Results for 'formal truth'

998 found
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  1. The Objects and the Formal Truth of Kantian Analytic Judgments.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (2):177-93.
    I defend the thesis that Kantian analytic judgments are about objects (as opposed to concepts) against two challenges raised by recent scholars. First, can it accommodate cases like “A two-sided polygon is two-sided”, where no object really falls under the subject-concept as Kant sees it? Second, is it compatible with Kant’s view that analytic judgments make no claims about objects in the world and that we can know them to be true without going beyond the given concepts? I address these (...)
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  2. Some Formal Moments of Truth.Barry Smith - 1982 - In Werner Leinfellner (ed.), Language and Ontology. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky / Reidel. pp. 186-90.
    A preliminary statement of the formal theory of the truthmaker relation advanced in the paper “Truth-makers” (Mulligan, Simons and Smith) in 1984. Correspondence theories of truth have. I give a brief account of some more or less obvious formal characteristics of this almost forgotten basic truthmaker relation. I then attempt to show how this account may be extended to provide elements of a theory of truth which is in keeping with the spirit of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
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  3. Formalization of dialectical logic, Separation theory of truth. Logic of cellular automata.Zhou Senhai - manuscript
    By separating the general concept of truth into syntactic truth and semantic truth, this article proposes a new theory of truth to explain several paradoxes like the Liar paradox, Card paradox, Curry’s paradox, etc. By revealing the relationship between syntactic /semantic truth and being-nothing-becoming which are the core concepts of dialectical logic, it is able to formalize dialectical logic. It also provides a logical basis for complexity theory by transferring all reasoning into a directed (cyclic/acyclic) (...)
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  4. Expressing Truth directly within a formal system with no need for model theory.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Because formal systems of symbolic logic inherently express and represent the deductive inference model formal proofs to theorem consequences can be understood to represent sound deductive inference to deductive conclusions without any need for other representations.
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  5. Disarming Context Dependence. A Formal Inquiry into Indexicalism and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.Stellan Petersson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    In the debate about semantic context dependence, various truth-conditional frameworks have been proposed. Indexicalism, associated with e.g. Jason Stanley, accounts for contextual effects on truth conditions in terms of a rich covert syntax. Truth-conditional pragmatics, associated with e.g. François Recanati, does not locate the mechanisms for context dependence in the syntactic structure but provides a more complex semantics. In this dissertation, the hypothesis that indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent is explored. The conclusion that the (...)
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  6. Wholistic reference, truth-values, universes of discourse, and formal ontology: tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...)
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  7. The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages.P. Olcott - manuscript
    For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts. -/- By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.
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  8. On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency.Walter Carnielli, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Abilio Rodrigues - 2018 - In Marco Ruffino, Max Freund & Max Fernández de Castro (eds.), Logic and philosophy of logic. Recent trends from Latin America and Spain. College Publications. pp. 48-74.
    This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability (...)
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  9. Truth and Generalized Quantification.Bruno Whittle - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):340-353.
    Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own (...)
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  10. From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
    In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we (...)
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  11. Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley P. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford, England: Oxford University. pp. 281-306.
    Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. In this paper I turn the tables on this traditional conception of the relation between the two. The theorist of truth need not constrain his search for a “material” theory of truth, i.e., a theory of the philosophical nature of truth, by committing himself to one solution or another to the Liar Paradox. If he focuses on the nature of (...) (leaving issues of formal consistency for a later stage), he can arrive at material principles that prevent the Liar Paradox from arising in the first place. I argue for this point both on general methodological grounds and by example. The example is based on a substantivist theory of truth that emphasizes the role of truth in human cognition. The key point is that truth requires a certain complementarity of “immanence” and “transcendence”, and this means that some hierarchical structure is inherent in truth. Approaching the Liar Paradox from this perspective throws new light on its existent solutions: their differences and commonalities, their purported ad-hocness, and the relevance of natural language and bivalence to truth and the Liar. (shrink)
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  12. Philosophy of Logic – Reexamining the Formalized Notion of Truth.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Tarski "proved" that there cannot possibly be any correct formalization of the notion of truth entirely on the basis of an insufficiently expressive formal system that was incapable of recognizing and rejecting semantically incorrect expressions of language. -/- The only thing required to eliminate incompleteness, undecidability and inconsistency from formal systems is transforming the formal proofs of symbolic logic to use the sound deductive inference model.
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  13. The Truth Table Formulation of Propositional Logic.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    Developing a suggestion of Wittgenstein, I provide an account of truth tables as formulas of a formal language. I define the syntax and semantics of TPL (the language of Tabular Propositional Logic), and develop its proof theory. Single formulas of TPL, and finite groups of formulas with the same top row and TF matrix (depiction of possible valuations), are able to serve as their own proofs with respect to metalogical properties of interest. The situation is different, however, for (...)
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  14. Philosophy of Logic – Reexamining the Formalized Notion of Truth.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Because formal systems of symbolic logic inherently express and represent the deductive inference model formal proofs to theorem consequences can be understood to represent sound deductive inference to true conclusions without any need for other representations such as model theory.
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  15. Formalizing the logical (self-reference) error of the Liar Paradox.P. Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
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  16. Is deflationism compatible with compositional and tarskian truth theories?Lavinia Maria Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2021 - In Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern (eds.), Modes of Truth: The Unified Approach to Truth, Modality, and Paradox. New York, NY: Routledge.
    What requirements must deflationary formal theories of truth satisfy? This chapter argues against the widely accepted view that compositional and Tarskian theories of truth are substantial or otherwise unacceptable to deflationists. First, two purposes that a formal truth theory can serve are distinguished: one descriptive, the other logical (i.e., to characterise the correctness of inferences involving ‘true’). The chapter argues that the most compelling arguments for the incompatibility of compositional and Tarskian theories concern descriptive theories (...)
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  17. Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
    A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is (...)
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  18. Truth, topicality, and transparency: one-component versus two-component semantics.Peter Hawke, Levin Hornischer & Franz Berto - 2024 - Linguistics and Philosophy 47:481-503.
    When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.
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  19. Formal Background for the Incompleteness and Undefinability Theorems.Richard Kimberly Heck - manuscript
    A teaching document I've used in my courses on truth and on incompleteness. Aimed at students who have a good grasp of basic logic, and decent math skills, it attempts to give them the background they need to understand a proper statement of the classic results due to Gödel and Tarski, and sketches their proofs. Topics covered include the notions of language and theory, the basics of formal syntax and arithmetization, formal arithmetic (Q and PA), representability, diagonalization, (...)
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  20. Truth Contests and Talking Corpses.Maud Gleason - 1999 - In James I. Porter (ed.), Constructions of the Classical Body. University of Michigan Press,. pp. 287-313.
    In diverse fictions from the second century Roman Empire, two parties with competing claims to truth hold a formal contest in a public place where, after a series of abrupt reversals, the issue is finally decided by the evidence of a dead, mutilated, or resurrected body. We can ask these corpses to tell us about the ways Roman society constructed truth. Furthermore, can we learn from the abrupt reversals in these narratives anything about the way Romans experienced (...)
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  21. Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuźniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 67-90.
    Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account (...)
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  22. 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In José Martinez, Achourioti Dora & Galinon Henri (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer. pp. 57-83.
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  23. Formalizing Kant’s Rules.Richard Evans, Andrew Stephenson & Marek Sergot - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48:1-68.
    This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These (...)
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  24. Analogical Truth-Conditions for Metaphors.Eric Steinhart - 1994 - Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 9 (3):161-178.
    It has often been said that metaphors are based on analogies, but the nature of this relation has never been made precise. This article rigorously and formally specifies two semantic relations that do obtain between some metaphors and analogies. We argue that analogies often provide conditions of meaningfulness and truth for metaphors. An analogy is treated as an isomorphism from a source to topic domain. Metaphors are thought of as surface structures. Formal analogical conditions of meaningfulness and (...) are fully and rigorously worked out for several grammatical classes of metaphors. By providing analogical meaningfulness and truth conditions for metaphors, this article shows that truth-conditional semantics can be extended to metaphors. (shrink)
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  25. Truth and Proof without Models: A Development and Justification of the Truth-valuational Approach (2nd edition).Hanoch Ben-Yami - manuscript
    I explain why model theory is unsatisfactory as a semantic theory and has drawbacks as a tool for proofs on logic systems. I then motivate and develop an alternative, the truth-valuational substitutional approach (TVS), and prove with it the soundness and completeness of the first order Predicate Calculus with identity and of Modal Propositional Calculus. Modal logic is developed without recourse to possible worlds. Along the way I answer a variety of difficulties that have been raised against TVS and (...)
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  26. Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument.Yussif Yakubu - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):449-466.
    Gettier presented the now famous Gettier problem as a challenge to epistemology. The methods Gettier used to construct his challenge, however, utilized certain principles of formal logic that are actually inappropriate for the natural language discourse of the Gettier cases. In that challenge to epistemology, Gettier also makes truth claims that would be considered controversial in analytic philosophy of language. The Gettier challenge has escaped scrutiny in these other relevant academic disciplines, however, because of its façade as an (...)
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  27. Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments: A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics.Markus Pantsar - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can (...)
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  28. Witness agreement and the truth-conduciveness of coherentist justification.William Roche - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):151-169.
    Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “witness agreement” by itself implies neither an increase in the probability of truth nor a high probability of truth—the witnesses need to have some “individual credibility.” It can seem that, from this formal epistemological result, it follows that coherentist justification (i.e., doxastic coherence) is not truth-conducive. I argue that this does not follow. Central to my argument is the thesis that, though coherentists deny that there can be (...)
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  29. Truth and Collective Truth.Gilbert Plumer - 1996 - Dialectica 50 (1):3-24.
    The paper argues for the applicability of the notion of collective truth as opposed to distributive truth, that is, truth at times or possibilia taken in groups rather than individually. The underlying reasoning is that there are transtemporal and transworld relationships, e.g., those involving the relations of <being a descendant of> and <thinking about>. Relationships are (one type of) truth-makers. Hence, there are transtemporal and transworld truth-makers. Therefore, there is transtemporal and transworld truth, i.e., (...)
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  30. Coherentism, truth, and witness agreement.William A. Roche - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):243-257.
    Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that (...)
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  31. Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability.Glen Hoffmann - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299.
    The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that (...)
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  32. Logic and formal ontology.Barry Smith - 2000 - Manuscrito 23 (2):275-323.
    Revised version of chapter in J. N. Mohanty and W. McKenna (eds.), Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook, Lanham: University Press of America, 1989, 29–67. -/- Logic for Husserl is a science of science, a science of what all sciences have in common in their modes of validation. Thus logic deals with universal laws relating to truth, to deduction, to verification and falsification, and with laws relating to theory as such, and to what makes for theoretical unity, both on the side (...)
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  33. Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  34.  93
    Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional.Andrea Iacona & Lorenzo Rossi - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2):559-584.
    This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naïve truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The (...)
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  35. Truth as Consistent Assertion.Adam Rozycki - 2023 - Preprints.Org.
    This paper presents four key results. Firstly, it distinguishes between _partial_ and _consistent_ assertion of a sentence, and introduces the concept of an _equivocal_ sentence, which is both partially asserted and partially denied. Secondly, it proposes a novel definition of truth, stating that _a true sentence is one that is consistently asserted_. This definition is immune from the Liar paradox, does not restrict classical logic, and can be applied to declarative sentences in the language used by any particular person. (...)
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  36. Reclaiming Metaphysical Truth for Educational Research.Robert Archer - 2002 - British Journal of Educational Studies 50 (3):339 - 362.
    It is not uncommon in educational research and social science in general either to eschew the word truth or to put it in scare quotes in order to signify scepticism about it. After the initial wave of relativism in the philosophy of natural science, a second wave has developed in social science with the rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism. The tendency here is to relativise truth or to bracket out questions of truth. In contradistinction, this paper revindicates (...)
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  37. Formalizing Darwinism, Naturalizing Mathematics.Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 33 (2):133-160.
    In the last decades two different and apparently unrelated lines of research have increasingly connected mathematics and evolutionism. Indeed, on the one hand different attempts to formalize darwinism have been made, while, on the other hand, different attempts to naturalize logic and mathematics have been put forward. Those researches may appear either to be completely distinct or at least in some way convergent. They may in fact both be seen as supporting a naturalistic stance. Evolutionism is indeed crucial for a (...)
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  38. Truth and Reparation for the U.S. Imprisonment and Policing Regime: A Transitional Justice Perspective.Jennifer M. Https://Orcidorg Page & Desmond King - 2022 - Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 19 (2):209–231.
    In the literature on transitional justice, there is disagreement about whether countries like the United States can be characterized as transitional societies. Though it is widely recognized that transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and reparations can be used by Global North nations to address racial injustice, some consider societies to be transitional only when they are undergoing a formal democratic regime change. We conceptualize the political situation of low-income Black communities under the U.S. imprisonment and policing (...)
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  39. Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (doctoral dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  40. Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar.Stephen Schiffer - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):61-87.
    A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis , is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to be (...)
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  41. Desiderative Truth: Caprice and the Flaws of Desire.Lauria Federico - 2022 - In Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    Ronald de Sousa has vindicated the importance of emotions in our lives. This transpires clearly through his emphasis on “emotional truth”. Like true beliefs, emotions can reflect the evaluative landscape and be true to ourselves. This article develops his insights on emotional truth by exploring the analogous phenomenon regarding desire: “desiderative truth”. According to the dominant view championed by de Sousa, goodness is the formal object of desire: a desire is fitting when its content is good. (...)
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  42. Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share (...)
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  43. Formalizing Self-Reference Paradox using Predicate Logic.P. Olcott - manuscript
    We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined such that ∀x Tarski:True(x) ↔ Boolean-True. On the basis of this logical premise we formalize the Truth Teller Paradox: "This sentence is true." showing syntactically how self-reference paradox is semantically ungrounded.
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  44. A mathematical theory of truth and an application to the regress problem.S. Heikkilä - forthcoming - Nonlinear Studies 22 (2).
    In this paper a class of languages which are formal enough for mathematical reasoning is introduced. Its languages are called mathematically agreeable. Languages containing a given MA language L, and being sublanguages of L augmented by a monadic predicate, are constructed. A mathematical theory of truth (shortly MTT) is formulated for some of those languages. MTT makes them fully interpreted MA languages which posses their own truth predicates. MTT is shown to conform well with the eight norms (...)
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  45. Truth, omniscience, and the knower.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):9 - 41.
    Let us sum up. The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an (...)
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  46. On the explanatory power of truth in logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, strong modal (...)
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  47. How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth.Boris Culina - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):1-31.
    This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical (...)
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  48. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
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  49. Conditionals and Truth Functionality.Rani Lill Anjum - manuscript
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to (...)
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  50. A Correspondence Theory of Truth.Jay Newhard - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown University
    The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these theories meets (...)
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