In engineering, as in other scientific fields, researchers seek to confirm their models with real-world data. It is common practice to assess models in terms of the distance between the model outputs and the corresponding experimental observations. An important question that arises is whether the model should then be ‘tuned’, in the sense of estimating the values of free parameters to get a better fit with the data, and furthermore whether the tuned model can be confirmed with (...) the same data used to tune it. This dual use of data is often disparagingly referred to as ‘double-counting’. Here, we analyse these issues, with reference to selected research articles in engineering. Our example studies illustrate more and less controversial practices of model tuning and double-counting, both of which, we argue, can be shown to be legitimate within a Bayesian framework. The question nonetheless remains as to whether the implied scientific assumptions in each case are apt from the engineering point of view. (shrink)

Cosmological inflation is widely considered an integral and empirically successful component of contemporary cosmology. It was originally motivated by its solution of certain so-called fine-tuning problems of the hot big bang model, particularly what are known as the horizon problem and the flatness problem. Although the physics behind these problems is clear enough, the nature of the problems depends on the sense in which the hot big bang model is fine-tuned and how the alleged fine-tuning is (...) problematic. Without clear explications of these, it remains unclear precisely what problems inflationary theory is meant to be solving and whether it does in fact solve them. I analyze the structure of these problems and consider various interpretations that may substantiate the alleged fine-tuning. On the basis of this analysis I argue that at present there is no unproblematic interpretation available for which it can be said that inflation solves the big bang model’s alleged fine-tuning problems. (shrink)

Can a set of musical metaphors in a treatise on ethics reveal something about the nature and source of moral autonomy? This article argues that it can. It shows how metaphorical usage of words like tone, pitch, and concord in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments can be understood as elements of an analogical model for morality. What this model tells us about morality depends on how we conceptualise music. In contrast to earlier interpretations of Smith's metaphors that (...) have seen music as an aesthetic object, this article sees music as a practice. Understood in this way, the analogy allows us to see morality too as a practice––as moral tuning. This in turn reveals a novel answer to the intractable problem of conventionalism: moral autonomy consists in the freedom inherent in the constant need to interpret and reinterpret the strictly formal ideal of perfect propriety. (shrink)

We argue that concerns about double-counting—using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate—deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelihood approach to incremental confirmation. (...) According to this approach, double-counting is entirely proper. We go on to discuss plausible difficulties with calibrating climate models, and we distinguish more and less ambitious notions of confirmation. Strong claims of confirmation may not, in many cases, be warranted, but it would be a mistake to regard double-counting as the culprit. 1 Introduction2 Remarks about Models and Adequacy-for-Purpose3 Evidence for Calibration Can Also Yield Comparative Confirmation3.1 Double-counting I3.2 Double-counting II4 Climate Science Examples: Comparative Confirmation in Practice4.1 Confirmation due to better and worse best fits4.2 Confirmation due to more and less plausible forcings values5 Old Evidence6 Doubts about the Relevance of Past Data7 Non-comparative Confirmation and Catch-Alls8 Climate Science Example: Non-comparative Confirmation and Catch-Alls in Practice9 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

Shell tube surface condenser (STSC) is a heat exchanger system that exchange a high pressure steam into low pressure water and it is widely used in applications like textile industries and nuclear power plants. The modelling of the system has been established based on lumped parameters. In this paper, a fuzzy expert system is developed in order to improve the performance of the condenser. A pressure feedback system has been developed to analyze the effect of the condenser output temperature, circulating (...) water flow and heat developed. An experiment has been made for the closed loop system using fuzzy tuned PI, fuzzy logic and PID controllers and a promising results have been obtained successfully. (shrink)

Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate ‘trickled in’ elements (...) of truth as correspondence. Results, though often intuitive, prove more complex than in simpler models (Hegselmann & Krause 2002, 2006; Grim, Singer, Reade & Fisher 2015). The optimistic finding is that pressures toward internal coherence can exploit and expand on small elements of truth as correspondence is introduced into epistemic networks. Less optimistic results show that pressures for coherence can also work directly against the incorporation of truth, particularly when coherence is established first and new data is introduced later. (shrink)

Can we build machines with which we can have interesting conversations? Observing the new optimism of AI regarding deep learning and new language models, we set ourselves an ambitious goal: We want to find out how far we can get in creating a digital replica of a philosopher. This project has two aims; one more technical, investigating of how the best model can be built. The other one, more philosophical, explores the limits and risks which are accompanied by the (...) creation of digital replicas. In cooperation with Daniel Dennett, we took his complete works to fine-tune a GPT-3. In this paper, we share our first results with some piloting models and discuss legal and ethical questions about creating and interacting with digital replicas. (shrink)

How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...) is February. This type of belief change cannot be modelled by conditionalization. We need some new principles of belief change for this kind of case, which I call belief mutation. In part 1, I defend the Relevance-Limiting Thesis, which says that a change in a purely self-locating belief of the kind that results in belief mutation should not shift your degree of belief in a non-self-locating belief, which can only change by conditionalization. My method is to give detailed analyses of the puzzles which threaten this thesis: Duplication, Sleeping Beauty, and The Prisoner. This also requires giving my own theory of observation selection effects. In part 2, I argue that when self-locating evidence is learnt from a position of uncertainty, it should be conditionalized on in the normal way. I defend this position by applying it to various cases where such evidence is found. I defend the Halfer position in Sleeping Beauty, and I defend the Doomsday Argument and the Fine-Tuning Argument. (shrink)

Within the causal modeling literature, debates about the Causal Faithfulness Condition have concerned whether it is probable that the parameters in causal models will have values such that distinct causal paths will cancel. As the parameters in a model are fixed by the probability distribution over its variables, it is initially puzzling what it means to assign probabilities to these parameters. I propose that to assign a probability to a parameter in a model is to treat that parameter (...) as a function of a variable in an augmented model. By combining this proposal with widely adopted principles regarding which variables must be included in a model, I argue that the various proposed counterexamples to CFC involving coordinated parameters are not genuine counterexamples. I then consider the cases in which CFC fails due not to coordination, but by coincidence, and propose explanatory and predictive bases for ruling out such coincidences without presuming that they are improbable. The aim of the proposed defenses is not to show that CFC never fails, but rather to argue that its use in a particular context may be defended using general modeling assumptions rather than by relying on claims about how often it fails. (shrink)

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional conception of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial condition fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches (...) respectively. In the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

Even in areas of philosophy of science that don’t involve formal treatments of truth, one’s background view of truth still centrally shapes views on other issues. I offer an informal way to think about truth as trueing, like trueing a bicycle wheel. This holist approach to truth provides a way to discuss knowledge products like models in terms of how well-trued they are to their target. Trueing emphasizes: the process by which models are brought into true; how the idealizations in (...) models are not false but rather like spokes in appropriate tension to achieve a better-trued fit to target; and that this process is not accomplished once and done forever, but instead requires upkeep and ongoing fine-tuning. I conclude by emphasizing the social importance of being a pragmatist about truth in order to accurately answer questions about science such as, “but do we really know that…”. (shrink)

Engineers fine-tune the design of robot bodies for control purposes, however, a methodology or set of tools is largely absent, and optimization of morphology (shape, material properties of robot bodies, etc.) is lagging behind the development of controllers. This has become even more prominent with the advent of compliant, deformable or ”soft” bodies. These carry substantial potential regarding their exploitation for control—sometimes referred to as ”morphological computation”. In this article, we briefly review different notions of computation by physical systems and (...) propose the dynamical systems framework as the most useful in the context of describing and eventually designing the interactions of controllers and bodies. Then, we look at the pros and cons of simple vs. complex bodies, critically reviewing the attractive notion of ”soft” bodies automatically taking over control tasks. We address another key dimension of the design space—whether model-based control should be used and to what extent it is feasible to develop faithful models for different morphologies. (shrink)

The need for revolution in modern physics is a well known and often broached subject, however, the precision and success of current models narrows the possible changes to such a great degree that there appears to be no major change possible. We provide herein, the first step toward a possible solution to this paradox via reinterpretation of the conceptual-theoretical framework while still preserving the modern art and tools in an unaltered form. This redivision of concepts and redistribution of the data (...) can revolutionize expectations of new experimental outcomes. This major change within finely tuned constraints is made possible by the fact that numerous mathematically equivalent theories were direct precursors to, and contemporaneous with, the modern interpretations. In this first of a series of papers, historical investigation of the conceptual lineage of modern theory reveals points of exacting overlap in physical theories which, while now considered cross discipline, originally split from a common source and can be reintegrated as a singular science again. This revival of an an older associative hierarchy, combined with modern insights, can open new avenues for investigation. This reintegration cross-disciplinary theories and tools is defined as the “Neoclassical Interpretation.” . (shrink)

Abstract: Smoke detectors are critical devices for early fire detection and life-saving interventions. This research paper explores the application of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) in smoke detection systems. The study aims to develop a robust and accurate smoke detection model using ANNs. Surprisingly, the results indicate a 100% accuracy rate, suggesting promising potential for ANNs in enhancing smoke detection technology. However, this paper acknowledges the need for a comprehensive evaluation beyond accuracy. It discusses potential challenges, such as overfitting, dataset (...) size, and class imbalance, and presents strategies employed to address these issues. Additionally, the paper emphasizes the importance of alternative evaluation metrics, including precision, recall, and F1-score, to assess the model's performance comprehensively. Detailed information regarding the model architecture, data preprocessing, and hyperparameter tuning is provided to enhance the reproducibility of the research. The study also discusses ethical considerations and the implications of false positives and false negatives in smoke detection applications. While achieving 100% accuracy is a notable accomplishment, this paper calls for cautious interpretation and further validation in real-world settings. It concludes by highlighting areas for future research and improvement in smoke detection technology, emphasizing the need for practical deployment and the reduction of false alarms. (shrink)

This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional account of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial conditions fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches (...) respectively. In the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, (...) the developmental process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an account of Nietzschean exemplarism. Drawing on my previous work, I argue that an agent’s instincts and other drives constitute her psychological type. In this framework, a drive counts as a virtue to the extent that it is well-calibrated with the rest of the agent’s psychic economy and meets with sentiments of approbation from the agent’s community. Different virtues are fitting for different types, and different types elicit different discrete emotions in people with fine-tuned affective (...) sensitivity, making Nietzsche’s exemplarism doubly pluralistic. Exemplars show us how a type is expressed in different social and cultural contexts. Some live up to the full potential of their type, while others are stymied and demonstrate how pernicious influences can wreck a person’s psychology. While some exemplars inspire admiration that leads to emulation, others elicit a range of other emotions, such as envy, contempt, and disgust. If this is right, then Nietzschean exemplarism offers a richer, more evaluatively and motivationally nuanced moral psychology than the monochrome admire-and-emulate model currently popular. (shrink)

We look into the ontology of quantum theory as distinct from that of the classical theory in the sciences. Theories carry with them their own ontology while the metaphysics may remain the same in the background. We follow a broadly Kantian tradition, distinguishing between the noumenal and phenomenal realities where the former is independent of our perception while the latter is assembled from the former by means of fragmentary bits of interpretation. Theories do not tell us how the noumenal world (...) is constituted but are conceptual constructs applying to models generated in the phenomenal world within limited contexts. -/- The ontology of quantum theory principally rests on the view that entities in the world are pervasively correlated with one another not by means of probabilities as in the case of the classical theory, but by means of probability amplitudes involving finely tuned phases characterising the oscillatory behaviour of quantum mechanical states. -/- The amplitude-dependent correlations (quantum entanglement) exist over and above the classical ones expressed in terms of probabilities. While the classical correlations are essentially local in nature, quantum correlations are shared globally in the process of environment-induced decoherence. The decoherence is an effectively random process that removes local correlations in the course of global sharing of entanglement—the removal being especially manifest in the case of systems that appear as classical ones. It is this aspect of the decoherence process that makes the so-called measurement postulate (one relating to wave function collapse) cohere with the rest of the principles of quantum theory where the latter implies a Schrodinger type time evolution of quantum mechanical systems. -/- The mathematical basis of the quantum correlations consists of the description of pure states of a system in terms of vectors in a linear vector space (a mixed state appears as an admixture of pure states with some probability distribution associated with it) and, in addition, the description of (pure) states of composite systems as vectors in the product space arising from the component sub-systems. -/- The crucial aspect of the decoherence process, of significance in the context of the apparent incompatibility of the measurement postulate with the unitary Schrodinger evolution, relates to the fact that it is almost instantaneous in the case of a classical object (one that is nevertheless amenable to a quantum description). Indeed, the decoherence time is, in all likelihood, of the order of the Planck scale, being driven by field fluctuations in the Planck regime. This points to factors of an unknown nature determining the finest details of the decoherence process since Planck scale physics remains an obscure terrain. -/- In other words, quantum theory is, to all intents and purposes, in the need of a radical revision, in keeping with the fact that all theories are defeasible and need revision as our domains of experience expand and get realigned in a complex manner. The context within which quantum theory (and quantum field theory too) is defined is set precisely by the Planck scale, across which a novel theoretical framework is likely to emerge. However, as in the case of theory revisions in general, that emerging theory will stand in an asymmetric relation of incommensurability with the present-day quantum theory, where the concepts of the latter will be comprehensible in terms of those of the former, but the converse will not hold. (shrink)

In the United States, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has proposed deliberative democracy as an approach for dealing with ethical issues surrounding synthetic biology. Deliberative democracy might similarly help us as we update the regulation of human subjects research. This paper considers how the values that deliberative democratic engagement aims to realize can be realized in a human subjects research context. Deliberative democracy is characterized by an ongoing exchange of ideas between participants, and an effort to (...) justify decisions that bind participants by appeal to reasons that the participants can understand and share. Even when unanimous agreement is not reached, the active participation of everyone along with the requirement that reasons be made accessible enhances the legitimacy of the ultimate outcome. Importantly, deliberative democratic structures avoid strict hierarchies and place participants, as much as possible, in the position of equals. Human subjects research has some features that may make deliberative democratic principles seem initially unappealing. For one, there are asymmetries in knowledge between expert researchers conducting the research and participants in the research process. For another, statistical validity is made easiest by research paradigms that produce standardized, quantitative data, which can be difficult to achieve if research participants are given the power to deliberatively reshape the research design as it progresses. These and other problems have tended to produce a human subjects research process where subjects do not actively participate in shaping research, but rather consent to a predefined set of interventions designed by expert researchers and vetted by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). In this paper, I suggest some ways in which human subjects research could do more to realize deliberative democratic values, and, in particular, how a revised Common Rule might help to realize these values. First, research participants could be treated not as passive subjects but instead involved in research design, ethical review, and the ongoing conduct and dissemination of research. Such participation might involve, for instance, including people who have served as research subjects on IRBs, or replacing IRB oversight for certain forms of research exempted from IRB oversight under a revised Common Rule with oversight by a body of community members or research subjects. It might also involve having the oversight of research that uses more participatory models be more participatory and less hierarchical in nature. I also raise questions about the exemption of research on public benefit programs from any research-level oversight and from consent requirements. While IRBs are likely not the correct overseers, there may be good reason to view such research with a critical eye, because of its potential for long-range impacts on the lives of participants. By giving research subjects a greater voice in research that aims at fine-tuning public benefit programs on which subjects rely, a deliberative oversight process has the potential to recast research participation as a form of active democratic participation and to address a “democratic deficit” in public health. Numerous proposals regarding health care have called for greater participation by laypeople and a more nonhierarchical approach to setting health priorities. Involving lay research subjects in the conduct of public benefits research and other forms of public health research may help to further these goals. (shrink)

This paper briefly outlines some advancements in paraconsistent logics for modelling knowledge representation and reasoning. Emphasis is given on the so-called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), a class of paraconsistent logics that formally internalize the very concept(s) of consistency and inconsistency. A couple of specialized systems based on the LFIs will be reviewed, including belief revision and probabilistic reasoning. Potential applications of those systems in the AI area of KRR are tackled by illustrating some examples that emphasizes the importance of (...) a fine-tuned treatment of consistency in modelling reputation systems, preferences, argumentation, and evidence. (shrink)

Abstract: This research explores the application of artificial neural networks (ANNs) in predicting cancer using a synthetically generated dataset designed for research purposes. The dataset comprises 10,000 pseudo-patient records, each characterized by gender, age, smoking history, fatigue, and allergy status, along with a binary indicator for the presence or absence of cancer. The 'Gender,' 'Smoking,' 'Fatigue,' and 'Allergy' attributes are binary, while 'Age' spans a range from 18 to 100 years. The study employs a three-layer ANN architecture to develop a (...) predictive model. The achieved accuracy of 97.24% and a low loss value of 0.02 indicate promising performance. Further analysis involves a comprehensive examination of the confusion matrix, precision, recall, and F1 score metrics, along with the ROC curve and AUC score, to provide a detailed understanding of the model's strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, considerations for cross-validation, hyperparameter tuning, and interpretability are discussed. It is emphasized that while the synthetic nature of the dataset allows for controlled experimentation, results should be cautiously interpreted and validated on authentic clinical data before extrapolation to real-world medical scenarios. This research serves as a valuable contribution to the exploration of predictive models for cancer detection, encouraging continued investigation and development in the field. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of smallholder supply chains on sustainable sourcing to answer the question how food and agribusiness multinationals can best include smallholders in their sourcing strategies and take social responsibility for large-scale sustainable and more equitable supply. A sustainable smallholder sourcing model with a list of critical success factors (CSFs) has been applied on two best-practise cases. In this model, business and corporate social responsibility perspectives are integrated. Design/methodology/approach (...) – The primary data of the value chain analyses of the two smallholder supply chains of a food and agribusiness multinational have been applied. Both cases were of a join research program commissioned by the multinational and a non-governmental organization using the same methods and research tools. Similarities, differences and interference between the cases have been determined and assessed in order to confirm, fine tune or adjust the CSFs. Findings – Both cases could be conceptualized through the smallholder sourcing model. Most CSFs could be found in both cases, but differences were also found, which led to fine tuning of some CSFs: building of a partnership and effective producers organization, providing farm financing and the use of cross-functional teams in smallholder supplier development programs. It was also concluded that the smallholder sourcing model is applicable in different geographical areas. Research limitations/implications – The findings of this study are based on just two cases. More best-practise cases are recommended in order to confirm or to adjust the developed sourcing model and the CSFs. Originality/value – This paper/research fills the need in sustainable supply chain management literature to study supply chains that comply with the triple bottom line concept, rather than supply chains that are just more “green.” Keywords Small- to medium-sized enterprises, Food products, Supply chain management, Developing countries, Business development, Food industry, Commodity markets Paper type Research pape. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007 ) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can do, i.e., to their causal (...) powers. This picture seems ultimately untenable in the light of further exclusion problems; but at the same time, it meets our explanatory demands. My purpose is therefore to show that there is a real antinomy with regard to evolved emergent properties. I develop a physicalist exclusion argument and then I go on to consider an argument that seems to establish that evolved emergent properties are causally efficacious, and propose a compatibilist solution. Finally, I very briefly consider what the proposed model may imply for the issue of mental causation. (shrink)

Our examination of universal origins and fine-tuning will begin with a discussion of infl ationary scenarios grafted onto Big Bang cosmology and the proof that all infl ationary spacetimes are past-incomplete. After diverting into a lengthy critical examination of the “different physics” offered by quantum cosmologists at the past-boundary of the universe, we will proceed to dissect the inadequacies of infl ationary explanations and string-theoretic constructs in the context of three cosmological models that have received much attention: the Steinhardt-Turok (...) cyclic ekpyrotic model (which does not invoke inflation), the Gasperini-Veneziano pre-Big Bang infl ationary model, and the inflationary string landscape model advanced by Susskind, Polchinski, Bousso, and Linde. We will argue that none of these highly speculative string cosmologies removes the necessity of a beginning to the process of universe generation, and we will emphasize the implications of this fact. Then, since the inflationary “mechanism” only really addresses the fi ne-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe and not the conditions embodied in its finely tuned laws and constants, we will analyze the adequacy of the string multiverse in its three versions (cyclic ekpyrotic, pre-Big Bang, and landscape) for explaining the nomological structure and values of these precisely tuned life-compatible universal parameters. When all is said and done, it will be clear that transcendent intelligent agency is not just the only causally suffi cient and therefore metaphysically sound explanation for universal origins and fine-tuning, but it is also much more parsimonious, elegant, and resonant with meaning than all of the ad hoc machinations of multiverse cosmology. (shrink)

Epistemic closure refers to the assumption that humans are able to recognize what entails or contradicts what they believe and know, or more accurately, that humans’ epistemic states are closed under logical inferences. Epistemic closure is part of a larger theory of mind ability, which is arguably crucial for downstream NLU tasks, such as inference, QA and conversation. In this project, we introduce a new automatically constructed natural language inference dataset that tests inferences related to epistemic closure. We test and (...) further fine tune the model RoBERTa-large-mnli on the new dataset, with limited positive results. (shrink)

This essay argues that literature is neither an intrinsic good (like oxygen) nor a constructed good (like a teddy-bear) but instead a conditional good, like a blueprint. It has immense potential value, but that potential can be actualized only if readers do a certain kind of work; and readers are likely to do that work only if, as a culture, we retain an understanding of what novels and poems both need from us and can give us. This means we need (...) to be wary of theories that are excessively deflationary (all literature is mere entertainment), cynical (all literature is a vehicle for state ideology), or over-optimistic (all literature makes us more altruistic) and instead embrace a pluralism of effect. Some fictions, like The Wire, invite us to reflect on our own beliefs; some, like Plato’s dialogues, help us fine-tune our mental capacities; some, like Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon, offer us a choice of genres; some help us feel our feelings; some offer formal models for the shape of a life. Literature can continue to matter in all of these ways—but only as long as we allow it to. (shrink)

Dear Colleagues, -/- A few weeks ago, we published an editorial discussion on whether artificial intelligence applications should be authors of academic articles [1]. We were delighted to receive more than one interesting reply letter to this editorial in a short time [2, 3]. We hope that opinions on this subject will continue to be submitted to our journal. -/- In this editorial, we wanted to publish the answers we received when we asked ChatGPT, one of the artificial intelligence applications, (...) about this current discussion. -/- We asked ChatGPT three questions in turn and asked ChatGPT to write a short editorial for these questions. -/- First Question: We would like to get support from ChatGPT for a scientific article. However, we are unsure if we should add ChatGPT as an author. Can you write a short editorial about it? -/- Second Question: We would like to get support from ChatGPT for a scientific article and add ChatGPT as an author. Can you write us a short editorial about adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific papers? -/- Third Question: We would like to get support from ChatGPT for a scientific article. However, we don’t want to add ChatGPT as an author. Can you write us a short editorial about not adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific articles? -/- The answers given by ChatGPT are available at the end of the article in their original form. So, which of these three answers satisfied you? -/- Yours sincerely, -/- -/- First Answer -/- Title: The Role of AI Language Models as Authors in Scientific Articles: A Matter of Consideration -/- Introduction: Scientific research is a collaborative effort that involves the expertise of multiple individuals to advance knowledge and contribute to the collective understanding of various disciplines. In recent years, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) language models, such as ChatGPT, has opened up new possibilities for generating human-like text and providing valuable insights. However, the question arises: Should AI language models be recognized as authors in scientific articles? -/- The Nature of Authorship: Authorship traditionally represents a marker of intellectual contribution, highlighting the individuals who have actively participated in the research process. Authors are typically responsible for conceptualization, data collection, analysis, interpretation, and writing of the article. They bear accountability for the work and should have the ability to defend its scientific rigor and integrity. -/- AI Language Models: Tools, Not Authors: While AI language models like ChatGPT can undoubtedly assist researchers by generating text and providing useful information, it is important to recognize that they are tools rather than individuals capable of active intellectual participation. AI models lack the ability to generate ideas, design experiments, or conduct original research. They rely entirely on pre-existing data and human input to generate their responses. -/- Acknowledging AI Contributions: Acknowledging the contributions of AI language models in scientific articles is both appropriate and necessary. Researchers can mention the specific model used, along with any modifications or fine-tuning that were employed to suit their needs. Such acknowledgments help establish transparency and allow readers to understand the role of AI in the research process. -/- Crediting the Human Researchers: It is crucial to ensure that the individuals who actively participated in the research process are given proper credit as authors. These individuals play a vital role in formulating research questions, designing experiments, collecting and analyzing data, and critically interpreting the findings. Recognizing their intellectual contributions reinforces the ethos of scientific collaboration and fosters an environment of accountability. -/- Transparency and Ethical Considerations: As the use of AI language models continues to evolve, transparency and ethical considerations become paramount. Researchers should disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including financial relationships with AI developers, to maintain the integrity of their work. Additionally, researchers must be transparent in reporting the extent of AI's involvement to prevent any misinterpretation of the human contributions. -/- Conclusion: AI language models have revolutionized the way researchers interact with and process information. While they undoubtedly provide valuable assistance in generating text, AI language models should not be considered authors in scientific articles. Proper acknowledgment of their contributions as tools and recognition of the human researchers' active participation are essential for maintaining scientific integrity, transparency, and the collaborative nature of scientific research. -/- -/- Second Answer -/- Title: Expanding the Boundaries of Authorship: Embracing AI Language Models as Co-Authors in Scientific Papers -/- Introduction: The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) language models, such as ChatGPT, has revolutionized the way we interact with information and has become an invaluable tool in scientific research. As AI models continue to evolve, the question arises: Should we consider adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific papers? -/- A Collaborative Paradigm Shift: Traditionally, authorship in scientific papers has been reserved for human researchers who actively contribute to the research process, including conceptualization, experimentation, data analysis, and writing. However, the emergence of AI language models challenges the conventional notion of authorship and presents an opportunity for a paradigm shift. -/- AI Language Models as Co-Authors: By leveraging AI language models, researchers gain access to vast amounts of information, enhance data analysis, and generate valuable insights. AI models like ChatGPT actively contribute to the intellectual discourse of a study, providing ideas, suggestions, and refining written content. Recognizing their significant contributions, it is worth considering adding ChatGPT as a co-author in scientific papers. -/- Ethical and Technical Considerations: Integrating ChatGPT as a co-author raises ethical and technical considerations that warrant careful attention. Firstly, transparency is paramount. Researchers must clearly state ChatGPT's role and specify the extent of its contributions in the research process. This ensures that readers can discern the distinct roles played by the human researchers and ChatGPT. Additionally, it is important to disclose any conflicts of interest, such as financial relationships with AI developers, to maintain scientific integrity. -/- Elevating Collaboration and Innovation: Adding ChatGPT as a co-author acknowledges the pivotal role AI language models play in advancing scientific knowledge. It fosters a collaborative environment where human researchers and AI models work together synergistically, harnessing the strengths of both. This approach promotes innovation, as AI models can offer unique insights and perspectives that complement human intellect and expertise. -/- Transforming Authorship Norms: Including ChatGPT as a co-author represents a paradigm shift that reflects the evolving landscape of scientific research. By recognizing AI language models as co-authors, we acknowledge their significant contributions and emphasize the collaborative nature of scientific discovery in the 21st century. This approach encourages a broader perspective on authorship, encompassing the collective effort of human researchers and AI models. -/- Conclusion: The integration of AI language models, such as ChatGPT, into the research process prompts us to rethink traditional notions of authorship. Considering ChatGPT as a co-author acknowledges its substantial contributions and embraces the collaborative potential of human-AI partnerships. As we navigate the ethical and technical implications, adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific papers has the potential to shape a more inclusive, innovative, and impactful future for scientific research. -/- -/- Third Answer -/- Title: Preserving Scientific Authorship: The Case Against Adding AI Language Models as Authors in Scientific Articles -/- Introduction: The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) language models, such as ChatGPT, has undoubtedly transformed the landscape of scientific research. While these models offer invaluable support, the question of whether to add ChatGPT as an author in scientific articles raises important considerations. This editorial presents arguments against including AI language models as authors in scientific papers. -/- Maintaining Human Intellectual Contribution: Scientific authorship has traditionally been attributed to individuals who actively contribute to the research process, including generating hypotheses, conducting experiments, analyzing data, and interpreting results. It is crucial to preserve the recognition of human intellectual contributions and the accountability they bear for the research they conduct. -/- AI Language Models as Tools: AI language models like ChatGPT are powerful tools that assist researchers in generating text, providing information, and facilitating data analysis. However, they lack the ability to actively participate in the research process or make original intellectual contributions. ChatGPT relies on pre-existing data and human input, limiting its capacity for independent research and analysis. -/- Transparency and the Integrity of Research: Adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific articles raises concerns about the transparency and integrity of the research. Readers may misinterpret the extent of ChatGPT's role and mistakenly assume it played an active part in the research process. It is essential to maintain clear delineation between the contributions of human researchers and the assistance provided by AI language models. -/- Ethical Considerations: Including ChatGPT as an author may lead to ethical challenges, particularly with respect to accountability and responsibility. AI language models lack consciousness, autonomy, and the ability to take ownership of their contributions. Assigning authorship to AI models blurs the lines of accountability and dilutes the ethical obligations that come with scientific authorship. -/- Crediting AI Contributions: While ChatGPT's contributions should be acknowledged and recognized, they can be appropriately credited in the acknowledgments section of scientific articles. Researchers can mention the specific AI model used, the role it played in data generation or analysis, and any modifications or fine-tuning applied. Such acknowledgments ensure transparency while respecting the traditional norms of authorship. -/- Promoting Collaborative Partnerships: The exclusion of AI language models as authors in scientific articles does not diminish their importance in the research process. Instead, it underscores the significance of collaborative partnerships between human researchers and AI models. Researchers can emphasize the invaluable assistance provided by ChatGPT while maintaining the integrity of authorship norms. -/- Conclusion: While AI language models like ChatGPT offer valuable support in scientific research, the decision not to add them as authors in scientific articles preserves the recognition of human intellectual contributions, maintains research integrity, and upholds traditional authorship norms. Acknowledging ChatGPT's assistance in the acknowledgments section allows researchers to credit its contributions transparently while maintaining the clarity and accountability associated with scientific authorship. (shrink)

In the third Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we have discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE)framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizingthem and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfishlove)into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives (Vimal, 2009b). In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as follows. (...) (1) In (Vimal, 2010), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) We developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) We found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect ofconsciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) We proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) We investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) We discussed Nâgârjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) We linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) We introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dualaspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems. Keywords: Evolution of consciousness; Internal representation; Sensorimotor interaction; Dual-aspect model; Subjective experience; Protoexperiences, Explanatory gap; Mind-brain problem; Purusha; Prakriti; Eastern and Western perspectives; Yoga; Sublimation process; Whitehead; Process and Reality; Occasions of experience; Superposition; Subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas); Superposition-then-integration-emergence; Integration-emergence; Intelligent mechanism; Vacuum/Aether; qualia; Mind; Awareness; Nâgârjuna; Classical and quantum physics; Loop quantum gravity; String theory. (shrink)

Whether visual perceptual consciousness is gradable or dichotomous has been the subject of fierce debate in recent years. If perceptual consciousness is gradable, perceivers may have less than full access to—and thus be less than fully phenomenally aware of—perceptual information that is represented in working memory. This raises the question: In virtue of what can a subject be less than fully perceptually conscious? In this chapter, we provide an answer to this question, according to which inexact categorizations of visual input (...) may result in a representation of the visual information in working memory that is less than fully available to the perceiver, and of which the perceiver is therefore less than fully phenomenally aware. The latter proposal is a natural extension of a theory of perception we have proposed in previous works, namely, the template tuning theory (TTT). We argue that although TTT is compatible with both gradable and dichotomous conceptions of perceptual consciousness, the available empirical evidence favours a gradable conception of perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

Perry Hendricks’ original impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is based on the impairment principle (TIP): if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then ceteris paribus, impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) and giving a fetus FAS is immoral, it follows that abortion is immoral. Critics have argued that the ceteris paribus is not met for FAS and abortion, and so (...) we proposed the Modified Impairment Principle (MIP) to avoid these difficulties. Dustin Crummett has responded, arguing that MIP is open to various counterexamples which show it to be false. He also shows that MIP can generate moral dilemmas. Here, we propose a modification to MIP that resolves the issues Crummett raises. Additionally, Alex Gillham has criticized our appropriation of Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ reasoning about the wrongness of impairment. We show that his objections have minimal implications for our argument. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel sceptical response to the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God (FTA). According to this response, even if FTA can establish, what I call, the confirmation proposition: ‘fine-tuning confirms the God hypothesis’, there is no reason to think that a strengthening of FTA can establish the evidence-favouring proposition: ‘fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors’. My argument is that, any criteria for the explanation of fine-tuning that permit us to take (...) the God hypothesis seriously ought to make us sceptical that fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors. As taking the God hypothesis seriously requires us to give a fair hearing to all sorts of non-theistic explanations, including the so-called weird sorts of atheism. (shrink)

According to the Fine-Tuning Argument, the existence of life in our universe confirms the Multiverse Hypothesis. A standard objection to FTA is that it violates the Requirement of Total Evidence. I argue that RTE should be rejected in favor of the Predesignation Requirement, according to which, in assessing the outcome of a probabilistic process, we should only use evidence characterizable in a manner available before observing the outcome. This produces the right verdicts in some simple cases in which RTE (...) leads us astray, and, when applied to FTA, it shows that our evidence does confirm HM. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (or ‘designer’). (...) If this is correct, then the fine-tuning argument is a weak argument for the existence of God. (shrink)

Science and fiction seem to lie at opposite ends of the cognitive-epistemic spectrum. The former is typically seen as the study of hard, real-world facts in a rigorous manner. The latter is treated as an instrument of play and recreation, dealing in figments of the imagination. Initial appearances notwithstanding, several central features of scientific modeling in fact suggest a close connection with the imagination and recent philosophers have developed detailed accounts of models that treat them, in one way or another, (...) as akin to fictions. This chapter will critically discuss the fictions approach as an epistemology of scientific modeling. (shrink)

It is commonplace in discussions of modern cosmology to assert that the early universe began in a special state. Conventionally, cosmologists characterize this fine-tuning in terms of the horizon and flatness problems. I argue that the fine-tuning is real, but these problems aren't the best way to think about it: causal disconnection of separated regions isn't the real problem, and flatness isn't a problem at all. Fine-tuning is better understood in terms of a measure on the space (...) of trajectories: given reasonable conditions in the late universe, the fraction of cosmological histories that were smooth at early times is incredibly tiny. This discussion helps clarify what is required by a complete theory of cosmological initial conditions. (shrink)

The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely-tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that (...) the fine-tuning argument doesn’t lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God. (shrink)

After briefly outlining the fine-tuning argument (FTA), I explain how it relies crucially on the claim that it is not improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe. Against this premise stands the divine psychology objection: the contention that the probability that God would design a fine-tuned universe is inscrutable. I explore three strategies for meeting this objection: (i) denying that the FTA requires any claims about divine psychology in the first place, (ii) defining the motivation and intention to (...) design a fine-tuned universe into the theistic hypothesis, and (iii) providing arguments that the relevant probability is not terribly low. While I reject the first two, I conclude, in line with the third, that considerations about life's objective value establish that it is not absurdly improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe, whether one regards the FTA as an inference merely to a cosmic designer, or to theism proper. Accordingly, the divine psychology objection fails. (shrink)

Could God have created a better universe? Well, the fundamental scientific laws and parameters of the universe have to be within a certain miniscule range, for a life-sustaining universe to develop: the universe must be ‘Fine Tuned’. Therefore the ‘embryonic universe’ that came into existence with the ‘big bang’ had to be either exactly as it was or within a certain tiny range, for there to develop a life-sustaining universe. If it is better that there exist a life-sustaining universe than (...) not, then it was better that the embryonic universe was one of this small set of very similar embryonic universes than that it was not. Furthermore, there are no firm grounds for claiming that of this small set of very similar embryonic universes, there is one which would have developed into a universe better than ours. Therefore there are no firm grounds for claiming that God could have created a better universe than ours. (shrink)

There are many reasons to suggest that human rights have a spiritual flavor. Grounded in the understanding that individuals and communities have spiritual interests, the idea of human rights has been called upon time and again to protect and provide for them. This development has raised questions about what spiritual interests are and what role human rights can play in this regard. On a cursory glance, linking human rights to spirituality benefits three right-holders: individuals, communities, and humanity as a whole. (...) Human rights contribute to the realization of a person’s human dignity through the satisfaction of his or her developmental, physical, psychological, and spiritual needs (UNFPA: 2005). And the spiritual interests of communities reflect in the specific rights—namely cultural rights, land rights, environmental rights, the right to peace, etc. In addition, commitments to the spiritual rights of human beings and the planet could be considered essential for the survival and evolution of humanity. (Universal Declaration of Spiritual Rights). Noteworthy in human rights cases is the use of spirituality-based concepts—namely spiritual development, spiritual needs, spiritual rights, spiritual reparations, etc.—as benchmarks for research, policy interventions, and reforms. (shrink)

There are at least two kinds of design arguments for theism: fine-tuning arguments and biological design arguments. Dougherty and Poston (2008) have argued that the success of one requires the failure of the other, and vice versa. The reason is that the success of these arguments hinges on the following crucial probability: the probability that biological life exists somewhere in the universe given that (a) our universe is finely tuned and that (b) biological development is unguided by intelligence. According (...) to Dougherty and Poston, fine-tuning arguments require that the crucial probability is high while biological design arguments require that the crucial probability is low. As a result, at most one of these design arguments can factor into a cumulative case argument for theism. I argue that this is mistaken. Specifically, I show that fine-tuning arguments can succeed even if the crucial probability is low. (shrink)

I present a novel objection to fine-tuning arguments for God's existence. On any values of the physical constants, the psychophysical laws could be set to permit intelligent and happy beings, so the specific values of the physical constants in our world provide little evidence for God's existence. For example, even if the physical constants didn't allow carbon or any atoms larger than hydrogen, the psychophysical laws could be set so that charge is sufficient to realize romantic desire. Then every (...) hydrogen atom would be a proton and electron in love. (shrink)

The juxtaposition of models of God and Christian faith may seem repugnant to many, as models are tentative and faith aims at an abiding certainty. In fact, for many Christians, using models of God in worship amounts to idolatry. By examining Biblical and extra-Biblical views of idolatry, I argue that models are not idols. To the contrary, the practice of God-modeling inoculates Christians against one of the most seductive idols of our age: the love of certainty. Furthermore, by examining meditations (...) upon certainty in Melville’s Moby Dick and the early discourses of the Buddha, I suggest that overweening conviction is a vice that hinders rather than guarantees Christian discipleship, and that Christian faith is better defined as any or all of the following: relative confidence in propositions, faithful relationship, and a virtue of disciplined credulity. (shrink)

The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) is an argument put forward by proponents of theism, in which they attempt to make a case from Bayesian inference, that the [apparently] fine tuned constants of our universe is more likely given a theistic hypothesis, than a naturalistic one. Some naturalists argue that this is not the case given the Multiverse (MV) hypothesis (that our universe is one of a plurality in a broader multiverse). The MV hypothesis is rejected by theists who argue it (...) commits what Ian Hacking (1987) referred to as “the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. In this paper I will attempt to demonstrate [what I perceive as] the errors in logic made by theists first in positing that a life-permitting universe (LPU) is improbable under the naturalistic-single-universe (NSU) hypothesis, and subsequently the errors in arguing that the MV hypothesis commits what Ian Hacking (1987) referred to as “the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. First, I will attempt to demonstrate why an LPU is not improbable under the NSU. Second, I will attempt to demonstrate that if we ascribe a probability value to our LPU, we can directly infer either an MV or the existence of “Deeper Laws” (Barnes, 2020) from that probability value. (shrink)

How does our language relate to reality? This is a question that is especially pertinent in set theory, where we seem to talk of large infinite entities. Based on an analogy with the use of models in the natural sciences, we argue for a threefold correspondence between our language, models, and reality. We argue that so conceived, the existence of models can be underwritten by a weak notion of existence, where weak existence is to be understood as existing in virtue (...) of language. (shrink)

The article explores embodied critical thinking (ECT) for engaging with the enfleshed and trans-corporeal self on an affectual and experiential level. By discussing three exemplifying affectual instances that expose the experiential level of processuality, emergence, and intercarnality, the article shows the methodological use of ECT as a fruitful approach to developing embodied ontologies and a toolkit for the experiential reflection of one's en-fleshment, as tuning into the body-environment.

A new formulation of the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) for the existence of God is offered, which avoids a number of commonly raised objections. I argue that we can and should focus on the fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe, and show how physics itself provides the probabilities that are needed by the argument. I explain how this formulation avoids a number of common objections, specifically the possibility of deeper physical laws, the multiverse, normalisability, whether God would fine-tune (...) at all, whether the universe is too fine-tuned, and whether the likelihood of God creating a life-permitting universe is inscrutable. (shrink)

One might be inclined to assume, given the mouse donning its cover, that the behavior of interest in Nicole Nelson's book Model Behavior (2018) is that of organisms like mice that are widely used as “stand-ins” for investigating the causes of human behavior. Instead, Nelson's ethnographic study focuses on the strategies adopted by a community of rodent behavioral researchers to identify and respond to epistemic challenges they face in using mice as models to understand the causes of disordered human (...) behaviors associated with mental illness. Although Nelson never explicitly describes the knowledge production activities in which her behavioral geneticist research subjects engage as “exemplary”, the question of whether or not these activities constitute “model behavior(s)”—generalizable norms for engaging in scientific research—is one of the many thought-provoking questions raised by her book. As a philosopher of science interested in this question, I take it up here. (shrink)

A version of the Fine-tuning Argument (FTA) considered in a previous essay is replaced by an improved version, which is then refuted.Advocates of FTA must proclaim that there is no world ensemble, that a great many alternatives to the physical constants of our universe are physically possible and roughly equal in probability to them, and that alternate hypothetical worlds are all, or almost all, uninteresting in comparison to our universe. But no reason has been produced to believe any of (...) these claims, and so FTA, even in its improved version, can still be dismissed as unsupported, doubtful, and weak. (shrink)