Results for 'perception of bodies'

996 found
Order:
  1. The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity.Jan Halák - 2018 - In Bernard Andrieu, Jim Parry, Alessandro Porrovecchio & Olivier Sirost (eds.), Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure. Londýn, Velká Británie: Routledge. pp. 37-50.
    In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  3. The Concept of Body in Hume’s Treatise.Miren Boehm - 2013 - ProtoSociology:206-220.
    Hume’s views concerning the existence of body or external objects are notoriously difficult and intractable. The paper sheds light on the concept of body in Hume’s Treatise by defending three theses. First, that Hume’s fundamental tenet that the only objects that are present to the mind are perceptions must be understood as methodological, rather than metaphysical or epistemological. Second, that Hume considers legitimate the fundamental assumption of natural philosophy that through experience and observation we know body. Third, that many of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Our Body Is the Measure: Malebranche and the Body-Relativity of Sensory Perception.Colin Chamberlain - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy.
    Malebranche holds that sensory experience represents the world from the body’s point of view. I argue that Malebranche gives a systematic analysis of this bodily perspective in terms of the claim that the five familiar external senses and bodily awareness represent nothing but relations to the body.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Encapsulated Social Perception of Emotional Expressions.Joulia Smortchkova - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:38-47.
    In this paper I argue that the detection of emotional expressions is, in its early stages, informationally encapsulated. I clarify and defend such a view via the appeal to data from social perception on the visual processing of faces, bodies, facial and bodily expressions. Encapsulated social perception might exist alongside processes that are cognitively penetrated, and that have to do with recognition and categorization, and play a central evolutionary function in preparing early and rapid responses to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Multiple Moving Perceptions of the Real: Arendt, Merleau-Ponty, and Truitt.Helen A. Fielding - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (3):518-534.
    This paper explores the ethical insights provided by Anne Truitt's minimalist sculptures, as viewed through the phenomenological lenses of Hannah Arendt's investigations into the co-constitution of reality and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's investigations into perception. Artworks in their material presence can lay out new ways of relating and perceiving. Truitt's works accomplish this task by revealing the interactive motion of our embodied relations and how material objects can actually help to ground our reality and hence human potentiality. Merleau-Ponty shows how our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. The Perception of Relations.Alon Hafri & Chaz Firestone - 2021 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25 (6):475-492.
    The world contains not only objects and features (red apples, glass bowls, wooden tables), but also relations holding between them (apples contained in bowls, bowls supported by tables). Representations of these relations are often developmentally precocious and linguistically privileged; but how does the mind extract them in the first place? Although relations themselves cast no light onto our eyes, a growing body of work suggests that even very sophisticated relations display key signatures of automatic visual processing. Across physical, eventive, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Perceiving Bodies Immediately: Thomas Reid's Insight.Marina Folescu - 2015 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (1):19-36.
    In An Inquiry into the Human Mind and in Essays on Intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him in a long tradition of philosophers concerned with understanding how human perception works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open question in the philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Spatial Perception and the Sense of Touch.Patrick Haggard, Tony Cheng, Brianna Beck & Francesca Fardo - 2017 - In The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 97-114.
    It remains controversial whether touch is a truly spatial sense or not. Many philosophers suggest that, if touch is indeed spatial, it is only through its alliances with exploratory movement, and with proprioception. Here we develop the notion that a minimal yet important form of spatial perception may occur in purely passive touch. We do this by showing that the array of tactile receptive fields in the skin, and appropriately relayed to the cortex, may contain the same basic informational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Our Bodies, Our Selves: Malebranche on the Feelings of Embodiment.Colin Chamberlain - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    Malebranche holds that the feeling of having a body comes in three main varieties. A perceiver sensorily experiences herself (1) as causally connected to her body, in so far as the senses represent the body as causing her sensory experiences and as uniquely responsive to her will, (2) as materially connected to her body, in so far as the senses represent the perceiver as a material being wrapped up with the body, and (3) as perspectivally connected to her body, in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Early and Late Time Perception: On the Narrow Scope of the Whorfian Hypothesis.Carlos Montemayor - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):133-154.
    The Whorfian hypothesis has received support from recent findings in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. This evidence has been interpreted as supporting the view that language modulates all stages of perception and cognition, in accordance with Whorf’s original proposal. In light of a much broader body of evidence on time perception, I propose to evaluate these findings with respect to their scope. When assessed collectively, the entire body of evidence on time perception shows that the Whorfian hypothesis has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Dual Structure of Touch: The Body Vs. Peripersonal Space.Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Frédérique de Vignemont (ed.), The World at Our Fingertips. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The sense of touch provides us knowledge of two kinds of events. Tactile sensation (T) makes us aware of events on or just below the skin; haptic perception (H) gives us knowledge of things outside the body with which we are in contact. This paper argues that T and H are distinct experiences, and not (as some have argued) different aspects of the same touch-experience. In other words, T ≠ H. Moreover, H does not supervene on T. Secondly: In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. A Mechanism for Spatial Perception on Human Skin.Francesca Fardo, Brianna Beck, Tony Cheng & Patrick Haggard - 2018 - Cognition 178:236-243.
    Our perception of where touch occurs on our skin shapes our interactions with the world. Most accounts of cutaneous localisation emphasise spatial transformations from a skin-based reference frame into body-centred and external egocentric coordinates. We investigated another possible method of tactile localisation based on an intrinsic perception of ‘skin space’. The arrangement of cutaneous receptive fields (RFs) could allow one to track a stimulus as it moves across the skin, similarly to the way animals navigate using path integration. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14.  77
    Motions in the Body, Sensations in the Mind: Malebranche's Mechanics of Sensory Perception and Taste.Katharine Julia Hamerton - forthcoming - Arts Et Savoirs.
    This article, which seeks to connect philosophy, polite culture, and the Enlightenment, shows how Malebranche’s Cartesian science presented a full-frontal attack on the worldly notion of a good taste aligned with reason. It did this by arguing that the aesthetic tastes that people experience were the result of mechanically-transmitted sensations that, like all physical sensations, were inaccurate, erroneous and relativistic. The mechanics of this process is explored in detail to show how Malebranche was challenging honnête thinking. The article suggests that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Environmental Representation of the Body.Adrian Cussins - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. Kantian Themes in Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of Perception.Samantha Matherne - 2016 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (2):193-230.
    It has become typical to read Kant and Merleau-Ponty as offering competing approaches to perceptual experience. Kant is interpreted as an ‘intellectualist’ who regards perception as conceptual ‘all the way out’, while Merleau-Ponty is seen as Kant’s challenger, who argues that perception involves non-conceptual, embodied ‘coping’. In this paper, however, I argue that a closer examination of their views of perception, especially with respect to the notion of ‘schematism’, reveals a great deal of historical and philosophical continuity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  17. Pain: Perception or Introspection?Murat Aydede - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    [Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  18. Proper Embodiment: The Role of the Body in Affect and Cognition.Mog Stapleton - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of grossmorphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19.  60
    On Perception and Ontology in the Context of Subjectivity and Modern Physics.Piotr Witas -
    I argue that our direct experience and some physical facts do not go well with an understanding of perception as a mechanism producing a representation of a ''truly'' outer world. Instead, it is much more coherent to treat what is traditionally considered an image in this context as a closed structure equipped in its own ontology, replacing the ''truly'' outer one from the point of view of an agent possessing it. In such a framework, the notion of existence is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. What is Morphological Computation? On How the Body Contributes to Cognition and Control.Vincent C. Müller & Matej Hoffmann - 2017 - Artificial Life 23 (1):1-24.
    The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “off-loading computation from the brain to the body”, where the body is said to perform “morphological computation”. Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the ‘off-loading’ perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus distinguish (1) morphology that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  21. Touching Voids: On the Varieties of Absence Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):355-366.
    Seeing one’s laptop to be missing, hearing silence and smelling fresh air; these are all examples of perceptual experiences of absences. In this paper I discuss an example of absence perception in the tactual sense modality, that of tactually perceiving a tooth to be absent in one’s mouth, following its extraction. Various features of the example challenge two recently-developed theories of absence perception: Farennikova’s memory-perception mismatch theory and Martin and Dockic’s meta-cognitive theory. I speculate that the mechanism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. The Body as Laboratory: Prediction-Error Minimization, Embodiment, and Representation.Christopher Burr & Max Jones - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):586-600.
    In his paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization, which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23.  79
    Medicine, Symbolization and the 'Real' Body: Lacan's Understanding of Medical Science.Hub Zwart - 1998 - Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 1 (2):107-117.
    Throughout the 20th century, philosophers have criticized the scientific understanding of the human body. Instead of presenting the body as a meaningful unity or Gestalt, it is regarded as a complex mechanism and described in quasi-mechanistic terms. In a phenomenological approach, a more intimate experience of the body is presented. This approach, however, is questioned by Jacques Lacan. According to Lacan, three basic possibilities of experiencing the body are to be distinguished: the symbolical (or scientific) body, the imaginary (or ideal) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Merleau-Ponty’s Conception of Dialectics in Phenomenology of Perception.Christopher Pollard - 2016 - Critical Horizons 17 (3-4):358-375.
    Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential.Inês Hipólito - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):184-188.
    This paper argues that it is possible to embrace the predictive processing framework without reducing affordances to inferential perception. The cognitivist account of PP contends that it can capture relational perception, such as affordances. The rationale for this claim is that over time, sensory data becomes highly-weighted. This paper, however, will show the inconsistency of this claim in the face of the cognitivist premise that ‘encapsulated’ models can throw away ‘the body, the world, or other people’ [Hohwy 2016: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Body Phenomenology, Somaesthetics and Nietzschean Themes in Medieval Art.Matthew Crippen - 2014 - Pragmatism Today 5:40-45.
    Richard Shusterman suggested that Maurice Merleau-Ponty neglected “‘lived somaesthetic reflection,’ that is, concrete but representational and reflective body consciousness.” While unsure about this assessment of Merleau-Ponty, lived somaesthetic reflection, or what the late Sam Mallin called “body phenomenology”—understood as a meditation on the body reflecting on both itself and the world—is my starting point. Another is John Dewey’s bodily theory of perception, augmented somewhat by Merleau-Ponty. -/- With these starting points, I spent roughly 20 hours with St. Benedict Restores (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body as a field of structuralisation and its ontological significance.Jan Halák - 2015 - Filosoficky Casopis 63 (2):175-196.
    [In Czech] Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objective” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that my (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Absent Body in Psychiatric Diagnosis, Treatment, and Research.Catherine Stinson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6).
    Discussions of psychiatric nosology focus on a few popular examples of disorders, and on the validity of diagnostic criteria. Looking at Anorexia Nervosa, an example rarely mentioned in this literature, reveals a new problem: the DSM has a strict taxonomic structure, which assumes that disorders can only be located on one branch. This taxonomic assumption fails to fit the domain of psychopathology, resulting in obfuscation of cross-category connections. Poor outcomes for treatment of Anorexia may be due to it being pigeonholed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - In W. F. Overton, U. Müller & J. L. Newman (eds.), Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  30.  35
    On Perception and Autonomy Considered Through the Phenomenological Understanding of Emotion Described by Kym Maclaren.Erika Grimm - 2015 - Res Cogitans: An Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 6 (1):171-178.
    Female philosopher Kym Maclaren, in her article, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Others in Becoming a Subject,” explores a phenomenological view on emotion as being-in-the-world as well as the ethical implications of understanding emotion in opposition to the moralistic view. In the first part of this paper, I provide an exegetical assessment of Maclaren’s thesis; in the second I introduce a critique of Maclaren’s argument and argue a claim of my own which explores perception and autonomy in the human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Merleau-Ponty’s ontological interpretation of Husserl’s conception of the body as a “double unity”.Jan Halák - 2014 - Filosoficky Casopis 62 (3):339-354.
    [In Czech] Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl’s descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of his own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that from the ontological point of view, perception and availability to be perceived, are one and the same in the body. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  63
    Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account.Marina Folescu - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):57-74.
    The starting point of this paper is Thomas Reid's anti-skepticism: our knowledge of the external world is justified. The justificatory process, in his view, starts with and relies upon one of the main faculties of the human mind: perception. Reid's theory of perception has been thoroughly studied, but there are some missing links in the explanatory chain offered by the secondary literature. In particular, I will argue that we do not have a complete picture of the mechanism of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Affects, Images and Childlike Perception: Self-Other Difference in Merleau-Ponty’s Sorbonne Lectures.Shiloh Whitney - 2012 - PhaenEx 7 (2):185-211.
    I begin by reviewing recent research by Merleau-Ponty scholars opposing aspects of the critique of Merleau-Ponty made by Meltzoff and colleagues based on their studies of neonate imitation. I conclude the need for reopening the case for infant self-other indistinction, starting with a re-examination of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of indistinction in the Sorbonne lectures, and attending especially to the role of affect and to the non-exclusivity of self-other distinction and indistinction. In undertaking that study, I discover the importance of understanding self-other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. The Objects of Bodily Awareness.John Schwenkler - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
    Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of his or her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  35. Elastic Membrane Based Model of Human Perception.Alexander Egoyan - 2011 - Toward a Science of Consciousness.
    Undoubtedly the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR model may be considered as a good theory for describing information processing mechanisms and holistic phenomena in the human brain, but it doesn’t give us satisfactory explanation of human perception. In this work a new approach explaining our perception is introduced, which is in good agreement with Orch OR model and other mainstream science theories such as string theory, loop quantum gravity and holographic principle. It is shown that human perception cannot be (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Is Merleau-Ponty’s Position in Phenomenology of Perception a New Type of Transcendental Idealism?Christopher Pollard - 2014 - Idealistic Studies 44 (1):119-138.
    It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  38.  89
    "Perception Is Already Expression." Merleau-Ponty's First Collège de France Lectures.Jan Halák - 2017 - Reflexe: Filosoficky Casopis 1 (52):111-135.
    In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new analysis of rational thought in order to clarify its link with corporeal-perceptive life. The formulation of thought in language as the most elaborate human activity of expression explicitly takes over what we already observe in perception as the implicit and mutual reference between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived.The article reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, based on his preparatory notes for the lectures, and (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception.Colin Marshall - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1411-1433.
    It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the puzzle have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  32
    Body Schema in Autonomous Agents.Zachariah A. Neemeh & Christian Kronsted - 2021 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 1 (8):113-145.
    A body schema is an agent's model of its own body that enables it to act on affordances in the environment. This paper presents a body schema system for the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. LIDA is a conceptual and computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory, also integrating other theories from neuroscience and psychology. This paper contends that the ‘body schema' should be split into three separate functions based on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Running It Through the Body.David Kirsh - 2012 - Proceedings of the 34th Annual Cognitive Science Society 34:593-598.
    Video data from three large captures of choreographic dance making was analyzed to determine if there is a difference between participant knowledge – the knowledge an agent acquires by being the cause of an action – and observer knowledge – the knowledge an observer acquires through close attention to someone else’s performance. The idea that there might be no difference has been challenged by recent findings about the action observation network and tacitly challenged by certain tenets in enactive perception. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Sense-Data and the Mind–Body Problem.Gary Hatfield - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis. pp. 305--331.
    The first two sections of the paper characterize the nineteenth century respect for the phenomenal by considering Helmholtz’s position and James’ and Russell’s move to neutral monism. The third section displays a moment’s sympathy with those who recoiled from the latter view -- but only a moment’s. The recoil overshot what was a reasonable response, and denied the reality of the phenomenal, largely in the name of the physical or the material. The final two sections of the paper develop a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  43. Sensible Qualities and Material Bodies in Descartes and Boyle.Lisa Downing - 2011 - In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
    Descartes and Boyle were the most influential proponents of strict mechanist accounts of the physical world, accounts which carried with them a distinction between primary and secondary (or sensible) qualities. For both, the distinction is a piece of natural philosophy. Nevertheless the distinction is quite differently articulated, and, especially, differently grounded in the two thinkers. For Descartes, reasoned reflection reveals to us that bodies must consist in mere extension and its modifications, and that sensible qualities as we conceive of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. ‘Let Us Imagine That God has Made a Miniature Earth and Sky’: Malebranche on the Body-Relativity of Visual Size.Colin Chamberlain - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):206-224.
    Malebranche holds that visual experience represents the size of objects relative to the perceiver's body and does not represent objects as having intrinsic or nonrelational spatial magnitudes. I argue that Malebranche's case for this body-relative thesis is more sophisticated than other commentators—most notably, Atherton and Simmons —have presented it. Malebranche's central argument relies on the possibility of perceptual variation with respect to size. He uses two thought experiments to show that perceivers of different sizes—namely, miniature people, giants, and typical human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  27
    Body Schema Dynamics in Merleau-Ponty.Jan Halák - 2021 - In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. pp. 33-51.
    This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Pre-Frontal Executive Committee for Perception, Working Memory, Attention, Long-Term Memory, Motor Control, and Thinking: A Tutorial Review.Bill Faw - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):83-139.
    As an explicit organizing metaphor, memory aid, and conceptual framework, the prefrontal cortex may be viewed as a five-member ‘Executive Committee,’ as the prefrontal-control extensions of five sub-and-posterior-cortical systems: the ‘Perceiver’ is the frontal extension of the ventral perceptual stream which represents the world and self in object coordinates; the ‘Verbalizer’ is the frontal extension of the language stream which represents the world and self in language coordinates; the ‘Motivator’ is the frontal cortical extension of a subcortical extended-amygdala stream which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47. Soul and Body.John Sutton - 2013 - In Peter Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 285-307.
    Ideas about soul and body – about thinking or remembering, mind and life, brain and self – remain both diverse and controversial in our neurocentric age. The history of these ideas is significant both in its own right and to aid our understanding of the complex sources and nature of our concepts of mind, cognition, and psychology, which are all terms with puzzling, difficult histories. These topics are not the domain of specialists alone, and studies of emotion, perception, or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  45
    How the Body Narrows the Interaction with the Environment.Marcello Costantini & Mog Stapleton - 2015 - In Yann Coello & Martin Fischer (eds.), Foundations of embodied cognition: Perceptual and emotional embodiment. pp. 181-197.
    Embodiment matters to perception and action. Beyond the triviality that, under normal circumstances, we need a body in order to perceive the world and act in it, our particular embodiment, right here, right now, both enables and constrains our perception of possibilities for action. In this chapter, we provide empirical support for the idea that the structural and morphological features of the body can narrow the set of our possible interactions with the environment by shaping the way we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Embodied Perception: Redefining the Social.Joshua Soffer - 2001 - Theory and Psychology 11 (5):655-670.
    Common to different versions of social constructionism is the definition of discourse as taking place between persons. Experiences which take place in the absence of immediate others, such as thinking to oneself or reading a text, are treated as secondary phenomena, as introjected versions of social utterance-gestures. This article asserts that representative constructionist articulations of between-person relationality rest on abstractions masking a more primary locus of sociality. I offer an alternative formulation of the social as the embodiment of sensate experience, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Rethinking the Human Body in the Digital Age.Teodor Negru - 2013 - European Journal of Science and Theology 9 (1):123-132.
    The theory of information and Cybernetics allowed the transcendence of the material substrata of the human being by thinking it in terms of information units. The whole material world is reduced to information flows, which are encoded in various forms and which, by means of algorithms can be processed and reconfigured with a view to multiple simulation of the physical reality we live in. By applying these codes, communication and information technologies open the possibility of multidimensional reconstruction of the body (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 996