The functional approach to scientific progress has been mainly developed by Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper, Laudan, and more recently by Shan. The basic idea is that science progresses if key functions of science are fulfilled in a better way. This chapter defends the function approach. It begins with an overview of the two old versions of the functional approach by examining the work of Kuhn, Laudan, Popper, and Lakatos. It then argues for Shan’s new functional approach, in which scientific (...) progress is defined as an increase of usefulness of exemplary practices. (shrink)

A consensus in a scientific community is often used as a resource for making informed public-policy decisions and deciding between rival expert testimonies in legal trials. This paper contains a social-epistemic analysis of the high-profile Bendectin drug controversy, which was decided in the courtroom inter alia by deference to a scientific consensus about the safety of Bendectin. Drawing on my previously developed account of knowledge-based consensus, I argue that the consensus in this case was (...) not knowledge based, hence courts’ deference to it was not epistemically justified. I draw sceptical lessons from this analysis regarding the value of scientific consensus as a desirable and reliable means of resolving scientific controversies in public life. (shrink)

In recent years, several strategies have been proposed to tackle social controversies about topics in which science is settled, among which one of the most influential is that of Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that any lay person with access to the Internet and basic education can reliably assess the acceptability of various claims involving expert knowledge. In particular, the author shows that this procedure can be successfully applied to the case of anthropogenic global warming. In this article we will try (...) to argue why, even if we concede that Anderson's proposal is satisfactory in that particular case, it fails to generalize when applied to other controversies. In this article, we illustrate it with the cases of flat-Eartherism and anti-vaxxerism. (shrink)

Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate (...) the existence of shared knowledge among the members of the consensus community. I address the question of under what conditions it is likely that a consensus is in fact knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is likely to be knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus, and I identify three conditions—social calibration, apparent consilience of evidence, and social diversity, for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus. (shrink)

Consensus and disagreement play important roles in the practice, development, and dissemination of science. This raises a host of important philosophical questions. Some of these issues are conceptual: When, exactly, does a scientific agreement count as a consensus? And in what sense, if any, is disagreement the opposite of consensus? Other questions concern the role of consensus and disagreement in the development of science: For example, is consensus on central methodological issues and assumptions necessary (...) for scientific work to proceed normally? Yet other questions are epistemological: From a layperson’s perspective, does the presence of a scientific consensus ever indicate that the relevant theory is probably correct? If so, what are the conditions under which it does so? Relatedly, should scientists themselves also defer to the consensus position among their peers whenever such a consensus exists? Or should they instead evaluate consensus theories for themselves, or even actively aim to dissent against such theories? (shrink)

Consensus conferences are social techniques which involve bringing together a group of scientific experts, and sometimes also non-experts, in order to increase the public role in science and related policy, to amalgamate diverse and often contradictory evidence for a hypothesis of interest, and to achieve scientific consensus or at least the appearance of consensus among scientists. For consensus conferences that set out to amalgamate evidence, I propose three desiderata: Inclusivity, Constraint, and Evidential Complexity. Two (...) examples suggest that consensus conferences can readily satisfy Inclusivity and Evidential Complexity, but consensus conferences do not as easily satisfy Constraint. I end by discussing the relation between social inclusivity and the three desiderata. (shrink)

Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disagrees with some theory, with expert consensus, in which some non-negligible proportion either (...) rejects or is uncertain about the theory. It is argued that, from a layperson’s point of view, an expert consensus is often stronger evidence for a theory’s truth than unanimity. Several lessons are drawn from this conclusion, e.g. concerning what laypeople should infer from expert pronouncements, how journalists should report on scientific theories, and how working scientists should communicate with the public. (shrink)

This paper is a rejoinder to Alan Irwin's constructive response "Agreeing to Differ?" to our (2017) paper. We zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises, namely (a) How to understand consensus? (b) Why are so many public participation activities consensus-driven? (c) Should we not value the art of closure, of finding ways to make agreements, particularly in view of the dire state of world politics today? We use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some of (...) our ideas. (shrink)

It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled (...) out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning: namely, Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis. (shrink)

This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the aim (...) of scientific inquiry, and if so, what ‎kind of ‎consensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference ‎that a ‎theory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking ‎into ‎consideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of ‎the ‎consensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of ‎consensus ‎formation.‎. (shrink)

The scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change is firmly established yet climate change denialism, a species of what I call pseudoskepticism, is on the rise in industrial nations most responsible for climate change. Such denialism suggests the need for a robust ethics of inquiry and public discourse. In this paper I argue: (1) that ethical obligations of inquiry extend to every voting citizen insofar as citizens are bound together as a political body. (2) It is morally condemnable for (...) public officials to put forward assertions contrary to scientific consensus when such consensus is decisive for public policy and legislation. (3) It is imperative upon educators, journalists, politicians and all those with greater access to the public forum to condemn, factually and ethically, pseudoskeptical assertions made in the public realm without equivocation. (shrink)

Normatively inappropriate scientific dissent prevents warranted closure of scientific controversies and confuses the public about the state of policy-relevant science, such as anthropogenic climate change. Against recent criticism by de Melo-Martín and Intemann of the viability of any conception of normatively inappropriate dissent, I identify three conditions for normatively inappropriate dissent: its generation process is politically illegitimate, it imposes an unjust distribution of inductive risks, and it adopts evidential thresholds outside an accepted range. I supplement these conditions with (...) an inference-to-the-best-explanation account of knowledge-based consensus and dissent to allow policy makers to reliably identify unreliable scientific dissent. (shrink)

A recent article by Kuhn1 showcases the plethora of proposed solutions for the mind-body problem as it is understood in current ’consciousness science’. Perusing this article, philosophers will likely find it surprising to see the inclusion of for instance Indian idealism and Buddhist thought, but neither German, nor British or US idealists, which seems especially unbalanced when instead of them theories like Kastrup’s analytical idealism (Hegel for physicists?) or Hoffmann’s interface theory (Kant for psychologists?) are included. The listings of dualist, (...) panpsychist and further theories seems equally eclectic, with for instance Descartes no more than a side-note in a number of entries, but several listings of religious ideas of body and soul. A possible problem with such omissions is of course that not taking philosophical history more seriously comes with the peril of repeating (now) avoidable errors. Nevertheless, judging from the disclaimers, Kuhn is well aware of this and most likely sees his list as more of a ’sociology of consciousness science’, i.e. a list of people and ideas that are currently circulating in this field. -/- It can in any case be taken from Kuhn’s monumental work effort, that it is often assumed that a solution to the mind-body problem would be either (in the wider sense) materialistic (including nonreductive and quantum theories), dualistic, panpsychistic (including monist theories) or idealistic. The core problems faced are then those of emergence (of consciousness), interaction (between brain and mind), de/combination (of ‘mind dust’ or a unity into proper subjects) or emanation, where the emanation problem is the problem of explaining in detail(!) how the physical world and our scientific theories arise from a given idealistic setup. To me it seems more likely that all these views have a point, but that none manages to cover the whole picture – and that it therefore might be possible to integrate these views into ’consensus models’, if we do not look at the proposed solutions, but the initial intentions and/or intuitions for setting them up (much like as if we would mediate a social conflict). (shrink)

A scientific community can be modeled as a collection of epistemic agents attempting to answer questions, in part by communicating about their hypotheses and results. We can treat the pathways of scientific communication as a network. When we do, it becomes clear that the interaction between the structure of the network and the nature of the question under investigation affects epistemic desiderata, including accuracy and speed to community consensus. Here we build on previous work, both our own (...) and others’, in order to get a firmer grasp on precisely which features of scientific communities interact with which features of scientific questions in order to influence epistemic outcomes. (shrink)

Scientific revolution has been one of the most controversial topics in the history and philosophy of science. Yet it has been no consensus on what is the best unit of analysis in the historiography of scientific revolutions. Nor is there a consensus on what best explains the nature of scientific revolutions. This chapter provides a critical examination of the historiography of scientific revolutions. It begins with a brief introduction to the historical development of the (...) concept of scientific revolution, followed by an overview of the five main philosophical accounts of scientific revolutions. It then challenges two historiographical assumptions of the philosophical analyses of scientific revolutions. (shrink)

Scientific Explanation of Belief Systems: A Multidisciplinary Analysis -/- Abstract Belief systems are central to human experience, influencing decisions, behaviors, and societal structures. This paper provides a comprehensive scientific explanation of belief systems, integrating insights from neuroscience, psychology, sociology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, systems theory, and educational technology. It also explores the persistence of false beliefs and how belief systems can be reprogrammed through education and technology. Finally, it demonstrates how belief systems are governed by the same natural principles (...) outlined in Angelito Malicse’s universal formula for solving the problem of free will, particularly the law of balance in nature. -/- 1. Introduction Belief systems are frameworks through which individuals interpret reality, assess truth, and guide action. These systems arise from a complex interplay of neural, psychological, social, and evolutionary processes. Understanding their scientific basis is crucial for addressing issues such as misinformation, ideological conflict, and educational reform. Angelito Malicse’s universal formula—composed of three universal laws, especially the law of balance in nature—provides a foundational principle that explains why belief systems function as they do and how they can be corrected when they violate natural balance. -/- 2. Neuroscience: Neural Foundations of Belief In neuroscience, beliefs are considered patterns of neural activity stored in the brain. They are formed through sensory input processed by brain regions such as: -/- Prefrontal Cortex: Responsible for logic, planning, and decision-making. -/- Amygdala: Links emotions to beliefs, often reinforcing emotionally charged beliefs. -/- Hippocampus: Integrates memory with new experiences. -/- Beliefs become reinforced through repetition and emotional engagement, making them resistant to change even when faced with contradictory evidence. This aligns with the universal formula’s concept that internal imbalance—caused by emotional reinforcement of false beliefs—can disrupt mental systems, echoing the principle of error-free systems for proper function. -/- 3. Psychology: Cognitive Structures and Biases Psychologically, beliefs are schemas—mental frameworks for organizing information. They are shaped by experiences, especially during early development, and maintained through various cognitive biases: -/- Confirmation Bias: Tendency to seek information that confirms existing beliefs. -/- Cognitive Dissonance: Mental discomfort from conflicting beliefs leads to rationalization. -/- Anchoring Bias: Overreliance on initial information. -/- These biases help maintain belief stability but also contribute to the persistence of incorrect or irrational beliefs. According to the universal formula, these mental errors represent imbalances within the cognitive system that must be corrected through conscious feedback and homeostasis. -/- 4. Sociology and Anthropology: Cultural Transmission Sociologically, belief systems are embedded within social institutions such as family, religion, education, and media. Anthropologically, they evolve as cultural constructs transmitted through rituals, myths, and traditions. They fulfill roles such as: -/- Establishing group identity -/- Maintaining social norms -/- Providing existential meaning -/- Shared beliefs, often in the form of ideologies or religions, act as cultural software that guides collective behavior. These collective belief systems must also conform to the universal law of balance in nature; otherwise, societal dysfunction and suffering emerge due to systemic imbalance, as described in the universal formula. -/- 5. Evolutionary Biology: Adaptive Functions From an evolutionary perspective, belief systems have contributed to human survival by: -/- Promoting group cohesion and cooperation -/- Offering explanations for uncertainty and danger -/- Establishing moral codes to reduce intra-group conflict -/- Belief systems that enhanced group survival and reproduction were naturally selected, giving rise to deeply ingrained tendencies toward belief formation and loyalty. However, maladaptive beliefs that once served a purpose may now create imbalance in modern societies, and must be re-evaluated according to the universal formula’s principle of aligning belief and behavior with nature’s laws. -/- 6. Systems Theory: Belief Systems as Feedback Loops Systems theory views belief systems as feedback mechanisms between individuals and their environment. These systems can be: -/- Open: Capable of incorporating new information and adapting. -/- Closed: Resistant to change and often self-reinforcing. -/- Beliefs influence perception and behavior, which in turn affect outcomes that reinforce the belief system, creating a cycle of reinforcement or entrenchment. The universal formula sees this as a form of cybernetic homeostasis: beliefs that maintain systemic balance are adaptive, while those that distort internal or external reality are destructive and must be corrected. -/- 7. Persistence of False Beliefs False beliefs can persist due to: -/- Neural reinforcement through emotional and repetitive activation. -/- Social validation from group consensus. -/- Psychological comfort, offering security or identity. -/- Educational shortcomings, such as lack of critical thinking training. -/- Even when disproven by evidence, beliefs may remain intact due to identity threats, group loyalty, and emotional investment. The universal formula asserts that these persistent false beliefs are violations of natural balance and must be addressed through systemic education that realigns the internal system with external realities. -/- 8. Reprogramming Belief Systems: Role of Education and Technology -/- 8.1 Through Education 8.2 A holistic education emphasizing critical thinking can: -/- Encourage open inquiry and evidence-based reasoning -/- Train students to detect bias and logical fallacies -/- Foster epistemic humility and intellectual flexibility -/- This approach aligns with the universal formula’s advocacy for educational systems that instill understanding of nature’s laws and feedback mechanisms. -/- 8.3 Through Technology 8.4 Modern technologies offer tools to reshape belief systems: -/- AI and adaptive learning platforms personalize education and challenge cognitive bias. -/- Virtual Reality (VR) enables perspective-taking and empathy development. -/- Algorithmic feedback control can reduce echo chambers and misinformation exposure. -/- These tools can facilitate belief revision by presenting evidence in emotionally intelligent and interactive ways. They also support the implementation of Angelito Malicse’s holistic educational vision, which seeks to reprogram minds in alignment with the law of balance in nature without negating individual religious or cultural identity. -/- 9. Case Studies -/- Case Study 1: Misinformation and Vaccine Hesitancy During the COVID-19 Pandemic During the global COVID-19 pandemic, widespread vaccine hesitancy emerged in many countries due to the influence of false belief systems reinforced through social media, political ideology, and cultural mistrust of institutions. These beliefs violated the law of balance in nature and were corrected through targeted education and empathetic communication. -/- Case Study 2: Religious Extremism and Radicalization Religious extremism often stems from closed belief systems that reject outside feedback and foster in-group superiority. Psychological biases, social isolation, and theological absolutism create cognitive rigidity and moral disengagement. Efforts to rehabilitate individuals through education, interfaith dialogue, and community reintegration aim to restore balance and re-open belief systems to critical evaluation. According to the universal formula, these efforts restore natural balance by re-aligning beliefs with moral responsibility and human dignity. -/- Case Study 3: Climate Change Denial Despite overwhelming scientific consensus, many individuals and leaders deny the reality of human-caused climate change. This denial is reinforced by economic interests, political ideology, and misinformation networks. The resulting imbalance manifests in unsustainable environmental practices that endanger planetary health. Educational campaigns, policy interventions, and youth-led climate activism work to correct these systemic imbalances by fostering scientifically grounded belief systems. -/- Case Study 4: Historical Revisionism in Education In various regions, educational systems have promoted historical revisionism that glorifies certain ideologies while omitting atrocities or systemic oppression. These distorted narratives produce nationalistic or supremacist beliefs that fuel division and conflict. Curriculum reforms that include accurate, inclusive, and balanced historical education help recalibrate belief systems in alignment with justice and truth—core tenets of the law of balance in nature. -/- 10. Conclusion Belief systems are not static; they are dynamic constructs shaped by neurological processes, psychological biases, cultural environments, evolutionary needs, and feedback mechanisms. While false beliefs can persist through various forms of reinforcement, they can also be reprogrammed through targeted education and technological interventions. A scientific understanding of belief systems is essential for addressing many of the cognitive and social challenges facing humanity today. Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, particularly its law of balance in nature, provides a natural-law foundation for understanding and reforming belief systems, ensuring that both individual minds and societies function in harmony with the laws of nature. -/- . (shrink)

The study examined constraints to accessing micro credit loan scheme of Bank of Agriculture BOA among farmers in Enugu State, Nigeria Implications for extension service delivery. Purposive and simple random sampling techniques were used in selecting one hundred 100 respondents for the study. Data were collected using structured interview schedule questionnaire and analyzed using frequency, percentage, mean scores and standard deviation. The study revealed that micro credit loan scheme 88.6 were the most patronized among the rural farmers. Others (...) such as ECOWAS, IFAD project and ATHP programme were not patronized at all, probably because the type of projects sponsored by these credit loan scheme are not important to the respondents. The respondents farmers were highly constrained by late release of funds M= 1.27 , grace period too short M= 1. 17 , excessive bureaucracy M= 1. 14 , too short payback period M= 1. 13 , services not regular M= 1. 13 , among others. The Bank of Agriculture staff also noted that they were constrained by late release of approved funds by head quarters of the Bank of Agriculture M= 1.43 , loan diversion M= 1.27 , poor funding of field officers M= 1.20 , lack of awareness by borrowers M= 1.10 and insufficient staff M= 0.93 . The study recommends that adequate awareness campaign on the availability of micro credit loan scheme by Bank of Agriculture should be created in order for the beneficiaries to be knowledgeable about it. It highlights the need for approval of more funds under the scheme and timely release of funds when needed especially during planting season in order to enable the farmers to make judicious use of it for optimum productivity. Mbah Evangeline N | Jiriko, R | Agada, M.O. "Constraints to Accessing Micro-Credit and Loan Scheme of Bank of Agriculture among Farmers in Enugu State, Nigeria: Implications for Extension Service Delivery" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-1 | Issue-4 , June 2017 . (shrink)

Background and Objectives: In this research article, the researcher addresses the issue of creating public understanding in a democratic society about the progress of science, with an emphasis on pluralism from philosophers of science. The idea that there is only one truth and that there are just natural laws awaiting discovery by scientists has historically made it difficult to explain scientific progress. This belief motivates science to develop theories that explain the unity of science, and it is thought that (...) diversity in the way different ideas presented by scientists is a problem that results in time being wasted in search of the most accurate theory. Some scientists perceive a benefit in having a range of scientific hypotheses, though. One benefit that is frequently cited is that scientific diversity as a whole contributes to the development of a democratic society that permits the expression of a range of viewpoints. The road to accountable scientific pluralism is fraught with difficulties, though. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account both pluralism's advantages and disadvantages. This research aims at: 1. analyzing in an epistemological way the interpretation of scientific theories and the progress of science from the perspectives of scientific pluralists; 2. analyzing the relationship between science and democracy in explaining scientific significance and progress; and 3. synthesizing new knowledge on epistemic dependentism and to argue that it plays a significant role in evaluating research issues related to scientific pluralism. Methodology: The research methodology involves the application of documentary investigation along with philosophical discourse. The method of philosophical argumentation involves analyzing the lines of arguments found in relevant academic publications in order to assess their validity and soundness. Main Results: One key argument of the pluralists is the use of the concept of theoretical pluralism, which suggests that scientific knowledge is created from a variety of perspectives according to the social and cultural context of knowledge creation. It is found that part of Longino's argument is based on the negation of rational/social dichotomy. Moreover, her theory is a departure from philosopher of science Philip Kitcher, who advocates the creation of scientific knowledge and the evaluation of scientific progress through the means of democratic society. He explains that these procedures will lead to "well-ordered science" in democratic society. Discussions: The researcher examines the underlying ideas accepted by these two philosophers of science and finds that although their opinions differ, they have common ground in the acceptance of consensus. However, the views of both philosophers still lack weight in explaining the knowledge itself. The researcher argues that the acceptance of pluralism as a way of understanding scientific progress necessarily lends itself to dependentism, which points to interdependence in comparisons of superiority/inferiority between scientific theories. It is undeniable that the situation has emerged all the time, even though the success of the scientific theories being compared to each other comes from different social and cultural grounds of thought. Conclusions: Some popular models of scientific pluralism in the philosophy of science still lack a compelling justification, particularly on the epistemic grounds. By elucidating the epistemic significance of the interdependence of these things, scientific pluralism can be strengthened by incorporating the notion of epistemic dependentism into the analysis of scientific progress. (shrink)

A collective understanding that traces a debate between 'what is science?’ and ‘what is a science about?’ has an extraction to the notion of scientific knowledge. The debate undertakes the pursuit of science that hardly extravagance the dogma of pseudo-science. Scientific conjectures invoke science as an intellectual activity poured by experiences and repetition of the objects that look independent of any idealist views (believes in the consensus of mind-dependence reality). The realistic machinery employs in an empiricist exposition (...) of the objective phenomenon by synchronizing the general method to make observational predictions that cover all the phenomena of the particular entity without any exception. The formation of science encloses several epistemological purviews and a succession of conjectures cum refutation that a newer theorem could reinstate. My attempt is to advocate a holistic plea of scientific conjectures that outruns the restricted regulation of experience or testable hypothesis to render the validity of a chain of logical reasoning (deductive or inductive) of basic scientific statements. The milieu of scientific intensification integrates speculation that loads efficiency towards a new experimental dimension where the reality is not itself objective or observers relative; in fact the observed phenomenon divulges in the constructive progression of preferred methods of falsifiability and uncertainty. (shrink)

This contribution provides an assessment of the epistemological role of scientific models. The prevalent view that all scientific models are representations of the world is rejected. This view points to a unified way of resolving epistemic issues for scientific models. The emerging consensus in philosophy of science that models have many different epistemic roles in science is presented and defended.

A methodology of science must satisfy two requirements: (i) It must be ampliative: the theories which it generates must make statements that go far beyond any data or observations that may have motivated those theories in the first place. (ii) It must be epistemically probative: it must somehow provide a warrant for believing that the theories so produced are correct, or at least partially correct, even if they can never be fully confirmed. These two requirements pull in opposite directions, and (...) attempts to specify the “scientific method” often focus on one to the exclusion of the other. On a few points there now exists something approaching a consensus. (i) Scientific hypotheses — including, particularly, statements about unobserved or unobservable entities or mechanisms — remain conjectural, no matter how frequently predictions based on those hypotheses are found to coincide with data. (ii) A good (best?) indicator of a theory’s verisimilitude is its ability to successfully predict phenomena which it was not specifically designed to predict. I discuss these ideas with particular reference to cosmological theories. (shrink)

Though the psychoanalytic method of interpretation is seen by psychoanalysts as a reliable scientific tool for investigating the unconscious mind, its reputation has long been marred by what’s known as the consensus problem: where different analysts fail to reach agreement when they interpret the same phenomena. This has long been thought, by both practitioners and observers of psychoanalysis, to undermine its claim to scientific status. The causes of this problem, however, are dimly understood. In this paper I (...) attempt to illuminate one important cause of the consensus problem by investigating the role which reliance on ‘associative evidence’ has in generating consensus failures. Various options for overcoming the difficulties with this form of clinical evidence are then examined. It is argued that these problems can be mitigated by the notion of overall associative fit, though they are exacerbated by certain loose standards used for what counts as acceptable associative evidence. The possibility of using more rigorous standards is discussed. (shrink)

I introduce a novel multidimensional framework tailored to investigate a set of phenomena that might appear intractable and render them amenable to scientific inquiry. In particular, I focus on examining altered states of consciousness that appear to the experiencing subject as “contentless” or “objectless” states in some form, either by having disrupted or reduced content of awareness, or content that appears as missing altogether. By drawing on empirical research, I propose a cluster of phenomenological dimensions aimed at enhancing our (...) understanding of this group of experiences of minimal awareness, including “Richness of the Content”, “Bodily-Awareness”, “Passage of Time”, “Attentional Focus”, and “Self-Revelation”. The result is a robust framework that provides precise scientific terminology, facilitating its operationalisation and adaptability for future empirical work. I show the explanatory power of this framework through a case study of the state of clear light sleep—a state widely reported by Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions as an instance of pure awareness during sleep, a state of consciousness-as-such. This rare phenomenon has gained increasing attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind for the study of the nature of consciousness. However, we still lack consensus on its characterisation and potential identity with other associated states. I end the paper by illustrating how the state of clear light sleep can be situated in relation to other associated states and more ordinary ones as regions of a multidimensional state space. (shrink)

Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz has argued—unconvincingly, we think—that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this article, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our (...) alternative proposal, hedging is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons. (shrink)

This is a comment on Professor Holm Tetens' paper, 'Scientific Objectivity with a Human Face'.

This article explores the institutionalization process of scientific organizations, with a focus on the case-study of the Laboratório Químico Municipal do Porto (LQMP). Within the context of Institutionalization Theory (IT) and framed by the history of chemistry, the LQMP’s lifecycle is examined to propose a new model for the institutionalization of scientific entities. The article reveals the dynamic interplay between historical developments in chemical science, micro-level scientific practices and macro-level societal changes, offering a comprehensive understanding of (...) how scientific institutions influence public policy and societal norms. Through the lens of IT, the article provides a nuanced exploration of the LQMP’s inception, development, and closure, shedding light on the broader implications of scientific institutionalization. This research addresses a gap in LQMP’s institutional understanding as a historical peripheral landmark in the emergence of science-based legislation. Its findings contribute to the theoretical discourse on the institutionalization of scientific practices, with implications for policy formulation on public health and food regulation. (shrink)

We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world's scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a ‘10 second survey’, where the participant is presented with a single (...) statement to consider, and a standard five point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement 'Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus'. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields. (shrink)

The question of when to stop an unsuccessful experiment can be difficult to answer from an individual perspective. To help to guide these decisions, we turn to the social epistemology of science and investigate knowledge inquisition within a group. We focused on the expensive and lengthy experiments in high energy physics, which were suitable for citation-based analysis because of the relatively quick and reliable consensus about the importance of results in the field. In particular, we tested whether the time (...) spent on a scientific project correlates with the project output. Our results are based on data from the high energy physics laboratory Fermilab. They point out that there is an epistemic saturation point in experimenting, after which the likelihood of obtaining major results drops. With time the number of less significant publications does increase, but highly cited ones do not get published. Since many projects continue to run after the epistemic saturation point, it becomes clearer that decisions made about continuing them are not always rational. (shrink)

It has been widely believed since the nineteenth century that modern science provides a serious challenge to religion, but less agreement as to the reason. One main complication is that whenever there has been broad consensus for a scientific theory that challenges traditional religious doctrines, one finds religious believers endorsing the theory or even formulating it. As a result, atheists who argue for the incompatibility of science and religion often go beyond the religious implications of individual scientific (...) theories, arguing that the sciences taken together provide a comprehensive challenge to religious belief. Scientific theories, on this view, can be integrated to form a general vision of humans and our place in nature, one that excludes the existence of supernatural phenomena to which many religious traditions refer. The most common name given to this general vision is the scientific worldview. The purpose of my paper is to argue that the relation of a worldview to science is more complex and ambiguous than this position allows, drawing upon recent work in the history and philosophy of science. While there are other ways to complicate the picture, this paper will focus on differing views that scientists and philosophers have on the proper scope and limits of scientific inquiry. I will identify two different types of science—Baconian and Cartesian—that have different ambitions with respect to scientific theories, and thus different answers about the possibility of a scientific worldview. The paper will conclude by showing how their differing intuitions about scientific inquiry are evident in contemporary debates about reductionism, drawing upon the work of two physicists, Steven Weinberg and John Polkinghorne. History is more complex than this simple schema allows, of course, but these types provide a useful first approximation into the ambiguities of modern science. (shrink)

Margaret Atwood and David Suzuki are two of the most prominent Canadian public ‎intellectuals ‎involved in the global warming debate. They both argue that anthropogenic global ‎warming is ‎occurring, warn against its grave consequences, and urge governments and the ‎public to take ‎immediate, decisive, extensive, and profound measures to prevent it. They differ, ‎however, in the ‎reasons and evidence they provide in support of their position. While Suzuki ‎stresses the scientific ‎evidence in favour of the global warming theory and (...) the scientific ‎consensus around it, Atwood is ‎suspicious of the objectivity of science, and draws on an ‎idiosyncratic neo-Malthusian theory of ‎human development. Their implicit views ‎about the cognitive authority of science may be ‎identified with Critical Contextual Empiricism ‎and Feminist Standpoint Epistemology, respectively, ‎both of which face difficulties with ‎providing solid grounds for the position they advocate.‎ ‎. (shrink)

Techniques from artificial intelligence (AI) can be used in forensic evidence evaluation and are currently applied in biometric fields. However, it is generally not possible to fully understand how and why these algorithms reach their conclusions. Whether and how we should include such ‘black box’ algorithms in this crucial part of the criminal law system is an open question that has not only scientific but also ethical, legal, and philosophical angles. Ideally, the question should be debated by people with (...) diverse backgrounds. Here, we present a view on the question from the philosophy of science angle: computational reliabilism (CR). CR posits that we are justified in believing the output of an AI system, if we have grounds for believing its reliability. Under CR, these grounds are classified into ‘reliability indicators’ of three types: technical, scientific, and societal. This framework enables debates on the suitability of AI methods for forensic evidence evaluation that take a wider view than explainability and validation. We argue that we are justified in believing the AI’s output for forensic comparison of voices and forensic comparison of faces. Technical indicators include the validation of the AI algorithm in itself, validation of its application in the forensic setting, and case-based validation. Scientific indicators include the simple notion that we know faces and voices contain identifying information along with operationalizing well-established metrics and forensic practices. Societal indicators are the emerging scientific consensus on the use of these methods, as well as their application and interpretation by well-educated and certified practitioners. We expect expert witnesses to rely more on technical indicators to be justified in believing AIsystems, and triers-of-fact to rely more on societal indicators to believe the expert witness supported by the AIsystem. (shrink)

Title: The Systemic Causes of Emergent Religious Dogma and Its Violation of the Three Universal Laws of Nature -/- Author: Angelito Malicse -/- Abstract: This paper examines the systemic causes behind the emergence of dogmatic teachings in major world religions and analyzes how such dogmas violate the Three Universal Laws of Nature proposed by the author. These laws include the Law of Karma (understood as error-free system functioning), the Law of Balance (homeostasis in natural and mental systems), and the Law (...) of Natural Feedback (interconnected response mechanisms within and between systems). By identifying the historical, cognitive, and systemic roots of religious dogmatism, this paper aims to provide a framework for reprogramming educational and leadership systems toward holistic and balanced decision-making. -/- 1. Introduction Religious dogma has played a central role in shaping civilizations, cultures, and individual behavior. While it has often provided moral guidance and social cohesion, it has also contributed to ignorance, intolerance, and societal imbalance. Through the lens of the Three Universal Laws of Nature, we can identify the ways in which rigid dogmatic systems disrupt natural and cognitive harmony. -/- 2. The Three Universal Laws of Nature -/- Law of Karma (System Integrity): Every system must operate without defects or errors to function effectively. When errors persist, the system’s outcomes are flawed. -/- Law of Balance (Homeostasis): All natural and human systems strive for balance. Imbalance causes internal conflict, societal dysfunction, or collapse. -/- Law of Natural Feedback: All systems must remain open to feedback from their internal and external environments. Ignoring feedback leads to maladaptation and systemic failure. -/- 3. Causes of Emergent Religious Dogma -/- 3.1 Fear-Based Origins Many religious doctrines emerged as responses to existential fear—of death, the unknown, and natural disasters. Dogmatic narratives provided simplified explanations and behavioral rules. 3.2 Example 1: Ancient Mesopotamian religions attributed floods and famines to the anger of gods. Such beliefs led to ritual sacrifices as a means to appease divine forces, rather than understanding ecological or agricultural causes. -/- Example 2: In medieval Christianity, the Black Death was interpreted as divine punishment for sin. This view discouraged public health interventions and led to persecution of marginalized groups. -/- Example 3: In early Hinduism, untouchability was justified through religious texts associating impurity with karmic punishment from past lives, perpetuating caste discrimination and fear-based exclusion. -/- Example 4: In pre-Columbian Aztec religion, fear of cosmic catastrophe led to mass human sacrifices to ensure the sun would rise. This reflected a deep-seated fear-based cosmology that stifled alternative explanations of natural cycles. -/- Violation: These teachings suppress inquiry and reinforce imbalance by replacing curiosity with fear, violating all three universal laws. -/- 3.3 Authority Control and Power Structures Religious institutions often formalized dogma to maintain social or political control, discouraging dissent and elevating select individuals or groups as unquestionable authorities. 3.4 Example 1: The Catholic Church during the Middle Ages used religious dogma to justify inquisitions and excommunication. Galileo was tried for promoting heliocentric theory. -/- Example 2: In early Islamic empires, the rationalist Mu’tazilite school was silenced by political authorities in favor of more conservative Sunni orthodoxy. -/- Example 3: In Tibet, theocratic rule under the Dalai Lamas mixed religious and political power, sometimes using spiritual authority to suppress rival views or secular reforms. -/- Example 4: In Imperial Japan, State Shinto was enforced as a sacred national ideology, deifying the emperor and using religion to justify wartime expansion. -/- Violation: These systems ignored feedback, violated the Law of Balance by consolidating unchecked power, and created systemic dysfunction. -/- 3.3 Lack of Critical Thinking in Education Religious dogma has historically discouraged critical thinking by promoting belief over analysis, often within educational institutions. -/- Example 1: In Islamic madrasas during the Abbasid period’s decline, rote memorization of Qur’anic verses replaced the earlier golden age of open philosophical debate. -/- Example 2: Christian parochial schools often emphasize catechism and obedience over philosophical inquiry, especially before modern curriculum reforms. -/- Example 3: In Orthodox Jewish yeshivas, intense focus on Talmudic repetition can limit exposure to secular critical reasoning. -/- Example 4: Buddhist monastic training in some Theravāda traditions may discourage questioning of senior monks or re-evaluation of ancient commentaries. -/- Violation: This suppresses the Law of Feedback (students cannot question), and disrupts cognitive homeostasis (Law of Balance), leading to mental rigidity. -/- 3.5 Mythologizing Natural Laws Early religions often interpreted natural phenomena (e.g., storms, disease, fertility) as divine interventions rather than natural processes. 3.6 Example 1: In ancient Egypt, the Nile’s flooding was attributed to the goddess Isis’s tears rather than seasonal rainfall patterns. -/- Example 2: In Norse mythology, lightning was seen as Thor’s hammer striking enemies of the gods, preventing meteorological exploration. -/- Example 3: In early Christianity, illness was often seen as divine punishment or demonic possession, leading to reliance on exorcism rather than medicine. -/- Example 4: In many African traditional religions, droughts or epidemics were attributed to the anger of ancestors, promoting rituals over sustainable agriculture or hygiene. -/- Violation: These interpretations contradict the Law of Karma (scientific accuracy), perpetuate system errors, and prevent systemic adaptation. -/- 3.5 Cultural Echo Chambers and Isolation When religious communities isolate themselves ideologically or physically, they create self-reinforcing dogmas. -/- Example 1: The Amish community rejects most forms of modern technology, sometimes impeding access to life-saving medical care. -/- Example 2: Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities may reject secular sciences and discourage contact with outsiders, limiting exposure to empirical knowledge. -/- Example 3: Some Pentecostal or evangelical sects promote insular beliefs about divine prophecy, rejecting scientific consensus on evolution or climate change. -/- Example 4: In certain Buddhist nationalist movements (e.g., in Myanmar), religious dogma is used to isolate the majority from minority faiths, promoting violence and xenophobia. -/- Violation: Such communities resist external feedback, violate the Law of Balance (sociopolitical harmony), and risk collapse under external pressures. -/- 4. Implications for Holistic Education and Leadership To rectify the imbalances caused by dogmatic teachings, education systems must integrate the Three Universal Laws. Leadership training should emphasize systemic thinking, feedback reception, and the pursuit of balance in decision-making. -/- Example in Practice 1: Finland’s education system promotes critical inquiry, emotional intelligence, and a secular understanding of comparative religion. -/- Example in Practice 2: Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness model balances spiritual traditions with modern governance, integrating wellbeing, feedback, and environmental balance. -/- Example in Practice 3: Montessori and Waldorf education methods encourage experiential learning and questioning authority, aligning with natural feedback and balanced cognitive growth. -/- Example in Practice 4: In Rwanda, post-genocide leadership training incorporates forgiveness and rational unity, balancing traditional values with forward-looking governance. -/- 5. Conclusion Dogmatic teachings in major religions arose from systemic needs but now often function in opposition to natural laws. By understanding their origins and violations through the Three Universal Laws of Nature, societies can reform education and leadership systems to restore balance, functionality, and human well-being. -/- . (shrink)

This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour (...) constancy and contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one person-level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which mark the lower borders of representational mind. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue (...) that contemporary cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway. (shrink)

On April 19, 2024, the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness was announced at the “Emerging Science of Animal Consciousness” conference held at New York University. The New York Declaration is an effort to showcase a scientific consensus on the presence of conscious experiences across all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fish) and many invertebrates (at least including cephalopods, decapod crustaceans, and insects). Scientifically, the New York Declaration marks a significant advancement for humanity. However, it also brings heightened (...) awareness to the moral challenges associated with animals that have conscious experiences (or phenomenal consciousness). This article will discuss philosophical approaches to the moral issue of killing sentient beings, thereby highlighting an existing moral dilemma in human society: In sustaining human survival, a species considered to have morality, we have to violate our own moral standards by killing other species with intrinsic value, consciousness, or sentience. This moral dilemma has long been present in human society. Various solutions have been proposed and implemented in practice to address this issue, such as the non-violence and vegetarian approach of Buddhism, the application of Islamic law and sacred rituals to animals in Islam, animal rights movements and voluntary extinction in Western countries, and the technology producing meat using animal cells. However, despite these approaches, we have not yet been able to fully resolve the dilemma, as sentient beings continue to be killed for our survival. We believe the most feasible solution is to change the current food consumption culture, build an eco-surplus culture to mitigate climate change, prevent deforestation, and promote peace. (shrink)

In a selected case study, set in the beginnings of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, I will look at accusations of inner-scientific science denialism as reactions to claims to scientific consensus positions. In the case, I am scrutinizing a claim of scientific consensus by the WHO, which culminated in a public and – to this day – unrevised Tweet (as of Oct. 1st, 2022). Their positioning can merely be partially distinguished from inner-scientific science denialism. Scientific (...) consensus may only be claimed, if there indeed is one. Even the claim of scientific consensus must not inhibit critical vetting. And, falsely claimed consensus positions ought to be revised in a Lakatosian step forward. (shrink)

This paper offers a structural diagnosis of the global climate inaction paradox: why, despite overwhelming scientific consensus and public awareness, meaningful action on climate change remains elusive. Drawing from Judgemental Philosophy, we argue that climate judgement is structurally undermined due to the failure of the Judgemental Triad: constructibility, coherence, and especially resonance. We demonstrate how temporal, spatial, and affective disconnects render climate scenarios experientially unownable. This disjunction leads to a collapse of judgement—not of information or will. As a (...) remedy, we propose a new framework for climate ethics based on restoring resonance with the planetary future, redefining climate responsibility not as a burden of facts, but as a structure of return. (shrink)

Recent work in psychology on ‘cultural cognition’ suggests that our cultural background drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, the idea is that we conform our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with clear political relevance to (...) our pre-existing political beliefs and convictions. In this paper I explore the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are those on the ‘political right’ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming unjustified in doing so, some of those on the ‘political left’ who accept the consensus are also unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions. (shrink)

Successful replication is a hallmark of scientific truth. Discordant evidence refers to the situation where findings from different studies of the same phenomenon do not agree. Although evidential discordance can spur scientific discovery, it also gives scientists a reason to rationally disagree and thereby compromises the formation of scientific consensus. Discordance indicates that facts about the phenomenon of interest remain unsettled and that a finding may not be reliably replicable. We single out persistent evidential discordance as (...) a particularly difficult problem for the epistemology of science, and distinguish between different causes of evidential discordance – non-systematic error, noise, and bias. Unlike discordance brought about by non-systematic error or noise, persistent discordance often cannot be rationally resolved by temporarily suspending judgment and collecting more data within existing lines of inquiry. We suggest that the analysis of enriched lines of evidence (Boyd 2018) provides a useful approach to diagnosing and evaluating episodes of persistent evidential discordance. Attention to the line of evidence, which extends from raw data to an evidential claim supporting or disconfirming a hypothesis, can help researchers to locate the source of discordance between inconsistent findings. We argue that reference to metadata, information about how the data were generated and processed, can be a key step in the process of resolving normative questions of correctness, i.e., whether a line of evidence provides a legitimate answer to a particular research question. We illustrate our argument with two cases: the alleged discovery of gravitational waves in the late 1960s, and the social priming controversy in experimental psychology. (shrink)

-/- The Correct Application and Principles of Freedom of Speech: Grounding Information in Absolute Truth -/- Freedom of speech is often regarded as one of the foundational pillars of democratic societies, allowing individuals to express their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs without fear of government retaliation or censorship. However, the true power of this freedom lies not only in the ability to speak but in the responsibility to ensure that the information shared is grounded in absolute truth. When freedom of speech (...) is misused, allowing the spread of black propaganda, false information, false beliefs, or negative mind manipulation, it undermines the integrity of societal discourse and impedes collective progress. Thus, the correct application of freedom of speech demands a commitment to truth, accountability, and the recognition of the collective responsibility we all bear in shaping the realities around us. -/- The Ethical Foundation of Freedom of Speech -/- At its core, freedom of speech is meant to enable individuals to seek, exchange, and debate ideas freely. This unrestricted flow of ideas is fundamental in ensuring that societies evolve in ways that promote justice, human rights, and understanding. However, while the right to speak freely is essential, it is crucial that this freedom is exercised in a manner that contributes positively to the societal fabric rather than causing harm. Freedom of speech, when exercised correctly, should encourage the exploration of truth, promote factual accuracy, and foster critical thinking. -/- Example 1: Consider the role of journalism in a free society. Journalists are given the freedom to investigate, report, and express opinions on matters of public interest. However, when media outlets intentionally or negligently report false information—such as in the case of “fake news”—they undermine public trust and create confusion. For instance, during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a number of fabricated stories were spread via social media, such as the widely debunked “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory. These false reports led to real-world consequences, including the harassment of innocent people and the creation of division among voters. This demonstrates how misinformation, under the guise of free speech, can be harmful to democratic processes. -/- In this context, freedom of speech is not absolute in the sense that it should permit the propagation of harmful or false narratives. Just as physical harm is a limitation to freedom of action, the spread of misinformation and the manipulation of minds represent a form of intellectual harm. Speech that is based on false information, black propaganda, or the deliberate distortion of facts violates the social contract that underpins a functioning society. These practices not only distort reality but also manipulate individuals, leading them to make decisions based on false beliefs and misconceptions. In contrast, speech grounded in truth strengthens the collective intelligence of a society, guiding people toward informed decisions and ethical actions. -/- Absolute Truth and Its Role in Speech -/- Absolute truth refers to a reality that is objective and unchanging, regardless of individual perceptions or beliefs. It is not influenced by subjective interpretations or distorted by biased perspectives. In the realm of speech, grounding all forms of communication in absolute truth is crucial for the integrity of discourse. When information is rooted in truth, it provides a foundation upon which individuals can build sound, rational, and ethical decisions. Absolute truth is often grounded in scientific evidence, empirical data, and the natural laws of reality, providing an anchor for all forms of communication, whether in politics, science, religion, or everyday interactions. -/- Example 2: In the scientific community, the principle of absolute truth is paramount when presenting research findings. For instance, when scientists discovered that smoking tobacco was linked to lung cancer, the truth of this discovery was based on years of rigorous research and empirical evidence. Although the tobacco industry initially attempted to deny or downplay this evidence in order to protect their business interests, the scientific consensus eventually prevailed, saving millions of lives. This is an example of how grounding information in absolute truth can have profound positive effects on society. -/- In contrast, the spread of misinformation and black propaganda distorts the truth to manipulate perceptions and control behavior. Black propaganda, for example, often involves the deliberate spreading of false or misleading information with the intent to deceive or harm. This type of speech is typically designed to exploit emotions, perpetuate fear, or create division among individuals or groups. When such falsehoods are accepted as truth, they distort reality and create a society based on delusion, not reality. This undermines the very purpose of free speech, which should aim to clarify and expose the truth. -/- The Responsibility of Speech in a Connected Society -/- In a modern, interconnected world, the consequences of speech extend far beyond the individual. What one person says can influence millions of others, shaping opinions, decisions, and even actions on a global scale. Given this interconnectedness, the responsibility that comes with the freedom to speak becomes even more significant. Freedom of speech must be viewed not only as a personal right but also as a collective duty to ensure that the information disseminated is constructive and truthful. -/- Example 3: The proliferation of social media has made this responsibility even more urgent. In 2020, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation about the virus spread widely across platforms like Facebook and Twitter. False claims, such as the idea that drinking bleach could cure COVID-19, were propagated by individuals with large followings, putting people’s health at risk. In this case, the freedom of speech was misused, as individuals failed to ensure that the information they shared was based on credible sources or scientific fact. This caused widespread harm, showing how information, when not grounded in truth, can have deadly consequences. -/- This responsibility also includes a commitment to critical thinking and the evaluation of sources. In a society where information is readily available through digital platforms, individuals must exercise discernment in assessing the veracity of the information they consume and share. Relying on reputable sources, scientific evidence, and well-established facts is essential in protecting the integrity of discourse. Those who engage in public speech should, therefore, prioritize truth over sensationalism or personal gain, understanding that their words have the power to shape not only public opinion but also the direction of societal progress. -/- The harm of False Information and Negative Manipulation -/- False information, whether it comes in the form of rumors, hoaxes, or biased reporting, has the potential to create chaos, foster division, and sow distrust. For example, during times of political unrest, the deliberate spread of misinformation can lead to the escalation of conflicts, the breakdown of trust between citizens and their leaders, and even the manipulation of election outcomes. In such cases, the misuse of free speech can harm the very foundations of democracy, undermining its ability to function effectively. -/- Example 4: In Myanmar, the spread of anti-Rohingya propaganda via social media platforms played a significant role in inciting violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority, resulting in a humanitarian crisis. The false information, which portrayed the Rohingya as a threat to national security, was used to justify mass killings and displacement. This is a striking example of how the abuse of free speech, when grounded in hate and misinformation, can lead to real-world violence and human suffering. -/- Similarly, the spread of false beliefs—whether rooted in pseudoscience, conspiracy theories, or superstition—can lead individuals to make decisions that are harmful to their health, their relationships, or society as a whole. In this sense, freedom of speech, when not grounded in truth, can perpetuate ignorance and hinder progress. Negative mind manipulation, which often relies on exploiting emotions such as fear, anger, or resentment, further compounds this issue by distorting people’s perception of reality and encouraging harmful behaviors. -/- Example 5: Anti-vaccine rhetoric is another example of harmful false beliefs gaining traction through the misuse of free speech. Despite overwhelming scientific evidence proving that vaccines are safe and effective, groups spreading misinformation about vaccines have caused significant harm. In the past decade, misinformation has contributed to declining vaccination rates, leading to outbreaks of preventable diseases such as measles and polio. This is a case where misinformation, under the guise of free speech, directly threatens public health. -/- Conclusion: Grounding Freedom of Speech in Truth -/- The correct application of freedom of speech demands that all information shared be rooted in absolute truth. This is the only way to ensure that speech serves its intended purpose: to promote understanding, facilitate informed decision-making, and contribute to the common good. When speech is grounded in falsehoods, it not only misguides individuals but also creates a society based on delusion and division. Therefore, as individuals and as a society, we must prioritize truth in our discourse, taking responsibility for the information we share and ensuring that it is both accurate and constructive. By doing so, we preserve the integrity of free speech and its vital role in fostering a just, informed, and balanced society. -/- . (shrink)

This article examines the effect of material evidence upon historiographic hypotheses. Through a series of successive Bayesian conditionalizations, I analyze the extended competition among several hypotheses that offered different accounts of the transition between the Bronze Age and the Iron Age in Palestine and in particular to the “emergence of Israel”. The model reconstructs, with low sensitivity to initial assumptions, the actual outcomes including a complete alteration of the scientific consensus. Several known issues of Bayesian confirmation, including the (...) problem of old evidence, the introduction and confirmation of novel theories and the sensitivity of convergence to uncertain and disputed evidence are discussed in relation to the model’s result and the actual historical process. The most important result is that convergence of probabilities and of scientific opinion is indeed possible when advocates of rival hypotheses hold similar judgment about the factual content of evidence, even if they differ sharply in their historiographic interpretation. This speaks against the contention that understanding of present remains is so irrevocably biased by theoretical and cultural presumptions as to make an objective assessment impossible. (shrink)

Understanding the relationship between experts and laypeople is crucial for understanding today’s world of post-truth and the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. The emergence of post-truth has been linked to various phenomena such as a flawed social and mass media ecosystem, poor citizen education, and the manipulation tactics of powerful interest groups. The paper argues that the problem is, however, more profound. The underlying issue is laypeople’s inevitable epistemic dependence on experts. The latter is part and parcel of the “risk (...) society” in which people question the scientific consensus and thus are able to manipulate the facts. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of illiberal democrats, though liberal democrats can make no use of it. The latter downplay the problem of citizens’ epistemic deficits and of the epistemic asymmetries between them. The third and fourth generations of deliberative democrats are a perfect example. The paper argues that the concepts of interactional expertise and epistemic dependence explain why understanding between experts and laypeople is impossible. The said phenomena undermine liberalism’s unrealistic assumptions concerning citizens’ decision-making competence. (shrink)

Misinformation can have significant societal consequences. For example, misinformation about climate change has confused the public and stalled support for mitigation policies. When people lack the expertise and skill to evaluate the science behind a claim, they typically rely on heuristics such as substituting judgment about something complex (i.e. climate science) with judgment about something simple (i.e. the character of people who speak about climate science) and are therefore vulnerable to misleading information. Inoculation theory offers one approach to effectively neutralize (...) the influence of misinformation. Typically, inoculations convey resistance by providing people with information that counters misinformation. In contrast, we propose inoculating against misinformation by explaining the fallacious reasoning within misleading denialist claims. We offer a strategy based on critical thinking methods to analyse and detect poor reasoning within denialist claims. This strategy includes detailing argument structure, determining the truth of the premises, and checking for validity, hidden premises, or ambiguous language. Focusing on argument structure also facilitates the identification of reasoning fallacies by locating them in the reasoning process. Because this reason-based form of inoculation is based on general critical thinking methods, it offers the distinct advantage of being accessible to those who lack expertise in climate science. We applied this approach to 42 common denialist claims and find that they all demonstrate fallacious reasoning and fail to refute the scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic global warming. This comprehensive deconstruction and refutation of the most common denialist claims about climate change is designed to act as a resource for communicators and educators who teach climate science and/or critical thinking. (shrink)

Taking Anthropogenic global warming as its framing example this paper develops an ethics of inquiry and public discourse influenced by Rawlsian public reason. The need to embrace scientific fact during civil discourse on topics of moral and political controversy is stressed as an ethical mandate. The paper argues: (1) ethicists have a moral obligation to recognize scientific consensus when relevant to ethical discussions. (2) The failure to condemn science denialism when it interferes with the public’s understanding of (...) ethical issues is itself a moral failure (especially in an educational setting). (3) The endorsed ethics of inquiry and public discourse encourages epistemic virtues that are desirable among members of a pluralistic society. (shrink)

Explanations of former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s public and private views on the aetiology of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country remain partial at best without the recognition that the latter presuppose and imply a postmodernist/postcolonialist philosophy of science that erases the line separating the political from the scientific. Evidence from Mbeki’s public speeches, interviews, and private and anonymous writings suggests that it was postmodernist/postcolonialist theory that inspired him to doubt the “Western” scientific consensus on HIV/AIDS (...) and to implement a public health policy that dragged its feet on full roll-out of antiretroviral therapy, causing thousands of avoidable deaths. A weak reductio ad absurdum allows us to conclude from this premise that postmodernist/postcolonial critique of “Western” science ought to be shunned. A comparative argument from consequences further suggests that in a situation where a misguided health policy has lead to a humanitarian catastrophe, and where postmodernist/postcolonialist critique of science can and has been used to justify this policy, an alternative theory ought to be preferred on which such justification would not be possible. The paper closes with a call for a non-relativist alternative to postmodernist/postcolonialist philosophy of science, and evaluates the potential of recent developments in ‘Studies of Expertise” to yield such. (shrink)

The continuing rejection of anthropogenic global warming by non-experts despite overwhelming scientific consensus is rationally untenable and best described as “pseudoskeptical;” it is akin to AIDS denialism, the advocacy of intelligent design, and anti-vaccination movements.

This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause (...) for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist. -/- Friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist in two distinct ways. As I discuss in chapter 2, the first way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a priori arguments meant to show that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, the past must be finite. If the past is necessarily finite, then the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite. And if having a finite past suffices for having a beginning, then, since the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite, physical reality necessarily began to exist. I show that the arguments which have been offered thus far for the view that the past is necessarily finite do not succeed. Moreover, as I elaborate on in chapter 5, having a finite past does not suffice for having a beginning. -/- As I discuss in chapter 3, the second way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a posteriori arguments meant to show that we have empirical evidence that physical reality has a finite past history. For example, the big bang is sometimes claimed to have been the beginning of physical reality and, since we have excellent empirical evidence for the big bang, we have excellent empirical evidence for the beginning of physical reality. The big bang can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, the big bang can be understood as a theory about the history and development of the observable universe. Understood in that sense, then I agree that the big bang is supported by excellent empirical evidence and by a scientific consensus. On the other hand, some authors (particularly science popularizers, science journalists, and religious apologists) have wrongly interpreted big bang theory as a theory about the beginning of the whole of physical reality. As I argue, while a beginning of physical reality may be consistent with classical big bang theory, classical big bang theory does not provide good reason for thinking that physical reality began to exist. -/- In part II, I turn to discussing three necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for physical reality to have a beginning. Before discussing the three conditions, in chapter 4, I introduce three metaphysical accounts of the nature of time (A-theory, B-theory, and C-theory) as well as some formal machinery that will subsequently become useful in the dissertation. I introduce the first of the three conditions in chapter 5. According to the Modal Condition, physical reality began to exist only if, at the closest possible worlds without time, physical reality does not exist. I show that this condition helps us to make sense of various views in both theology and philosophy of physics. In chapter 6}, I introduce the second of my three conditions, the Direction Condition, according to which, roughly, physical reality began to exist only if all space-time points agree about the direction of time, so that all space-time points can agree that physical reality's putative beginning took place in their objective past. In chapter 7, I discuss the third condition, the Boundary Condition, according to which physical reality began to exist only if there is a past temporal boundary such that physical reality did not exist before the boundary. I show that there are two senses in which physical reality could be said to have had a past temporal boundary. Lastly, in chapter 8, I show that there is a relationship between my three conditions and classical big bang theory, even though the relationship is not the one usually identified in the literature. -/- In part III, I present four arguments for the view that, at the present stage of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot know whether physical reality satisfies the three necessary conditions to have had a beginning and, consequently, we cannot know whether physical reality had a beginning. As I will prove in chapter 9, no set of observations that we currently have, when conjoined with General Relativity, entails that physical reality satisfies the Direction or Boundary Conditions. As I show in chapter 10, considerations in the philosophical foundations of statistical mechanics entail either that the Cosmos violates the Modal Condition or else that there is a transcendental condition on the possibility of our knowledge of the past that prevents our access to data we would need to gather to determine whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. In chapter 11, I show that there are a number of live cosmological models according to which physical reality does not satisfy the Boundary Condition. As long as we don't know whether any of those cosmological models are correct, we do not know whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. Lastly, I turn to confirmation theory and show that, at our present stage of inquiry, ampliative inferences for the conclusion that physical reality satisfies the Modal, Direction, and Boundary Conditions are not successful. (shrink)

The growing visibility of various forms of creationism in Northern Ireland raises issues for science education. Attempts have been made at political levels to have such “alternatives” to evolution taught in the science classroom, and the issue has received coverage in local press and media. A sample of 112 pre-service science teachers answered a survey on attitudes toward evolution. Preliminary analysis revealed many of these new teachers held views contrary to scientific consensus—over one fifth doubt the evidence for (...) human evolution, and over one quarter dispute the common ancestry of life. Over two thirds indicated a preference for teaching a “range of theories” regarding these issues in science. In addition, 49 pre-service biology teachers viewed a DVD resource promoting “intelligent design” and completed an evaluation of it. The biology teachers also took part in either focus groups or additional questionnaires. A majority took the resource at face value and made positive comments regarding its utility. Many articulated views contrary to the stated positions of science academies, professional associations, and the UK government teaching directives regarding creationism. Most indicated a perception that intelligent design is legitimate science and that there is a scientific “controversy” regarding the legitimacy of evolution. Concern is raised over the ability of these new teachers to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific theories. The suggestion is made that the issue should be addressed directly with pre-service science teachers to make clear the status of such “alternatives.” The paper raises implications for science education and questions for further research. (shrink)

A consensus is emerging in the philosophy of science that value judgements are ineliminable from scientific inquiry. Which values should then be chosen by scientists? This paper proposes a novel answer to this question, labelled the public reason view. To place this answer on firm ground, I first redraw the boundaries of the political forum; in other words, I broaden the range of actors who have a moral duty to follow public reason. Specifically, I argue that scientific (...) advisors to policy makers have that duty—a duty that is needed to create a barrier against any nonpublic values that scientific researchers might let enter their work. Next, I specify how scientific advisors should approach value judgements to satisfy public reason, arguing that they should work within a conception of justice that is political and reasonable in several distinct senses. Scientific researchers at large should instead communicate their value judgements by following norms of transparency that facilitate scientific advisors’ public reasoning. Finally, I contrast my account with the dominant response to the which-values question, which focuses instead on citizens’ values, demonstrating that that response shares several problematic features with the heavily criticised external conception of public reason. (shrink)

During the 1630s Descartes recognized that he could not expect all legitimate claims in natural science to meet the standard of absolute certainty. The realization resulted from a change in his physics, which itself arose not through methodological reflections, but through developments in his substantive metaphysical doctrines. Descartes discovered the metaphysical foundations of his physics in 1629-30; as a consequence, the style of explanation employed in his physical writings changed. His early methodological conceptions, as preserved in the Rules and sketched (...) in Part Two of the Discourse, pertained primarily to his early work in optics. By the early 1630s, Descartes was concerned with new methodological problems pertaining to the postulation of micro-mechanisms. Recognition of the need to employ a method of hypothesis led him to lower the standard of certainty required of particular explanations in his mature physics. (shrink)