Results for 'moral status of animals'

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  1. The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach.Zorana Todorovic - 2021 - Philosophy and Society 2 (32):282–295.
    This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches (...)
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  2. Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):795-815.
    Consciousness has an important role in ethics: when a being consciously experiences the frustration or satisfaction of its interests, those interests deserve higher moral priority than those of a behaviourally similar but non-conscious being. I consider the relationship between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or “type-B”) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept of phenomenal consciousness is radically indeterminate between (...)
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  3. Hsiao on the Moral Status of Animals: Two Simple Responses.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (5):927-933.
    According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers :277–291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28:11270–1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30:37–54, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status (...)
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  4. Peter Singer and the Moral Status of Animals. A Critical Assessment.Francesco Allegri - 2017 - Ragion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 48:pp. 117-140.
    Forthy years after the issue of Animal Liberation (1975), this essay tries to make a critical assessment of the theses of Peter Singer on the moral status of animals, showing their historical evolution. Notwithstanding the limits of his utilitarian theoretical view, a good part of Singer’s moral reflection about animals reveals itself convincing and is finding some achievements in the positive legislation of a lot of countries. Following David DeGrazia, the author develops Singer’s theses in (...)
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  5. Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of Animals: A Psychological Perspective.François Jaquet, Manon Delphine Gouiran & Florian Cova - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.
    Recent years have seen a growing interest among psychologists for debates in moral philosophy. Moral psychologists have investigated the causal origins of the opposition between utilitarian and deontological judgments and the psychological underpinnings of people’s beliefs about the moral status of animals. One issue that remains underexplored in this research area is the relationship between people’s disposition to engage in utilitarian thinking and their attitudes towards animals. This gap is unfortunate considering the tight philosophical (...)
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  6. Capacities, Context and the Moral Status of Animals.Sherri Irvin - 2004 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1):61–76.
    According to a widely shared intuition, normal adult humans require greater moral concern than normal, adult animals in at least some circumstances. Even the most steadfast defenders of animals' moral status attempt to accommodate this intuition, often by holding that humans' higher-level capacities (intellect, linguistic ability, and so on) give rise to a greater number of interests, and thus the likelihood of greater satisfaction, thereby making their lives more valuable. However, the moves from capacities to (...)
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  7. Moral and legal status of animals.Zorana Todorović - 2015 - Glasnik Za Društvene Nauke 7 (2015):199-217.
    This paper addresses the issue of the moral standing of nonhuman animals and their moral and legal rights. First of all, two most prominent views arguing for moral significance of animals are discussed. Peter Singer’s utilitarian view is that animals are sentient beings and therefore deserve equal consideration of their interests. Next, Tom Regan’s standpoint is that many animals have inherent value as experiencing subjects of a life, and consequently an equal right to (...)
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  8. The moral status of conscious subjects.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - In Stephen Clarke, Hazem Zohny & Julian Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status.
    The chief themes of this discussion are as follows. First, we need a theory of the grounds of moral status that could guide practical considerations regarding how to treat the wide range of potentially conscious entities with which we are acquainted – injured humans, cerebral organoids, chimeras, artificially intelligent machines, and non-human animals. I offer an account of phenomenal value that focuses on the structure and sophistication of phenomenally conscious states at a time and over time in (...)
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  9. Metaphysical and Moral Status of Cryopreserved Embryos.Jason T. Eberl - 2012 - The Linacre Quarterly 79 (3):304-315.
    Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research argue for a clear position on the metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This position does not differ whether the embryo is present inside its mother’s reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. It is worth examining, however, whether an embryo in “suspended animation” has the same status as one actively developing in utero. I will explore this question from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human (...)
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  10. Dignity Beyond the Human: A Deontic Account of the Moral Status of Animals.Matthew Wray Perry - 2023 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    Dignity is traditionally thought to apply to almost all and almost only humans. However, I argue that an account of a distinctly human dignity cannot achieve a coherent and non-arbitrary justification; either it must exclude some humans or include some nonhumans. This conclusion is not as worrying as might be first thought. Rather than attempting to vindicate human dignity, dignity should extend beyond the human, to include a range of nonhuman animals. Not only can we develop a widely inclusive (...)
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  11. The Moral Rights of Animals.Mylan Engel & Gary Comstock (eds.) - 2016 - Lanham, MD: Lexington.
    This volume brings together essays by seminal figures and rising stars in the fields of animal ethics and moral theory to analyze and evaluate the moral status of non-human animals, with a special focus on the question of whether or not animals have moral rights. Though wide-ranging in many ways, these fourteen original essays and one reprinted essay direct significant attention to both the main arguments for animal rights and the biggest challenges to animal (...)
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  12.  21
    AI Enters Public Discourse: a Habermasian Assessment of the Moral Status of Large Language Models.Paolo Monti - 2024 - Ethics and Politics 61 (1):61-80.
    Large Language Models (LLMs) are generative AI systems capable of producing original texts based on inputs about topic and style provided in the form of prompts or questions. The introduction of the outputs of these systems into human discursive practices poses unprecedented moral and political questions. The article articulates an analysis of the moral status of these systems and their interactions with human interlocutors based on the Habermasian theory of communicative action. The analysis explores, among other things, (...)
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  13. Animals and the agency account of moral status.Marc G. Wilcox - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1879-1899.
    In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for (...)
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  14. An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism.Thaddeus Metz - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late (...)
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  15. Self-serving bias and the structure of moral status.Thomas Douglas - 2012 - Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (3):141-142.
    David DeGrazia tentatively defends what he calls the Interests Model of moral status (see page 135).1 On this model all sentient beings have the same moral status, though some are owed more than others in virtue of having more or stronger interests. The proponent of this model can accept, say, that one should normally save the life of a human in preference to that of a dog. But she denies that we should save the human because (...)
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  16. Animated Persona: The Ontological Status of a Deceased Person Who Continues to Appear in This World.Masahiro Morioka - 2021 - European Journal of Japanese Philosophy 6:115-131.
    In this paper, I propose the concept of the “animated persona,” a soundless voice that says, “I am here” and appears on the surface of someone or something. This concept can bring clarity to the experience of perceiving a kind of personhood on a corpse, a wooden mask, or even a tree. In the first half of this paper, I will examine some Japanese literature and a work of Viktor Frankl’s that discuss these phenomena. In the second half, I will (...)
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  17. Consciousness and Moral Status.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in a permanent vegetative state, debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness, controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia, and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various (...)
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  18. Duty and the Beast: Should We Eat Meat in the Name of Animal Rights?Andy Lamey - 2019 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    The moral status of animals is a subject of controversy both within and beyond academic philosophy, especially regarding the question of whether and when it is ethical to eat meat. A commitment to animal rights and related notions of animal protection is often thought to entail a plant-based diet, but recent philosophical work challenges this view by arguing that, even if animals warrant a high degree of moral standing, we are permitted - or even obliged (...)
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  19. Moral Status, Luck, and Modal Capacities: Debating Shelly Kagan.Harry R. Lloyd - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (2):273-287.
    Shelly Kagan has recently defended the view that it is morally worse for a human being to suffer some harm than it is for a lower animal (such as a dog or a cow) to suffer a harm that is equally severe (ceteris paribus). In this paper, I argue that this view receives rather less support from our intuitions than one might at first suppose. According to Kagan, moreover, an individual’s moral status depends partly upon her ‘modal capacities.’ (...)
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  20. Non-Human Moral Status: Problems with Phenomenal Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (2):148-157.
    Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for (...)
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  21. On the Idea of Degrees of Moral Status.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
    A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some (...)
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  22. Is Moral Status Good for You?Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - In Stephen Clarke, Hazem Zohny & Julian Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford, UK:
    Should we cognitively alter animals in ways that might change their moral status? There has been some discussion of this question. For example, Chan (2009) and Chan and Harris (2001) consider whether we should radically enhance the cognitive capacities of animals, while Thompson (2008) and Shriver (2009) argue that we should in fact substantially disenhance some animals to protect them from suffering. More controversially, some have countenanced radical and possibly moral status-altering transformations of (...)
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  23. Relationship between Cognition and Moral Status Needs Overhaul.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (3):1-2.
    I commend Mikhalevich & Powell for extending the discussion of cognition and its relation to moral status with their well researched and argued target article on invertebrate cognition. I have two small criticisms: that the scala naturae still retains its appeal to some in biology as well as psychology, and that drawing the line at invertebrates requires a bit more defense given the larger comparative cognitive-scientific context.
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  24. The Problem with Person‐Rearing Accounts of Moral Status.Travis Timmerman & Bob Fischer - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):119-128.
    Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum recently developed the ingenious and novel person‐rearing account of moral status, which preserves the commonsense judgment that humans have a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. It aims to vindicate speciesist judgments while avoiding the problems typically associated with speciesist views. We argue, however, that there is good reason to reject person‐rearing views. Person‐rearing views have to be coupled with an account of flourishing, which will (according to Jaworska and Tannenbaum) (...)
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  25. Against the Precautionary Approach to Moral Status: The Case of Surrogates for Living Human Brains.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (1):53-56.
    My paper builds on the conceptual tools from three interrelated philosophical debates that—as I believe—may help structure important if chaotic discussions about surrogates for living human brains and resolve some practical issues related to regulatory matters. In particular, I refer to the discussions about the “moral precautionary principle” in research ethics (Koplin and Wilkinson 2019); about normative uncertainty in ethics (MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020), and about the inductive risk problem for animal welfare scientists (Birch 2018). I elucidate upon (...)
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  26. Of Animals, Robots and Men.Christine Tiefensee & Johannes Marx - 2015 - Historical Social Research 40:70-91.
    Domesticated animals need to be treated as fellow citizens: only if we conceive of domesticated animals as full members of our political communities can we do justice to their moral standing—or so Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka argue in their widely discussed book Zoopolis. In this contribution, we pursue two objectives. Firstly, we reject Donaldson and Kymlicka’s appeal for animal citizenship. We do so by submitting that instead of paying due heed to their moral status, (...)
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  27. Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status: A Further Reply to Hsiao.Stephen Puryear - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (4):697-704.
    Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the capacity for the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao's view: his conception of the moral community, his (...)
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  28. Shifting the Moral Burden: Expanding Moral Status and Moral Agency.L. Syd M. Johnson - 2021 - Health and Human Rights Journal 2 (23):63-73.
    Two problems are considered here. One relates to who has moral status, and the other relates to who has moral responsibility. The criteria for mattering morally have long been disputed, and many humans and nonhuman animals have been considered “marginal cases,” on the contested edges of moral considerability and concern. The marginalization of humans and other species is frequently the pretext for denying their rights, including the rights to health care, to reproductive freedom, and to (...)
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  29. Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal.David DeGrazia - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):22-25.
    Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have interests (...)
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  30. Defending a Relational Account of Moral Status.Thaddeus Metz - 2023 - In Mbih Jerome Tosam & Erasmus Masitera (eds.), African Agrarian Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 105-124.
    For the more than a decade, I have advanced an account of what makes persons, animals, and other beings entitled to moral treatment for their own sake that is informed by characteristically African ideas about dignity, a great chain of being, and community. Roughly according to this account, a being has a greater moral status, the more it is capable of communing (as a subject) or of us communing with it (as an object). I have mainly (...)
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  31. Disentangling Human Nature from Moral Status: Lessons for and from Philip K. Dick.James Okapal - 2023 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 6.
    A common interpretation of Philip K. Dick’s texts _Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?_ and _We Can Build You_ is that they attempt to answer the question “What does it mean to be human?” -/- Unfortunately, these interpretations fail to deal with the fact that the term “human” has both metaphysical and moral connotations. Metaphysical meanings associated with theories of human nature and moral meanings associated with theories of moral status are thus blurred in the novels (...)
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  32. What Matters for Moral Status: Behavioral or Cognitive Equivalence?John Danaher - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (3):472-478.
    Henry Shevlin’s paper—“How could we know when a robot was a moral patient?” – argues that we should recognize robots and artificial intelligence (AI) as psychological moral patients if they are cognitively equivalent to other beings that we already recognize as psychological moral patients (i.e., humans and, at least some, animals). In defending this cognitive equivalence strategy, Shevlin draws inspiration from the “behavioral equivalence” strategy that I have defended in previous work but argues that it is (...)
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  33. The Animal Ethics of Temple Grandin: A Protectionist Analysis.Andy Lamey - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (1):1-22.
    This article brings animal protection theory to bear on Temple Grandin’s work, in her capacity both as a designer of slaughter facilities and as an advocate for omnivorism. Animal protection is a better term for what is often termed animal rights, given that many of the theories grouped under the animal rights label do not extend the concept of rights to animals. I outline the nature of Grandin’s system of humane slaughter as it pertains to cattle. I then outline (...)
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  34. Unitarianism or Hierarchical Approach for Moral Status? A Very Subtle Difference.Francesco Allegri - 2021 - Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism 9 (1-2):91-107.
    The article is inspired by Shelly Kagan’s recent book “How to Count Animals”, which focuses on the alternative between a unitarian and a hierarchical conception of the moral status of beings in the animal ethics debate. The paper finds a way of compromise between the two perspectives in the principle of equal consideration of interests, but above all it lessens the role of such opposition – especially its practical relevance – by emphasizing that, regardless of the fact (...)
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  35. Animals Deserve Moral Consideration.Scott Hill - 2020 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 33 (2):177-185.
    Timothy Hsiao asks a good question: Why believe animals deserve moral consideration? His answer is that we should not. He considers various other answers and finds them wanting. In this paper I consider an answer Hsiao has not yet discussed: We should accept a conservative view about how to form beliefs. And such a view will instruct us to believe that animals deserve moral consideration. I think conservatives like Hsiao do best to answer his question in (...)
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  36. Necessary Conditions for Morally Responsible Animal Research.David Degrazia & Jeff Sebo - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (4):420-430.
    In this paper, we present three necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research that we believe people on both sides of this debate can accept. Specifically, we argue that, even if human beings have higher moral status than nonhuman animals, animal research is morally permissible only if it satisfies (a) an expectation of sufficient net benefit, (b) a worthwhile-life condition, and (c) a no unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We then claim that, whether or not these necessary conditions are jointly (...)
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  37.  45
    Non-human animals in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics.Thornton C. Lockwood - forthcoming - In Peter Adamson & Miira Tuominen (eds.), Animals in Greek, Arabic, and Latin Philosophy.
    At first glance, it looks like Aristotle can’t make up his mind about the ethical or moral status of non-human animals in his ethical treatises. Somewhat infamously, the Nicomachean Ethics claims that “there is neither friendship nor justice towards soulless things, nor is there towards an ox or a horse” (EN 8.11.1161b1–2). Since Aristotle thinks that friendship and justice are co-extensive (EN 8.9.1159b25–32), scholars have often read this passage to entail that humans have no ethical obligations to (...)
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  38. Resisting Moral Conservatism with Difficulties of Reality: a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian Approach to Animal Ethics.Konstantin Deininger, Andreas Aigner & Herwig Grimm - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57.
    In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are (...)
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  39.  31
    Review of Animals, Ethics and Us. [REVIEW]Teddy Duncan - 2022 - Between the Species 7 (1):147-156.
    In Animals, Ethics, and Us, Dr. Madeleine L.H. Campbell offers insight into the moral landscape of human-animal relations through a specific ethical framework that rejects the rights of non-human animals, opting instead for a “qualified utilitarian approach” (2019, 9). For Campbell, animal ethics should not be bound to animal rights or the autonomy of individual animals; she asserts that animal rights should not factor into the moral consideration of animals at all. Since she does (...)
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  40. Against animal replaceability: a restriction on consequences.Ricardo Miguel - 2021 - In Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Utility, Progress, and Technology: Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. pp. 183-192.
    Animal replaceability is supposed to be a feature of some consequentialist theories, like Utilitarianism. Roughly, an animal is replaceable if it is permissible to kill it because the disvalue thereby caused will be compensated by the value of a new animal’s life. This is specially troubling since the conditions for such compensation seem easily attainable by improved forms of raising and killing animals. Thus, grounding a strong moral status of animals in such theories is somewhat compromised. (...)
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  41. A Critique of Mary Anne Warren’s Weak Animal Rights View.Aaron Simmons - 2007 - Environmental Ethics 29 (3):267-278.
    In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren defends a comprehensive theory of the moral status of various entities. Under this theory, she argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans, who have rights in the fullest, strongest sense. Subsequently, Warren believes that our duties to animals are far weaker than our duties to other humans. This weakness is especially (...)
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  42. Against moral intrinsicalism.Nicolas Delon - 2015 - In Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley (eds.), Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy. London: Rowman and Littlefield International. pp. 31-45.
    This paper challenges a widespread, if tacit, assumption of animal ethics, namely, that the only properties of entities that matter to their moral status are intrinsic, cross‐specific properties—typically psychological capacities. According to moral individualism (Rachels 1990; McMahan 2002; 2005), the moral status of an individual, and how to treat him or her, should only be a function of his or her individual properties. I focus on the fundamental assumption of moral individualism, which I call (...)
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  43. Artificial Beings Worthy of Moral Consideration in Virtual Environments: An Analysis of Ethical Viability.Stefano Gualeni - 2020 - Journal of Virtual Worlds Research 13 (1).
    This article explores whether and under which circumstances it is ethically viable to include artificial beings worthy of moral consideration in virtual environments. In particular, the article focuses on virtual environments such as those in digital games and training simulations – interactive and persistent digital artifacts designed to fulfill specific purposes, such as entertainment, education, training, or persuasion. The article introduces the criteria for moral consideration that serve as a framework for this analysis. Adopting this framework, the article (...)
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  44. Review of Gary Varner, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism. [REVIEW]Gary Comstock - 2013 - Environmental Values 22 (3):417-420.
    With his 1998 book, In Nature’s Interests? Gary Varner proved to be one of our most original and trenchant of environmental ethicists. Here, in the first of a promised two volume set, he makes his mark on another field, animal ethics, leaving an even deeper imprint. Thoroughly grounded in the relevant philosophical and scientific literatures, Varner is as precise in analysis as he is wide-ranging in scope. His writing is clear and rigorous, and he explains philosophical nuances with extraordinary economy (...)
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  45. Re-framing the debate over animal morality.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2020 - EurSafe Newsletter 22 (1):3-6.
    Is morality uniquely human or does morality exist in at least some non-human animals? Are animals full-fledged moral creatures or do they merely exhibit proto-morality—evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article? Such questions, prompted by remarkable advances in empirical research into the social and emotional lives of non-human animals, have aroused much recent interest amongst scientists, philosophers, and in the popular media, not least for their apparent bearing on questions of (...)
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  46. Moral Uncertainty and Our Relationships with Unknown Minds.John Danaher - 2023 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (4):482-495.
    We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with “locked-in” syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of (...) uncertainty, we need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the “risk asymmetry argument,” which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human–AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take. (shrink)
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  47. Relating morally to farmed salmon – fellow creatures and biomass.Hannah Winther & Bjørn Myskja - 2021 - In Hanna Schübel & Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Justice and food security in a changing climate. Wageningen Academic Publishers. pp. 194-199.
    Cora Diamond has criticized capacity-based approaches to determining the moral status of animals, arguing instead that the morally significant fact is that we have relationships to animals as our fellow creatures. This paper explores implications of her approach to fish and the practice of fish farming. Fish differ from most other animals due to their appearances and under-water existence, and it is not obvious that fish belong to our fellow creatures, and – if so – (...)
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  48. Are the folk utilitarian about animals?Guy Kahane & Lucius Caviola - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1081-1103.
    Robert Nozick famously raised the possibility that there is a sense in which both deontology and utilitarianism are true: deontology applies to humans while utilitarianism applies to animals. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in such a hybrid views of ethics. Discussions of this Nozickian Hybrid View, and similar approaches to animal ethics, often assume that such an approach reflects the commonsense view, and best captures common moral intuitions. However, recent psychological work challenges this empirical assumption. (...)
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  49. Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogs of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors—i.e., cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event’s probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events, such as airplane crashes, are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research program on cognitive (...)
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  50. Animal Rights or just Human Wrongs?Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2012 - In Animal Rights: Past and Present Perspectives. Berlin: Logos Verlag. pp. 279-291.
    Reportedly ever since Pythagoras, but possibly much earlier, humans have been concerned about the way non human animals (henceforward “animals” for convenience) should be treated. By late antiquity all main traditions with regard to this issue had already been established and consolidated, and were only slightly modified during the centuries that followed. Until the nineteenth century philosophers tended to focus primarily on the ontological status of animals, to wit on whether – and to what degree – (...)
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