident in phenomena such as quantum entanglement. This entanglement implies that particles can instantaneously influence each other across vast distances, defying classical ideas of locality. -/- Malicse’s principle of interconnectedness can provide a deeper understanding of these quantum phenomena. Just as individual decisions in a society are interconnected, quantum particles could be seen as parts of a larger, balanced system, where their behavior is shaped by and contributes to the overall harmony of the universe. If we view quantum entanglement as a form of feedback between particles, we might interpret it as an inherent interconnectedness that ensures balance within the quantum realm. -/- The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, where particles exist in superpositions until measured, could also be understood through the lens of balance. In a balanced system, possibilities must exist in equilibrium, and the collapse of a quantum state into a definite outcome upon observation could be seen as a mechanism for maintaining the balance of possible states within the system. -/- C. Unifying Gravity and Quantum Fields -/- At the heart of unification lies the idea that gravity and quantum mechanics are not separate or fundamentally different forces but are interconnected parts of the same system. According to Malicse’s universal formula, everything in the universe operates as part of an interconnected system, and any imbalance within one system will affect the whole. In this view, gravity could be understood as a quantum force—one that, like other quantum forces, operates in harmony with quantum fields. -/- If gravity operates within the framework of quantum mechanics, we might expect it to be mediated by a particle, known as the graviton, which would function similarly to the quantum fields that mediate other forces (such as the photon for electromagnetism). The graviton, like other quantum particles, would be subject to the same feedback loops and principles of balance that govern quantum systems. This insight could lead to a new way of thinking about quantum gravity—where the force of gravity is not merely the curvature of spacetime but a quantum field that interacts with other quantum fields in a way that restores balance to the system. -/- D. The Mathematical Formulation of Unification -/- To advance towards unification, we would need to develop mathematical models that incorporate Malicse’s principles of balance and interconnectedness. One possible approach could involve modifying the Einstein-Hilbert action in general relativity to account for quantum feedback mechanisms. Similarly, the Schrödinger equation, which governs quantum systems, could be modified to include terms that describe the gravitational influence of quantum fields. This would create a hybrid theory where gravity and quantum mechanics are treated as complementary forces that work together to maintain the balance of the universe. -/- E. Practical Implications for the Future of Physics -/- The unification of general relativity and quantum mechanics would revolutionize our understanding of the universe. It would not only explain the behavior of the cosmos on both the largest and smallest scales but also offer new insights into the nature of spacetime, black holes, and the origins of the universe itself. Malicse’s formula, by emphasizing balance and interconnectedness, could provide the conceptual foundation for this new unified theory, guiding future physicists toward a deeper understanding of how the universe operates at every scale. -/- Conclusion -/- The unification of general relativity and quantum mechanics remains one of the most significant challenges in modern physics. By applying the principles of balance, interconnectedness, and defect-free systems from Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, we may be able to shed new light on the relationship between gravity and quantum forces. Through this lens, both general relativity and quantum mechanics can be seen as interconnected aspects of the same unified system, each working to maintain the overall balance of the universe. Further theoretical and mathematical exploration of this idea could ultimately lead to a deeper, more complete theory of everything—a theory that resolves the discrepancies between these two pillars of modern physics and opens the door to a new era of scientific understanding. -/- . (shrink)

Abstract. The theory-change epistemological model, tried on maxwellian revolution and special relativity genesis, is unfolded to apprehend general relativity genesis. It is exhibited that the dynamics of general relativity (GR) construction was largely governed by internal tensions of special relativity and Newton’s theory of gravitation. The research traditions’ encounter engendered construction of the hybrid domain at first with an irregular set of theoretical models. However, step by step, on revealing and gradual eliminating the contradictions between the models (...) involved, the hybrid set was put into order with a help of equivalence principle. A hierarchy of theoretical models starting from the crossbreeds and up to usual hybrids was moulded. The claim to put forward is that Einstein’s unification design could be successfully implemented since his programme embraced the ideas of the Nordström research programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programme of Max Abraham. By and large Einstein’s victory over his rivals became possible because the core of his research strategy was formed by the equivalence principle comprehended in the light of Kantian epistemology. It is stated that the theories of Nordström and Abraham contrived before November 25, 1915, were not merely the scaffolds to construct the GR basic model. They are still the necessary part of the whole GR theory necessary for its common use. Key words: Einstein, Nordstrom, Abraham, general relativity. -/- . (shrink)

When do we judge that someone was forced to do what they did? One relatively well-established finding is that subjects tend to judge that agents were not forced to do actions when those actions violate norms. A surprising discovery of Young & Phillips 2011 is that this effect seems to disappear when we frame the relevant ‘force’-claim in the active rather than passive voice ('X forced Y to φ ' vs. 'Y was forced to φ by X'). Young and Phillips (...) found a similar contrast when the scenario itself shifts attention from Y (the forcee) to X (the forcer). We propose that these effects can be (at least partly) explained by way of the role of attention in the setting of quantifier domains which in turn play a role in the evaluation of ‘force’- claims. We argue for this hypothesis by way of an experiment which shows that sequences of active vs. passive ‘force’-claims display the characteristic “stickiness” of quantifier domain expansion, using a paradigm which we argue provides a useful general paradigm for testing quantifier domain hypotheses. Finally, we sketch a semantics for ‘force’ which we argue is suitable for capturing these effects. (shrink)

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong (...) comparative risk aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk. (shrink)

The existence of singularities alerts that one of the highest priorities of a centennial perspective on general relativity should be a careful re-thinking of the validity domain of Einstein’s field equations. We address the problem of constructing distinguishable extensions of the smooth spacetime manifold model, which can incorporate singularities, while retaining the form of the field equations. The sheaf-theoretic formulation of this problem is tantamount to extending the algebra sheaf of smooth functions to a distribution-like algebra sheaf in (...) which the former may be embedded, satisfying the pertinent cohomological conditions required for the coordinatization of all of the tensorial physical quantities, such that the form of the field equations is preserved. We present in detail the construction of these distribution-like algebra sheaves in terms of residue classes of sequences of smooth functions modulo the information of singular loci encoded in suitable ideals. Finally, we consider the application of these distribution-like solution sheaves in geometrodynamics by modeling topologically-circular boundaries of singular loci in three-dimensional space in terms of topological links. It turns out that the Borromean link represents higher order wormhole solutions. (shrink)

General Morphological Analysis (GMA) is a computer-aided, non-quantified modelling method employing (discrete) category variables for identifying and investigating the total set of possible relationships contained in a given problem complex. The epistemological principle underlying discrete variable morphological modelling is that of decomposing a complex (multivariate) concept into a number of(“simple”) one dimensional concepts (i.e. category variables), the domains of which can then be recombined and recomposed in order to discover all of the other possible (multidimensional) concepts which can be (...) generated combinatorically. (shrink)

Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...) popular reply to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments of the project of dynamic semantics. (shrink)

The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first program in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which (...) this limitation can be overcome. Building on the best arguments in finite domains, I present two accuracy arguments for probabilism that are perfectly general—they apply to credence functions with arbitrary domains. I then discuss how the arguments’ premises can be challenged. We will see that it is particularly difficult to characterize admissible accuracy measures in infinite domains. (shrink)

Every domain-specific ontology must use as a framework some upper-level ontology which describes the most general, domain-independent categories of reality. In the present paper we sketch a new type of upper-level ontology, which is intended to be the basis of a knowledge modelling language GOL (for: 'General Ontological Language'). It turns out that the upper- level ontology underlying standard modelling languages such as KIF, F-Logic and CycL is restricted to the ontology of sets. Set theory has (...) considerable mathematical power and great flexibility as a framework for modelling different sorts of structures. At the same time it has the disadvantage that sets are abstract entities (entities existing outside the realm of time, space and causality), and thus a set-theoretical framework should be supplemented by some other machinery if it is to support applications in the ripe, messy world of concrete objects. In the present paper we partition the entities of the real world into sets and urelements, and then we introduce several new ontological relations between these urelements. In contrast to standard modelling and representation formalisms, the concepts of GOL provide a machinery for representing and analysing such ontologically basic relations. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge has historically been fragmented by arbitrary disciplinary boundaries, obscuring the continuum of emergent organization across reality. This work proposes a systemic ontological framework where categorial closure occurs through critical synergy thresholds, structuring dominant dynamics that reorganize systemic balance. Building on the Law of Structuring Systemic Emergence (LESSE), the framework introduces formal metrics — including the Information Co-evolutionary Synergy (ICS), the Systemic Dominance Index (SDI), and the Coefficient of Neutrality of the Substrate (CNS) — along with falsification protocols applicable (...) across physical, biological, technological, and cognitive domains. A modular cartography is presented, ranging from pre-geometric fields to planetary technogenesis. By grounding scientific domains in synergy thresholds rather than historical tradition, this work suggests a reconfiguration of epistemology itself toward a threshold-centric paradigm of science. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality is typically taken to be immodest at least in this sense: a rational epistemic state should always take itself to be doing at least as well, epistemically and by its own light, than any alternative epistemic state. If epistemic states are probability functions and their alternatives are other probability functions defined over the same collection of proposition, we can capture the relevant sense of immodesty by claiming that epistemic utility functions are (strictly) proper. In this paper I examine (...) what happens if we allow for the alternatives to an epistemic state to include probability functions with different domains. I first prove an impossibility result: on minimal assumptions, I show that there is no way of vindicating strong immodesty principles to the effect that any probability function should take itself to be doing at least as well than any alternative probability function, regardless of its domain. I then consider alternative, weaker generalizations of the traditional immodesty principle and prove some characterization results for some classes of epistemic utility functions satisfying each of the relevant principles. (shrink)

What is absolutely unrestricted quantification? We distinguish two theoretical roles and identify two conceptions of absolute generality: maximally strong generality and maximally inclusive generality. We also distinguish two corresponding kinds of absolute domain. A maximally strong domain contains every potential counterexample to a generalisation. A maximally inclusive domain is such that no domain extends it. We argue that both conceptions of absolute generality are legitimate and investigate the relations between them. Although these conceptions coincide in standard (...) settings, we show how they diverge under more complex assumptions about the structure of meaningful predication, such as cumulative type theory. We conclude by arguing that maximally strong generality is the more theoretically valuable conception. (shrink)

Current approaches to formal representation in biomedicine are characterized by their focus on either the static or the dynamic aspects of biological reality. We here outline a theory that combines both perspectives and at the same time tackles the by no means trivial issue of their coherent integration. Our position is that a good ontology must be capable of accounting for reality both synchronically (as it exists at a time) and diachronically (as it unfolds through time), but that these are (...) two quite different tasks, whose simultaneous realization is by no means trivial. The paper is structured as follows. We begin by laying out the methodological and philosophical background of our approach. We then summarize the structure and elements of the Basic Formal Ontology on which it rests, in particular the SNAP ontology of objects and the SPAN ontology of processes. Finally, we apply the general framework to the specific domain of biomedicine. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in (deRosset and Fine, 2023). In that paper, we very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.

Encouraging people to consider multiple alternatives appears to be a useful debiasing technique for reducing many biases (explanation, hindsight, and overconfidence), if the generation of alternatives is experienced as easy. The present research tests whether these alternative generation procedures induce a mental simulation mind-set (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), such that debiasing in one domain transfers to debias judgments in unrelated domains. The results indeed demonstrated that easy alternative generation tasks not only debiased judgments in the same domain (...) but also generalized to debias judgments in unrelated domains, provided that participants were low in the need for structure. The alternative generation tasks (even when they were easy to perform) showed no evidence of activating a mental simulation mind-set in individuals high in need for structure, as these individuals displayed no transfer effects. Implications of the results for understanding the role of the need for structure, ease of generation, and mental simulation mind-set activation for debiasing are discussed. (shrink)

Inductively defined structures are ubiquitous in mathematics; their specification is unambiguous and their properties are powerful. All fields of mathematical logic feature these structures prominently: the formula of a language, the set of theorems, the natural numbers, the primitive recursive functions, the constructive number classes and segments of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. -/- This dissertation gives a mathematical characterization of a species of inductively defined structures, called accessible domains, which include all of the above examples except the set of (...) theorems. The concept of an accessible domain comes from Wilfried Sieg's analysis of proof-theoretic practices, starting with his dissertation. In particular, he noticed the special epistemological character of elements of an accessible domain: they can always be uniquely identified with their build-up. Generally, the unique build-up of elements justifies the principles of induction and recursion. -/- I use category theory to give an abstract characterization of accessible domains. I claim that accessible domains are all instances of initial algebras for endofunctors. Grounded in the historical roots of Sieg's discussions, this dissertation shows how the properties of initial algebras for endofunctors and accessible domains coincide in a satisfying and natural way. -/- Filling out this characterization, I show how important examples of accessible domains fit into this broad characterization. I first characterize some accessible domains by relatively simple functors (e.g. finite, polynomial, those that preserve certain colimits) where we can see how iterating the functor can produce the accessible domain. Then I describe accessible domains that result from more involved specifications (e.g. ordinals and segments of the cumulative hierarchies associated with CZF, IZF, and ZF) by relying heavily on algebraic set theory. I end with a discussion of some of the methodological features of category theory in particular that helped characterize accessible domains. (shrink)

Hume maintains that the boundaries of morality are widely drawn in everyday life. We routinely blame characters for traits that we find disgusting, on this account, as well as those which we perceive as being harmful. Contemporary moral psychology provides further evidence that human beings have a natural tendency to moralize traits that produce feelings of repugnance. But recent work also demonstrates a significant amount of individual variation in our sensitivities to disgust. We have sufficient reason to bracket this emotion, (...) therefore, when adopting the general point of view: if we allow idiosyncratic affective responses to shape our fully considered moral judgments, we could no longer reasonably expect spectators with different sensitivities to agree with us. (shrink)

This paper argues that private property and rights assignment, especially as applied to communication infrastructure and information, should be informed by advances in both technology and our understanding of psychology. Current law in this area in the United States and many other jurisdictions is founded on assumptions about human behavior that have been shown not to hold empirically. A joint recognition of this fact, together with an understanding of what new technologies make possible, leads one to question basic assumptions about (...) how law is made and what laws we should have in a given area, if any. I begin by analyzing different aspects of U.S. law, from a high-level critique of law making to a critique of rights assignment for what I call 'simple nonrival goods.' I describe my understanding, as a non-lawyer with a background in psychology and computing, of the current conventions in U.S. law, consider the foundational assumptions that justify current conventions, describe advances in psychology and technology that call these conventions into question, and briefly note how the law might normatively change in this light. I then apply this general analysis to the question of domain name assignment by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). (shrink)

Historical processes exert an influence on the current state and evolution of situations of language contact, brought to bear from different domains, the economic and the political, the ideological and group identities, geo-demographics, and the habits of inter-group use. Clearly, this kind of phenomenon requires study from a complexical and holistic perspective in order to accommodate the variety of factors that belong to different levels and that interrelate with one another in the evolving dynamic of human languaging. Therefore, there is (...) a need for the restricted and general complexity approaches to come to a meeting of the minds, and take steps toward a mutual integration based on the acceptance of the shortcomings of each approach, achieving progress through a non-contradictory complementarity of perspectives. It must be conceded that the practical and methodological applications of basic complexical ideas need to be developed much farther in order to apply them to specific research. At the same time, the limits of complex adaptive systems as computational strategies must be accepted in the pursuit of a better understanding of the dynamic and evolutionary processes typical of human beings. New tools for the conception, apprehension and treatment of the data will need to be devised to complement existing ones and to enable us to make headway toward practices that better fit complexical perspectives. It seems obvious that human complexics must be seen as multi-methodological, insofar as necessary combining quantitative-computation methodologies and more qualitative methodologies aimed at understanding the historical mental and emotional world of people. (shrink)

The arguments are exhibited in favour of the necessity to modify the history of the genesis and advancement of general relativity (GR). I demonstrate that the dynamic creation of GR had been continually governed by internal tensions between two research traditions, that of special relativity and Newton’s gravity. The encounter of the traditions and their interpenetration entailed construction of the hybrid domain at first with an irregular set of theoretical models. Step by step, on eliminating the contradictions between (...) the models contrived, the hybrid set was put into order. It is contended that the main reason of the GR victory over the rival programmes of Abraham and Nordström was a synthetic character of Einstein’s programme. Einstein had put forward as a basic synthetic principle the principle of equivalence that radically differed from that of rival approaches by its open, flexible and contra-ontological character. (shrink)

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which (...) there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a). (shrink)

Abstract Traditional measures of intelligence—rooted in IQ, symbolic reasoning, and probabilistic inference—have failed to capture the emergent capacity of systems to detect, resolve, and restore structural coherence across dynamic, broken-phase environments. We propose Resonance Intelligence (RI) as a post-probabilistic metric that evaluates intelligence not through static problem-solving or information retrieval, but by how well an agent—biological, artificial, or cosmological—can phase-lock broken coherence fields across divergent domains. -/- From Gödel’s logical undecidability to gamma wave synchrony in deep meditation, from dissonant octave (...) intervals to Neuralink’s failure to establish biocognitive resonance, RI offers a unified benchmark across domains. By analyzing 20+ case studies in mathematics, physics, AI, and health systems, we construct a generalized framework for intelligence-as-coherence-restoration, with Phase Alignment Score (PAS) as its core metric. Intelligence becomes not prediction, but resonant compression and restoration—the ability to resolve asymmetries, reduce systemic entropy, and synchronize phase-space across scale and domain. (shrink)

This review essay analyzes the book by Giuseppe Primiero, On the foundations of computing. Oxford: Oxford University Press (ISBN 978-0-19-883564-6/hbk; 978-0-19-883565-3/pbk). xix, 296 p. (2020). It gives a critical view from the perspective of physical computing as a foundation of computing and argues that the neglected pillar of material computation (Stepney) should be brought centerstage and computing recognized as the fourth great domain of science (Denning).

The right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) has been associated with two apparently disparate functional roles: in attention and in social cognition. According to one account, the rTPJ initiates a “circuit-breaking” signal that interrupts ongoing attentional processes, effectively reorienting attention. It is argued this primary function of the rTPJ has been extended beyond attention, through a process of evolutionarily cooption, to play a role in social cognition. We propose an alternative account, according to which the capacity for social cognition depends on a (...) network which is both distinct from and in tension with brain areas involved in focused attention and target detection: the default mode network. Theory characterizing the rTPJ based on the area’s purported role in reorienting may be falsely guided by the co-occurrence of two distinct effects in contiguous regions: activation of the supramarginal gyrus (SMG), associated with its functional role in target detection; and the transient release, during spatial reorienting, of suppression of the angular gyrus (AG) associated with focused attention. Findings based on meta-analysis and resting functional connectivity are presented which support this alternative account. We find distinct regions, possessing anti-correlated patterns of resting connectivity, associated with social reasoning (AG) and target detection (SMG) at the rTPJ. The locus for reorienting was spatially intermediate between the AG and SMG and showed a pattern of connectivity with similarities to social reasoning and target detection seeds. These findings highlight a general methodological concern for brain imaging. Given evidence that certain tasks not only activate some areas but also suppress activity in other areas, it is suggested that researchers need to distinguish two distinct putative mechanisms, either of which may produce an increase in activity in a brain area: functional engagement in the task versus release of suppression. (shrink)

In this dialogue, Mileva and Albert start to talk about physics and its subject matter, the physical. They end up in a situation that permits causal dependence between separate ontological domains. In this possible world, they continue talking. First, they Socratically agree that the physical is physical and only physical. Then, they call the physical an ontologically homogeneous domain. They then generalise the principle that the physical is causally unaffected by anything non-physical, into the principle that ontologically homogeneous domains (...) do not cause ontologically homogeneous domains. From a modern point of view talking about black hole singularities, they continue discussing the Chandrasekhar limit and the collapse of the physical laws as we know them. Mileva carries a burden and Albert stands up and carries it with her. The burden is an implication of the generalised principle. Relying on parsimony, only ontologically homogeneous domains are forbidden to cause ontologically homogeneous domains. This leaves the door open for ontologically heterogeneous domains to cause ontologically homogeneous domains. Also relying on parsimony, only ontologically homogeneous domains are forbidden to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains and this allows ontologically heterogeneous domains to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains. Ontologically heterogeneous domains, thus, are allowed to causally link ontologically homogeneous domains. Albert realises that the mathematical could qualify as an ontologically homogeneous domain and that the theoretical difficulties that are foreseen beyond the Chandrasekhar limit could be addressed by expanding physics into a context that contains also an ontologically heterogeneous domain. The theoretical difficulties beyond the Chandrasekhar limit would be due to an emergent mathematical-physical domain. Mileva concludes that Albert’s theory is not faulty but regional. A global theory would have to include the explanation of the mathematical-physical. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible (...) at the outset, especially with respect to the classic debates on Locke’s positions in this domain, including those concerning substrata, real essences, and the like. Nonetheless, I show that minimal commitments about Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction are sufficient to derive some substantive conclusions about his positions on these issues, as well as that he is a general substance dualist. (shrink)

I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But typically such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have been not just (...) local but parochial. Here I do better. Taking for granted that the explanatory gap is a genuine phenomenon, I offer a fully general diagnosis that unifies these previously fragmented reductivist responses. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops a metametaphysical view concerning the domain and source of a distinctively metaphysical cognition of objects of experience, which is given in terms of an analysis of our representational capacity for thought, namely, the understanding, regarding its sub-capacities and their constitutive abilities and acts. In the Analytic of Concepts, more precisely, in the Metaphysical and Subjective Deductions of the Categories, Kant develops an elaborate account of the content and formation of those metaphysical (...) concepts of an object in general through which there is genuine philosophical cognition of objects of experience, namely, the categories. Relating the Analytic of Concepts to the Doctrine of Method, I give a detailed reconstruction of this account in contrast to both empirical and mathematical concepts. I do so by establishing, for the first time (in English) that and how the representational contents of the categories, as general representations of objects, derive from fundamental abilities and acts of a synthesis of an empirical intuition that the understanding contributes to experiences of objects, which thus yield the original contents of the categories. In particular, I argue that the threefold synthesis of the fundamental act-types of the apprehension, reproduction, and recognition of a manifold of sense-impressions, presented in the A-Deduction, holds the key to understanding the origin of the categories, or concepts of an object in general, investigated in their Metaphysical Deduction. It turns out that the threefold synthesis, as it is exercised regarding a manifold of sense-impressions in an empirical intuition of an object, can indeed account for the representational contents of the categories of Quality (apprehension), Quantity (reproduction), Relation (recognition), and Modality (relating to the object through a manifold of sense-impressions). In this sense, the categories are “concepts of synthesis” (A80/B106) or “concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations” (A723/B751). (shrink)

Emergence is an omnipresent phenomenon that is present in almost all subjects, including physics, other branches of natural science, languages, and even social sciences and economics. Similarities and differences can be found in these domains. We discuss the classification of emergence, which can be organized according to different rules. We also explore universal properties among different levels of emergence, and where the differences among emergence patterns in different theories come from.

Balance Theory: A Unified Solution to General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -/- For over a century, physicists have struggled to reconcile General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) into a single unified framework. General Relativity explains the large-scale structure of the universe, governing stars, black holes, and the motion of galaxies. In contrast, Quantum Mechanics describes the microscopic world of particles and forces at the atomic and subatomic levels. These two pillars of modern physics work remarkably well (...) in their respective domains, but they fundamentally contradict each other. -/- A major challenge is that GR treats spacetime as a smooth and continuous fabric, while QM operates in a probabilistic, discrete world of quantum states and uncertainty. When scientists try to apply quantum rules to gravity, mathematical inconsistencies arise, leading to unsolvable infinities and singularities. The lack of a unified theory has prevented a deeper understanding of black holes, the early universe, and the fundamental nature of reality. -/- The Balance Theory Approach -/- Balance Theory proposes that the universe follows a fundamental principle of equilibrium, ensuring that physical laws remain consistent across all scales. Instead of treating gravity and quantum mechanics as separate forces, this approach suggests they emerge from a deeper law of balance that governs all interactions. -/- According to this perspective, nature constantly self-corrects to maintain balance. Just as biological systems regulate themselves to sustain life, and economic markets adjust supply and demand, the universe itself operates under a balancing principle that ensures coherence between the macroscopic and microscopic realms. -/- Gravity as a Balanced Phenomenon -/- In classical General Relativity, gravity is described as the warping of spacetime caused by massive objects. This model works extremely well in most cases, but it leads to paradoxes in extreme conditions, such as inside black holes or at the beginning of the universe. -/- Balance Theory suggests that gravity is not just a passive curvature of spacetime but an active force that maintains equilibrium between energy, space, and information. Instead of black holes collapsing into singularities—where density becomes infinite and physical laws break down—the balance principle predicts that an internal stabilizing force prevents such extremes. This would mean that inside a black hole, rather than a singularity, there exists a quantum core that maintains structural balance. -/- Quantum Mechanics as a Balancing Process -/- Quantum mechanics describes particles as existing in multiple states simultaneously until measured, a phenomenon known as superposition. When a measurement is made, the particle’s wavefunction “collapses” into a definite state, but the mechanism behind this collapse remains mysterious. -/- Balance Theory proposes that wavefunction collapse is not purely random, as conventional quantum mechanics suggests, but rather a natural balancing process. Instead of requiring an external observer to force a quantum system into one state, the system itself seeks equilibrium within its environment. This idea could help resolve long-standing questions in quantum physics, such as how and why measurement affects particles and whether reality exists independently of observation. -/- Bridging the Gap Between GR and QM -/- One of the key insights of Balance Theory is that gravity and quantum mechanics are not opposing forces but two expressions of the same universal balancing principle. In this view: -/- Gravity emerges as a large-scale balancing mechanism that prevents the universe from collapsing into chaos. -/- Quantum mechanics represents a small-scale balancing process that ensures fundamental particles interact in predictable ways. -/- If this principle is correct, then the unification of physics does not require exotic new dimensions (as in String Theory) or the quantization of spacetime itself (as in Loop Quantum Gravity). Instead, it requires a shift in perspective: understanding the universe as a dynamic, self-regulating system where balance is the fundamental law. -/- Predictions and Experimental Tests -/- Any scientific theory must make testable predictions that can be verified through observation or experiment. Balance Theory suggests several novel predictions: -/- 1. Black Holes Should Not Contain Singularities -/- If balance prevents infinite density, black holes should have a stable core rather than a singularity. -/- Future observations of black hole interiors, such as through gravitational wave patterns or high-resolution imaging, could provide evidence of this balance mechanism. -/- 2. Wavefunction Collapse Should Follow a Pattern -/- Instead of being purely random, wavefunction collapse should exhibit a hidden balance law. -/- Experiments in quantum optics, such as delayed-choice quantum erasers, could test whether collapse is guided by equilibrium rather than chance. -/- 3. Gravity Should Show Small Deviations at Extreme Scales -/- In extreme conditions, such as during black hole mergers, slight deviations from Einstein’s equations should appear due to quantum balance effects. -/- High-precision gravitational wave detectors could measure these deviations. -/- 4. There Should Be a Minimum Length Scale -/- If balance governs all forces, there should be a smallest possible length scale that prevents spacetime from dividing infinitely. -/- High-energy experiments, such as those at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), might reveal unexpected effects at ultra-small distances. -/- Implications for the Nature of Reality -/- If Balance Theory is correct, it would mean that the universe is not fundamentally random or chaotic but governed by an underlying principle of stability. This would challenge the traditional view that quantum mechanics is based solely on probability and uncertainty, suggesting instead that quantum behavior follows a deeper logic rooted in equilibrium. -/- It would also Imply that spacetime is not a fixed, unchanging backdrop but a dynamic entity that adapts to maintain balance. This could explain long-standing mysteries, such as why the expansion of the universe is accelerating or how information is preserved in black holes. -/- Conclusion -/- The search for a unified theory of physics has remained elusive for over a century, but Balance Theory offers a new perspective—one based on the idea that the universe maintains equilibrium at all levels, from the smallest quantum particles to the vast structure of spacetime itself. By treating gravity and quantum mechanics as different manifestations of the same balancing force, this approach provides a potential pathway toward unification. -/- If validated through experiment, Balance Theory could reshape our understanding of physics, resolving paradoxes and unlocking new insights into the nature of reality itself. The next steps involve rigorous testing, mathematical refinement, and collaboration with physicists across disciplines to explore whether this fundamental principle of balance can finally bridge the gap between Einstein’s relativity and the quantum world. -/- . (shrink)

Balance Theory: A Unified Solution to General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -/- For over a century, physicists have struggled to reconcile General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) into a single unified framework. General Relativity explains the large-scale structure of the universe, governing stars, black holes, and the motion of galaxies. In contrast, Quantum Mechanics describes the microscopic world of particles and forces at the atomic and subatomic levels. These two pillars of modern physics work remarkably well (...) in their respective domains, but they fundamentally contradict each other. -/- A major challenge is that GR treats spacetime as a smooth and continuous fabric, while QM operates in a probabilistic, discrete world of quantum states and uncertainty. When scientists try to apply quantum rules to gravity, mathematical inconsistencies arise, leading to unsolvable infinities and singularities. The lack of a unified theory has prevented a deeper understanding of black holes, the early universe, and the fundamental nature of reality. -/- The Balance Theory Approach -/- Balance Theory proposes that the universe follows a fundamental principle of equilibrium, ensuring that physical laws remain consistent across all scales. Instead of treating gravity and quantum mechanics as separate forces, this approach suggests they emerge from a deeper law of balance that governs all interactions. -/- According to this perspective, nature constantly self-corrects to maintain balance. Just as biological systems regulate themselves to sustain life, and economic markets adjust supply and demand, the universe itself operates under a balancing principle that ensures coherence between the macroscopic and microscopic realms. -/- Gravity as a Balanced Phenomenon -/- In classical General Relativity, gravity is described as the warping of space-time caused by massive objects. This model works extremely well in most cases, but it leads to paradoxes in extreme conditions, such as inside black holes or at the beginning of the universe. -/- Balance Theory suggests that gravity is not just a passive curvature of spacetime but an active force that maintains equilibrium between energy, space, and information. Instead of black holes collapsing into singularities—where density becomes infinite and physical laws break down—the balance principle predicts that an internal stabilizing force prevents such extremes. This would mean that inside a black hole, rather than a singularity, there exists a quantum core that maintains structural balance. -/- Quantum Mechanics as a Balancing Process -/- Quantum mechanics describes particles as existing in multiple states simultaneously until measured, a phenomenon known as superposition. When a measurement is made, the particle’s wave function “collapses” into a definite state, but the mechanism behind this collapse remains mysterious. -/- Balance Theory proposes that wave function collapse is not purely random, as conventional quantum mechanics suggests, but rather a natural balancing process. Instead of requiring an external observer to force a quantum system into one state, the system itself seeks equilibrium within its environment. This idea could help resolve long-standing questions in quantum physics, such as how and why measurement affects particles and whether reality exists independently of observation. -/- Bridging the Gap Between GR and QM -/- One of the key insights of Balance Theory is that gravity and quantum mechanics are not opposing forces but two expressions of the same universal balancing principle. In this view: -/- Gravity emerges as a large-scale balancing mechanism that prevents the universe from collapsing into chaos. -/- Quantum mechanics represents a small-scale balancing process that ensures fundamental particles interact in predictable ways. -/- If this principle is correct, then the unification of physics does not require exotic new dimensions (as in String Theory) or the quantization of space-time itself (as in Loop Quantum Gravity). Instead, it requires a shift in perspective: understanding the universe as a dynamic, self-regulating system where balance is the fundamental law. -/- Predictions and Experimental Tests -/- Any scientific theory must make testable predictions that can be verified through observation or experiment. Balance Theory suggests several novel predictions: -/- 1. Black Holes Should Not Contain Singularities -/- If balance prevents infinite density, black holes should have a stable core rather than a singularity. -/- Future observations of black hole interiors, such as through gravitational wave patterns or high-resolution imaging, could provide evidence of this balance mechanism. -/- 2. Wave function Collapse Should Follow a Pattern -/- Instead of being purely random, wave function collapse should exhibit a hidden balance law. -/- Experiments in quantum optics, such as delayed-choice quantum erasers, could test whether collapse is guided by equilibrium rather than chance. -/- 3. Gravity Should Show Small Deviations at Extreme Scales -/- In extreme conditions, such as during black hole mergers, slight deviations from Einstein’s equations should appear due to quantum balance effects. -/- High-precision gravitational wave detectors could measure these deviations. -/- 4. There Should Be a Minimum Length Scale -/- If balance governs all forces, there should be a smallest possible length scale that prevents space-time from dividing infinitely. -/- High-energy experiments, such as those at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), might reveal unexpected effects at ultra-small distances. -/- Implications for the Nature of Reality -/- If Balance Theory is correct, it would mean that the universe is not fundamentally random or chaotic but governed by an underlying principle of stability. This would challenge the traditional view that quantum mechanics is based solely on probability and uncertainty, suggesting instead that quantum behavior follows a deeper logic rooted in equilibrium. -/- It would also Imply that space-time is not a fixed, unchanging backdrop but a dynamic entity that adapts to maintain balance. This could explain long-standing mysteries, such as why the expansion of the universe is accelerating or how information is preserved in black holes. -/- Conclusion -/- The search for a unified theory of physics has remained elusive for over a century, but Balance Theory offers a new perspective—one based on the idea that the universe maintains equilibrium at all levels, from the smallest quantum particles to the vast structure of space-time itself. By treating gravity and quantum mechanics as different manifestations of the same balancing force, this approach provides a potential pathway toward unification. -/- If validated through experiment, Balance Theory could reshape our understanding of physics, resolving paradoxes and unlocking new insights into the nature of reality itself. The next steps involve rigorous testing, mathematical refinement, and collaboration with physicists across disciplines to explore whether this fundamental principle of balance can finally bridge the gap between Einstein’s relativity and the quantum world. -/- . (shrink)

Research on concepts has concentrated on the way people apply concepts online, when presented with a stimulus. Just as important, however, is the use of concepts offline, when planning what to do or thinking about what is the case. There is strong evidence that inferences driven by conceptual thought draw heavily on special-purpose resources: sensory, motoric, affective, and evaluative. At the same time, concepts afford general-purpose recombination and support domain-general reasoning processes—phenomena that have long been the focus (...) of philosophers. There is a growing consensus that a theory of concepts must encompass both kinds of process. This book shows how concepts are able to act as an interface between general-purpose reasoning and special-purpose systems. Concept-driven thinking can take advantage of the complementary costs and benefits of each. The book lays out an empirically-based account of the different ways in which thinking with concepts takes us to new conclusions and underpins planning, decision-making, and action. It also spells out three useful implications of the account. First, it allows us to reconstruct the commonplace idea that thinking draws on the meaning of a concept. Second, it offers an insight into how human cognition avoids the frame problem and the complementary, less discussed, ‘if-then problem’ for nested processing dispositions. Third, it shows that metacognition can apply to concepts and concept-driven thinking in various ways. The framework developed in the book elucidates what it is that makes concept-driven thinking an especially powerful cognitive resource. (shrink)

To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest anAesthetic Self Effectsupporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral changes, such (...) as altering political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other categories of taste, such as food preferences (Study 1). Using a multidimensional scaling technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in identity (Study 2). Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical domain: general changes in visual art preferences, for example from more traditional to abstract art, also elicited a strong Self Effect (Study 3). Exploring the breadth of this effect we also found anAnaesthetic Self Effect.That is, hypothetical changes from aesthetic indifference to caring about music, art, or beauty are judged to have a significant impact on identity. This effect on identity is stronger for aesthetic fields compared to leisure activities, such as hiking or playing video games (Study 4). Across our studies, the Anaesthetic Self Effect turns out to be stronger than the Aesthetic Self Effect. Taken together, we found evidence for a link between aesthetics and identity: we are aesthetic selves. When our tastes in music and the arts or our aesthetic interests change we take these to be transformative changes. (shrink)

I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful (...) consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics. (shrink)

We often effortlessly take the perceptual perspective of others: we represent some aspect of the environment that others currently perceive. However, taking someone's perspective can interfere with one's perceptual processing: another person's gaze can spontaneously affect our ability to detect stimuli in a scene. But it is still unclear whether our cognitive evaluation of those judgements is also affected. In this study, we investigated whether social perspective-taking can influence participants' metacognitive judgements about their perceptual responses. Participants performed a contrast detection (...) task with a task-irrelevant avatar oriented either congruently or incongruently to the stimulus location. By “blindfolding” the avatar, we tested the influence of social perspective-taking versus domain-general directional orienting. Participants had higher accuracy and perceptual sensitivity with a congruent avatar regardless of the blindfold, suggesting a directional cueing effect. However, their metacognitive efficiency was modulated only by the congruency of a seeing avatar. These results suggest that perceptual metacognitive ability can be socially enhanced by sharing perception of the same objects with others. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength (...) has been largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)