The study presented here examines how interacting with a more capable interlocutor influences use of argumentation strategies in electronic discourse. To address this question, 54 young adolescents participating in an intervention centered on electronic peer dialogs were randomly assigned to either an experimental or control condition. In both conditions, pairs who held the same position on a social issue engaged in a series of electronic dialogs with pairs who held an opposing position. In the experimental condition, in some dialogs, unbeknownst (...) to them (because dialog took place electronically), the opponent was a more capable (“expert”) adult. Dialogs in the control condition were only with peers. Argumentation strategies of the experimental group who argued with the “expert” showed immediate strategy improvements in their subsequent peer dialogs, improvement absent in the control group (Cohen's d = 1.12). In particular, the experimental group showed greater use of counterargument in general and advanced forms of counterargument (undermining) that challenges the deeper premises or reasoning on which an argument is based. Implications with respect to mechanisms of change in the development of argumentation skills are considered. (shrink)

This study examines how evidence is used differently in argumentative discourse compared to individual arguments. Applying a 1×2 crossover study design, 37 secondary school students were asked either to discuss a social issue with their partner before individually writing an essay outlining their opinion or, vice versa, first to discuss and then to write. As background information, they were provided with pieces of evidence with different levels of quality. Dialogs and essays were analyzed regarding (a) the type of evidence and (...) (b) the way evidence was used. Results showed that in their essays students referred more often to the pieces of evidence provided to them (shared evidence). In contrast, they used evidence more often to address the opposing viewpoint in dialogs by incorporating it in a more elaborated (clearer) line of reasoning. Findings suggest that dialogues are a more effective tool than individual writing production, and the study provides first hints regarding how to design curricula that will encourage students to use evidence in a more sophisticated way in their argumentation. (shrink)

This paper is aimed at combining the advances in argumentation theory with the models used in the field of education to address the issue of improving students’ argumentative behavior by interacting with an expert. The concept of deeper or more sophisticated argumentative strategy is theoretically defined and used to advance two new coding schemes, based on the advances in the argumentation studies and aimed at capturing the dialectical, or structural, behavior, and the argumentative content of each dialogue unit. These coding (...) schemes are then applied for a qualitative analysis of a study designed to investigate how students’ argumentative behavior can be influenced by the interaction with an expert, who used specific types of attacks to the interlocutors’ positions. The twofold coding shows at which dialogical level expert–peer interactions can directly and more stably affect students’ argumentative behavior, and what effects such more sophisticated strategies can have on the discussion and the analysis of disagreements. In particular, this paper shows how a specific type of deep-level attack, the underminer, can open dialogues of a different level, focused on unveiling and debating background beliefs underlying a specific position. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Meandering Sobriety”.

Cloud Computing is a developing field and lean toward by numerous one at current yet it's rage is part more rely upon its execution which thusly is excessively rely upon the powerful booking algorithm and load adjusting . In this paper we address this issue and propose an algorithm for private cloud which has high throughput and for open cloud which address the issue of condition awareness likewise with execution. To enhance the throughput in private cloud SJF is utilized for (...) planning and to conquer shape the issue of starvation we utilize limited pausing. For stack adjusting we screen the heap and dispatch the activity to the minimum stacked VM. To acquire advantage and to have open door for future upgrade out in the open cloud condition cognizance is the key factor and for better execution and load adjusting likewise wanted. While stack adjusting enhances the execution, the earth awareness increment the benefit of cloud suppliers. (shrink)

Pausing to reflect feels like stagnant inactivity, but it’s crucial for our youths as increasingly more students come to higher education without having truly engaged in self-reflection.

Forthcoming in Darren Bradley (ed.), Carnap and Contemporary Philosophy. -/- This paper is centered on Carnap’s views on rationality. More specifically, much of the focus is on a puzzle regarding Carnap’s view on rationality that Florian Steinberger has recently discussed. Not only is Steinberger’s discussion of significant intrinsic interest: his discussion also raises general questions about Carnap interpretation. As I have discussed in earlier work, there are two very different ways of interpreting Carnap’s talk of “frameworks” – and, relatedly, different (...) ways of interpreting Carnap’s principle of tolerance. Carnap can be interpreted as either a relativist or as what I call a language pluralist. Steinberger’s puzzle arises given the relativist interpretation; I believe the language pluralist interpretation is correct. Most of the discussion will concern the correct interpretation of Carnap, and what this means for Steinberger’s puzzle. While I will not here mount a full defense of the language pluralist interpretation, I will pause to discuss Vera Flocke’s recent criticism of it. Towards the end, I will describe a puzzle regarding rationality different from Steinberger’s. The puzzle that I describe does arise already for the language pluralist. (shrink)

In the wake of the non-ideal theory turn in political philosophy, few have paused to ask: Is non-ideal theory a form of ideology? And perhaps even fewer have paused to ask: Is the debate between ideal/non-ideal theorists itself a form of ideology? To the first question, I argue that non-ideal theory is ideological in virtue of the fact that it rules out more utopian ways of theorizing by methodological fiat, and in so doing, risks entrenching an unjust status quo. To (...) the second question, I argue that the debate between ideal/non-ideal theorists is itself a form of ideology, one which serves to reinforce the status quo by convincing political philosophers/theorists that the most pressing problems are problems about what we should think about what we are doing. But this is false. An upshot of my argument is that we ought to abandon the ideal/non-ideal theory debate and address the pressing problems of political philosophy head-on in pluralist fashion, oscillating back and forth between these two modes of theorizing without a decision procedure to tell us when we should take up one perspective or the other. (shrink)

The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we (...) might wonder: What is so great about the concept of knowledge that we happen to have? Might it be more important, epistemically speaking, to investigate whether our beliefs satisfy some other relevantly similar concept instead? And how should questions such as these even be understood? This paper discusses the epistemological significance of these issues. In particular, a novel skeptical stance called ‘meta-skepticism’ is introduced, which is a kind of skepticism about the idea that some knowledge-like concepts are epistemically more important than others. It suggested that it is unclear whether this form of skepticism can be avoided. (shrink)

The evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement is touted as a new paradigm in medical education and practice, a description that carries with it an enthusiasm for science that has not been seen since logical positivism flourished (circa 1920–1950). At the same time, the term ‘‘evidence-based medicine’’ has a ring of obviousness to it, as few physicians, one suspects, would claim that they do not attempt to base their clinical decision-making on available evidence. However, the apparent obviousness of EBM can and should (...) be challenged on the grounds of how ‘evidence’ has been problematised in the philosophy of science. EBM enthusiasm, it follows, ought to be tempered. The post-positivist, feminist, and phenomenological philosophies of science that are examined in this paper contest the seemingly unproblematic nature of evidence that underlies EBM by emphasizing different features of the social nature of science. The appeal to the authority of evidence that characterizes evidence-based practices does not increase objectivity but rather obscures the subjective elements that inescapably enter all forms of human inquiry. The seeming common sense of EBM only occurs because of its assumed removal from the social context of medical practice. In the current age where the institutional power of medicine is suspect, a model that represents biomedicine as politically disinterested or merely scientific should give pause. (shrink)

I critically discuss respects in which conceptions of community have featured in African moral-political philosophy over the past 40 years or so. Some of the discussion is in the vein of intellectual history, recounting key theoretical moves for those unfamiliar with the field. However, my discussion is also opinionated, noting prima facie weaknesses with certain positions and presenting others as more promising, particularly relative to prominent Western competitors. There are a variety of forms that African communitarianism has taken and could (...) take in respect of moral status, good character, and just policy, and my aims include arguing that some are more plausible than others and should give more individualist thinkers in Euro-American traditions pause. (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination of Stephen Neale's *The Philosophical Significance of Godel's slingshot*. I am sceptical of the philosophical significance of Godel’s Slingshot (and of Slingshot arguments in general). In particular, I do not believe that Godel’s Slingshot has any interesting and important philosophical consequences for theories of facts or for referential treatments of definite descriptions. More generally, I do not believe that any Slingshot arguments have interesting and important philosophical consequences for theories of facts or for referential (...) treatments of definite descriptions. Friends of facts and referential treatments of definite descriptions can, and should, proceed with the construction of their theories, blithely ignoring the many Slingshots which now litter the landscape. (Of course, there may be other considerations which should give such theorists pause -- but those are other considerations.). (shrink)

The last decade has seen an increasing number of references to quantum mechanics in the humanities and social sciences. This development has in particular been driven by Karen Barad’s agential realism: a theoretical framework that, based on Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, aims to inform social theorizing. In dealing with notions such as agency, power, and embodiment as well as the relation between the material and the discursive level, the influence of agential realism in fields such as feminist science (...) studies and posthumanism has been profound. However, no one has hitherto paused to assess agential realism’s proclaimed quantum mechanical origin including its relation to the writings of Niels Bohr. This is the task taken up here. We find that many of the implications that agential realism allegedly derives from a Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics dissent from Bohr’s own views and are in conflict with those of other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Agential realism is at best consistent with quantum mechanics and consequently, it does not capture what quantum mechanics in any strict sense implies for social science or any other domain of inquiry. Agential realism may be interesting and thought provoking from the perspective of social theorizing, but it is neither sanctioned by quantum mechanics nor by Bohr’s authority. This conclusion not only holds for agential realism in particular, it also serves as a general warning against the other attempts to use quantum mechanics in social theorizing. (shrink)

Considering questions at the intersection of time and fiction deepens our understanding of fiction, introduces new questions for philosophy of time, and brings analytic philosophy in discussion with narratology. Philosophers debate whether fictional time can be tensed, whether fictional time can branch, repeat, pause, rewind, or skip and whether fictional time travel is possible. Much of the way we answer these questions will depend on our overall commitment to the nature of fiction. It’s also unclear what, if anything, we (...) can learn about the metaphysics of time from fiction. This chapter will introduce readers to discussions that are shaping the debates in this domain. (shrink)

Since the post-August 5 discourse among public intellectuals has centered around op-eds and commentaries, the buzzwords "reform" and "rewrite" dominate discussions about our Constitution. But how many of us have paused to explore what these terms truly mean? In this commentary, I delve into the ongoing debate about reforming vs. rewriting Bangladesh’s Constitution. My op-ed explores the semantics of these terms and insinuates a bold argument: You don’t need to invoke the “spirit of 2024” to justify rewriting the 1972 Constitution. (...) Instead, the answer lies in returning to the core spirit of Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War: equality, human dignity, and social justice. Even substantial reformation may fall short to abolish all elements that contradict the Liberation War. A comprehensive rewrite is the only way to uphold the true spirit of our Liberation War and lay the foundation for a genuinely democratic Bangladesh, free from Hasinocratic authoritarianism. (shrink)

In a world that is overflowing with journals and other outlets for scientific publication, the appearance of any new periodical requires some justification. There are already more journals than we can read and more conferences than we can attend. In the case of applied Ontology, we believe that the creation of anew journal not only is completely justifiable, it is downright exciting. For too long, workers in computer science have assumed that content comes for free. “Theory” in computer science has (...) always meant the theory of processes and of computation. We measure the complexity of computer programs in terms of how long it takes machines to execute them, not in terms of how long it takes people to understand and to represent the data on which those programs might operate. We typically describe computer code in terms of algorithms that operate on formal parameters, often without pausing to discuss where the data that might satisfy those parameters come from. This journal was founded on the premise that workers in computer science, informatics, and information science are overdue in paying as much attention to contents as they do to algorithms. (shrink)

Studies of visual event individuation often consider people's representations of activities involving agents performing complex tasks. Concomitantly, theories of event individuation emphasize predictions about agents' intentions. Studies that have examined simple, non-agential occurrences leave open the possiblity that principles of visual object individuation play a role in visual event individuation. Unearthing principles that may be sufficient for event individuation which are distinct both from predictions about agents' intentions and from visual object individuation, we draw on and extend studies that reveal (...) object and event representation to be deeply analogous in our cognitive economy. We provide evidence that ‘temporal shaping' is a sufficient low-level perceptual criterion for the visual individuation of events. In our study, temporal shaping is effected by the introduction of pauses into an otherwise continuous process. Future studies should address other visual mechanisms for introducing temporal shaping (e.g., color changes). (shrink)

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self-understandings. In this paper, I argue that while such practical self-understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment (...) specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self-understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self-understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility-constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self-understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. (shrink)

The phenomenon of the little—the weak, the veiled, the lowly—is, by right, overlooked. Its revelation passes unnoticed while the self remains inflated. The arrival of the little awaits its selfless reducer, not the nihilating selflessness of an absolute alterity but a way of becoming little which occasions its fullest manifestation. So little, so revealed. I advance toward a phenomenology of becoming little according to its spirituality’s namesake, Thérèse of Lisieux. I build on the phenomenologies of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion (...) pausing at three moments along the way: the return to childhood; the discovery, after me, of self-confidence; and an imbalanced audacity. The upshot is that the significance of the little is big: littleness makes possible the immanent glimpse of unconditional revelation, a glimpse of beauty. (shrink)

My project is to explain why the question ‘How does it feel to be a white problem?’ cannot be answered in the fluttering grammar of white talk. The whiteness of white talk lies not only in its having emerged from white mouths, but also in its evasiveness—in its attempt to suppress fear and anxiety, and its consequential [if unintended] reinscription and legitimation of racist oppression. I White talk is designed, indeed scripted, for the purposes of evading, rejecting, and remaining ignorant (...) about the injustices that flow from whiteness and its attendant privileges. I want to suggest a new point of entry—a way to flip the script, so to speak. -/- I begin with some observations about the basic advantages and disadvantages of using white talk as a route into the white problem. My account develops an expanded version of Alice MacIntyre’s definition of white talk that is attentive to the racialized bodily scripts that accompany white talk. I argue that white talk persists because it has an enduring and powerful moral, ontological, and epistemic pay off for white folks. I explore each payoff with an eye towards clarifying how white talk functions to maintain the illusion that we are invulnerable beings. Next, I pause to reply to the popular objection that this particular critique of white talk silences white people in conversations on race. If we cannot address the question ‘how does it feel to be a white problem’ in the fluttering grammar of white talk, then how shall we begin? In closing, I suggest that we might reduce fluttering by replacing white talk with a discourse of vulnerability, where vulnerability is defined not as weakness, but as a condition for potential. I offer some brief guidelines for how we might start this conversation. (shrink)

The results of a recent survey of Nigerian women might give pause to opponents of female genital mutilation (FGM). One could well argue that if these Nigerian women themselves favour FGM, then it is ironically paternalistic to oppose it. Should Western feminists actually support FGM if it is what women in the South want? I argue in this commentary that such an argument rests on shaky statistical, psychological, medical, political and philosophical grounds. We should go on opposing female genital (...) mutilation with all our power. (shrink)

Science has always strived for objectivity, for a ‘‘view from nowhere’’ that is not marred by ideology or personal preferences. That is a lofty ideal toward which perhaps it makes sense to strive, but it is hardly the reality. This collection of thirteen essays assembled by Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers ought to give much pause to scientists and the public at large, though historians, sociologists and philosophers of science will hardly be surprised by the material covered (...) here. (shrink)

In times of crises, public health leaders may claim that trials of public health interventions are unethical. One reason for this claim can be that equipoise—i.e. a situation of uncertainty and/or disagreement among experts about the evidence regarding an intervention—has been disturbed by a change of collective expert views. Some might claim that equipoise is disturbed if the majority of experts believe that emergency public health interventions are likely to be more beneficial than harmful. However, such beliefs are not always (...) justified: where high quality research has not been conducted, there is often considerable residual uncertainty about whether interventions offer net benefits. In this essay we argue that high-quality research, namely by means of well-designed randomized trials, is ethically obligatory before, during, and after implementing policies in public health emergencies (PHEs). We contend that this standard applies to both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and we elaborate an account of equipoise that captures key features of debates in the recent pandemic. We build our case by analyzing research strategies employed during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding drugs, vaccines, and non-pharmaceutical interventions; and by providing responses to possible objections. Finally, we propose a public health policy reform: whenever a policy implemented during a PHE is not grounded in high-quality evidence that expected benefits outweigh harms, there should be a planned approach to generate high-quality evidence, with review of emerging data at preset time points. These preset timepoints guarantee that policymakers pause to review emerging evidence and consider ceasing ineffective or even harmful policies, thereby improving transparency and accountability, as well as permitting the redirection of resources to more effective or beneficial interventions. (shrink)

Stephen Palmquist is Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Hong Kong Baptist University. We invited him to answer the question "What norms or values define excellent philosophy of religion? as part of our "Philosophers of Religion on Philosophy of Religion" series. If we regard this as a philosophical (not a scientific) question, then the first step to answering it is to determine what norms or values define excellent philosophy, in general. Once that is established, we can inquire whether the nature (...) of religion brings with it any special features that make the task of doing excellent philosophy of religion unique. Unlike scientific explanations, excellent philosophical explanations must be multi-perspectival. A question that has only one right answer is not philosophical; instead, it is likely to be about facts. While we philosophers should care (deeply!) about any facts relevant to our inquiries, our peculiar way of interpreting facts means that answering a philosophical question cannot be done in one absolutely "right" way. This does not mean there are no right answers to philosophical questions; rather, there are many. But this does not make any answer equally good; for there would then be no such thing as excellent philosophy. The essentially perspectival nature of all genuinely philosophical questions means that the correctness of each purportedly "right" answer must be assessed in terms of its aptness for the perspective the questioner adopts when posing the question. A single question, such as "Does God exist?" can have many good answers, depending on whether the questioner assumes science, morality, aesthetics, or something else as the context. Each different type of inquiry has different boundary-conditions, so a good answer within each context is bound to differ from those in other contexts. Bad philosophy typically lacks depth: like a cyclops, its approach to answering questions is mono-perspectival. But if good philosophy acknowledges perspectives, what makes philosophy excellent? Good philosophy achieves excellence when it approaches a completeness whereby we begin to understand the range of relevant perspectives from which a given question can be asked, and the distinct boundary-conditions for answering it properly from each relevant perspective. Before applying this definition of excellent philosophy to the specific case at hand, we must pause to consider whether anything distinctive characterizes the range of philosophical topics and questions that typically come under the umbrella of philosophy of religion. In particular, does religion have features that make it especially difficult (or for that matter, easy) to think about philosophically, compared to other philosophical topics? Yes and no. (shrink)

I propose that Mandarin ｡-sentences (units marked by ｡) are aspectual topic-comment sequences, where an initial update (terminating in a pause) introduces a topic state for comment by one or more clauses. Each comment anaphorically refers to the topic state via the aspect feature of the verbal predicate. This proposal explains why Mandarin ｡-sentences have controversial boundaries, since speakers may disagree where one topic state ends and the next one begins. It also explains various manifestations of aspect-prominence and topic-prominence (...) in Mandarin discourse. In Bittner (2014), this proposal is formally implemented in Categorial Grammar and a new dynamic logic called Update with Centering. (shrink)

This book offers a refreshing mix of science, personal stories, and reflections on the nature of thought. I really liked how the author uses simple yet deep anecdotes like the clever paradox of the sage and the king to explore complex ideas in an approachable way. The writing flows smoothly, and the content feels like little nuggets of wisdom that make you pause and think.

Many young people, especially in high schools in Canada and the United States, are exposed to a dangerously simplistic “make a difference” narrative that often unravels in the face of very real and complex crises. This essay begins in the moment of social justice education (or indeed any education oriented toward political action) where students learn enough about injustice to ask: “now what?” The paralysis that may emerge from a rupture of that narrative is one of the reasons that the (...) starry-eyed optimism of youth falls away so quickly upon entering into the world, which on a pragmatic level is a barrier to organizing political action. I argue that this question poses a challenge for the teacher, who must decide if and how they will guide the student through the incredible difficulty, complexity, and risk of political action. By drawing on Hannah Arendt’s work, in particular The Human Condition, I will show how Arendt’s account of action can help teachers respond authentically to the “now what?” question and prepare students for “the task of renewing the common world.” The “answers” that Arendt provides to the “now what?” question may seem plain but they are not simple and they do not counteract the enormity of the task before us. In some ways, The Human Condition is itself the “now what?” question; it is the pause required “to think what we are doing” – and what we will do. Arendt’s understanding of action reveals the stakes at hand. (shrink)

People inhabit a vast and intricate social network nowadays. In addition to our own decisions and actions, we confront those of various groups every day. Collective decisions and actions are more complex and bewildering compared to those made by individuals. As members of a collective, we contribute to its decisions, but our contributions may not always align with the outcome. We may also find ourselves excluded from certain groups and passively subjected to their influences without being aware of the source. (...) We are used to being in overlapping groups and may switch identities, supporting or opposing the claims of particular groups. But rarely do we pause to think: What do we talk about when we talk about groups and their decisions? At the heart of this dissertation is the question of collective agency, i.e., in what sense can we treat a group as a rational agent capable of its action. There are two perspectives we take: a philosophical and logical one. The philosophical perspective mainly discusses the ontological and epistemological issues related to collective agency, sorts out the relevant philosophical history, and argues that the combination of a relational view of collective agency and a dispositional view of collective intentionality provides a rational and realistic account. The logical perspective is associated with formal theories of groups, it disregards the psychological content involved in the philosophical perspective, establishes a logical system that is sufficiently formal and objective, and axiomatizes the nature of a collective. The first topic that is addressed is the ontology of collective agency, i.e., the question what exactly is collective agency. The philosophical discussion of collective agency centres around the reduction problem of the concept of a collective. Individualism and Cartesian internalism have long influenced orthodox theories and made them face the choice between an irreducible concept of a collective and ontological reductionism. Heterodox theories such as functionalism and interpretationism reinterpret the concept of agency and accept it as also realized on the level of a collective. To adequately explain social phenomena that are essentially relational in nature, we propose a relational, holistic account of collective agency and argue that functionalism and interpretationism can be integrated into such an account. While acknowledging the irreducibility of the concept of a collective, we find that there is a deep incompatibility between the concept of a collective and the concept of intentionality as the mark of the mental. To explain how collective intentionality nevertheless is possible and why we tend to use it analogously to how we use the concept of individual intentionality, we explore a dispositional account of intentionality which enables us to give an account of the concept of intentionality at both the individual and collective level. Specifically, we subdivide the dispositional account into three aspects: behavioral, purely mental, and cognitive. We then argue that collective intentionality is real by analyzing different forms of attributive judgments of intentionality and by introducing the perspective of indispensable collective responsibility. We also analyze how philosophical theories about collective agency relate to central features of formal theories about collective decisions, such as game theory. Although the two fields are both concerned with collectives, there are also differences that need to be addressed. For example, game theory is clearly anti-psychologistic since its aim is a formal and objective analysis. However, from the relational and dispositional perspective, intentionality at the individual level and collective intentionality as we analyze it, inevitably involve mental content. In order to explain this difference and identify where the boundary is, we analyze the relationships between the three basic concepts involved, namely intentionality, preference, and dependency, so as to provide a unified picture of collective theory across philosophical and formal theories. After paving the nexus between philosophical and formal perspectives, the logical perspective becomes the theme of our discussion. To be able to express game theoretical concepts and to connect them to our philosophical perspective, We present a logic of preference and functional dependence and its hybrid extension, and provide an axiomatization which is sound and strongly complete. The decidability of this logic is also proved. Its application to modeling non-cooperative and cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulting framework provides a unified view of Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Finally, we conclude and clarify the position of our theory in the broader field of research on the topics addressed in the thesis. Also, we point out many new questions and directions suggested by our analysis, including philosophical and logical open problems. (shrink)

Trans healthcare and thus trans people have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Trans people’s healthcare situations have turned out to be so vulnerable in this crisis because they have been precarious to begin with. There are multiple ways in which trans healthcare has been affected: Surgeries and other procedures have been cancelled or postponed, and mental health services have been paused or moved online. This raises ethical questions around discrimination against trans people in the healthcare system. This article (...) argues that cancelling trans surgeries and procedures in the COVID-19 crisis is made possible through an understanding of trans healthcare as non-essential. The article explores how trans healthcare in particular has been affected by the pandemic. (shrink)

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don’t necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a (...) conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn’t very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don’t figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief-like to provide us with something premise-like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn’t let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don’t think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don’t seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I’ve found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don’t find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson’s (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support. (shrink)

The institute of education in modern society is currently in the process of serious transformation associated with the large-scale introduction of high technologies, which is due to a similar process in post-industrial society as a whole. There is a growing understanding of the negative consequences of digitalization of society and education along with the understanding of the objective necessity of such transformation. The article contains an analysis of the negative consequences and problems arising in the course of the spread of (...) digitalization of higher education in Russia. Methodology and sources . The methodology of the research is based on the methods of comparative analysis and extrapolation of transformations of social environment and anthropological factors under the influence of technological progress in the field of higher education. The signs of “high technology poisoning” considered by J. Naisbitt in his book “High Tech – High Touch: Technology and Our Search for Meaning” and the concept of extensive and intensive types of creativity formulated by A.I. Stoletov are a conceptual basis for analyzing the impact of high technology on education. Results and Discussion . Seven symptoms of technological poisoning in higher education, representing the main risks of the modern educational system, their manifestations in the educational process and prospects in case the existing trend persists, have been considered. One of the sources of manifestation of these symptoms is the extensive character of creativity inherent in scientific and technological activity of the society, which stakes on innovative development and mastering of material aspects of nature. The technogenic character of the emerging innovation process levels out the activities associated with the intensive type of creativity, aimed at the meaning-creating and existential aspects of human existence. Conclusion. Minimization of negative consequences presupposes the strengthening of the humanitarian component in education, allowing to form a culture of “pause of contemplation” (Grigory Pomerantz), in which technology will acquire, as it was suggested by J. Naisbitt himself, a fullness of meaning that goes beyond instrumental values into the realm of ethical and existential ones. (shrink)

The notes for Theodor Adorno’s courses in the 1960’s are important resources not only for an understanding of his magnum opus, Negative Dialectics, but also for developing critical responses to this problematic philosophical heir of idealism. Particularly noteworthy among the volumes that have appeared so far is from Adorno’s 1965 course on metaphysics where he engages in a sustained reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and explicitly connects it with the project of Negative Dialectics. Adorno’s chief concern is to demonstrate, by way (...) of Eduard Zeller’s work, that Aristotle is indeed a proto-idealist and that his ontology is comprised of a fundamental dualism. Adorno is not an informed reader of Aristotle, as his reliance on Zeller makes clear, but he succeeds in drawing the reader’s attention to the organizing force exerted by  upon . The interest in this organizing force is motivated by an interest in the ethics that is consequent upon it: an ethics that ignores the sufferings of the concrete in the name of a rational ideal. While there are echoes of this in Aristotle’s ethical writings, his account of imagination in De Anima ought to give pause to an account as reductive as Adorno’s. In De Anima, Aristotle provides an account of the imagination () that makes it a power reducible neither to  nor to . The imagination, a power of the bodily senses, and especially sight, is a power that grants to thinking its power but is itself the unmotivated actualization of the purely potential. This essay argues that such a power resists interpretation into any dialectical schema insofar as it constitutes a distinct power of the human animal. At the same time, such an interpretation provides a possible route out of the ethical impasse of the unthinkable concrete. (shrink)

Is there something about the deep logic of democracy that destines it to succeed in the world? Democracy, the form of politics that includes everyone as equals – does it perhaps suit human nature better than the alternatives? After all, surely any person who is excluded from the decision-making in a society will be more liable to rise up against it. From ancient thinkers like Seneca to contemporary thinkers like Francis Fukuyama, we can see some version of this line of (...) thought. Seneca thought that tyrannies could never last long; Fukuyama famously argued that liberal democracy is the end of history. I want to focus instead on the person credited with giving the most direct and uncompromising statement of this thought: Benedict de Spinoza. However, in this article, I argue to the contrary that Spinoza’s view of aristocracy should give pause to radical democrats. He does not see a historical movement towards democracy, nor does he see the superiority of democracy as written into human nature. (shrink)

One can observe that modern man already is in a society where achievement becomes the main, even sole, goal. Neoliberalism highly influenced people to see themselves as subjects of achievement. The society becomes the one that dictates the activities of man, leaving him without freedom. It is observed that in today’s world, man submits himself easily to the demands of the particular situation without even thinking. In this paper, we look at the ways of life, namely, Vita Contemplativa and Vita (...) Activa, as means towards liberation from the achievement society. The relevance of Vita Activa is acknowledged as a reminder of our true selves as homo faber, but still looks upon the primacy of Vita Con- templativa. Contemplation and these ideals both feature prominently in the ideas of the contemporary philosopher, Byung-Chul Han, and the Christian thinker St. Thomas Aquinas. This paper shows an approach towards revaluing contemplation, especially as actualized in prayer. The value of taking time to rest and pausing for a while so as to contemplate and encounter the Divine amidst the ever-rising reality of the busy contemporary world is appreciated once more. (shrink)

Many of the following literary-critical texts (not all quite conventional “long-form” essays) originally appeared on the Landscape Agency New York website, LANY Archive-Grotto, on the web portal Geocities, between the years 1997 and 2008 – i.e., over a period of roughly ten years. Versions of some were published in various journals, academic or otherwise. In re-presenting them here, the intention is to trace a proverbial “red thread” that crosses the entirety of the work, arguably what might be denoted the works-based (...) agency of works, and, arguably, the telltale trace of what is otherwise known as the “life-work,” yet for works versus for authors. -/- The entire, retrospective apparatus of The Editioning of Gardens is also, decidedly, an homage to New York, New York, either where or from where much of the research was undertaken and “lived.” Manhattan, indeed, haunts these pages, directly and indirectly – that is to say, the unparalleled access to libraries, bookstores, universities, galleries, cafés, pubs, restaurants, cinemas, parks, and the streets is quite simply the source for the often-intense, yet suitably critical exegetical works. -/- This book is meant to both recapitulate themes crossing the “life-work” of the works collected, but to also illustrate the transitional gestalt of the 1990s and 2000s, something we collectively have not yet quite exited, and something that still haunts and gives pause to architects and landscape architects today. In naming this collection “The Editioning of Gardens,” the intention is to draw attention to the fact that it is landscape that underwrites almost all architectural interventions, whether acknowledged or denied, and that it is “landscape” – in the widest sense of the word – that we inherently and collectively inhabit. -/- NOTA BENE: -/- While many of the essays and texts presented here have been previously published as “working papers” or “reviews” on the LANY Archive-Grotto website, or in journals and P2P dossiers (i.e., in open-access collections posted to research repositories, here denoted Things Czech and Dossier LANY), their presentation in book form makes them more readily accessible and effectively new works as totality. Most have also been re-edited and re-formatted for inclusion in The Editioning of Gardens. -/- All texts are also dated so as to situate them in the timeframe in which they appeared (or were written), as snapshots or surveys of passing times. While re-edited and re-formatted for presentation here, they have not been re-written as such due to their implied “historic” and “time-based” nature. As collection, however, they function as an (un)timely reminder of critical exegesis as rite of passage – underscoring the significance of the title of the collection. This latter trait is what, ironically, makes the collection contemporary and post-contemporary – timely and untimely at once. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the C-Manuscripts to see how Husserl reflects on the margins of phenomenality with reference to the three limit-phenomena of sleep, death, and others. We choose to juxtapose these three limit-phenomena, because in the C-Manuscripts Husserl has depicted their affinities, both in terms of their phenomenal characters and their transcendental functions, in a creative way. There Husserl has outlined at least two approaches for introducing the limit-phenomena of sleep, death, and others to the core concerns (...) of phenomenology. These two approaches rely on different heuristic strategies to shed light on the genetic constitution of monadic life and the generative constitution of humanity respectively. The first approach privileges sleep as the model of unconscious pause in order to illuminate the more perplexing cases of death and others. The second approach treats sleep and death as bridging-members of the constitution of the total human world, after the model of others in the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity. (shrink)

The Iliad is a work of great poetic temperament, and by analyzing its content we can see how, through the development of the theme of the Trojan War, cultural categories are created that have acquired an immeasurable value in the life of the human being. For this reason, it is worth pausing to analyze the text from different points of view, from which one can begin to understand how those categories are created that, without being aware of it, manifest themselves (...) in one way or another in daily life, such as the love for a child and the close friendship between two people, to name just a few. In this paper we have studied epithets, which have a certain importance in the composition of the Iliad. Therefore, we began by analyzing the genesis of this literary resource and its repercussions on the style of the work, all of this organized into four short sections. In this research, special emphasis was placed on answering whether the use of epithets contributes to the configuration of Zeus as an Olympian god. In order to answer this question, the value of the epithet as a literary resource was first taken into account, and then the epithets of the god Zeus were analyzed, observing if there is any relationship between the times they are mentioned, who uses them, and the location of this god at the top of Olympus. This specific case in the Iliad allowed us to draw conclusions that could perhaps be applied to epithets in general. -/- La Ilíada es una obra de un gran temple poético que al analizar su contenido se puede entrever cómo a través del desarrollo del tema de la guerra de Troya, se van creando categorías culturales, que han tomado un valor inconmensurable en la vida del ser humano. Por esto vale la pena detenerse a analizar el texto bajo diferentes puntos de vista, a partir de los cuales se pueda ir adentrándose a conocer cómo se van originando esas categorías que sin darse cuenta se manifiestan, de una u otra forma en la vida diaria, como lo es el amor por un hijo y la amistad entrañable entre dos personas, como para mencionar algunas. En este trabajo se estudiaron los epítetos, los cuales tienen una cierta importancia en la composición de la Ilíada. Por consiguiente se empezó analizando cómo fue surgiendo este recurso literario y su repercusión en el estilo de la obra; todo esto, organizado en cuatro cortas secciones. En esta investigación se hizo un énfasis especial en responder la pregunta de si el uso de los epítetos ayuda a configurar a Zeus como un dios olímpico. Para responderla, se tomó inicialmente el valor del epíteto como recurso literario, para luego analizar los epítetos del dios Zeus, observando si existe alguna relación entre las veces en que son mencionados, quién hace uso de ellos, y la ubicación de este dios en la cima del Olimpo. Este caso específico en la Ilíada permitió llegar a conclusiones que tal vez se puedan aplicar a los epítetos en general. (shrink)

Humans and artificial intelligences (AI) will increasingly participate digitally and physically in conflicts yet there is a lack of trusted communications across agents and platforms. For example, humans in disasters and conflict already use messaging and social media to share information, however, international humanitarian relief organisations treat this information as unverifiable and untrustworthy. AI may reduce the ‘fog-of-war’ and improve outcomes, however current AI implementations are often brittle, have a narrow scope of application and wide ethical risks. Meanwhile, human error (...) causes significant civilian harms even by combatants committed to complying with international humanitarian law. AI offers an opportunity to help reduce the tragedy of war and better deliver humanitarian aid to those who need it. However, to be successful, these systems must be trusted by humans and their information systems, overcoming flawed information flows in conflict and disaster zones that continue to be marked by intermittent communications, poor situation awareness, mistrust and human errors. In this paper, we consider the integration of a communications protocol (the ‘Whiteflag protocol’), distributed ledger technology, and information fusion with artificial intelligence (AI), to improve conflict communications called “Protected Assurance Understanding Situation & Entities” PAUSE. Such a trusted human-AI communication network could provide accountable information exchange regarding protected entities, critical infrastructure; humanitarian signals and status updates for humans and machines in conflicts. Trust-based information fusion provides resource-efficient use of diverse data sources to increase the reliability of reports. AI can be used to catch human mistakes and complement human decision making, while human judgment can direct and override AI recommendations. We examine several case studies for the integration of these technologies into a trusted human-AI network for humanitarian benefit including mapping a conflict zone with civilians and combatants in real time, preparation to avoid incidents and using the network to manage misinformation. (shrink)

Abstract In Creative Evolution (1907/1911), a pivotal discussion is the extreme complexity of instinctual behavior. As one of many examples, a member of the Hymenoptera “knows” precisely the three locations of motor-neuron complexes at which to sting a cricket such that it is paralyzed, yet remains fully alive for the wasp’s larvae. Two points: a) This behavior is as much an “irreducible” complex of acts as the structural organization of the wasp’s body, and just as inexplicably formed by natural selection, (...) and, b) the instinctual behavior is actually at the same level as the vital processes of the organism. This is to say that any theory of evolution, be it selection, self-assembly or self-organization, is equally bound to address not only the origin-problem of an organism’s structure, but the correlated functional problem of instinct. Instinct, however, was Bergson’s prime source for holding, firstly, that we must see Consciousness as the impetus behind evolution and secondly, that it is only by utilizing the essence of instinct, conjoined with intellect – his “intuition” – that mind and science can penetrate these mysterious evolutionary processes. This double thesis of the role of Consciousness and the role of intuition likely helped to cause Bergson’s neglect in the biological world, but subsequently there has emerged the current sharp awareness of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). The ongoing failure on a solution to this problem – its very, very unresolved status – should give us pause. In fact, integral to the argument of Creative Evolution, though always only obliquely referenced, was Matter and Memory (1896/1912), and in this work was a remarkable solution to the Hard Problem – when understood, an amazing feat of “intuition.” This, we will see, casts Bergson’s view of the role of Consciousness in evolution, and the nature of instinct as one of evolution’s lines of development, in a new light. (shrink)

In Book 3 of Herodotus’Histories, seven Persian noblemen discuss which form of government would best fit the empire. If we accept its dramatic date, 522 BCE, this scene offers the first example of a comparative definition of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. It offers, even more strikingly, the very first description of the government of the many — a novel political order that will eventually be called a democracy. The power of the people, this quintessentially Hellenic thing, was then a Persian (...) invention, an idea that occurred originally not to the masses of a polis, not to an Athenian demagogue, but to a relative of the Great King. In the course of the narrative, democracy will prove to be a unique form of government: the winning one. The Histories take up the challenge of recounting, and accounting for, a most improbable defeat, and for an even less foreseeable victory. The text does so not by preaching a morality of self-knowledge and self-control, but by exposing the realistic effects of different kinds of rule. Against the odds, democracy enhances and strengthens a small polis, Athens, making it grand and successful. Notwithstanding its immeasurable capabilities, the Persian monarchy fails. The turning point is the battle of Salamis, a prowess of the dêmos. A theatrical pause, in the narration of how the Great Kings came to prepare their campaigns against Greece, the debate offers a counterfactual explanation to historical events, in terms of political theory. This is, I will argue, the effect of the scene on the Histories. (shrink)

Les défenseurs d'Ion Antonescu considèrent l'acte du roi Mihai I comme une erreur tragique ou une « grave erreur politique », affirmant que le roi aurait dû attendre encore un mois ou deux pour que le Maréc lui-même exige un armistice. L'historien Neagu Djuvara a déclaré que ces « conditions plus faciles » qu'aurait obtenues Ion Antonescu « sont de pures fables », en réalité Antonescu avait l'intention de donner aux Allemands une pause pour quitter la Roumanie. Entre le (...) 24 et le 26 août, l'armée roumaine a vaincu les derniers points de résistance allemande, avec l'aide de volontaires civils. Jusqu'au 28 août, il n'y avait plus de troupes allemandes à Bucarest et ses environs, et jusqu'au 31 août, toutes les troupes allemandes du pays étaient expulsées. Le 10 février 1947 a lieu la cérémonie de signature du Traité de paix de Paris entre les puissances alliées et associées et la Roumanie. Les Alliés n'ont pas reconnu la Roumanie comme une nation co-belligérante, la considérant comme une « alliée de l'Allemagne hitlérienne ». La frontière avec l'URSS et la Bulgarie a été fixée dans son état en janvier 1941, mais la Roumanie a repris le nord de la Transylvanie, suite à la reconnaissance que la Roumanie « a agi dans l'intérêt de toutes les Nations Unies » après le 23 août 1944. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32483.02086. (shrink)

This chapter considers the presence, in digital games, of experiences of dwelling. Starting with an engagement with the philosopher Edward S. Casey's distinction between hestial and hermetic spatial modes, the chapter argues that the player's spatial engagement with digital game worlds has tended to align with the hermetic pole, emphasizing movement, traversal and exploration. By contrast, hestial spatial practices, characterized by centrality, lingering and return, are far less prevalent both in digital games themselves and in discussions on spatiality in the (...) game studies discourse. To counter this lack, this chapter draws upon philosophical work on space by Casey, Martin Heidegger, Yi-Fu Tuan and Christian Norberg-Schulz, using these as a conceptual lens to identify spatial structures and practices in digital games that diverge from the hermetic mode. Attention is paid to games that invite pausing and lingering in place, games where the player's relation to place is structured around practices of building, the phenomenology of home and dwelling in games, and familiarity and identity as experiential characteristics of being at home. Minecraft and Animal Crossing: New Leaf are examined in detail as case studies, though the chapter also refers to examples from other games. (shrink)

This essay is on Man's limitations as per his perceptions of his reality, given his physiology and given his mind's attributes. Of course, not many people think or care much about this matter, moving on through their daily chores, doing, serving, and buying their specific necessities for life. That fact does not change the truth that what all human beings experience, feel, endure and remember as their reality is a vastly complex fabrication woven by our minds, ultimately creating, designing a (...) cohering ‘reality’ that makes our ‘reality’ recognizable enough such that, as stated, we can go on ignoring the unreality of our reality and get on with the necessities for our daily sustenance. -/- Thus, each day, we believe in all that we did, spoke, and in the ways, we acted and interacted with whomsoever we performed and interacted with. We live each day believing, feeling, experiencing ‘our consciousness’ as being real; believing our memories are real; believing in all that we experience, witnessed, and/or participated in specific events. Now the point here is this; rare is the Man who pauses a while, contemplating the truth of all his beliefs, considering the vastness of the falsities of much of these beliefs. And, apart from such a few introspective, the fact of the matter is most human beings live and die believing they have genuinely experienced the entirety of all that they have experienced, considering, in effect, the entire film of their life was ‘real.’ . (shrink)

Abstract: Obstructive Sleep Apnea(OSA) is breathing disorder syndrome in which the airway tract pauses during sleep due to collapse of pharyngeal airway. It is occurred at the sleep time, with fourth dimensional high resolution in airway tract Obstruction in children and adults with OSA. Here, we the operator places the seeds that includes the Oesopharyngeal air tract and found out a threshold for the first frame in order to determine the affected tissues which blocks the patients pharyngeal tract. In this (...) automated segmentation method it shows the process of MRI studies of the pharyngeal air pathway and enable diagnose of obstructive tissues with the collapse tissues. Region growing method results well in Dice Coefficients compared with manual segmentation. It automatically detects 90% of collapse tissues. This approach leads to segment the pharyngeal pathway correctly. It uses long MRI scans in order to diagnosis the collapsed tissues with graph, accurate details and coefficients in a short span of duration. (shrink)

Ini adalah pendapat saya bahwa tabel intensionality (rasionalitas, kesadaran, pikiran, pikiran, bahasa, kepribadian dll) yang menonjol di sini menggambarkan lebih atau kurang akurat, atau setidaknya berfungsi sebagai heuristic untuk, bagaimana kita berpikir dan berperilaku, dan sehingga mencakup tidak hanya filsafat dan psikologi, tetapi segala sesuatu yang lain (sejarah, sastra, matematika, politik dll). Perhatikan terutama bahwa intensionalitas dan rasionalitas sebagai I (bersama dengan Searle, Wittgenstein dan lain-lain) melihatnya, mencakup baik sistem linguistik pertimbangan sadar 2 dan tidak disadari otomatis sistem prelinguistik 1 (...) tindakan atau refleks. Aku memberikan survei kritis dari beberapa temuan utama dari dua siswa yang paling terkemuka perilaku zaman modern, Ludwig Wittgenstein dan John Searle, pada struktur Logis intensionality (pikiran, bahasa, kesadaran, perilaku), mengambil sebagai titik awal saya adalah penemuan fundamental Wittgenstein-bahwa semua benar ' filosofis ' masalah adalah sama-kebingungan tentang bagaimana menggunakan bahasa dalam konteks tertentu, dan sehingga semua solusi yang sama-melihat bagaimana bahasa dapat digunakan dalam konteks di masalah sehingga kondisi kebenarannya (kondisi kepuasan atau cos) yang jelas. Masalah dasar adalah bahwa seseorang dapat mengatakan apa-apa kecuali satu tidak bisa berarti (negara yang jelas cos untuk) sembarang ucapan dan makna yang hanya mungkin dalam konteks yang sangat spesifik. Saya menganalisis berbagai tulisan oleh dan tentang mereka dari perspektif modern dari dua sistem pemikiran (Dipopulerkan sebagai ' berpikir cepat, berpikir lambat '), mempekerjakan sebuah meja baru intensionality dan baru sistem ganda nomenklatur. Saya menunjukkan bahwa ini adalah heuristic kuat untuk menggambarkan perilaku. Dengan demikian, Semua perilaku yang erat terhubung jika salah satu mengambil sudut pandang yang benar. The fenomenologis Illusion (terlupakan untuk sistem otomatis kami 1) adalah universal dan meluas tidak hanya di seluruh filsafat tetapi sepanjang hidup. Saya yakin bahwa Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg dan Paus akan menjadi tidak percaya jika diberitahu bahwa mereka menderita masalah yang sama seperti Hegel, Husserl dan Heidegger, (atau bahwa mereka hanya berbeda dalam derajat dari obat dan pecandu seks dalam menjadi termotivasi oleh stimulasi dari Coral frontal mereka dengan pengiriman dopamin (dan lebih dari 100 bahan kimia lainnya) melalui tegmentum ventral dan inti accumbens), tapi itu jelas benar. Sementara fenomenolog hanya menyia-nyiakan banyak waktu orang, mereka membuang-buang bumi dan masa depan keturunan mereka. (shrink)

Ini adalah pendapat saya bahwa tabel intensionality (rasionalitas, kesadaran, pikiran, pikiran, bahasa, kepribadian dll) yang menonjol di sini menggambarkan lebih atau kurang akurat, atau setidaknya berfungsi sebagai heuristic untuk, bagaimana kita berpikir dan berperilaku, dan sehingga mencakup tidak hanya filsafat dan psikologi, tetapi segala sesuatu yang lain (sejarah, sastra, matematika, politik dll). Perhatikan terutama bahwa intensionalitas dan rasionalitas sebagai I (bersama dengan Searle, Wittgenstein dan lain-lain) melihatnya, mencakup baik sistem linguistik pertimbangan sadar 2 dan tidak disadari otomatis sistem prelinguistik 1 (...) tindakan atau refleks. Aku memberikan survei kritis dari beberapa temuan utama dari dua siswa yang paling terkemuka perilaku zaman modern, Ludwig Wittgenstein dan John Searle, pada struktur Logis intensionality (pikiran, bahasa, kesadaran, perilaku), mengambil sebagai titik awal saya adalah penemuan fundamental Wittgenstein-bahwa semua benar ' filosofis ' masalah adalah sama-kebingungan tentang bagaimana menggunakan bahasa dalam konteks tertentu, dan sehingga semua solusi yang sama-melihat bagaimana bahasa dapat digunakan dalam konteks di masalah sehingga kondisi kebenarannya (kondisi kepuasan atau cos) yang jelas. Masalah dasar adalah bahwa seseorang dapat mengatakan apa-apa kecuali satu tidak bisa berarti (negara yang jelas cos untuk) sembarang ucapan dan makna yang hanya mungkin dalam konteks yang sangat spesifik. Saya menganalisis berbagai tulisan oleh dan tentang mereka dari perspektif modern dari dua sistem pemikiran (Dipopulerkan sebagai ' berpikir cepat, berpikir lambat '), mempekerjakan sebuah meja baru intensionality dan baru sistem ganda nomenklatur. Saya menunjukkan bahwa ini adalah heuristic kuat untuk menggambarkan perilaku. Dengan demikian, Semua perilaku yang erat terhubung jika salah satu mengambil sudut pandang yang benar. The fenomenologis Illusion (terlupakan untuk sistem otomatis kami 1) adalah universal dan meluas tidak hanya di seluruh filsafat tetapi sepanjang hidup. Saya yakin bahwa Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg dan Paus akan menjadi tidak percaya jika diberitahu bahwa mereka menderita masalah yang sama seperti Hegel, Husserl dan Heidegger, (atau bahwa mereka hanya berbeda dalam derajat dari obat dan pecandu seks dalam menjadi termotivasi oleh stimulasi dari Coral frontal mereka dengan pengiriman dopamin (dan lebih dari 100 bahan kimia lainnya) melalui tegmentum ventral dan inti accumbens), tapi itu jelas benar. Sementara fenomenolog hanya menyia-nyiakan banyak waktu orang, mereka membuang-buang bumi dan masa depan keturunan mereka. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese ThinkingJeremy E. HenkelA Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. By François Jullien, translated by Janet Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004. Pp. x + 202. $22.00.In A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking François Jullien argues that the different ways Chinese and Western thinkers have dealt with warfare and diplomacy reflect important differences in how (...) the two cultures understand human action in the world. When Chinese texts such as the Sunzi and the Guiguzi are set up as counterpoints to the Europeans Clausewitz and Machiavelli, Jullien argues that the Aristotelian inheritance of the latter pair is shown to be the cause of their inability to provide clean theories with the consistent predictive power they desired. Chinese strategists, by contrast, meet with no such limitations in the realm of human interaction. The basic difference between Western and Chinese thought that Jullien seeks to demonstrate is that "one constructs a model that is then projected onto the situation, which implies that the situation is momentarily 'frozen.' The other relies on the situation as on a disposition that is known to be constantly evolving" (p. 189; italics in original).Jullien's regular use of the generic terms "Western" and "Chinese" in constructing his comparison will likely give many comparative philosophers pause. But this [End Page 347] need not be a source of worry, as he is careful not to essentialize the two world-views. While he is pointing out patterns and tendencies in the thinking of Europe and China, he is not positing an essential incommensurable difference between them. Rather, he is pointing out that "what remains underdeveloped in the one context is more developed in the other" (p. 145). He goes on to say, "The purpose of our foray into China is not to imagine-let alone fabricate-other 'mentalities'.... It is simply to make use of other possible sources of intelligibility" (ibid.).Jullien begins by showing that Western thought regards human action as something that imposes itself on the world in order to bring about a predetermined goal. This is a natural consequence of the belief that the world is created: belief in creation implies something existing outside that creation, thus an intention behind that creation, and thus a transcendent norm toward which things within that creation aim. This two-leveled ontology of creator and creation yields a distinction between theory and practice, wherein practice always aims-and ultimately fails-at implementing an ideal that is established by theory. This worldview has led to demonstrable success in the sciences but meets with frequent frustration in the arena of human interaction. This limitation has been recognized by strategists in the West but has never been successfully resolved.Aristotle was the first to identify and try to resolve this problem. He posited phronesis as the skill that enables an individual to apply a model to the world successfully. For Aristotle such successful action consists of first identifying one's desired end and then reasoning back to one's present situation in order to establish the best means to achieve that end. Jullien's analysis shows that Clausewitz was working with the same model more than two thousand years later. Clausewitz believed that earlier attempts at creating a general theory of warfare had failed to achieve their goal-namely, to provide a model of warfare that a general could use to ensure victory-because the opponent's actions are unpredictable. The system that the military strategist is dealing with, then, is not mechanistic, and consequently plans are easily frustrated by ever-changing circumstances. But Clausewitz was unable to conceive of strategy as based on anything other than plans.For Clausewitz, warfare is composed of distinct engagements, separate moments in time where an army seeks to impose a plan on the world. Seeing warfare as composed of distinct moments means that time is an opponent, for time brings with it change and uncertainty and thus a greater chance that one's plans will be frustrated. Opportunity, then, is something unexpected-a chance happening at a specific moment that can be taken advantage of only... (shrink)

According to Stanley Kubrick, “[i]f it can be written, or thought, it can be filmed”. This is true for award-winning Irish short story writer Claire Keegan (1968) whose sparse and effective prose has hit the core of audiences struggling to process the lingering impact of national trauma. Keegan confronts it all head-on, highlighting social issues that loom large in evocative narratives where thoughts, situations and scenarios spill over into the space between the words. What is left unsaid says it all. (...) The silence that reigns in a space of ‘NON-sayability’ in Keegan’s stories is anything but opaque. In Small Things Like These she navigates treacherous territories in a dark Christmas tale about the widespread and notorious Magdalene Laundry apparatus that keeps weighing heavily on our collective conscience. How can we remain passive in the face of wrongdoings and how does Keegan unlock the past and urge us to scrutinise history? (shrink)