Results for 'killing and letting die'

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  1. Why Are Killing and Letting Die Wrong?Matthew Hanser - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):175-201.
    This article has two main sections. In Section I, I argue against the skeptic's position. I examine an attempt to see both prima facie objections as arising from features that killing and letting die have in common, and then argue that all such attempts are doomed to failure. In Section II, I explain how even defenders of the distinction's significance have misconstrued the difference between the two objections. In so doing I attempt to develop a better account of (...)
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  2. Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism.Ken Levy - 2010 - Georgia Law Review 44:607-695.
    For over a century now, American scholars (among others) have been debating the merits of “bad Samaritan” laws — laws punishing people for failing to attempt easy and safe rescues. Unfortunately, the opponents of bad Samaritan laws have mostly prevailed. In the United States, the “no-duty-to-rescue” rule dominates. Only four states have passed bad Samaritan laws, and these laws impose only the most minimal punishment — either sub-$500 fines or short-term imprisonment. -/- This Article argues that every state should criminalize (...)
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  3. Why Letting Die Instead of Killing? Choosing Active Euthanasia on Moral Grounds.Evangelos Protopapadakis - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy.
    Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there is any, it (...)
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  4. The Rejection of Consequentializing.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):79-96.
    Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.
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  5. Murdering an Accident Victim: A New Objection to the Bare-Difference Argument.Scott Hill - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):767-778.
    Many philosophers, psychologists, and medical practitioners believe that killing is no worse than letting die on the basis of James Rachels's Bare-Difference Argument. I show that his argument is unsound. In particular, a premise of the argument is that his examples are as similar as is consistent with one being a case of killing and the other being a case of letting die. However, the subject who lets die has both the ability to kill and the (...)
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  6.  42
    Error Theories and Bare-Difference Methodology: A Reply to Kopeikin.Scott Hill - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-10.
    Kopeikin (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Rachels’ (1975) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that killing is no different than letting die. Hill’s (2018) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that killing is worse than letting die. At least one of the intuitions must be mistaken. This calls for an error theory. Hill has an error theory for the intuition elicited by the Kopeikin/Rachels’ cases. Kopeikin and Rachels have an error theory for the intuition elicited by Hill’s cases. (...)
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  7. Living High and Letting Die.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (3):435-442.
    Imagine that your body has become attached, without your permission, to that of a sick violinist. The violinist is a human being. He will die if you detach him. Such detachment seems, nonetheless, to be morally permissible. Thomson argues that an unwantedly pregnant woman is in an analogous situation. Her argument is considered by many to have established the moral permissibility of abortion even under the assumption that the foetus is a human being. Another popular argument is that presented by (...)
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  8. Two Ways to Kill a Patient.Ben Bronner - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (1):44-63.
    According to the Standard View, a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient but rather allows the patient to die—an important distinction, according to some. I argue that killing can be understood in either of two ways, and given the relevant understanding, the Standard View is insulated from typical criticisms. I conclude by noting several problems for the Standard View that remain to be fully addressed.
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  9. Review of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Natural Law Ethics Approach. [REVIEW]Craig Paterson - 2010 - Ethics and Medicine 26 (1):23-4.
    As medical technology advances and severely injured or ill people can be kept alive and functioning long beyond what was previously medically possible, the debate surrounding the ethics of end-of-life care and quality-of-life issues has grown more urgent. In this lucid and vigorous book, Craig Paterson discusses assisted suicide and euthanasia from a fully fledged but non-dogmatic secular natural law perspective. He rehabilitates and revitalises the natural law approach to moral reasoning by developing a pluralistic account of just why we (...)
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  10. Miscarriage Is Not a Cause of Death: A Response to Berg’s “Abortion and Miscarriage”.Nicholas Colgrove - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (4):394-413.
    Some opponents of abortion claim that fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. Following Berg (2017), let us call these individuals “Personhood-At-Conception” (or PAC), opponents of abortion. Berg argues that if fetuses are persons from the moment of conception, then miscarriage kills far more people than abortion. As such, PAC opponents of abortion face the following dilemma: They must “immediately” and “substantially” shift their attention, resources, etc., toward preventing miscarriage or they must admit that they do not actually believe (...)
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  11. Innocent Burdens.James Edwin Mahon - 2014 - Washington and Lee Law Review 71.
    In this article Judith Jarvis Thomson's Good Samaritan Argument in defense of abortion in the case of rape is defended from two objections: the Kill vs. Let Die Objection, and the Intend to Kill vs. Merely Foresee Death Objection. The article concludes that these defenses do not defend Thomson from further objections from Peter Singer and David Oderberg.
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  12. Illusory Innocence: Review of Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die. [REVIEW]David K. Lewis - 1996 - Eureka Street 6 (10):35-36.
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  13. Frowe's Machine Cases.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (2): 93-104.
    Helen Frowe (2006/2010) contends that there is a substantial moral difference between killing and letting die, arguing that in Michael Tooley's infamous machine case it is morally wrong to flip a coin to determine who lives or dies. Here I argue that Frowe fails to show that killing and letting die are morally inequivalent. However, I believe that she has succeeded in showing that it is wrong to press the button in Tooley's case, where pressing the (...)
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  14. The Meaning of Killing[REVIEW]Nicolas Delon - 2018 - Books and Ideas 2018.
    Why do we consider killing and letting someone die to be two different things? Why do we believe that a doctor who refuses to treat a terminally ill patient is doing anything less than administering a lethal substance? After all, the consequences are the same, and perhaps the moral status of these acts should be judged accordingly. -/- Reviewed: Jonathan Glover, Questions de vie ou de mort (Causing Death and Saving Lives), translated into French and introduced by Benoît (...)
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  15.  60
    Living High and Letting Die.Nicola Bourbaki, Berit Brogaard & Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (297):435 - 442.
    Imagine that your body has become attached, without your permission, to that of a sick violinist. The violinist is a human being. He will die if you detach him. Such detachment seems, nonetheless, to be morally permissible. Thomson argues that an unwantedly pregnant woman is in an analogous situation. Her argument is considered by many to have established the moral permissibility of abortion even under the assumption that the foetus is a human being. Another popular argument is that presented by (...)
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  16. The Problem of Spontaneous Abortion: Is the Pro-Life Position Morally Monstrous?Bruce P. Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - The New Bioethics 25 (2):103-120.
    A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity’s most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do not act as (...)
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  17.  32
    Persson, Ingmar. From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons, and Responsibility.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 336. $55.00. [REVIEW]Fiona Woollard - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):272-276.
    From Morality to the End of Reason is an ambitious book. Ingmar Persson tackles key issues from across the spectrum of ethical theory and beyond: the nature of rights, self-ownership, killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, collective action, freedom and moral responsibility, the nature and ground of practical and epistemic reasons. His conclusions on these wide-ranging issues are woven into an overarching view of morality and rationality.
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  18. Book Review, Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die. [REVIEW]Irwin Goldstein - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):557-561.
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  19. Autonomy and the Moral Symmetry Principle: Reply to Frowe and Tooley.Jacob Blair - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):531-541.
    Helen Frowe has recently objected to Michael Tooley’s famous Moral Symmetry Principle, which is meant to show that in themselves killing and letting die are morally equivalent. I argue that her objection is not compelling but a more compelling objection is available. Specifically, Tooley’s rebuttal of a proposed counter-example to his Moral Symmetry Principle has two problematic implications. First, it undercuts the very principle itself. If we reject the proposed counter-example, then any instance of the Moral Symmetry Principle (...)
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  20. Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing.Nathan Nobis - 2019 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
    Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore. -/- When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die? -/- Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to (...)
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  21. The Total Artificial Heart and the Dilemma of Deactivation.Ben Bronner - 2016 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 26 (4):347-367.
    It is widely believed to be permissible for a physician to discontinue any treatment upon the request of a competent patient. Many also believe it is never permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient. I argue that the prospect of deactivating a patient’s artificial heart presents us with a dilemma: either the first belief just mentioned is false or the second one is. Whichever horn of the dilemma we choose has significant implications for contemporary medical ethics.
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  22. Gonzales V. Oregon and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy Issues.Ken Levy - 2007 - Tulsa Law Review 42:699-729.
    The euthanasia literature typically discusses the difference between “active” and “passive” means of ending a patient’s life. Physician-assisted suicide differs from both active and passive forms of euthanasia insofar as the physician does not administer the means of suicide to the patient. Instead, she merely prescribes and dispenses them to the patient and lets the patient “do the rest” – if and when the patient chooses. One supposed advantage of this process is that it maximizes the patient’s autonomy with respect (...)
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  23. Animals, Advance Directives, and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?David Limbaugh - 2016 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 2 (4):481-489.
    A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...)
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  24. Dignity and Assisted Dying: What Kant Got Right (and Wrong).Michael Cholbi - 2018 - In Human Dignity and Assisted Death. pp. 143-160.
    That Kant’s moral thought is invoked by both advocates and opponents of a right to assisted dying attests to both the allure and and the elusiveness of Kant’s moral thought. In particular, the theses that individuals have a right to a ‘death with dignity’ and that assisting someone to die contravenes her dignity appear to gesture at one of Kant’s signature moral notions, dignity. The purposes of this article are to outline Kant’s understanding of dignity and its implications for the (...)
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  25.  73
    Trolley Cases and Being ‘In the Realm,’.Michael Barnwell - 2010 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 32:29-35.
    I argue against Judith Jarvis Thomson’s solution for solving paradoxes surrounding trolley cases. I then offer my own competing, novel solution. Thomson famously proposed that what matters in trolley-type cases is whether an agent does something to a threat itself so as to minimize harm or whether the agent initiates a new threat against a person so as to minimize harm. According to her, we intuitively assume that minimizing harm is permissible in the former case (doing something to a threat) (...)
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  26. Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2015 - Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such (...)
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  27. “ ‘Let the Law Cut Through the Mountain’: Salomon Maimon, Moses Mendelssohn, and Mme. Truth”.Yitzhak Melamed - 2014 - In Lukas Muehlethaler (ed.), Höre die Wahrheit, wer sie auch spricht. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. pp. 70-76.
    Moses Maimonides was a rare kind of radical. Being a genuine Aristotelian, he recommended following the middle path and avoiding extremism. Yet, within the sphere of Jewish philosophy and thought, he created a school of philosophical radicalism, inspiring Rabbis and thinkers to be unwilling to compromise their integrity in searching for the truth, regardless of where their arguments might lead. Both Spinoza and Salomon Maimon inherited this commitment to uncompromising philosophical inquiry. But of course, such willingness to follow a philosophical (...)
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  28. Legalising Euthanasia for Children: Dying with 'Dignity' or Killing the Vulnerable?Caroline Ong - 2014 - Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin 20 (1):5.
    Ong, Caroline In February 2014, the Belgian parliament passed an amendment to the Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28th, 2002 removing the age limit of those requesting euthanasia provided that they have discerning capabilities and their parents approve. After mentioning briefly the arguments against legalising euthanasia, this article questions the ethical validity of removing the age limit, as well as the presumption that ending lives prematurely allows people to die with dignity. Caring for people who are vulnerable in their (...)
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  29. Is There a Duty to Militarily Intervene to Stop a Genocide?Uwe Steinhoff - forthcoming - In Christian Neuhäuser & Christoph Schuck (eds.), Military Interventions: Considerations from Philosophy and Political Science.
    Is there is a moral obligation to militarily intervene in another state to stop a genocide from happening (if this can be done with proportionate force)? My answer is that under exceptional circumstances a state or even a non-state actor might have a duty to stop a genocide (for example if these actors have promised to do so), but under most circumstances there is no such obligation. To wit, “humanity,” states, collectives, and individuals do not have an obligation to make (...)
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  30. Deep Uncertainties in the Criteria for Physician Aid-in-Dying for Psychiatric Patients.Piotr Grzegorz Nowak & Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (10):54-56.
    In their insightful article, Brent Kious and Margaret Battin (2019) correctly identify an inconsistency between an involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid in dying (PAD). They declare that it may be possible to resolve the problem by articulating “objective standards for evaluating the severity of others’ suffering,” but ultimately they admit that this task is beyond the scope of their article since the solution depends on “a deep and difficult” question about comparing the worseness of two possible (...)
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  31. Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong.Todd Karhu - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):378–394.
    Many people believe that the wrongness of killing a person does not depend on factors like her age, condition, or how much she has to lose by dying – a view Jeff McMahan calls the ‘Equal Wrongness Thesis’. This article argues that we should reject the Equal Wrongness Thesis on the basis of the moral equivalence between killing a person and knocking her unconscious.
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  32.  52
    Planet of the Degenerate Monkeys.Eugene Halton - 2013 - In John Huss (ed.), In Planet of the Apes and Philosophy. Chicago, IL, USA: Open Court Chicago. pp. 279-292.
    In the words of Charles Peirce from 1901, “man is but a degenerate monkey, with a paranoic talent for self-satisfaction, no matter what scrapes he may get himself into, calling them ‘civilization…’” Peirce’s concept of degenerate monkey draws attention both to our neotenous or prolonged newborn-like nature as “degenerate” in the mathematical sense of a genetic falling away from more mature genomes of other primates, and also to our monkeying around with the long evolutionary narrative of foraging, through the advent (...)
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  33. Age and Death: A Defence of Gradualism.Joseph Millum - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):279-297.
    According to standard comparativist views, death is bad insofar as it deprives someone of goods she would otherwise have had. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues against such views and in favor of a gradualist account according to which how bad it is to die is a function of both the future goods of which the decedent is deprived and her cognitive development when she dies. Comparativists and gradualists therefore disagree about how bad it is to die (...)
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  34. Relevance and Non-Consequentialist Aggregation.J. Paul Kelleher - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (4):385-408.
    Interpersonal aggregation involves the combining and weighing of benefits and losses to multiple individuals in the course of determining what ought to be done. Most consequentialists embrace thoroughgoing interpersonal aggregation, the view that any large benefit to each of a few people can be morally outweighed by allocating any smaller benefit to each of many others, so long as this second group is sufficiently large. This would permit letting one person die in order to cure some number of mild (...)
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  35. Fire and Forget: A Moral Defense of the Use of Autonomous Weapons in War and Peace.Duncan MacIntosh - 2021 - In Jai Galliott, Duncan MacIntosh & Jens David Ohlin (eds.), Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Re-Examining the Law and Ethics of Robotic Warfare. Oxford University Press. pp. 9-23.
    Autonomous and automatic weapons would be fire and forget: you activate them, and they decide who, when and how to kill; or they kill at a later time a target you’ve selected earlier. Some argue that this sort of killing is always wrong. If killing is to be done, it should be done only under direct human control. (E.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peter Asaro, Christof Heyns.) I argue that there are surprisingly many kinds of situation where this is (...)
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  36. Sentient Nonpersons and the Disvalue of Death.David DeGrazia - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (7):511-519.
    Implicit in our everyday attitudes and practices is the assumption that death ordinarily harms a person who dies. A far more contested matter is whether death harms sentient individuals who are not persons, a category that includes many animals and some human beings. On the basis of the deprivation account of the harm of death, I argue that death harms sentient nonpersons. I next consider possible bases for the commonsense judgment that death ordinarily harms persons more than it harms sentient (...)
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  37. Buddhismus Und Quantenphysik: Die Wirklichkeitsbegriffe Nāgārjunas Und der Quantenphsyik [I.E. Quantenphysik].Christian Thomas Kohl - 2005 - Windpferd.
    1.Summary The key terms. 1. Key term: ‘Sunyata’. Nagarjuna is known in the history of Buddhism mainly by his keyword ‘sunyata’. This word is translated into English by the word ‘emptiness’. The translation and the traditional interpretations create the impression that Nagarjuna declares the objects as empty or illusionary or not real or not existing. What is the assertion and concrete statement made by this interpretation? That nothing can be found, that there is nothing, that nothing exists? Was Nagarjuna denying (...)
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  38. Saving Seven Embryos or Saving One Child? Michael Sandel on the Moral Status of Human Embryos.Gregor Damschen & Dieter Schönecker - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Ethics and the Life Sciences):239-245.
    Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...)
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  39. Theories of Consciousness & Death.Gregory Nixon (ed.) - 2016 - New York, USA: QuantumDream.
    What happens to the inner light of consciousness with the death of the individual body and brain? Reductive materialism assumes it simply fades to black. Others think of consciousness as indicating a continuation of self, a transformation, an awakening or even alternatives based on the quality of life experience. In this issue, speculation drawn from theoretic research are presented. -/- Table of Contents Epigraph: From “The Immortal”, Jorge Luis Borges iii Editor’s Introduction: I Killed a Squirrel the Other Day, Gregory (...)
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  40. Belief and Death: Capital Punishment and the Competence-for-Execution Requirement.David M. Adams - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (1):17-30.
    A curious and comparatively neglected element of death penalty jurisprudence in America is my target in this paper. That element concerns the circumstances under which severely mentally disabled persons, incarcerated on death row, may have their sentences carried out. Those circumstances are expressed in a part of the law which turns out to be indefensible. This legal doctrine—competence-for-execution —holds that a condemned, death-row inmate may not be killed if, at the time of his scheduled execution, he lacks an awareness of (...)
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  41. Don’T Demean “Invasives”: Conservation and Wrongful Species Discrimination.C. E. Abbate & Bob Fischer - 2019 - Animals 871 (9).
    It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as “invasive”. We argue that the classification of any species as “invasive” constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals—assuming that conservationists “kill equally”. It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who (...)
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  42. The Violence of Care: An Analysis of Foucault's Pastor.Christopher Mayes - 2010 - Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory.
    This paper will address Foucault’s analysis of the Hebrew and Christian pastor and argue that Foucault’s analysis of pastoral power in Security, Territory, Population neglects an important characteristic of the shepherd/pastor figure: violence. Despite Foucault’s close analysis of the early development of the Hebrew pastor, he overlooks the role of violence and instead focuses on sacrifice. However the sacrificial pastor does not figure in the Hebrew Scriptures. The Hebrew pastor is called to lead, feed and protect the flock, not sacrifice (...)
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  43. Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017.Michael Starks - 2017 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of the edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and (...)
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  44.  22
    Let Me Go and Try.Kirk Ludwig - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):340-358.
    This paper argues for a deflationary account of trying on which ‘x tried to ϕ’ abbreviates ‘x did something with the intention of ϕ-ing’, where ‘did something’ is treated as a schematic verb. On this account, tryings are not a distinctive sort of episode present in some or all cases of acting. ‘x tried to ϕ’ simply relates some doing of x’s to a further aim x had, which may or may not have been achieved. Consequently, the analysis of ‘x (...)
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  45. Killing Fetuses and Killing Newborns.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):19-20.
    The argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns is a challenge to liberal positions on abortion because it can be considered a reductio of their defence of abortion. Here I defend the liberal stance on abortion by arguing that the argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns on ground of the social, psychological and economic burden on the parents recently put forward by Giubilini and Minerva is not valid; this is because they fail to show that (...)
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  46. Never Let the Passions Be Your Guide: Descartes and the Role of the Passions.Shoshana Brassfield - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3):459-477.
    Commentators commonly assume that Descartes regards it as a function of the passions to inform us or teach us which things are beneficial and which are harmful. As a result, they tend to infer that Descartes regards the passions as an appropriate guide to what is beneficial or harmful. In this paper I argue that this conception of the role of the passions in Descartes is mistaken. First, in spite of a number of texts appearing to show the contrary, I (...)
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  47. Don't Fear the Reaper: An Epicurean Answer to Puzzles About Death and Injustice.Simon Cushing - 2007 - In Kate Woodthorpe (ed.), Layers of Dying and Death. Oxford, UK: Inter-Disciplinary Press. pp. 117-127.
    I begin by sketching the Epicurean position on death - that it cannot be bad for the one who dies because she no longer exists - which has struck many people as specious. However, alternative views must specify who is wronged by death (the dead person?), what is the harm (suffering?), and when does the harm take place (before death, when you’re not dead yet, or after death, when you’re not around any more?). In the second section I outline the (...)
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  48. Associative Duties and the Ethics of Killing in War.Seth Lazar - 2013 - Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):3-48.
    this paper advances a novel account of part of what justifies killing in war, grounded in the duties we owe to our loved ones to protect them from the severe harms with which war threatens them. It discusses the foundations of associative duties, then identifies the sorts of relationships, and the specific duties that they ground, which can be relevant to the ethics of war. It explains how those associa- tive duties can justify killing in theory—in particular how (...)
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  49. A Death Full of Gods: The Arcane Link Between Beauty and Death in the Philosophy of 'Socrates' and Shankaracharya.Anway Mukhopadhyay - manuscript
    Abstract: The present paper seeks to explore the emotional structures that make human beings afraid of death in solitude, the feelings that necessitate the imagining of a peopled death, a death accompanied by fellow humans, gods, or God. In order to do this I take up the works of two great thinkers of the East and the West, and place them on a comparativist spectrum. The discussion covers many areas, including the polytheistic imaginations of ancient Greece and eighth century India, (...)
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  50. Letting Happen, Omissions and Causation.Maria Alvarez - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):63-81.
    In this paper I consider whether it is possible to cause an event by letting it happen.
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