Results for 'social value'

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  1. The Social Value of Health Research and the Worst Off.Nicola Barsdorf & Joseph Millum - 2017 - Bioethics 31 (2):105-115.
    In this article we argue that the social value of health research should be conceptualized as a function of both the expected benefits of the research and the priority that the beneficiaries deserve. People deserve greater priority the worse off they are. This conception of social value can be applied for at least two important purposes: in health research priority setting when research funders, policy-makers, or researchers decide between alternative research projects; and in evaluating the ethics (...)
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  2. The Social Value of Reasoning in Epistemic Justification.Jennifer Nagel - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):297-308.
    When and why does it matter whether we can give an explicit justification for what we believe? This paper examines these questions in the light of recent empirical work on the social functions served by our capacity to reason, in particular, Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning.
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  3.  13
    Mapping Value Sensitive Design Onto AI for Social Good Principles.Steven Umbrello & Ibo van de Poel - manuscript
    Although not much work has been done regarding the practical implementations of AI4SG principles for design, initial first steps provide promising ways forward. This paper proposes that the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) approach to technology design maps symbiotically onto the initially formulated AI4SG principles and that the VSD bolsters these principles by providing designers and engineers a principled approach to incorporating human values into AI systems design. Likewise, it distinguishes several sources of values in AI systems’ design that not (...)
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  4. Racist Value Judgments as Objectively False Beliefs: A Philosophical and Social-Psychological Analysis.Sharyn Clough & William E. Loges - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):77–95.
    Racist beliefs express value judgments. According to an influential view, value judgments are subjective, and not amenable to rational adjudication. In contrast, we argue that the value judgments expressed in, for example, racist beliefs, are false and objectively so. Our account combines a naturalized, philosophical account of meaning inspired by Donald Davidson, with a prominent social-psychological theory of values pioneered by the social-psychologist Milton Rokeach. We use this interdisciplinary approach to show that, just as with (...)
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  5.  53
    Life Sustains Life 1. Value: Social and Ecological.James Tully - forthcoming - In Akeel Bilgrami (ed.), Nature and Value. New York: Columbia University Press.
    I would like to address the question of social and ecological value by bringing two approaches to this question into conversation with one another and show their connections. The two approaches are those of Jonathan Schell and Akeel Bilgrami. The connection between the two approaches is their shared interest in the ‘conditions that sustain life’ on earth. The answer to the question of what are the conditions that sustain life is, in my opinion, ‘life sustains life’: that is, (...)
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  6. The Epistemology of Social Facts: The Evidential Value of Personal Experience Versus Testimony.Luc Bovens & Stephen Leeds - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Frankfurt A. M.: Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 43-51.
    "The Personal is Political": This was an often-heard slogan of feminist groups in the late sixties and early seventies. The slogan is no doubt open to many interpretations. There is one interpretation which touches on the epistemology of social facts, viz. the slogan claims that in assessing the features of a political system, personal experiences have privileged evidentiary value. For instancte, in the face of third person reports about political corruption, I may remain unmoved in my belief that (...)
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  7.  78
    How Do Decision Heuristic Performance and Social Value Orientaion Matter in the Building of Preferences?Marcus Selart, Ole Boe & Kazuhisa Takemura - 2000 - Göteborg Psychological Reports 30 (6).
    In the present study it was shown that both decision heuristics and social value orientation play important roles in the building of preferences. This was revealed in decision tasks in which participants were deciding about candidates for a job position. An eye-tracking equipment was applied in order to register participants´ information acquisition. It was revealed that participants performing well on a series of heuristics tasks (availability, representativeness, anchoríng & adjustment,and attribution) including a confidence judgment also behaved more accurately (...)
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  8. The Embodied and Social Dimensions of Free Will: The Value of Phenomenology.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (2):23-24.
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  9.  95
    Morality as a Value Criterion and a Social Fact.Jovan Babić - 2014 - In Olga Zubec (ed.), Morality: Diversity of Concepts and Meanings. Moscow, Russia: Russian Academy of Sciences – Institute of Philosophy & Alfa-M. pp. 219-224.
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  10. Real Kinds in Real Time: On Responsible Social Modeling.Theodore Bach - 2019 - The Monist 102 (2):236-258.
    There is broad agreement among social researchers and social ontologists that the project of dividing humans into social kinds should be guided by at least two methodological commitments. First, a commitment to what best serves moral and political interests, and second, a commitment to describing accurately the causal structures of social reality. However, researchers have not sufficiently analyzed how these two commitments interact and constrain one another. In the absence of that analysis, several confusions have set (...)
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  11. Contingency and Value in Social Decision Making.Marcus Selart & Daniel Eek - 1999 - In Peter Juslin & Henry Montgomery (eds.), Judgment and Decision Making. Erlbaum. pp. 261-273.
    This chapter discusses different perspectives and trends in social decision making, especially the actual processes used by humans when they make decisions in their everyday lives or in business situations. The chapter uses cognitive psychological techniques to break down these processes and set them in their social context. Most of our decisions are made in a social context and are therefore influenced by other people. If you are at an auction and bidding on a popular item, you (...)
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  12. Corruption, Corporate Character-Formation and "Value-Strategy".Aleksandar Fatic - 2013 - Filozofija I Društvo 24 (1):60-80.
    While most discussions of corruption focus on administration, institutions, the law and public policy, little attention in the debate about societal reform is paid to the “internalities” of anti-corruption efforts, specifically to character-formation and issues of personal and corporate integrity. While the word “integrity” is frequently mentioned as the goal to be achieved through institutional reforms, even in criminal prosecutions, the specifically philosophical aspects of character-formation and the development of corporate and individual virtues in a rational and systematic way tend (...)
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  13.  72
    Business-Inflicted Social Harm.Edmund F. Byrne - 1998 - In Yeager Hudson (ed.), Technology, Morality and Social Policy. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press. pp. 55-73.
    Businesses cause social harm, meaning harm to society at large and not just to those with whom a business is contractually linked. Evidence introduced: normative claims that businesses should be "socially responsible"; positive claims that they contribute to social well-being; and negative claims that they are sometimes military-like, causing extensive harm for which no one is held personally responsible. The latter point to corporate survivalism, which acknowledges no mandatory civil responsibilities. Neither law nor social pressure has yet (...)
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  14. Clinical Research: Should Patients Pay to Play?Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Steven Joffe, Christine Grady, David Wendler & Govind Persad - 2015 - Science Translational Medicine 7 (298):298ps16.
    We argue that charging people to participate in research is likely to undermine the fundamental ethical bases of clinical research, especially the principles of social value, scientific validity, and fair subject selection.
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  15. Retweeting: Its Linguistic and Epistemic Value.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper analyses the communicative and epistemic value of retweeting (and more generally of reposting content on social media). Against a naïve view, it argues that retweets are not acts of endorsement, motivating this diagnosis with linguistic data. Retweeting is instead modelled as a peculiar form of quotation, in which the reported content is indicated rather than reproduced. A relevance-theoretic account of the communicative import of retweeting is then developed, to spell out the complex mechanisms by which retweets (...)
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  16. How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World?Nicholas Maxwell - 2009 - In Leemon McHenry (ed.), Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom. Ontos Verlag.
    The Urgent Need for an Intellectual Revolution For much of my working life (from 1972 onwards) I have argued, in and out of print, that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science – and of academic inquiry more generally. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, academia needs to devote itself to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, (...)
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  17. Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value.Kareem Khalifa & Jared A. Millson - 2020 - In Michela Massimi & Ana-Maria Cretu (eds.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 87-106.
    Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social (...)
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  18.  77
    Corporatised Identities ≠ Digital Identities: Algorithmic Filtering on Social Media and the Commercialisation of Presentations of Self.Charlie Harry Smith - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Springer.
    Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical identity theory requires modification when theorising about presentations of self on social media. This chapter contributes to these efforts, refining a conception of digital identities by differentiating them from ‘corporatised identities’. Armed with this new distinction, I ultimately argue that social media platforms’ production of corporatised identities undermines their users’ autonomy and digital well-being. This follows from the disentanglement of several commonly conflated concepts. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of presentation of self that I collectively (...)
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  19. Ontology of the False State: On the Relation Between Critical Theory, Social Philosophy, and Social Ontology.Italo Testa - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):271-300.
    In this paper I will argue that critical theory needs to make its socio-ontological commitments explicit, whilst on the other hand I will posit that contemporary social ontology needs to amend its formalistic approach by embodying a critical theory perspective. In the first part of my paper I will discuss how the question was posed in Horkheimer’s essays of the 1930s, which leave open two options: (1) a constructive inclusion of social ontology within social philosophy, or else (...)
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  20. Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502.
    This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual (...)
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  21.  81
    Why the Intrinsic Value of Public Goods Matters.Avigail Ferdman - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-16.
    Existing accounts of public-goods distribution rely on the existence of solidarity for providing non-universal public goods, such as the humanities or national parks. There are three fundamental problems with these accounts: they ignore instances of social fragmentation; they treat preferences for public goods as morally benign, and they assume that these preferences are the only relevant moral consideration. However, not all citizens unanimously require public goods such as the humanities or national parks. Public-goods distribution that is based only on (...)
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  22. Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks.Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of (...)
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  23.  66
    What is Peace? : It's Value and Necessity.Hortensia Cuellar - 2009 - In Jinfen Yan & David E. Schrader (eds.), Creating a Global Dialogue on Value Inquiry: Papers From the Xxii Congress of Philosophy (Rethinking Philosophy Today). Edwin Mellen Press.
    The following article is a reflection on the value of peace, a term often attributes to the absence of war or the lack of violence, conflict, suppression or, in short, phenomena considerer opposite to peace. But, is this really how peace should be defined? It is a fact that peace, be it personal inner peace or peace within a society, is constantly threatened, attacked, violated, and destroyed by a variation of causes: the failure to keep a promise, the breach (...)
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  24. Our Fundamental Problem: A Revolutionary Approach to Philosophy.Nicholas Maxwell - June 2020 - Montreal, Canada: Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    How can the world we live in and see, touch, hear, and smell, the world of living things, people, consciousness, free will, meaning, and value - how can all of this exist and flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe, made up of nothing but physical entities such as electrons and quarks? How can anything be of value if everything in the universe is, ultimately, just physics? In Our Fundamental Problem Nicholas Maxwell argues that this problem (...)
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  25.  31
    What Does an African Ethic of Social Cohesion Entail for Social Distancing?Thaddeus Metz - 2020 - Developing World Bioethics 20 (2):1-10.
    The most prominent strand of moral thought in the African philosophical tradition is relational and cohesive, roughly demanding that we enter into community with each other. Familiar is the view that being a real person means sharing a way of life with others, perhaps even in their fate. What does such a communal ethic prescribe for the coronavirus pandemic? Might it forbid one from social distancing, at least away from intimates? Or would it entail that social distancing is (...)
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  26.  54
    A Proposed Hybrid Effect Size Plus P -Value Criterion: Empirical Evidence Supporting its Use.William M. Goodman - 2019 - The American Statistician 73 (Sup(1)):168-185.
    DOI: 10.1080/00031305.2018.1564697 When the editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology effectively banned the use of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) from articles published in their journal, it set off a fire-storm of discussions both supporting the decision and defending the utility of NHST in scientific research. At the heart of NHST is the p-value which is the probability of obtaining an effect equal to or more extreme than the one observed in the sample data, given the null (...)
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  27. ’The Crowd is Untruth!’ Kierkegaard on Freedom, Responsibility, and the Problem of Social Comparison.Paul Carron - 2018 - In Fernando Di Mieri & Daniele D'Agostino (eds.), Identità, libertà e responsabilità (Identity, Freedom, and Responsibility). Italy: Ripostes. pp. 53-77.
    In this essay, I first describe Kierkegaard’s understanding of free and responsible selfhood. I then describe one of Kierkegaard’s unique contributions to freedom and responsibility – his perceptual theory of the emotions. Kierkegaard understands emotions as perceptions that are related to beliefs and concerns, and thus the self can—to some extent—freely participate in the cultivation of various emotions. In other words, one of the ways that self takes responsibility for itself is by taking responsibility for its emotions. In the final (...)
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  28. Value Judgements and Value Neutrality in Economics.Philippe Mongin - 2006 - Economica 73 (290):257-286.
    The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other (...)
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  29. Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value?Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - In Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Franz Schmid & Emidio Spinelli (eds.), Sceptical Paths: Enquiry and Doubt from Antiquity to the Present. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 43-66.
    My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian skepticism, as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works, has practical or epistemic value. More precisely, I would like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment (ἐποχή) and undisturbedness (ἀταραξία) can be deemed to be of practical or epistemic value. By ‘practical’ value I mean both moral value and prudential value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential value (...)
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  30. The Social Cost of Carbon From Theory to Trump.J. Paul Kelleher - forthcoming - In Ravi Kanbur & Henry Shue (eds.), Climate Justice: Integrating Economics and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a central concept in climate change economics. This chapter explains the SCC and investigates it philosophically. As is widely acknowledged, any SCC calculation requires the analyst to make choices about the infamous topic of discount rates. But to understand the nature and role of discounting, one must understand how that concept—and indeed the SCC concept itself—is yoked to the concept of a value function, whose job is to take ways the world (...)
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  31. What’s Wrong with Social Simulations?Eckhart Arnold - 2014 - The Monist 97 (3):359-377.
    This paper tries to answer the question why the epistemic value of so many social simulations is questionable. I consider the epistemic value of a social simulation as questionable if it contributes neither directly nor indirectly to the understanding of empirical reality. To examine this question, two classical social simulations are analyzed with respect to their possible epistemic justification: Schelling’s neighborhood segregation model and Axelrod’s reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma simulations of the evolution of cooperation. It is (...)
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  32. Value Disagreement and Two Aspects of Meaning.Erich Rast - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (51):399-430.
    The problem of value disagreement and contextualist, relativist and metalinguistic attempts of solving it are laid out. Although the metalinguistic account seems to be on the right track, it is argued that it does not sufficiently explain why and how disagreements about the meaning of evaluative terms are based on and can be decided by appeal to existing social practices. As a remedy, it is argued that original suggestions from Putnam's 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' ought to be taken (...)
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  33.  6
    Social Ontology. Emotional Sharing as the Foundation of Care Relationships.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - In S. Bourgault & E. Pulcini, Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peeters.
    Scheler’s theory that emotional sharing underlies social ontology, which was already presented in the first edition of Sympathiebuch in 1913, made a comeback in Formalismus. Sharing one’s feelings and emotions is the reason behind various “forms of being-with-one-another [Miteinandersein] and co-living-with-one-another [Miteinaderleben], in which the corresponding forms of social unit constitute themselves” [GW II, 515, my translation]. Scheler thus lays the foundation for a general theory of social ontology: There is a theory of all the possible (...) essential units [Wesenseinheiten]. To develop it and to apply it for the comprehension of real, existing social units (marriage, family, people, nation etc.) constitutes the fundamental problem of a philosophical sociology and the premise of any social ethics [GW II, 515, my translation] . According to this hypothesis, we can outline four major correlations between forms of emotional sharing and forms of social unit. 1) “The social unit that constitutes itself (simultaneously) through so-called contagion without comprehension and involuntary imitation. It is called ‘herd’ for animals and ‘mass’ if it occurs with the human being.” [GW II, 515, my translation]; 2) “The social unit that constitutes itself in [...] co-experiencing [Miterleben] or re-experiencing [Nacherleben] (co-feeling [Mitfühlen], co-striving [Mitstreben], co-thinking [Mitdenken], co-judging [Miturteilen] etc.)” [GW II, 515, my translation]. This type of social unit is called “vital community” (Lebensgemeinschaft) [GW II, 516, my translation]; 3) Society, unlike the vital community, is “a unit made up of adult and self-conscious single persons” [GW II, 518, my translation]. In society, individuals are not considered in relation to the difference of their irreplaceable singularity; in fact, “differences in society and differences in value between its elements come about only through different values of accomplishment of the individuals in the value-direction of the agreeable and the useful, the value-correlates of society.” [GW II, 519, my translation]. This efficientistic and individualistic logic entails an ability to share the Other’s emotions qua emotions of the Other, based on the clear and conscious distinction between I and You. However, it also entails the absence of any form of “original co-responsibility [Mitverantwortlichkeit] since every form of responsibility that is assumed towards the Other is founded on a unilateral self-responsibility [Selbstverantwortlichkeit] instead” [GW II, 518, my translation]. 4) The “personal community” is established according to a solidaristic form of sharing responsibility, or “co-responsibility” (Mitverantwortlichkeit), based on the principle of “irreplaceable solidarity” [GW II, 523]. Already in the second edition of Sympathiebuch (1923), Scheler felt the need to offer a modified version of the four ways of sharing feelings and emotions: 1) Unconscious sharing through unipathy (Einsfühlung, “feeling as one”, a term that appeared neither in the 1913 edition nor in Formalismus) or affective contamination (Gefühlsanstekung); 2) Sharing through empathy, which Scheler calls Nachfühlung, to distance himself from Lipps’ theory of empathy (Einfühlung); 3) Conscious sharing through sympathy or “affective co-feeling” (Mitgefühl) according to the logic of social recognition; 4) Solidaristic sharing that leads to love or hate. Scheler also institutes a foundational law according to which unipathy is the foundation of empathy, empathy is that of sympathy, and sympathy is the basis of the forms of love and hate [GW VII, 105]. (shrink)
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  34. The Social Disvalue of Premature Deaths.Hilary Greaves - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and reasoning: Themes from the philosophy of John Broome. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Much public policy analysis requires us to place a monetary value on the bad- ness of a premature human death. Currently dominant approaches to determining this ‘value of a life’ focus exclusively on the ‘self-regarding’ value of life — that is, the value of a person’s life to the person whose death is in question — and altogether ignore effects on other people. This procedure would be justified if, as seems intuitively plausible, other-regarding effects were negligible (...)
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  35.  83
    Human Dignity and the Non-Utilitarist Consequentialist Ethics of Social Consequences.V. Gluchman - 2004 - Filozofia 59:502-506.
    Prominent critics of consequentialism hold that utilitarianism is not capable of accepting authentic human values, because the consequentialist viewpoint is impersonal. According to it consequentialist rationality has no axiological limits and it can think about doing the unthinkable. The main objective of the paper is to show that human dignity has a significant position in the author’s conception of ethics of social consequences arguing for a particular theory of the value of human dignity. The author argues that the (...)
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  36. Reflections on the Value of Freedom.John T. Sanders - 1997 - In Sirkku Hellsten, Marjaana Kopperi & Olli Loukola (eds.), Taking the Liberal Challenge Seriously: Essays on Contemporary Liberalism at the Turn of the 21st Century. Ashgate. pp. 260.
    I examine the claim that the underlying importance given to freedom within a society's scheme of values varies with historical circumstance and social context (I shall sometimes call this the "relativist claim"). The point of the examination will be to attempt to determine the manner in which, and the extent to which, this claim really endangers the liberal argument, which seems to suggest that freedom is valuable everywhere and always. It will be seen that several apparent challenges may be (...)
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  37. Whose Social Values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘Death of Evidence’ Controversy.Maya J. Goldenberg - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):404-424.
    With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of (...)
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  38. Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: Between Agency and Communion. [REVIEW]van Marrewijk Marcel - 2003 - Journal of Business Ethics 44 (2-3):95-105.
    This paper provides an overview of the contemporary debate on the concepts and definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Sustainability (CS). The conclusions, based on historical perspectives, philosophical analyses, impact of changing contexts and situations and practical considerations, show that "one solution fits all"-definition for CS(R) should be abandoned, accepting various and more specific definitions matching the development, awareness and ambition levels of organizations.
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  39.  18
    Evolution of Socio-Philosophical Approaches to Mercy in the Context of Social Development.Yuriy Khodanych - 2018 - EUREKA: Social and Humanities 3:33-38.
    The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of socio-philosophical approaches to charity in the context of social development. The author analyzes the phenomenon of mercy through the prism of various philosophical traditions and views: Confucianism and the period of Antiquity, the Middle Ages (Blessed Augustine), German classical philosophy, Russian religious philosophy, Western philosophical thought of the twentieth century, neo-Marxism and post-Marxism. The author comes to the conclusion that at different periods of the socio-philosophical thought development, the (...)
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  40. Human Enhancement, Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):359-378.
    This paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the drive for hyperagency. The first derives from the work of Sandel and Hauskeller—and is concerned with the negative impact of hyperagency on social solidarity. In responding to their objection, I argue that although social solidarity is valuable, there is a danger in overestimating its value and (...)
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  41. On the Value of Faith and Faithfulness.Daniel McKaughan - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):7-29.
    There was a time when Greco-Roman culture recognized faith as an indispensable social good. More recently, however, the value of faith has been called into question, particularly in connection with religious commitment. What, if anything, is valuable about faith—in the context of ordinary human relations or as a distinctive stance people might take in relation to God? I approach this question by examining the role that faith talk played both in ancient Jewish and Christian communities and in the (...)
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  42. The Democratization of Social Media A Critical Perspective in Technology.Rangga Kala Mahaswa - 2017 - In International Conference on Religion and the Challenge of Democracy in Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Center for Religion and Science, UIN Sunan Kalijaga.
    Social Media is part of contemporary technology that is the contentious subject matter within the society. It is paradoxical when social media should provide techniques and objects that serve human being in a positive way, but at the same time, it can dehumanize human being such as alienation. The main problem is because the lack of impact of public policy, which does not involve society in the democratic sphere. The article is about the possibility of democratization social (...)
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  43. Science is Not Always “Self-Correcting” : Fact–Value Conflation and the Study of Intelligence.Nathan Cofnas - 2016 - Foundations of Science 21 (3):477-492.
    Some prominent scientists and philosophers have stated openly that moral and political considerations should influence whether we accept or promulgate scientific theories. This widespread view has significantly influenced the development, and public perception, of intelligence research. Theories related to group differences in intelligence are often rejected a priori on explicitly moral grounds. Thus the idea, frequently expressed by commentators on science, that science is “self-correcting”—that hypotheses are simply abandoned when they are undermined by empirical evidence—may not be correct in all (...)
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  44.  51
    Is There a Social Contract Between the Firm and Community: Revisiting the Philosophy of Corporate Social Responsibility.Diana-Abasi Ibanga - 2018 - International Journal of Development and Sustainability 7 (1):355-380.
    In this study, I demonstrated that there is a corporate social contract between firms and their host communities. The implication is that the idea of the social contract places corporate social responsibility (CSR) on a conditional pivot, whereby the host communities have to fulfil their own side of the contract in order to merit CSR projects. I examined the implication of the social contract for corrupt and unaccountable host communities. I based my analysis on two philosophical (...)
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  45.  22
    The World Without Money: Economic and Socio-Cultural Transformations of the Value Equivalent.Alex V. Halapsis - 2018 - Scientific Knowledge: Methodology and Technology 40 (1):126-135.
    The notion of “worth” and “value” throughout human history was only partly dependent on economic reasons. Arrangements about what is considered an equivalent value/measure of wealth are the result of complex interdependencies of economic, social and cultural factors. For thousands of years people have used precious metals as universal equivalent and main measure of wealth; full-value metal money was, in fact, only reinforced by the authority of state (ruler) evidence of presence certain amount of precious metal. (...)
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  46. Resilient Understanding: The Value of Seeing for Oneself.Matthew Slater & Jason Leddington - manuscript
    The primary aim of this paper is to argue that the value of understanding derives in part from a kind of subjective stability of belief that we call epistemic resilience. We think that this feature of understanding has been overlooked by recent work, and we think it’s especially important to the value of understanding for social cognitive agents such as us. We approach the concept of epistemic resilience via the idea of the experience of epistemic ownership and (...)
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  47. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, (...)
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  48. Constructing Commitment: Brandom's Pragmatist Take on Rule‐Following.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2012 - Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):101-126.
    According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes (...)
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  49. Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value.Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency (...)
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  50. Some Libertarian Ideas About Human Social Life.Gheorghe-Ilie Farte - 2012 - Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric 10 (2):07-19.
    The central thesis of my article is that people live a life worthy of a human being only as self-ruling members of some autarchic (or self-governing) communities. On the one hand, nobody is born as a self-ruling individual, and on the other hand, everybody can become such a person by observing progressively the non-aggression principle and, ipso facto, by behaving as a moral being. A self-ruling person has no interest in controlling her neighbors, but in mastering his own impulses, needs, (...)
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