Results for 'second-order belief'

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  1. A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.
    According to Russellianism (or Millianism), the two sentences ‘Ralph believes George Eliot is a novelist’ and ‘Ralph believes Mary Ann Evans is a novelist’ cannot diverge in truth-value, since they express the same proposition. The problem for the Russellian (or Millian) is that a puzzle of Kaplan’s seems to show that they can diverge in truth-value and that therefore, since the Russellian holds that they express the same proposition, the Russellian view is contradictory. I argue that the standard Russellian appeal (...)
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  2. Mental Files and Belief: A Cognitive Theory of How Children Represent Belief and its Intensionality.Josef Perner, Michael Huemer & Brian Leahy - 2015 - Cognition 145:77-88.
    We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball was taken from box (...)
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  3. Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):251-268.
    I develop a general framework with a rationality constraint that shows how coherently to represent and deal with second-order information about one's own judgmental reliability. It is a rejection of and generalization away from the typical Bayesian requirements of unconditional judgmental self-respect and perfect knowledge of one's own beliefs, and is defended by appeal to the Principal Principle. This yields consequences about maintaining unity of the self, about symmetries and asymmetries between the first- and third-person, and a principled (...)
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  4. Whither Higher-Order Evidence?Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    First-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a proposition is true. Higher-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a person is able to assess her evidence for or against a proposition. A widespread view is that higher-order evidence makes a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In this paper, I consider in what way higher-order evidence might do this. More specifically, I consider whether and how higher-order (...)
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  5. Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.
    Titelbaum Oxford studies in epistemology, 2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, if it cannot be rational to have akratic beliefs of the form “p, but I shouldn’t believe that p,” then rational beliefs cannot be defeated by higher-order evidence, which indicates that they are irrational. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of understanding Titelbaum’s argument, and argue that (...)
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  6. The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief.Branden Thornhill-Miller & Peter Millican - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):1--49.
    This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, (...)
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  7. Is Higher-Order Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question? When we gain information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational, we are in one of two general cases. In the first case we made no error, and our beliefs are rational. In that case the input to the contrary is misleading. In (...)
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  8. Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief.Brad Armendt - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768.
    Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we (...)
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  9. Against SecondOrder Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.
    A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I (...)
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  10.  57
    Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    Many theories of rational belief give a special place to logic. They say that an ideally rational agent would never be uncertain about logical facts. In short: they say that ideal rationality requires "logical omniscience." Here I argue against the view that ideal rationality requires logical omniscience on the grounds that the requirement of logical omniscience can come into conflict with the requirement to proportion one’s beliefs to the evidence. I proceed in two steps. First, I rehearse an influential (...)
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  11. Second-Order Logic.John Corcoran - 2001 - In M. Zeleny (ed.), Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. KLUKER. pp. 61–76.
    Second-order Logic” in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds. Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 61–76. -/- Abstract. This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols. It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is (...)
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  12. Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.
    It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. (...)
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  13. Second-Order Science of Interdisciplinary Research: A Polyocular Framework for Wicked Problems.Hugo F. Alrøe & E. Noe - 2014 - Constructivist Foundations 10 (1):65-76.
    Context: The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are “wicked problems,” such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem: The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order (...)
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  14. Second-Order Science: A Vast and Largely Unexplored Science Frontier.K. H. Müller & A. Riegler - 2014 - Constructivist Foundations 10 (1):7-15.
    Context: Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. Problem: We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. (...)
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  15. Mackie Vs Plantinga on the Warrant of Theistic Belief Without Arguments.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (1):77.
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis (...)
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  16. Does Rationality Demand Higher-Order Certainty?Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Should you always be certain about what you should believe? In other words, does rationality demand higher-order certainty? First answer: Yes! Higher-order uncertainty can’t be rational, since it breeds at least a mild form of epistemic akrasia. Second answer: No! Higher-order certainty can’t be rational, since it licenses a dogmatic kind of insensitivity to higher-order evidence. Which answer wins out? The first, I argue. Once we get clearer about what higher-order certainty is, a view (...)
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  17.  81
    Second Order Properties: Why Kim's Reduction Does Not Work.Simone Gozzano - 2003 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 1 (1):1-15.
    The paper sets forth an argument against Kim's distinction between levels and orders.
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  18. Second Order Science: Putting the Metaphysics Back Into the Practice of Science.Michael Lissack -
    The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. Through the imposition of “enabling constraints” -- making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus -- science can bracket away ambiguity. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. After rendering explicit the role of uceps in scientific claims, the scientific method is (...)
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  19. First- and Second-Order Logic of Mass Terms.Peter Roeper - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (3):261-297.
    Provided here is an account, both syntactic and semantic, of first-order and monadic second-order quantification theory for domains that may be non-atomic. Although the rules of inference largely parallel those of classical logic, there are important differences in connection with the identification of argument places and the significance of the identity relation.
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  20. Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
    Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this (...)
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  21. An Argument for a Second-Order Cosmology.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    This paper proposes the feasibility of a second-order approach in cosmology. It is intended to encourage cosmologists to rethink standard ideas in their field, leading to a broader concept of self-organization and of science itself. It is argued, from a cognitive epistemology perspective, that a first-order approach is inadequate for cosmology; study of the universe as a whole must include study of the scientific observer and the process of theorizing. Otherwise, concepts of self-organization at the cosmological scale (...)
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  22. Second Order Inductive Logic and Wilmers' Principle.M. S. Kliess & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (4):462-476.
    We extend the framework of Inductive Logic to Second Order languages and introduce Wilmers' Principle, a rational principle for probability functions on Second Order languages. We derive a representation theorem for functions satisfying this principle and investigate its relationship to the first order principles of Regularity and Super Regularity.
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  23. Second-Order Science and Policy.Anthony Hodgson & Graham Leicester - 2017 - World Futures 73 (3):119-178.
    In March 2016, an interdisciplinary group met for two days and two evenings to explore the implications for policy making of second-order science. The event was sponsored by SITRA, the Finnish Parliament's Innovation Fund. Their interest arose from their concern that the well-established ways, including evidence-based approaches, of policy and decision making used in government were increasingly falling short of the complexity, uncertainty, and urgency of needed decision making. There was no assumption that second-order science or (...)
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  24. Inconsistent Countable Set in Second Order ZFC and Nonexistence of the Strongly Inaccessible Cardinals.Jaykov Foukzon - 2015 - British Journal of Mathematics and Computer Science 9 (5):380-393.
    In this article we derived an important example of the inconsistent countable set in second order ZFC (ZFC_2) with the full second-order semantics. Main results: (i) :~Con(ZFC2_); (ii) let k be an inaccessible cardinal, V is an standard model of ZFC (ZFC_2) and H_k is a set of all sets having hereditary size less then k; then : ~Con(ZFC + E(V)(V = Hk)):.
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  25.  78
    COMMENTARY: “Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties” by Andrew Egan.Peter Alward - unknown
    Egan argues against Lewis’s view that properties are sets of actual and possible individuals and in favour of the view that they are functions from worlds to extensions (sets of individuals). Egan argues that Lewis’s view implies that 2nd order properties are never possessed contingently by their (1st order) bearers, an implication to which there are numerous counter-examples. And Egan argues that his account of properties is more commensurable with the role they play as the semantic values of (...)
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  26.  89
    On Second-Order Religion, Agatheism and Naturalism. A Reply to Branden Thornhill-Miller, Peter Millican and Janusz Salamon.Graham Oppy - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (3):257--272.
    These comments, on the paper by Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican, and on the critique of that paper by Janusz Salamon, divide into four sections. In the first two sections, I briefly sketch some of the major themes from the paper by Thornhill-Miller and Millican, and then from the critique by Salamon. In the final two sections, I provide some critical thoughts on Salamon’s objections to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, and then on the leading claims made by Thornhill-Miller and Millican. I (...)
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  27. Extensionalizing Intensional Second-Order Logic.Jonathan Payne - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):243-261.
    Neo-Fregean approaches to set theory, following Frege, have it that sets are the extensions of concepts, where concepts are the values of second-order variables. The idea is that, given a second-order entity $X$, there may be an object $\varepsilon X$, which is the extension of X. Other writers have also claimed a similar relationship between second-order logic and set theory, where sets arise from pluralities. This paper considers two interpretations of second-order logic—as (...)
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  28. An Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software Agents and Human Users.Christopher Burr, Nello Cristianini & James Ladyman - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (4):735-774.
    Interactions between an intelligent software agent and a human user are ubiquitous in everyday situations such as access to information, entertainment, and purchases. In such interactions, the ISA mediates the user’s access to the content, or controls some other aspect of the user experience, and is not designed to be neutral about outcomes of user choices. Like human users, ISAs are driven by goals, make autonomous decisions, and can learn from experience. Using ideas from bounded rationality, we frame these interactions (...)
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  29.  57
    Methodological Issues of Second-Order Model Building.Pedro J. Sánchez Gómez & P. J. Sánchez Gómez - 2014 - Constructivist Foundations 9 (3):344-346.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivist Model Building: Empirical Examples From Mathematics Education” by Catherine Ulrich, Erik S. Tillema, Amy J. Hackenberg & Anderson Norton. Upshot: I argue that radical constructivism poses a series of deep methodological constraints on educational research. We focus on the work of Ulrich et al. to illustrate the practical implications of these constraints.
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  30. Atheism and Agatheism in the Global Ethical Discourse: Reply to Millican and Thornhill-Miller.Janusz Salamon - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):197– 245.
    Peter Millican and Branden Thornhill-Miller have recently argued that contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with the host of defeaters based on empirical research concerning alleged sources of evidence for ‘perceived supernatural agency’, render all ‘first-order’, that is actual, religious traditions positively irrational, and a source of discord on a global scale. However, since the authors recognise that the ‘secularisation thesis’ appears to be incorrect, and that empirical research provides evidence that religious belief also has (...)
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  31. Constructing Formal Semantics From an Ontological Perspective. The Case of Second-Order Logics.Thibaut Giraud - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2115-2145.
    In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view \(O\) and wants to interpret a formal language \(L\) , a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for \(L\) in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with \(O\) . Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an (...)
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  32. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
    Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via (...)
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  33. Strong Normalization of a Symmetric Lambda Calculus for Second-Order Classical Logic.Yoriyuki Yamagata - 2002 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 41 (1):91-99.
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  34.  95
    A Promethean Philosophy of External Technologies, Empiricism, & the Concept: Second-Order Cybernetics, Deep Learning, and Predictive Processing.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Media Theory 4 (1):87-146.
    Beginning with a survey of the shortcoming of theories of organology/media-as-externalization of mind/body—a philosophical-anthropological tradition that stretches from Plato through Ernst Kapp and finds its contemporary proponent in Bernard Stiegler—I propose that the phenomenological treatment of media as an outpouching and extension of mind qua intentionality is not sufficient to counter the ̳black-box‘ mystification of today‘s deep learning‘s algorithms. Focusing on a close study of Simondon‘s On the Existence of Technical Objectsand Individuation, I argue that the process-philosophical work of Gilbert (...)
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  35.  94
    Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic.Richard Kimberly Heck - 2018 - In Ivette Fred-Rivera & Jessica Leach (eds.), Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140-169.
    In two recent papers, Bob Hale has attempted to free second-order logic of the 'staggering existential assumptions' with which Quine famously attempted to saddle it. I argue, first, that the ontological issue is at best secondary: the crucial issue about second-order logic, at least for a neo-logicist, is epistemological. I then argue that neither Crispin Wright's attempt to characterize a `neutralist' conception of quantification that is wholly independent of existential commitment, nor Hale's attempt to characterize the (...)
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  36.  52
    Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-52.
    This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.
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  37. INVENTING LOGIC: THE LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEM THEOREM AND FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER LOGIC.Valérie Lynn Therrien - 2012 - Pensées Canadiennes 10.
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  38. Too Resilient for Anyone’s Good: ‘Infant Psychophysics’ Viewed Through Second-Order Cybernetics, Part 1 (Background and Problems).Lance Nizami - 2019 - Kybernetes 48.
    Purpose – This study aims to examine the observer’s role in “infant psychophysics”. Infant psychophysics was developed because the diagnosis of perceptual deficits should be done as early in a patient’s life as possible, to provide efficacious treatment and thereby reduce potential long-term costs. Infants, however, cannot report their perceptions. Hence, the intensity of a stimulus at which the infant can detect it, the “threshold”, must be inferred from the infant’s behavior, as judged by observers (watchers). But whose abilities are (...)
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  39.  18
    The General Solution for a Linear Second Order Homogenous Differential Equations with Variable Coefficients.Rehab A. Shaaban - 2019 - International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) 3 (4):16-25.
    Abstract : The main goal in this work to find the general solution for some kind of linear second order homogenous differential equations with variable coefficients which have the general form , by using the substitution ,which transform form the above equation to Riccati equation .
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  40. Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational (...)
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  41. How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.
    Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how (...)
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  42.  16
    A (Very) Brief Doxographical Analysis of Constructivism: From Pre-Socratics to Second-Order Cybernetics.Israel Salas Llanas - 2018 - Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía 18 (2):61-76.
    Constructivism is a philosophical current that manifests itself greatly within the realm of contemporary epistemology. Its bases come from the idea that knowledge is not only actively constructed by the observer but also provides a lens through which reality can be interpreted as a result of experiences. This paper traces a brief interdisciplinary curve that outlines some of the most important philosophical approaches that contributed to the consolidation of this school of thought for more than twenty-five centuries.
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  43. Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. But on virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. (...)
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  44.  96
    Too Resilient for Anyone’s Good: ‘Infant Psychophysics’ Viewed Through Second-Order Cybernetics, Part 2 (Re-Interpretation).Lance Nizami - 2019 - Kybernetes 48.
    Purpose – This paper aims to extend the companion paper on “infant psychophysics”, which concentrated on the role of in-lab observers (watchers). Infants cannot report their own perceptions, so for five decades their detection thresholds for sensory stimuli were inferred from their stimulus-evoked behavior, judged by watchers. The inferred thresholds were revealed to inevitably be those of the watcher–infant duo, and, more broadly, the entire Laboratory. Such thresholds are unlikely to represent the finest stimuli that the infant can detect. What, (...)
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  45. Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These (...)
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  46. Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.
    This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and (...)
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  47. Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
    Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving (...)
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  48. Una proposta per la caratterizzazione della credenza religiosa.Daniele Bertini - 2014 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 16.
    My paper challenges the externalist mainstream assumptions towards the understanding of religious beliefs (i.e., reliabilism by W.Alston, the warrant belief approach by A.Plantinga, the neowittgensteinian analysis of doxastic systems). According to such assumptions, religious beliefs should be evaluated rational in terms of the same doxastic standard giving justification for ordinary factual beliefs. Moving from the empiricist intuition that the kind of content of belief matters to the form of belief and the justification practices for it, I argue (...)
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  49. There is No Standard Model of ZFC and ZFC_2. Part I.Jaykov Foukzon - 2017 - Journal of Advances in Mathematics and Computer Science 2 (26):1-20.
    In this paper we view the first order set theory ZFC under the canonical frst order semantics and the second order set theory ZFC_2 under the Henkin semantics. Main results are: (i) Let M_st^ZFC be a standard model of ZFC, then ¬Con(ZFC + ∃M_st^ZFC ). (ii) Let M_stZFC_2 be a standard model of ZFC2 with Henkin semantics, then ¬Con(ZFC_2 +∃M_stZFC_2). (iii) Let k be inaccessible cardinal then ¬Con(ZFC + ∃κ). In order to obtain the statements (...)
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  50. Modal Structuralism and Theism.Silvia Jonas - forthcoming - In Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Drawing an analogy between modal structuralism about mathematics and theism, I o er a structuralist account that implicitly de nes theism in terms of three basic relations: logical and metaphysical priority, and epis- temic superiority. On this view, statements like `God is omniscient' have a hypothetical and a categorical component. The hypothetical component provides a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic language are converted into statements of second-order modal logic. The categorical component asserts the logical possibility (...)
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