Results for 'prediction error minimization'

541 found
Order:
  1. The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1).
    An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  2. Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2016 - In Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Springer. pp. 639-661.
    Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing.Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described here (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  4. Explanatory Pluralism: An Unrewarding Prediction Error for Free Energy Theorists.Matteo Colombo & Cory Wright - 2017 - Brain and Cognition 112:3–12.
    Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5. How to Entrain Your Evil Demon.Jakob Hohwy - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    The notion that the brain is a prediction error minimizer entails, via the notion of Markov blankets and self-evidencing, a form of global scepticism — an inability to rule out evil demon scenarios. This type of scepticism is viewed by some as a sign of a fatally flawed conception of mind and cognition. Here I discuss whether this scepticism is ameliorated by acknowledging the role of action in the most ambitious approach to prediction error minimization, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Skull-Bound Perception and Precision Optimization Through Culture.Bryan Paton, Josh Skewes, Chris Frith & Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):222-222.
    Clark acknowledges but resists the indirect mind–world relation inherent in prediction error minimization (PEM). But directness should also be resisted. This creates a puzzle, which calls for reconceptualization of the relation. We suggest that a causal conception captures both aspects. With this conception, aspects of situated cognition, social interaction and culture can be understood as emerging through precision optimization.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Addiction as a Disorder of Self-Control.Edmund Henden - forthcoming - In Hanna Pickard & Serge Ahmed (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction. Routledge.
    Impairment of self-control is often said to be a defining feature of addiction. Yet many addicts display what appears to be a considerable amount of control over their drug-oriented actions. Not only are their actions clearly intentional and frequently carried out in a conscious and deliberate manner, there is evidence that many addicts are responsive to a wide range of ordinary incentives and counter-incentives. Moreover, addicts have a wide variety of reasons for using drugs, reasons which often seem to go (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Predictive Coding and Representationalism.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2).
    According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  9. The Hypothesis Testing Brain: Some Philosophical Applications.Jakob Hohwy - 2010 - Proceedings of the Australian Society for Cognitive Science Conference.
    According to one theory, the brain is a sophisticated hypothesis tester: perception is Bayesian unconscious inference where the brain actively uses predictions to test, and then refine, models about what the causes of its sensory input might be. The brain’s task is simply continually to minimise prediction error. This theory, which is getting increasingly popular, holds great explanatory promise for a number of central areas of research at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. I show how the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10.  73
    Just How Conservative is Conservative Predictive Processing?Paweł Gładziejewski - 2017 - Hybris. Revista de Filosofía 38:98-122.
    Predictive Processing (PP) framework construes perception and action (and perhaps other cognitive phenomena) as a matter of minimizing prediction error, i.e. the mismatch between the sensory input and sensory predictions generated by a hierarchically organized statistical model. There is a question of how PP fits into the debate between traditional, neurocentric and representation-heavy approaches in cognitive science and those approaches that see cognition as embodied, environmentally embedded, extended and (largely) representation-free. In the present paper, I aim to investigate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Simon Prosser - 2012 - In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158-179.
    Saying ┌ that ψ is F ┐ when one should have said ┌ that φ is F ┐ involves making one of two different kinds of error. Either the wrong nominal term (┌ ψ ┐ instead of ┌ φ ┐) is ascribed to the right object or the right nominal term is ascribed to the wrong object. Judgments susceptible to one kind of error are immune to the other. Indexical terms such as ‘here’ and ‘now’ exhibit a corresponding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  12. Modeling Measurement: Error and Uncertainty.Alessandro Giordani & Luca Mari - 2014 - In Marcel Boumans, Giora Hon & Arthur Petersen (eds.), Error and Uncertainty in Scientific Practice. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 79-96.
    In the last few decades the role played by models and modeling activities has become a central topic in the scientific enterprise. In particular, it has been highlighted both that the development of models constitutes a crucial step for understanding the world and that the developed models operate as mediators between theories and the world. Such perspective is exploited here to cope with the issue as to whether error-based and uncertainty-based modeling of measurement are incompatible, and thus alternative with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. The Error in the Error Theory.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.
    Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  14. Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  15. In Defence of Error Theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
    Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against (...) theories. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  16. A Theory of Predictive Dissonance: Predictive Processing Presents a New Take on Cognitive Dissonance.Roope Oskari Kaaronen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This article is a comparative study between predictive processing (PP, or predictive coding) and cognitive dissonance (CD) theory. The theory of CD, one of the most influential and extensively studied theories in social psychology, is shown to be highly compatible with recent developments in PP. This is particularly evident in the notion that both theories deal with strategies to reduce perceived error signals. However, reasons exist to update the theory of CD to one of “predictive dissonance.” First, the hierarchical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. On Believing the Error Theory.Alexander Hyun & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (11):631-640.
    In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible (for anyone, anywhere) to believe the error theory. This might sound like a problem for the error theory, but Streumer argues that it is not. He argues that the un-believability of the error theory offers a way for error theorists to respond to several objections commonly made against the view. In this paper, we respond to Streumer’s arguments. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18. Punishment and Psychopathy: A Case-Control Functional MRI Investigation of Reinforcement Learning in Violent Antisocial Personality Disordered Men.Sarah Gregory, R. James Blair, Dominic Ffytche, Andrew Simmons, Veena Kumari, Sheilagh Hodgins & Nigel Blackwood - 2014 - Lancet Psychiatry 2:153–160.
    Background Men with antisocial personality disorder show lifelong abnormalities in adaptive decision making guided by the weighing up of reward and punishment information. Among men with antisocial personality disorder, modifi cation of the behaviour of those with additional diagnoses of psychopathy seems particularly resistant to punishment. Methods We did a case-control functional MRI (fMRI) study in 50 men, of whom 12 were violent off enders with antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, 20 were violent off enders with antisocial personality disorder but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19.  40
    Linguistic Intuitions: Error Signals and the Voice of Competence.Steven Gross - forthcoming - In Samuel Schindler, Anna Drożdżowicz & Karen Brøcker (eds.), Linguistic Intuitions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Linguistic intuitions are a central source of evidence across a variety of linguistic domains. They have also long been a source of controversy. This chapter aims to illuminate the etiology and evidential status of at least some linguistic intuitions by relating them to error signals of the sort posited by accounts of on-line monitoring of speech production and comprehension. The suggestion is framed as a novel reply to Michael Devitt’s claim that linguistic intuitions are theory-laden “central systems” responses, rather (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  21. The Origins of Modal Error.George Bealer - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  22.  36
    Prediction Versus Accommodation in Economics.Robert Northcott - unknown - Journal of Economic Methodology 26 (1):59-69.
    Should we insist on prediction, i.e. on correctly forecasting the future? Or can we rest content with accommodation, i.e. empirical success only with respect to the past? I apply general considerations about this issue to the case of economics. In particular, I examine various ways in which mere accommodation can be sufficient, in order to see whether those ways apply to economics. Two conclusions result. First, an entanglement thesis: the need for prediction is entangled with the methodological role (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
    I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the problems (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24.  52
    Reductivism, Nonreductivism and Incredulity About Streumer’s Error Theory.N. G. Laskowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):766-776.
    In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues via elimination for a global error theory, according to which all normative judgments ascribe properties that do not exist. Streumer also argues that it is not possible to believe his view, which is a claim he uses in defending his view against several objections. I argue that reductivists and nonreductivists have compelling responses to Streumer's elimination argument – responses constituting strong reason to reject Streumer’s diagnosis of any alleged incredulity about his error (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Error Theory and Fictionalism.Nadeem Hussain - 2010 - In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
    This paper surveys contemporary accounts of error theory and fictionalism. It introduces these categories to those new to metaethics by beginning with moral nihilism, the view that nothing really is right or wrong. One main motivation is that the scientific worldview seems to have no place for rightness or wrongness. Within contemporary metaethics there is a family of theories that makes similar claims. These are the theories that are usually classified as forms of error theory or fictionalism though (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26.  34
    Random and Systematic Error in the Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    A puzzle of an unmarked clock, used by Timothy Williamson to question the KK principle, was separately adapted by David Christensen and Adam Elga to critique a principle of Rational Reflection. Both authors, we argue, flout the received relationship between ideal agency and the classical distinction between systematic and random error, namely that ideal agents are subject only to the latter. As a result, these criticisms miss their mark.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-25.
    Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality, adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality, and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged. I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral (...). Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Aristotle and Alexander on Perceptual Error.Mark A. Johnstone - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (3):310-338.
    Aristotle sometimes claims that the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that the perception of common perceptibles is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of. I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  53
    Relinquishing Control: What Romanian De Se Attitude Reports Teach Us About Immunity To Error Through Misidentification.Marina Folescu - forthcoming - In Alessandro Capone, Manuel García-Carpintero & Alessandra Falzone (eds.), Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages. Springer. pp. 1-20.
    Higginbotham (2003) argued that certain linguistic items of English, when used in indirect discourse, necessarily trigger first-personal interpretations. They are: the emphatic reflexive pronoun and the controlled understood subject, represented as PRO. PRO is special, in this respect, due to its imposing obligatory control effects between the main clause and its sub- ordinates (Chierchia (1989)). Folescu & Higginbotham (2012), in addition, argued that in Romanian, a language whose grammar doesn’t assign a prominent role to PRO (if it assigns it a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. The Semantic Error Problem for Epistemic Contextualism.Patrick Michael Greenough & Dirk Kindermann - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 305--320.
    Epistemic Contextualism is the view that “knows that” is semantically context-sensitive and that properly accommodating this fact into our philosophical theory promises to solve various puzzles concerning knowledge. Yet Epistemic Contextualism faces a big—some would say fatal—problem: The Semantic Error Problem. In its prominent form, this runs thus: speakers just don’t seem to recognise that “knows that” is context-sensitive; so, if “knows that” really is context-sensitive then such speakers are systematically in error about what is said by, or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Charity and Error‐Theoretic Nominalism.Arvid Båve - 2015 - Ratio 28 (3):256-270.
    I here investigate whether there is any version of the principle of charity both strong enough to conflict with an error-theoretic version of nominalism (EN) about abstract objects, and supported by the considerations adduced in favour of interpretive charity in the literature. I argue that in order to be strong enough, the principle, which I call (Charity), would have to read, “For all expressions e, an acceptable interpretation must make true a sufficiently high ratio of accepted sentences containing e”. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Scientific Uncertainty: A User's Guide.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - Grantham Institute on Climate Change Discussion Paper.
    There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty enters science, focusing on uncertainty in climate science and weather prediction. I then show how we cope with some of these sources of error through sophisticated modelling techniques. I show how we maintain confidence in the face of error.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Constructivism and the Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Avoiding Reification: Heuristic Effectiveness of Mathematics and the Prediction of the Omega Minus Particle.Michele Ginammi - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 53:20-27.
    According to Steiner (1998), in contemporary physics new important discoveries are often obtained by means of strategies which rely on purely formal mathematical considerations. In such discoveries, mathematics seems to have a peculiar and controversial role, which apparently cannot be accounted for by means of standard methodological criteria. M. Gell-Mann and Y. Ne׳eman׳s prediction of the Ω− particle is usually considered a typical example of application of this kind of strategy. According to Bangu (2008), this prediction is apparently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Are There Uncontroversial Error Theories?Terence Rajivan Edward - 2011 - Philosophical Pathways (162).
    This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Motor Experience Interacts with Effector Information During Action Prediction.Lincoln Colling, William Thompson & John Sutton - 2013 - Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society:2082-2087.
    Recent theory suggests that action prediction relies of a motor emulation mechanism that works by mapping observed actions onto the observer action system so that predictions can be generated using that same predictive mechanisms that underlie action control. This suggests that action prediction may be more accurate when there is a more direct mapping between the stimulus and the observer. We tested this hypothesis by comparing prediction accuracy for two stimulus types. A mannequin stimulus which contained information (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection.Julien Dutant - 2007 - Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Knowledge, Pragmatics, and Error.Dirk Kindermann - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):429-57.
    ‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag- matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis: while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic content that depends on the context of use. In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. The Construction of Transfinite Equivalence Algorithms.Han Geurdes - manuscript
    Context: Consistency of mathematical constructions in numerical analysis and the application of computerized proofs in the light of the occurrence of numerical chaos in simple systems. Purpose: To show that a computer in general and a numerical analysis in particular can add its own peculiarities to the subject under study. Hence the need of thorough theoretical studies on chaos in numerical simulation. Hence, a questioning of what e.g. a numerical disproof of a theorem in physics or a prediction in (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory.Toby Svoboda - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler solution to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  94
    "Deliberation and Prediction: It's Complicated".Vavova Katia - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):529-538.
    Alan Hájek launches a formidable attack on the idea that deliberation crowds out prediction – that when we are deliberating about what to do, we cannot rationally accommodate evidence about what we are likely to do. Although Hájek rightly diagnoses the problems with some of the arguments for the view, his treatment falls short in crucial ways. In particular, he fails to consider the most plausible version of the view, the best argument for it, and why anyone would ever (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (3):373-390.
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  74
    Prediction in General Relativity.C. McCoy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):491-509.
    Several authors have claimed that prediction is essentially impossible in the general theory of relativity, the case being particularly strong, it is said, when one fully considers the epistemic predicament of the observer. Each of these claims rests on the support of an underdetermination argument and a particular interpretation of the concept of prediction. I argue that these underdetermination arguments fail and depend on an implausible explication of prediction in the theory. The technical results adduced in these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  78
    On Contingently Error-Theoretic Concepts.Kristie Miller - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):181-190.
    An error theorist about a particular discourse combines the cognitivist thesis that the discourse is truth-apt with the thesis that core statements asserted by the discourse are false. For instance, one is an error theorist about witch discourse if one thinks that witch discourse is truth-apt and that some of the entities and properties quantified over by core statements in the discourse, namely witches and magical powers, do not exist and hence that certain core statements of the discourse (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  11
    Arithmetic Judgements, First-Person Judgements and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Michele Palmira - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):155-172.
    The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to error through misidentification by pursuing a comparison between arithmetic judgements and first-person judgements. By doing so, the first part of the paper offers a conciliatory resolution of the Coliva-Pryor dispute about so-called “de re” and “which-object” misidentification. The second part of the paper draws some lessons about what it takes to explain immunity to error through misidentification. The lessons are: First, the so-called (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  57
    Getting to Know You: Accuracy and Error in Judgments of Character.Evan Westra - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Character judgments play an important role in our everyday lives. However, decades of empirical research on trait attribution suggest that the cognitive processes that generate these judgments are prone to a number of biases and cognitive distortions. This gives rise to a skeptical worry about the epistemic foundations of everyday characterological beliefs that has deeply disturbing and alienating consequences. In this paper, I argue that this skeptical worry is misplaced: under the appropriate informational conditions, our everyday character-trait judgments are in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Ontology-Based Error Detection in SNOMED-CT.Werner Ceusters, Barry Smith, Anand Kumar & Christoffel Dhaen - 2004 - Proceedings of Medinfo 2004:482-6.
    Quality assurance in large terminologies is a difficult issue. We present two algorithms that can help terminology developers and users to identify potential mistakes. We demon­strate the methodology by outlining the different types of mistakes that are found when the algorithms are applied to SNOMED-CT. On the basis of the results, we argue that both formal logical and linguistic tools should be used in the development and quality-assurance process of large terminologies.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification * Edited by Simon Prosser and Francois Recanati. [REVIEW]J. Schwenkler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):180-182.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Delusions: Between Phenomenology and Prediction.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3/2014):11-16.
    One of the leading and central figures in research on delusions, Max Coltheart, presents and summarises his heretofore work in a short text. Miyazono and Bortolotti present an interesting argument aimed at the charges against the doxastic concept of delusions. Adams, Brown and Friston showcase a predictive-Bayesian concept of delusions. Young criticizes the current changes in the two-factor account of delusions and argues that the role of experience should not be dismissed within it. Kapusta presents an interesting, phenomenological approach to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Formalizing the Logical (Self-Reference) Error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 541