I argue that the human sciences (i.e. humanities, social- and behavioural sciences) should not try to imitate the methodology of the natural sciences. The human sciences study meaningful phenomena whose nature is decisively different from the merely physical phenomena studied by the natural sciences, and whose study therefore require different methods; meaningful phenomena do not obviously obey natural laws while the merely physical necessarily does. This is not to say that the human sciences do not study an objective reality (...) about which we cannot have genuine knowledge. The notion of objective reality is discussed, and it is suggested that social constructions can be understood as objectively real entities. (shrink)

Il s’agit d’un excellent examen des interactions génétiques / environnement sur le comportement et, en dépit d’être un peu daté, est une lecture facile et utile. Ils commencent par des études jumelles qui montrent l’impact écrasant de la génétique sur le comportement. Ils notent les études de plus en plus connues de Judith Harris qui étendent et résument les faits que l’environnement familial partagé n’a presque aucun effet sur le comportement et que les enfants adoptés grandissent pour être aussi différents (...) de leurs demi-frères et soeurs que les personnes choisies au hasard. Un point fondamental qu’ils (et presque tous ceux qui discutent de la génétique comportementale) ne parviennent pas à noter est que les centaines (des milliers selon votre point de vue) des universels comportementaux humains, y compris toutes les bases de nos personnalités, sont 100% déterminés par nos gènes, sans aucune variation dans les normales. Tout le monde voit un arbre comme un arbre et non une pierre, cherche et mange de la nourriture, se met en colère et jaloux, etc. Donc, ce dont ils parlent surtout ici, c’est de la quantité d’environnement (culture) qui peut influer sur la mesure dans laquelle les divers traits sont montrés, plutôt que leur apparence. Enfin, ils discutent de l’eugénisme de la manière politiquement correcte habituelle, à défaut de noter que nous et tous les organismes sommes les produits de l’eugénisme de la nature et que les tentatives de vaincre la sélection naturelle avec la médecine, l’agriculture, et la civilisation dans son ensemble, sont désastreuses pour toute société qui persiste à le faire. Jusqu’à 50% de toutes les conceptions, soit environ 100 millions par an, se terminent par un avortement spontané précoce, presque tous sans que la mère soit au courant. Cet abattage naturel de gènes défectueux stimule l’évolution, nous maintient relativement génétiquement sains et rend la société possible. Dysgenics est suffisant pour détruire la civilisation, mais la surpopulation sera do ild’abord. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein et John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

How is knowledge of geometry developed and acquired? This central question in the philosophy of mathematics has received very different answers. Spelke and colleagues argue for a “core cognitivist”, nativist, view according to which geometric cognition is in an important way shaped by genetically determined abilities for shape recognition and orientation. Against the nativist position, Ferreirós and García-Pérez have argued for a “culturalist” account that takes geometric cognition to be fundamentally a culturally developed phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that (...) when understood as moderate versions supported by the state-of-the-art research, the nativist and culturalist views are in fact possible to reconcile. While Ferreirós and García-Pérez present the work of Spelke and colleagues as implying that geometric cognition is genetically determined, I argue that they fail to appreciate the role that Spelke and colleagues see for cultural factors. On this basis, I provide theoretical and terminological clarifications and show that moderate versions of the nativist and culturalist view are in fact consistent with each other. I then propose a unifying theoretical framework for future study that can integrate the two accounts in ontogeny by moving beyond the crude nature (nativism) vs. nurture (culturalism) dichotomy. (shrink)

«Les gens disent encore et encore que la philosophie ne progresse pas vraiment, que nous sommes toujours occupés avec les mêmes problèmes philosophiques que les Grecs. Mais les gens qui disent cela ne comprennent pas pourquoi il doit en être ainsi. C’est parce que notre langue est restée la même et continue de nous séduire à poser les mêmes questions. Tant qu’il continue à y avoir un verbe qui ressemble à s’il fonctionne de la même manière que de manger et (...) de boire, tant que nous avons encore les adjectifs 'identiques', 'faux', 'false', 'possible', tant que nous continuons à parler d’une rivière du temps, d’une étendue d’espace, etc., etc., les gens continueront à trébucher sur les mêmes difficultés déroutantes et se retrouveront à regarder quelque chose qui ne semble pas capable de se dégager. Et qui plus est, cela satisfait un désir pour le transcendant, parce que, dans la mesure où les gens pensent qu’ils peuvent voir les ‘«limites de la compréhension humaine », ils croient bien sûr ce ils peuvent voir au-delà de ceux-ci. Cette citation est de Ludwig Wittgenstein qui a redéfini la philosophie il ya 70 ans (mais la plupart des gens n’ont pas encore de le savoir). Dennett, bien qu’il ait été un philosophe pendant une quarantaine d’années, est l’un d’entre eux. Il est également curieux que lui et son antagoniste principal, John Searle, étudié sous les célèbres Wittgensteiniens (Searle avec John Austin, Dennett avec Gilbert Ryle) mais Searle plus ou moins obtenu le point et Dennett n’a pas, (bien qu’il est étirer les choses à appeler Searle ou Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett est un déterministe difficile (bien qu’il essaie de se faufiler la réalité dans la porte arrière), et peut-être cela est dû à Ryle, dont le célèbre livre "Le concept de l’esprit" (The Concept of Mind) (1949) continue d’être réimprimé. Ce livre a fait un excellent travail d’exorciser le fantôme, mais il a quitté la machine. Dennett aime faire les erreurs Wittgenstein, Ryle (et beaucoup d’autres depuis) ont exposé en détail. Notre utilisation des mots conscience, choix, liberté, intention, particule, pensée, détermine, vague, cause, arrivé, événement (et ainsi de suite sans fin) sont rarement une source de confusion, mais dès que nous quittons la vie normale et entrer dans la philosophie (et toute discussion détachée de l’environnement dans lequel la langue a évolué-c’est-à-dire le contexte exact dans lequel les mots avaient un sens) chaos règne. Comme la plupart, Dennett n’a pas un cadre cohérent - que Searle a appelé la structure logique de la rationalité. J’ai développé sur ce considérablement depuis que j’ai écrit cette revue et mes articles récents montrent en détail ce qui ne va pas avec l’approche de Dennett à la philosophie, que l’on pourrait appeler Scientism sur les stéroïdes. Permettez-moi de terminer par une autre citation de Wittgenstein-- «L’ambition est la mort de la pensée. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systèmes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2020) et autres. (shrink)

Dans 'Godel’s Way', trois éminents scientifiques discutent de questions telles que l’indécidabilité, l’incomplétude, le hasard, la calculabilité et la paraconsistence. J’aborde ces questions du point de vue de Wittgensteinian selon lesquelles il y a deux questions fondamentales qui ont des solutions complètement différentes. Il y a les questions scientifiques ou empiriques, qui sont des faits sur le monde qui doivent être étudiés de manière observationnelle et philosophique quant à la façon dont le langage peut être utilisé intelligiblement (qui incluent certaines (...) questions en mathématiques et en logique), qui doivent être décidés en regardant un comment nous utilisons réellement des mots dans des contextes particuliers. Lorsque nous obtenons clair sur le jeu de langue que nous jouons, ces sujets sont considérés comme des questions scientifiques et mathématiques ordinaires comme les autres. Les idées de Wittgenstein ont rarement été égalées et jamais dépassées et sont aussi pertinentes aujourd’hui qu’elles l’étaient il y a 80 ans lorsqu’il a dicté les Livres Bleus et Brown. Malgré ses défauts, vraiment une série de notes plutôt qu’un livre fini, c’est une source unique du travail de ces trois savants célèbres qui travaillent aux confins de la physique, des mathématiques et de la philosophie depuis plus d’un demi-siècle. Da Costa et Doria sont cités par Wolpert (voir ci-dessous ou mes articles sur Wolpert et mon examen de Yanofsky 'The Outer Limits of Reason') depuis qu’ils ont écrit sur le calcul universel, et parmi ses nombreuses réalisations, Da Costa est un pionnier dans la paraconsistence. -/- Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux système peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 » 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Inner speech vs. anendophasia: Questions of information, serendipity, and the mental realm’s connection with nature.

The moral debates continued to see good as merely that which gives happiness or pleasure. \"…it was assumed that what we ought to do is always a function of what it would be good to bring about: action can only be right because it produces good (J.B. Schneewind 'Modern Moral Philosophy'). It was the breaking away from this idea that was perhaps the most important aspect of the works of both Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and David Hume (1711-1776). Hume's moral theory (...) arose out of his belief that reason alone can never cause action. Desire or feelings cause action. Because reason alone can never cause action, morality is rooted in our feelings. Virtue arises from acting on a desire to help others. Hume's moral theory is therefore a virtue-centered morality rather than the natural-law morality, which saw morality as coming from God. Kant's notion of morality arose from his notion of a moral law; a law applicable to all people at all times, that imposes absolute duties on us. According to Kant, you \"ought to act according to the maxim that is qualified for universal law giving; that is, you ought to act so that the maxim of your action may become a universal law\" (Immanuel Kant 'Lectures of Mr. Kant on the Metaphysics of Morals'). Kant, unlike Hume, saw it as possible to act on reason alone, and whether or not a person acted morally depended on whether he/she had acted on reason alone. The essential difference between Kant and Hume that affected their whole thinking on the matter of morality was each one's belief about the autonomy of the will. Kant saw the will as fully autonomous and therefore needing no external sources for motivation, thus making it possible to act out of reason alone. (shrink)

The human-nature relationship has been a focus of research for the environment has seen a dramatic increase. To subdue nature, to bend its forces to our will, has been the acknowledged purpose of mankind since human life began, but the time has come for a revision of our conception of the benefits and responsibilities of holding domination over all other created things. A new spirit is abroad as scientists and layman realize that man and the rest of (...) class='Hi'>nature are united and indivisible. The study of anthropocentrism and biocentrism as approach to study the human-nature relationship has not yet received enough attention. Although both express environmental concerns and have an interest in protecting nature and also have recognize that we have a responsibility to the environment, but they have different motives. This paper is an attempt to expound and clarify these two concepts and try to give answer to the question “Does it matter which of these two views we adopt?”. (shrink)

Social robots are robots that can interact socially with humans. As social robots and the artificial intelligence that powers them becomes more advanced, they will likely take on more social and work roles. This has many important ethical implications. In this paper, we focus on one of the most central of these, the impacts that social robots can have on human autonomy. We argue that, due to their physical presence and social capacities, there is a strong potential for social robots (...) to enhance human autonomy as well as several ways they can inhibit and disrespect it. We argue that social robots could improve human autonomy by helping us to achieve more valuable ends, make more authentic choices, and improve our autonomy competencies. We also argue that social robots have the potential to harm human autonomy by instead leading us to achieve fewer valuable ends ourselves, make less authentic choices, decrease our autonomy competencies, make our autonomy more vulnerable, and disrespect our autonomy. Whether the impacts of social robots on human autonomy are positive or negative overall will depend on the design, regulation, and use we make of social robots in the future. (shrink)

Does the human mind resemble the machines that can behave like it? Biologically inspired machine-learning systems approach “human-level” accuracy in an astounding variety of domains, and even predict human brain activity—raising the exciting possibility that such systems represent the world like we do. However, even seemingly intelligent machines fail in strange and “unhumanlike” ways, threatening their status as models of our minds. How can we know when human–machine behavioral differences reflect deep disparities in their underlying capacities, vs. when such failures (...) are only superficial or peripheral? This article draws on a foundational insight from cognitive science—the distinction between performance and competence—to encourage “species-fair” comparisons between humans and machines. The performance/competence distinction urges us to consider whether the failure of a system to behave as ideally hypothesized, or the failure of one creature to behave like another, arises not because the system lacks the relevant knowledge or internal capacities (“competence”), but instead because of superficial constraints on demonstrating that knowledge (“performance”). I argue that this distinction has been neglected by research comparing human and machine behavior, and that it should be essential to any such comparison. Focusing on the domain of image classification, I identify three factors contributing to the species-fairness of human–machine comparisons, extracted from recent work that equates such constraints. Species-fair comparisons level the playing field between natural and artificial intelligence, so that we can separate more superficial differences from those that may be deep and enduring. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the thesis that an agreement between representatives of two different cultures can and should be reached at a theoretical level. The author tries to verify the Theory of Communicative Action proposed by Jürgen Habermas in the light of philosophical reflections of American neopragmatist Stanley Fish. Habermas is one of the most important and widely read social theorists in the post-Second World War era. He is also one of the authors of the concept (...) of deliberative democracy, which holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation – disinterested exchange of reasons – not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. The foundation of deliberative democracy is, according to the German thinker, a communicative action based on communicative rationality. Stanley Fish, in turn, is one of the most eminent American philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The main area of his scientific activity is the theory of literature, law, and history. In the course of his reflections, Fish constructed the concept of an interpretive communities, which implies an original view on the nature of the process of cognition, status of human convictions or beliefs, nature of communication situation and capabilities of theory. The final conclusion stemming from the reflection on Fish’s philosophy explains why Habermas’ theory is not an adequate tool to reach an intercultural agreement. (shrink)

The Brown vs. Board of Education decision of 1954 mandated school integration. The decision also to recognize that inequalities outside the schools, of both a class- and race-based nature, prevent equality in education. Today, the most prominent argument for integration is that disadvantaged students benefit from the financial, social, and cultural “capital” of middle class families when the children attend the same schools. This argument fails to recognize that disadvantaged students contribute to advantaged students’ educational growth, and sends demeaning (...) messages to the disadvantaged students and messages of unwarranted superiority to the advantaged. Parents, teachers, and schools can adopt a justice perspective that avoids these deleterious aspects of the capital argument, and helps create a community of equals inside the integrated school. Struggles for educational justice must remain closely linked with struggles of both a class- and race-based nature for other forms of justice in the wider society. (shrink)

This book brings together papers from a conference that took place in the city of L'Aquila, 4–6 April 2019, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the earthquake that struck on 6 April 2009. Philosophers and scientists from diverse fields of research debated the problem that, on 6 April 1922, divided Einstein and Bergson: the nature of time. For Einstein, scientific time is the only time that matters and the only time we can rely on. Bergson, however, believes that scientific (...) time is derived by abstraction, even in the sense of extraction, from a more fundamental time. The plurality of times envisaged by the theory of Relativity does not, for him, contradict the philosophical intuition of the existence of a single time. But how do things stand today? What can we say about the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of time in the light of contemporary science? What do quantum mechanics, biology and neuroscience teach us about the nature of time? The essays collected here take up the question that pitted Einstein against Bergson, science against philosophy, in an attempt to reverse the outcome of their monologue in two voices, with a multilogue in several voices. (shrink)

Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology (...) while engaging in contemporary debates. Written by two of today’s foremost epistemologists. Includes an extensive bibliography. (shrink)

In Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus takes pains to differentiate the skeptical way of life from other positions with which it is often confused, and in the course of this discussion he briefly explains how skepticism differs from Cyrenaicism. Surprisingly, Sextus does not mention an important apparent difference between the two. The Cyrenaics have a positive epistemic commitment--that we can apprehend our own affections. Although we cannot know whether the honey is really sweet, we can know infallibly that right now (...) we are being sweetened. By contrast, Sextus says explicitly that, as skeptics, Pyrrhonists apprehend nothing whatsoever. A case can (and has) been made that Sextus does not mention this difference because, on this matter, there really isn't an important difference between the two: the skeptic is perfectly able to report how things appear to him, e.g., that the honey seems sweet, and it is crucial for the skeptic that he not abolish the appearances. But, I argue, what the skeptics are doing when they report how things appear to them is importantly different from the sort of immediate, infallible apprehension of one's own affections claimed by the Cyrenaics, as the latter involves theoretical commitments regarding the nature of one's affections that the skeptic eschews. (shrink)

This paper explores whether terrorist violence could be morally justified or excused. It defends the absolute immunity of innocent people against those who might want to sacrifice them for other goals. The defense is based on recognizing people’s stringent natural duty of nonmaleficence, which entails an obligation on moral agents to refrain from intentionally bringing about harm or significant risk of it to the innocent. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part distinguishes between unconditional and conditional critics’ (...) arguments regarding the use of terrorist violence, and between a narrow and a broad definition of terrorism. While unconditional critics accept the narrow definition or one akin to it because they equate terrorism with murder, conditional critics accept the broad definition or one akin to it because they attempt to justify or excuse the use of terrorism based, e.g., on an analogy with a just war approach, consequentialism, moral relativism, supreme emergency or last resort. Exception is taken with the latter arguments since they attempt to justify or excuse morally unjustifiable and inexcusable actions such as the deliberate use of violence against the innocent. The second part explores plausible conditional critics’ reasons for justifying or excusing the 9/11/01 attacks and find them wanting. If the argument works, then, with minor modifications, it could also apply to the 3/11/04 attacks in Madrid, the 7/7/05 attacks in London, and similar attacks elsewhere. (shrink)

Our time is characterized by what seems like an unprecedented process of intense global homogenization. This reality provides the context for exploring the nature and value of toleration. Hence, this essay is meant primarily as a contribution to international ethics rather than political philosophy. It is argued that because of the non-eliminability of differences in the world we should not even hope that there can be only one global religion or ideology. Further exploration exposes conceptual affinity between the concepts (...) of intolerance, ideology, and doctrinal evil. The last concept is developed in contrast to pure evil and average evil, and under the assumption of the metaphysical necessity of free will. Doctrinal evil is found to represent the main source of intolerance as a result of a mechanism that tends to confuse doctrinal evil (or the competing conceptions of the good) with pure evil. This connection between doctrinal evil and pure evil provides ideologies with their forcefulness. Tolerance cannot be properly understood in terms of a simple opposition to intolerance, however. Tolerance emerges as a sort of vigilance, conscientiousness, and non-negligence based not on a supposedly correct interpretation of the good, but rather on the acceptance of the fallibility of any such attempted definition. Conversely, the principal evil in doctrinal evil is found in arrogance that accompanies the intolerance-inducing irresponsible thoughtlessness. With this conceptual topology in mind the paper also addresses questions regarding religious tolerance, the ideology of human rights and democracy, the right to self-defense, ways to face evil, the dialectics of using old names for novel evils, and related issues. (shrink)

In this paper I will take it for granted that Zagzebski's position articulates a broadly Catholic perspective, and that Plantinga's position accurately represents a broadly Calvinist one. But I will argue that so construed, the Catholic and the Calvinist are much closer than Zagzebski implies: both views are person-based in an important sense of that term; both are internalist on Zagzebski's usage and externalist on the standard usage; and Plantinga's position is consistent with the social elements that Zagzebski stresses in (...) her view. In the second part of the paper I will identify what I think is the real issue between Zagzebski and Plantinga. Namely, Zagzebski thinks that knowledge requires epistemic responsibility, in the sense that instances of knowledge must be appropriately praiseworthy. Plantinga thinks that no such condition is required for knowledge or warranted belief. I will argue that on this issue Zagzebski is right, and that her virtue approach gives us resources for seeing why. Finally, I will look at the consequences for religious knowledge. Here I will argue that the consequences are minimal. Even if knowledge requires responsibility, Plantinga can still make a good case that religious belief is properly basic. And even if religious belief is properly basic, natural theology can still have an important role in the justification of religious belief. (shrink)

In this brief paper, starting from recent works, we analyze from conceptual point of view this basic question: can be the nature of quantum entangled states interpreted ontologically or epistemologically? According some works, the degrees of freedom of quantum systems permit us to establish a possible classification between factorizables and entangled states. We suggest, that the "choice" of degree of freedom, even if mathematically justified introduces epistemic element, not only in the systems but also in their classification. We retain, (...) instead, that there are not two classes of quantum states, entangled and factorizables, but only a single classes of states: the entangled states. In fact, the factorizable states become entangled for a different choice of their degrees of freedom. In the same way, there are not partitions of quantum system which have an ontological superior status with respect to any other. For all these reasons, both mathematical tools utilized are responsible of improper classification of quantum systems. Finally, we argue that we cannot speak about a classification of quantum systems: all the quantum states exhibit a unique objective nature, they are all entangled states. (shrink)

The paper compares dispositionalism about laws of nature with primitivism. It argues that while the distinction between these two positions can be drawn in a clear-cut manner in classical mechanics, it is less clear in quantum mechanics, due to quantum non-locality. Nonetheless, the paper points out advantages for dispositionalism in comparison to primitivism also in the area of quantum mechanics, and of contemporary physics in general.

The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood (...) can be defined independently of naturalness, if we help ourselves to the notion of a fundamental physical property. I end by showing how the notions of naturalness and lawhood that my account delivers help illuminate a number of other important philosophical notions, like causation, reference/meaning, and rational induction. (shrink)

The introspective devices framework proposed by Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) offers an attractive conceptual tool for evaluating and developing accounts of introspection. However, the framework assumes that different views about the nature of introspection can be easily evaluated against a set of common criteria. In this paper, I set out to test this assumption by analysing two formal models of introspection using the introspective device framework. The question I aim to answer is not only whether models developed outside (...) of philosophy can be successfully evaluated against the set of conceptual criteria proposed by Kammerer and Frankish, but also whether this kind of evaluation can reveal some limitations inherent to the framework. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because (...) belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted. (shrink)

This paper seeks to defuse two claims. On the one hand, I confront the Hildebrandian claim that Thomism, by placing the principium of love in the needs and desires of the lover rather than in the beloved, denies the possibility of transcendent love; on the other, I seek to refute the Thomistic objection that Hildebrand lacks a sufficient understanding of nature and its inherent teleology. In order to accomplish this, a distinction must be made between different kinds of principium (...) or “for-its-own-sakeness.” Using St. Thomas’ theory of friendship-love, I show how every affective movement in fact has two fundamentally different principia: an “end-desired,” and an “end-for-whom” the former is desired. I next note that “value” and “bonum honestum” each encompass both of these types of “worthiness,” and that the failure to distinguish between these two has led to much of the misunderstanding between Thomists and Hildebrandians: for while the latter sometimes seem to include inanimate objects like sunsets under the higher “worthiness” (as “ends-for-whom”), the former often tend to classify even the beloved under the lower “worthiness” (as a mere “end-desired”), which are both untenable positions. It is shown, however, that for St. Thomas it is the higher, more ultimate sense of “worthiness” that is the foundation of friendship-love, and that thus love remains a truly “transcendent” or “ecstatic” phenomenon. Two objections are then addressed: 1) St. Thomas’ claim that substantial unity is the greatest cause of love, and 2) his claim that man’s primary end is Vision. In both these respects I argue that Aquinas’ position needs correction; still I maintain that neither claim should be taken to imply that, for Aquinas, man is his own center, his own chief “end-for-whom.” Finally, while Hildebrand emphatically denies that natural teleology can explain man’s transcendence (a Thomistic position), this denial seems to flow simply from confusing two ways in which “nature” can be invoked as an explanation: where he sees it invoked as the final cause, Thomists actually invoke it as simply the formal cause of our love for our true Final Cause. (shrink)

Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of (...) special, anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism. (shrink)

Jag tror att det är ett misstag att kräva av humanvetenskaperna (d.v.s. humaniora, samhälls- och beteendevetenskaperna) att de imiterar naturvetenskapernas forskningsmetodik. Humanvetenskaperna studerar meningsfulla fenomen vilkas natur är på ett grundläggande sätt annorlunda än de blott fysiska fenomen som naturvetenskapen studerar. Den största skillnaden är att meningsfulla fenomen inte uppenbarligen är lagbundna på samma sätt som fysiska fenomen och uppvisar därför inte samma regelbundenhet och förutsägbarhet som fysiska fenomen. För att studera meningsfulla fenomen krävs därför andra forskningsmetoder. Trots att humanvetenskaperna (...) studerar fenomen som inte är lagbundna och är på ett visst sätt subjektiva, så vill jag mena att de studerar objektivt verkliga fenomen och kan få giltig kunskap om dem. Att subjektiva fenomen också kan vara objektivt verkliga kan låta märkligt för vissa läsare, varför jag rundar av med en diskussion om vad det egentligen innebär för något att vara objektivt verkligt. Enligt den definition jag föreslår så framstår att meningsfulla fenomen, också de som kallas ”sociala konstruktioner”, kan förstås som objektivt verkliga företeelser trots att de på ett betydelsefullt sätt också är subjektiva. (shrink)

Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional (...) realism is not, to the pessimistic induction. I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories. (shrink)

Meontology of Gorgias vs. Nihilism. The purpose of this paper is to challenge Gorgias’ image of a “nihilist existentialist”. The original thesis ouden estin, too frequently rendered as „nothing exists”, thus reducing the verb “to be” to denote “bare” existence, and ouden to denote “nothingness”. On close inspection, it turns out that, in Gorgias, neither do we have a negation of reality nor an affirmative treatment of the word “nothingness”.Therefore, ouden” should not be understood as a negation of all reality (...) or a kind of affirmative “nothingness”, whereas “estin” should not be reduced to “bare” existence. (When existence is negated what we obtain is annihilation). Such practices still affect the various translations of Gorgias’ treaty On the non-being or on Nature. Gorgias’ “sophist” thought is typically interpreted as a joke or a parody of dialectical thinking of the Eleatics. In fact, as it turns out, he made no parody of dialectic but applied the elenctic, apagogic method in Zeno’s masterly manner. He did so not for an artificial purpose but to prove the absurdity of the hypothesis of absolute, transcendent (hence incognizable) one Truth-Being, which eliminates the non-being of becoming as absolute non-being. Gorgias argued in earnest in favour of relative being as such, Becoming as the only reality, which from the point of view of absolute being is after all non-being, but not-this-being, or relative non-being but not non-relative non-being, as the Eleatics had claimed. Gorgias’ positions appears to be an apologia of non-being which is, that is of Becoming. We do not transform the “nothing” into a “no thing”. The main question of the treaty is: what is predicated by the word “nothing”? Gorgias’ position can be recapitulated as “nothing is sc. true, there is no criterion because, after all, everything is opinion. It is reinforced further by meontological, i.e. anti-eleatic Gorgias’ emphasis: “No thing is Being (substance)”, because everything is Becoming. Thus the title if Gorgias’ treaty can thus be treated as as an antithesis to that of Melissos’, which – in our opinion – is to emphasize the “non-beingness” of nature, the non-substantiality of things. Therefore, if Gorgias’ text was polemical, and it questioned (while at the same time maintaining the positivity of Becoming as non-being) only the immutability of things, and thus we cannot speak of the existence or the cognizability of natures or of essences of things. In sum, the reasoning of Zeno and Melissos was of a kind that is apt to cut both ways, and that is what Gorgias showed. The argument given as peculiar to himself was to this effect. “What is not” is not, so, it is just as much as “what is”. It is as if the onset of the issues that Plato will take up in The Sophist as the problem of non-being understood as difference. The axis of Gorgias’s anti-eleatic critique, in our view, is his polemic with Parmenides’ famous thesis B3 regarding the relationship of identity or equality between noein and einai. It is an additional and perhaps the most important point of his critique that aims at demonstrating that such relationship is impossible. In brief, things are not words just as thoughts are not words. (shrink)

The paper develops some of the conclusions, reached in Floridi (2007), concerning the future developments of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and their impact on our lives. The two main theses supported in that article were that, as the information society develops, the threshold between online and offline is becoming increasingly blurred, and that once there won't be any significant difference, we shall gradually re-conceptualise ourselves not as cyborgs but rather as inforgs, i.e. socially connected, informational organisms. In this paper, (...) I look at the development of the so-called Semantic Web and Web 2.0 from this perspective and try to forecast their future. Regarding the Semantic Web, I argue that it is a clear and well-defined project, which, despite some authoritative views to the contrary, is not a promising reality and will probably fail in the same way AI has failed in the past. Regarding Web 2.0, I argue that, although it is a rather ill-defined project, which lacks a clear explanation of its nature and scope, it does have the potentiality of becoming a success (and indeed it is already, as part of the new phenomenon of Cloud Computing) because it leverages the only semantic engines available so far in nature, us. I conclude by suggesting what other changes might be expected in the future of our digital environment. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the possible influence of J. G. Fichte on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of language. I first argue that the historical record is unclear, but show that there is a deep philosophical difference between the two views and, as a result of this difference, we should conclude that the influence was small. Drawing on a distinction made by Michael Dummett, I show that Fichte understands language as encoding thought while Humboldt understands language (...) as a medium of thought. The consequences of this difference affect a wide range of issues from their views on the nature of personal pronouns, to their theories of communicative understanding, to their theories of the proper nature of inquiry into language. (shrink)

As an alternative for causality – which modern science found to be rather construed than objective – Jung developed his idea of synchronicity according to the demands of a modern scientific approach of nature. As I will show in the following paper, even if he promised a complementary principle of explanation, he ended by offering a principle of reality. His attempt gave birth to a pretty vast literature that links Jung’s synchronicity to Bohr’s complementarity. I will show that such (...) a connection, although not entirely groundless, should be treated with caution as long as the two approaches of reality are on completely different bases. Keywords: Jung, Bohr, causality, the measurement problem, quantum epistemology. (shrink)

Turning away from entities and focusing instead exclusively on ‘structural’ aspects of scientific theories has been advocated as a cogent response to objections levelled at realist conceptions of the aim and success of science. Physical theories whose (predictive) past successes are genuine would, in particular, share with their successors structural traits that would ultimately latch on to ‘structural’ features of the natural world. Motives for subscribing to Structural Realism are reviewed and discussed. It is argued that structural retention claims lose (...) their force if one gives up merely historical readings of the transition from Galilean-relativistic classical mechanics to the ‘special’ theory of relativity, heeding instead basic requirements that lead to their common derivation. Further cause for scepticism is found upon realising that the basic mathematical framework of quantum theory essentially reflects its predictive purpose, without any necessary input, be it of a ‘structural’ kind, from the physical world. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is one of the most controversial philosophers and political theorists of the Enlightenment. He has often been accused of laying the ideological foundation for many repressive and radical movements and regimes, from the reign of terror of the French Revolution to the right-wing and left-wing totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Especially his idea of the general will has been criticised by scholars as an abstract Platonism that establishes the dictatorship of the state and rejects basic human rights. (...) Some authors even believe that all of Rousseau’s authoritarian passages are merely a paraphrase of arguments found in French absolutist thought. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s novelty lay in his denial of identifying authority with only one person. Instead, sovereignty was based on the will of all those people who made up the political body. Accordingly, the theory of absolute monarchy was transformed into an alternative democratic version of absolute popular sovereignty. Rousseau is also considered one of the classics of the contractual tradition. He argued that mankind without a govern- ment would live in what he called a “state of nature” where there would be no law and order. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is to compare Rousseau’s ideas about the principles of political authority in two of his works: “The Social Contract” and “Considerations on the Government of Poland”. In the first part of the paper we will briefly review the main concepts developed in The Social Contract, such as the general will, the social contract, sovereignty and direct democracy. In the second part, we will focus on the main ideas put forward in Considerations on the Government of Poland. Then, at the end, we will try to identify the reasons for the conceptual changes in some of Rousseau’s views. (shrink)

This paper presents a view of nature as a network of infocomputational agents organized in a dynamical hierarchy of levels. It provides a framework for unification of currently disparate understandings of natural, formal, technical, behavioral and social phenomena based on information as a structure, differences in one system that cause the differences in another system, and computation as its dynamics, i.e. physical process of morphological change in the informational structure. We address some of the frequent misunderstandings regarding the natural/morphological (...) computational models and their relationships to physical systems, especially cognitive systems such as living beings. Natural morphological infocomputation as a conceptual framework necessitates generalization of models of computation beyond the traditional Turing machine model presenting symbol manipulation, and requires agent-based concurrent resource-sensitive models of computation in order to be able to cover the whole range of phenomena from physics to cognition. The central role of agency, particularly material vs. cognitive agency is highlighted. (shrink)

The proposed paper presents an argument in favor of a Rawlsian approach to ethics for Internet technology companies (den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008; Hoffman, 2017). Ethics statements from such companies are analyzed and shown to be utilitarian and teleological in nature, and therefore in opposition to Rawls’ theories of justice and fairness. The statements are also shown to have traits in common with Confucian virtue ethics (Ames, 2011; Nylan, 2008).

We will show with examples that all results of modern science are based on or derived from assumptions. Since assumptions cannot be valid for nature and engineering, modern science therefore cannot represent the nature, and be applicable to nature and engineering. For the same reason results of modern science can never be demonstrated. On the other hand the Vedic science is entirely based on observations, just like what Galileo observed. Vedic science does not therefore has any assumptions, (...) and it is a record of what you see is happening in nature. The Vedic science also has another very crucial difference – it observed two types of causes: (a) efficient cause and (b) material cause, behind every phenomenon. As a result Vedic science is universal and eternal. We will illustrate all results of Vedic science with observations in nature. Such examples will be beyond comprehension of modern science. (shrink)

Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano’s repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects of intentionality (...) which cannot come apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored interpretation. (shrink)

A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSM’s descriptive diagnostic (...) categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSM’s purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSM’s purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSM’s descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual. (shrink)

This paper presents a theoretical study of the binary oppositions underlying the mechanisms of natural computation understood as dynamical processes on natural information morphologies. Of special interest are the oppositions of discrete vs. continuous, structure vs. process, and differentiation vs. integration. The framework used is that of computing nature, where all natural processes at different levels of organisation are computations over informational structures. The interactions at different levels of granularity/organisation in nature, and the character of the phenomena that (...) unfold through those interactions, are modeled from the perspective of an observing agent. This brings us to the movement from binary oppositions to dynamic networks built upon mutually related binary oppositions, where each node has several properties. (shrink)

According to contextualism, vast majority of natural-language expressions are context-sensitive. When testing whether this claim is reflected in Folk intuitions, some interesting methodological questions were raised such as: which experimental design is more appropriate for testing contextualism – the within- or the between-subject design? The main thesis of this paper is that the between-subject design should be preferred. The first experiment aims at assessing the difference between the results obtained for within-subjects measurements (where all participants assess all contexts) and between-subject (...) measurements (where respondents evaluating different contexts are distinct groups). It is shown that the within-subject design provides data that seems to support contextualism. However, I present an alternative, invariantist interpretation of these results, therefore showing that the within-subject design does not allow to empirically distinguish between contextualism and invariantism. The second experiment further elaborates the issue of how perceiving the contrast between contexts can affect subjects’ judgments – I show that certain kinds of contexts may elicit opposite intuitions when contrasted with different contexts. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair (and demonic evil) and to show its relevance for discussions of the guise of the good thesis (i.e. that in f-ing intentionally, we take f-ing to be good). Contemporary discussions of diabolic evil often emphasise the phenomena of despair and acedia as apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good. I contend that Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair is relevant to these discussions, because it reconciles demonic (extreme) despair (...) and acedia with the guise of the good. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard provides an influential, systematic account of despair that relates evil, despair, and acedia to each other. Michelle Kosch argues that this account goes beyond Kierkegaard’s German predecessors by introducing a concept of diabolic evil and despair. By contrast, the present paper argues that Kierkegaard takes diabolic evil to be impossible, although he offers a rich analysis of the demonic that resembles diabolic agency. Still, Kierkegaard’s analysis rests on ontological assumptions about the nature of the good that belong to a Platonico-Christian tradition that is controversial today. (shrink)

The striking difference between the orthodox nomological necessitation view of laws and the claims made recently by Scientific Essentialism is that on the latter interpretation laws are metaphysically necessary while they are contingent on the basis of the former. This shift is usually perceived as an upgrading: essentialism makes the laws as robust as possible. The aim of my paper—in which I contrast Brian Ellis’s Scientific Essentialism and David Armstrong’s theory of nomological necessity—is threefold. (1) I first underline the familiar (...) fact that metaphysical necessity (of Kripkean “water is necessarily H2O” kind) is not a stronger kind of necessity than nomological necessity but an entirely different kind of thing: nomological, but not metaphysical necessity, is an intra-world necessitation which Armstrong (almost) identifies with causation; metaphysical, but not nomological necessitation, has a canonical link to possible world considerations and counterfactual reasoning. Hence, the change from one necessity to the other is not an upgrading but a substantial shift. (2) I will explain how the essentialists, who promote this shift, are nonetheless able to retain the features of nomological necessity. (3) I also explore, for both the essentialist and the Armstrongian, whether they could extract a modal force from intra-world nomological necessity which it does not have per se. I argue that such a modal force is, indeed, obtainable for them. I will close the paper with some remarks and questions about the relation between Kripkean metaphysical necessity and the modal version of nomological necessity as defined in (3). (shrink)

Whether mathematical truths are syntactical (as Rudolf Carnap claimed) or empirical (as Mill actually never claimed, though Carnap claimed that he did) might seem merely an academic topic. However, it becomes a practical concern as soon as we consider the role of questions. For if we inquire as to the truth of a mathematical statement, this question must be (in a certain respect) meaningless for Carnap, as its truth or falsity is certain in advance due to its purely syntactical (or (...) formal-semantical) nature. In contrast, for Mill such a question is as valid as any other. These differing views have their consequences for contemporary erotetic logic. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that there is an essential difference between social intelligence and creative intelligence, and that they have their foundation in human sexuality. For sex differences, we refer to the vast psychological, neurological, and cognitive science research where problem-solving, verbal skills, logical reasoning, and other topics are dealt with. Intelligence tests suggest that, on average, neither sex has more general intelligence than the other. Though people are equals in general intelligence, they are different in special forms of (...) intelligence such as social intelligence and creative intelligence, the former dominant in women, the latter dominant in men. The dominance of creative intelligence in men needs to be explained. The focus of our research is on the strictly anthropological aspects, and consequently our explanation for this fact is based on the male-female polarity in the mating systems. Sexual dimorphism does not only regard bodily differences but implies different forms of sex life. Sex researchers distinguish between two levels of sexual intercourse: procreative sex and recreational sex, and to these we would add “creative sex.” On all three levels, there is a behavioral difference between men and women, including the subjective experience. These differences are as well attributed to culture as genetically founded in nature. Sexual reproduction is only possible if females cooperate. Their biological inheritance makes females play a decisive role in mate choice. Recreational sex for the purpose of pleasure rather than reproduction results from female extended sexual activity. Creative sex, on the contrary, is a specifically male performance of sexuality. We identify creative sex with eroticism. Eroticism evolved through the transformation of the sexual drive into a mental state of expectation and fantasizing. Hence, sex differences (that nowadays are covered up by cultural egalitarianism) continue to be the evolutionary origin of the difference between social and creative intelligence. (shrink)

I am very used to strange books and special people but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, (...) people. So muscle reading to find out their true feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) to do “paranormal science”. Hawkins describes the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in response to increases in cognitive load thus causing the arm to drop in response to the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. He seems unaware that there is a long established and vast ongoing research effort in social psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, ‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle tone (infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin response and most frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations at times varying from seconds to months after the stimulus. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean we are automatons who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 and many others such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are creatures of S2. Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was when Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. Nevertheless, this book is an easy read and some therapists and spiritual teachers may find it of use. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

The paper delves into manuscript sources connected with various disputations held at Prague University from around 1390 to 1420 and singles out a set of hitherto unknown quaestiones dealing with the nature of the human intellect and its relation to the body. Prague disputations from around 1400 arguably offer a unique vantage point on late medieval anthropological issues, since they encompass an entanglement of numerous doctrinal influences from Buridanian De anima commentaries to John Wyclif’s theories. The paper delineates several (...) conceptual tensions regarding the nature of the intellect, e.g., between materialism (entailed by the emphasis on the intellect’s inherence in the body) and personal immortality. It presents several strategies Prague masters employed to overcome these tensions. For example, an anonymous participant of the 1409 quodlibet develops the Buridanian distinction between the rationally demonstrable materialist tendency and the indemonstrable “catholic truth” about the intellect both inhering in and separable from the body. On the other hand, Wyclif’s adherents (Jacob of Mies and another anonymous master) postulate an immortal spirit hypostatically united to each human being beside the human soul educed from the potency of the matter. Yet, the boundaries between the doctrinal standpoints in question seem permeable, whereby a rigid definition of antagonistic groups in late medieval Prague intellectual milieu (e.g., Buridanians vs Wycliffites) is rendered ineffective. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to investigate the main philosophical underpinnings of major research paradigms using Positivism and Interpretivism as examples. It would also explain and give crucial interrelationships with ontology, epistemology, methodology, and method. The study followed a literature review approach and was mostly supported by secondary research, which included the incorporation and consideration of many peer-reviewed academic papers relevant to the issue as well as other sources such as books. Researchers might examine the fitness of every model (...) based on the nature and context of their study. This work will assist scholars in developing a better grasp of both positivist and interpretivist perspectives. The interpretivist paradigm might allow researchers to go deeper by seeking perceptions and experiences of a specific social context. The positivist paradigm, on the other hand, will allow researchers to rely more on statistics and generalization, resulting in the formation of universal rules and discoveries. -/- . (shrink)

As soon as you believe an imagination to be nonfictional, this imagination becomes your ontological theory of the reality. Your ontological theory (of the reality) can describe a system as the reality. However, actually this system is only a theory/conceptual-space/imagination/visual-imagery of yours, not the actual reality (i.e., the thing-in-itself). An ontological theory (of the reality) actually only describes your (subjective/mental) imagination/visual-imagery/conceptual-space. An ontological theory of the reality, is being described as a situation model (SM). There is no way to prove/disprove (...) that there is only one reality, or there are two realities (i.e., “subjective reality” and “objective reality”). So, every ontology talk/theory/imagination about the two realities is only a talk/theory/imagination – we will never know whether it is true or not. The conventionally-called “physical/objective reality/world” around my conventionally-called “physical/objective body” is actually a geometric mathematical model (being generated/mathematically-modeled by my brain) – it's actually a subset/component/part/element of my brain’s mind/consciousness/manifest-image. Our cosmos is an autonomous objective parallel computing automaton (aka state machine) which evolves by itself automatically/unintentionally – wave-particle duality and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle can be explained under this SM of my brain. Each elementary particle (as a building block of our cosmos) is an autonomous mathematical entity itself (i.e., a thing in itself). Our cosmos has the same nature as a Game of Life system – both are autonomous objective parallel-computing automata. Cosmos (as a state machine) is indistinguishable from a digital simulation – my consciousness (as something nonphysical) is not cosmos (as a state machine). If we are happy to accept randomness/stochasticity, then it is obviously possible that all other worlds in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) actually do not exist (objectively). As one metaphysical option, we can treat all other worlds as subjective only (even if they are actually objective). Under the context of this metaphysical option, we are only living in one world (i.e., the world we are currently living in; this world) – we are not living in many worlds at the same time parallelly. Under the context of this metaphysical option, there is only one possible future. The relationship among any number of elementary particles, is governed/described by Schrodinger equation. If (in theory) Schrodinger equation can’t be used to reliably forecast whether I will go to McDonald for dinner in this world (based on the current state of all elementary particles of the cosmos), then what can Schrodinger equation do? The conventionally-called “space” does not exist objectively. “Time” and “matter” are not physical. Consciousness is the subjective-form (aka quale) of the mathematical models (of the objective cosmos) which are intracorporeally/subjectively used by the control logic of a Turing machine’s program fatedly. A Turing machine’s mind/consciousness/manifest-image or deliberate decisions/choices should not be able to actually/objectively change/control/drive the (autonomous or fated) worldline of any elementary particle within this world (i.e., the world we are currently living in, under the context of MWI). Besides the Schrodinger equation (or another mathematical equation/function which is yet to be discovered) which is a valid/correct/factual causality of our cosmos/state-machine, every other causality (of our cosmos/state-machine) is either invalid/incorrect/counterfactual or can be proved by deductive inference based on the Schrodinger equation (or the aforementioned yet-to-be-discovered mathematical equation/function) only. Closed causality entails no causality. Consciousness plays no causal role (“epiphenomenalism”), or in other words, any cognitive/behavioural activity can in principle be carried out without consciousness (“conscious inessentialism”). If the “loop quantum gravity” theory is correct, then time/space does not actually/objectively exist in the objective-evolution of the objective cosmos, or in other words, we should not use the subjective/mental concept of “time”, “state” or “space” to describe/imagine the objective-evolution of our cosmos. (shrink)